[openssl-dev] sizeof (HMAC_CTX) changes with update, breaks binary compatibility
Matt Caswell
matt at openssl.org
Fri Jun 12 09:38:02 UTC 2015
On 12/06/15 09:49, Timo Teras wrote:
> On Fri, 12 Jun 2015 11:27:42 +0300
> Timo Teras <timo.teras at iki.fi> wrote:
>
>> On Thu, 11 Jun 2015 21:09:59 -0400
>> Dan McDonald <danmcd at omniti.com> wrote:
>>
>>>
>>>> On Jun 11, 2015, at 9:07 PM, Dan McDonald <danmcd at omniti.com>
>>>> wrote:
>>>>
>>>> typedef struct hmac_ctx_st {
>>>> const EVP_MD *md;
>>>> EVP_MD_CTX md_ctx;
>>>> EVP_MD_CTX i_ctx;
>>>> EVP_MD_CTX o_ctx;
>>>> unsigned int key_length;
>>>> unsigned char key[HMAC_MAX_MD_CBLOCK];
>>>> + int key_init;
>>>> } HMAC_CTX;
>>>
>>> A cheesy, but binary compatible, fix might be:
>>>
>>> typedef struct hmac_ctx_st {
>>> const EVP_MD *md;
>>> EVP_MD_CTX md_ctx;
>>> EVP_MD_CTX i_ctx;
>>> EVP_MD_CTX o_ctx;
>>> unsigned int key_init:1; /* Ewww, cheesy use of bitfields... */
>>> unsigned int key_length:31; /* but the sizeof (HMAC_CTX) doesn't
>>> change! */ unsigned char key[HMAC_MAX_MD_CBLOCK];
>>> } HMAC_CTX;
>>
>> Why is separate key_init needid? Could we not use md!=NULL or
>> key_length!=0 checks to see if the context is initialized?
>
> Seems it'd be along with the line to just use key_length instead.
>
> Something along the lines of:
Your patch does introduce a change in behaviour if key != NULL but len
== 0. Previously this would set ctx->key to all 0s, and key_init to 1,
and would then continue to use that all zero key. A subsequent
invocation of HMAC_Init_ex with key == NULL would reuse that all zero
key. Your patch would allow the first invocation, but error out on the
second.
Should it be a valid use case to allow an all zero key in this way?
Matt
>
> diff --git a/crypto/hmac/hmac.c b/crypto/hmac/hmac.c
> index 5925467..e6876bf 100644
> --- a/crypto/hmac/hmac.c
> +++ b/crypto/hmac/hmac.c
> @@ -97,7 +97,7 @@ int HMAC_Init_ex(HMAC_CTX *ctx, const void *key, int len,
> return 0;
> }
>
> - if (!ctx->key_init && key == NULL)
> + if (!ctx->key_length && key == NULL)
> return 0;
>
> if (key != NULL) {
> @@ -121,7 +121,6 @@ int HMAC_Init_ex(HMAC_CTX *ctx, const void *key, int len,
> if (ctx->key_length != HMAC_MAX_MD_CBLOCK)
> memset(&ctx->key[ctx->key_length], 0,
> HMAC_MAX_MD_CBLOCK - ctx->key_length);
> - ctx->key_init = 1;
> }
>
> if (reset) {
> @@ -159,7 +158,7 @@ int HMAC_Update(HMAC_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *data, size_t len)
> if (FIPS_mode() && !ctx->i_ctx.engine)
> return FIPS_hmac_update(ctx, data, len);
> #endif
> - if (!ctx->key_init)
> + if (!ctx->key_length)
> return 0;
>
> return EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx->md_ctx, data, len);
> @@ -174,7 +173,7 @@ int HMAC_Final(HMAC_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *md, unsigned int *len)
> return FIPS_hmac_final(ctx, md, len);
> #endif
>
> - if (!ctx->key_init)
> + if (!ctx->key_length)
> goto err;
>
> if (!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&ctx->md_ctx, buf, &i))
> @@ -195,7 +194,7 @@ void HMAC_CTX_init(HMAC_CTX *ctx)
> EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx->i_ctx);
> EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx->o_ctx);
> EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx->md_ctx);
> - ctx->key_init = 0;
> + ctx->key_length = 0;
> ctx->md = NULL;
> }
>
> @@ -207,11 +206,8 @@ int HMAC_CTX_copy(HMAC_CTX *dctx, HMAC_CTX *sctx)
> goto err;
> if (!EVP_MD_CTX_copy(&dctx->md_ctx, &sctx->md_ctx))
> goto err;
> - dctx->key_init = sctx->key_init;
> - if (sctx->key_init) {
> - memcpy(dctx->key, sctx->key, HMAC_MAX_MD_CBLOCK);
> - dctx->key_length = sctx->key_length;
> - }
> + memcpy(dctx->key, sctx->key, HMAC_MAX_MD_CBLOCK);
> + dctx->key_length = sctx->key_length;
> dctx->md = sctx->md;
> return 1;
> err:
> diff --git a/crypto/hmac/hmac.h b/crypto/hmac/hmac.h
> index f8e9f5e..b8b55cd 100644
> --- a/crypto/hmac/hmac.h
> +++ b/crypto/hmac/hmac.h
> @@ -79,7 +79,6 @@ typedef struct hmac_ctx_st {
> EVP_MD_CTX o_ctx;
> unsigned int key_length;
> unsigned char key[HMAC_MAX_MD_CBLOCK];
> - int key_init;
> } HMAC_CTX;
>
> # define HMAC_size(e) (EVP_MD_size((e)->md))
>
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