[openssl] master update
tomas at openssl.org
tomas at openssl.org
Mon Jan 3 09:36:43 UTC 2022
The branch master has been updated
via da7db7ae6d7d1929893a58e41335c88e472fc364 (commit)
via 1dfef929e43ebfa3a7f1108317f75747f92effb6 (commit)
via c7debe811123951a60cdfe73716184ca8fdd79d2 (commit)
via 5b5342e04ff24d5138c054c1677c32729d47e938 (commit)
via ef65bbb96352650bf9ce4ff46c60c71d9f138d08 (commit)
from 9f6841e9d8964943cf5f616543750cee85c4911c (commit)
- Log -----------------------------------------------------------------
commit da7db7ae6d7d1929893a58e41335c88e472fc364
Author: Tomas Mraz <tomas at openssl.org>
Date: Wed Dec 29 09:26:58 2021 +0100
try_pkcs12(): cleanse passphrase so it is not left on the stack
Reviewed-by: Ben Kaduk <kaduk at mit.edu>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/17320)
commit 1dfef929e43ebfa3a7f1108317f75747f92effb6
Author: Tomas Mraz <tomas at openssl.org>
Date: Tue Dec 28 12:46:31 2021 +0100
try_pkcs12(): Correct handling of NUL termination of passphrases
Reviewed-by: Ben Kaduk <kaduk at mit.edu>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/17320)
commit c7debe811123951a60cdfe73716184ca8fdd79d2
Author: Tomas Mraz <tomas at openssl.org>
Date: Tue Dec 21 16:05:52 2021 +0100
Test that PEM_BUFSIZE is passed into pem_password_cb
When pem_password_cb is used from SSL_CTX, its size
parameter should be equal to PEM_BUFSIZE.
Reviewed-by: Ben Kaduk <kaduk at mit.edu>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/17320)
commit 5b5342e04ff24d5138c054c1677c32729d47e938
Author: Tomas Mraz <tomas at openssl.org>
Date: Tue Dec 21 15:58:44 2021 +0100
pem_password_cb: Clarify the documentation on passphrases
Reviewed-by: Ben Kaduk <kaduk at mit.edu>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/17320)
commit ef65bbb96352650bf9ce4ff46c60c71d9f138d08
Author: Tomas Mraz <tomas at openssl.org>
Date: Tue Dec 21 12:26:05 2021 +0100
Compensate for UI method always adding NUL termination
The UI method always adds NUL termination and we need to
compensate for that when using it from a pem_password_cb
because the buffer used in pem_password_cb does not account
for that and the returned password should be able fill the
whole buffer.
Fixes #16601
Reviewed-by: Ben Kaduk <kaduk at mit.edu>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/17320)
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
Summary of changes:
crypto/passphrase.c | 33 ++++++++++++++++++++++++---------
crypto/store/store_result.c | 19 +++++++++++++------
doc/man3/PEM_read_bio_PrivateKey.pod | 5 +++--
test/certs/leaf-encrypted.key | 30 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
test/sslapitest.c | 14 +++++++++++++-
5 files changed, 83 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 test/certs/leaf-encrypted.key
diff --git a/crypto/passphrase.c b/crypto/passphrase.c
index d61e249440..cb1bc66958 100644
--- a/crypto/passphrase.c
+++ b/crypto/passphrase.c
@@ -109,7 +109,8 @@ int ossl_pw_disable_passphrase_caching(struct ossl_passphrase_data_st *data)
* UI_METHOD processor. It differs from UI_UTIL_read_pw() like this:
*
* 1. It constructs a prompt on its own, based on |prompt_info|.
- * 2. It allocates a buffer for verification on its own.
+ * 2. It allocates a buffer for password and verification on its own
+ * to compensate for NUL terminator in UI password strings.
* 3. It raises errors.
* 4. It reports back the length of the prompted pass phrase.
