[openssl-dev] [openssl.org #4080] Malformed Client Hello messages are accepted (session_id length)

[Alessandro Ghedini via RT]

On Thu, Oct 08, 2015 at 06:14:00pm +0000, Alessandro Ghedini via RT wrote:
> On Thu, Oct 08, 2015 at 05:19:06pm +0000, Alessandro Ghedini via RT wrote:
> > On Thu, Oct 08, 2015 at 04:12:50pm +0000, Hubert Kario via RT wrote:
> > > The server does not abort connection upon receiving a Client Hello 
> > > message with malformed session_id field.
> > > 
> > > Affects 1.0.1, 1.0.2 and master.
> > > 
> > > In SSLv3 and all versions of TLS (e.g. RFC 5246), the SessionID is 
> > > defined as
> > > 
> > >       opaque SessionID<0..32>;
> > > 
> > > that means, that any SessionID longer than 32 bytes creates an 
> > > incorrectly formatted Client Hello message, and as such, should be 
> > > rejected.
> > 
> > Looking at the code in master, for non-v2 ClientHello messages the code uses
> > the PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1() function to extract the SessionID, however I
> > see no way to pass a maximum allowed length to it. I think a new function would
> > have to be added to the PACKET_* interface (I can look into this). Haven't
> > checked older branches yet.
> 
> So, it turns out the check was already performed, but this failure didn't cause
> the session to be aborted (the original PACKET was advanced anyway though, even
> is the session_id isn't actually extracted), I don't know if this was on
> purpose though.

Another thing to consider is that the client already aborts when an invalid
session_id is received in the ServerHello and sends the ILLEGAL_PARAMETER alert.

My patch doesn't actually send any alert so the check should be moved earlier
to allow an alert to be sent, if that is desired.

Cheers