*/
@@ -117,8 +118,8 @@ static int do_ui_passphrase(char *pass, size_t pass_size, size_t *pass_len,
const char *prompt_info, int verify,
const UI_METHOD *ui_method, void *ui_data)
{
- char *prompt = NULL, *vpass = NULL;
- int prompt_idx = -1, verify_idx = -1;
+ char *prompt = NULL, *ipass = NULL, *vpass = NULL;
+ int prompt_idx = -1, verify_idx = -1, res;
UI *ui = NULL;
int ret = 0;
@@ -145,9 +146,16 @@ static int do_ui_passphrase(char *pass, size_t pass_size, size_t *pass_len,
goto end;
}
+ /* Get a buffer for verification prompt */
+ ipass = OPENSSL_zalloc(pass_size + 1);
+ if (ipass == NULL) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_CRYPTO, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto end;
+ }
+
prompt_idx = UI_add_input_string(ui, prompt,
UI_INPUT_FLAG_DEFAULT_PWD,
- pass, 0, pass_size - 1) - 1;
+ ipass, 0, pass_size) - 1;
if (prompt_idx < 0) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_CRYPTO, ERR_R_UI_LIB);
goto end;
@@ -155,15 +163,15 @@ static int do_ui_passphrase(char *pass, size_t pass_size, size_t *pass_len,
if (verify) {
/* Get a buffer for verification prompt */
- vpass = OPENSSL_zalloc(pass_size);
+ vpass = OPENSSL_zalloc(pass_size + 1);
if (vpass == NULL) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_CRYPTO, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto end;
}
verify_idx = UI_add_verify_string(ui, prompt,
UI_INPUT_FLAG_DEFAULT_PWD,
- vpass, 0, pass_size - 1,
- pass) - 1;
+ vpass, 0, pass_size,
+ ipass) - 1;
if (verify_idx < 0) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_CRYPTO, ERR_R_UI_LIB);
goto end;
@@ -178,13 +186,20 @@ static int do_ui_passphrase(char *pass, size_t pass_size, size_t *pass_len,
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_CRYPTO, ERR_R_UI_LIB);
break;
default:
- *pass_len = (size_t)UI_get_result_length(ui, prompt_idx);
+ res = UI_get_result_length(ui, prompt_idx);
+ if (res < 0) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_CRYPTO, ERR_R_UI_LIB);
+ break;
+ }
+ *pass_len = (size_t)res;
+ memcpy(pass, ipass, *pass_len);
ret = 1;
break;
}
end:
- OPENSSL_free(vpass);
+ OPENSSL_clear_free(vpass, pass_size + 1);
+ OPENSSL_clear_free(ipass, pass_size + 1);
OPENSSL_free(prompt);
UI_free(ui);
return ret;
diff --git a/crypto/store/store_result.c b/crypto/store/store_result.c
index 3f21c904f4..de00f4f562 100644
--- a/crypto/store/store_result.c
+++ b/crypto/store/store_result.c
@@ -525,7 +525,7 @@ static int try_pkcs12(struct extracted_param_data_st *data, OSSL_STORE_INFO **v,
if (p12 != NULL) {
char *pass = NULL;
- char tpass[PEM_BUFSIZE];
+ char tpass[PEM_BUFSIZE + 1];
size_t tpass_len;
EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
X509 *cert = NULL;
@@ -547,17 +547,23 @@ static int try_pkcs12(struct extracted_param_data_st *data, OSSL_STORE_INFO **v,
OSSL_PARAM_END
};
- if (!ossl_pw_get_passphrase(tpass, sizeof(tpass), &tpass_len,
+ if (!ossl_pw_get_passphrase(tpass, sizeof(tpass) - 1,
+ &tpass_len,
pw_params, 0, &ctx->pwdata)) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_OSSL_STORE,
OSSL_STORE_R_PASSPHRASE_CALLBACK_ERROR);
goto p12_end;
}
pass = tpass;
- if (!PKCS12_verify_mac(p12, pass, strlen(pass))) {
+ /*
+ * ossl_pw_get_passphrase() does not NUL terminate but
+ * we must do it for PKCS12_parse()
+ */
+ pass[tpass_len] = '\0';
+ if (!PKCS12_verify_mac(p12, pass, tpass_len)) {
ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_OSSL_STORE,
OSSL_STORE_R_ERROR_VERIFYING_PKCS12_MAC,
- strlen(pass) == 0 ? "empty password" :
+ tpass_len == 0 ? "empty password" :
"maybe wrong password");
goto p12_end;
}
@@ -613,9 +619,10 @@ static int try_pkcs12(struct extracted_param_data_st *data, OSSL_STORE_INFO **v,
}
ctx->cached_info = infos;
}
+ p12_end:
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(tpass, sizeof(tpass));
+ PKCS12_free(p12);
}
- p12_end:
- PKCS12_free(p12);
*v = sk_OSSL_STORE_INFO_shift(ctx->cached_info);
}
diff --git a/doc/man3/PEM_read_bio_PrivateKey.pod b/doc/man3/PEM_read_bio_PrivateKey.pod
index a71907b170..27e7849ef7 100644
--- a/doc/man3/PEM_read_bio_PrivateKey.pod
+++ b/doc/man3/PEM_read_bio_PrivateKey.pod
@@ -335,7 +335,7 @@ I<klen> bytes at I<kstr> are used as the passphrase and I<cb> is
ignored.
If the I<cb> parameters is set to NULL and the I<u> parameter is not
-NULL then the I<u> parameter is interpreted as a null terminated string
+NULL then the I<u> parameter is interpreted as a NUL terminated string
to use as the passphrase. If both I<cb> and I<u> are NULL then the
default callback routine is used which will typically prompt for the
passphrase on the current terminal with echoing turned off.
@@ -355,7 +355,8 @@ value as the I<u> parameter passed to the PEM routine. It allows
arbitrary data to be passed to the callback by the application
(for example a window handle in a GUI application). The callback
I<must> return the number of characters in the passphrase or -1 if
-an error occurred.
+an error occurred. The passphrase can be arbitrary data; in the case where it
+is a string, it is not NUL terminated. See the L</EXAMPLES> section below.
Some implementations may need to use cryptographic algorithms during their
operation. If this is the case and I<libctx> and I<propq> parameters have been
diff --git a/test/certs/leaf-encrypted.key b/test/certs/leaf-encrypted.key
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..99a802dbe6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/test/certs/leaf-encrypted.key
@@ -0,0 +1,30 @@
+-----BEGIN ENCRYPTED PRIVATE KEY-----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+-----END ENCRYPTED PRIVATE KEY-----
diff --git a/test/sslapitest.c b/test/sslapitest.c
index 6e0da6299a..1abe120c3e 100644
--- a/test/sslapitest.c
+++ b/test/sslapitest.c
@@ -672,15 +672,27 @@ end:
return ret;
}
+static int get_password_cb(char *buf, int size, int rw_flag, void *userdata)
+{
+ static const char pass[] = "testpass";
+
+ if (!TEST_int_eq(size, PEM_BUFSIZE))
+ return -1;
+
+ memcpy(buf, pass, sizeof(pass) - 1);
+ return sizeof(pass) - 1;
+}
+
static int test_ssl_ctx_build_cert_chain(void)
{
int ret = 0;
SSL_CTX *ctx = NULL;
- char *skey = test_mk_file_path(certsdir, "leaf.key");
+ char *skey = test_mk_file_path(certsdir, "leaf-encrypted.key");
char *leaf_chain = test_mk_file_path(certsdir, "leaf-chain.pem");
if (!TEST_ptr(ctx = SSL_CTX_new_ex(libctx, NULL, TLS_server_method())))
goto end;
+ SSL_CTX_set_default_passwd_cb(ctx, get_password_cb);
/* leaf_chain contains leaf + subinterCA + interCA + rootCA */
if (!TEST_int_eq(SSL_CTX_use_certificate_chain_file(ctx, leaf_chain), 1)
|| !TEST_int_eq(SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey_file(ctx, skey,
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