[openssl-dev] [openssl.org #4301] [BUG] OpenSSL 1.1.0-pre2 fails to parse x509 certificate in DER format

Blumenthal, Uri - 0553 - MITLL uri at ll.mit.edu
Fri Feb 12 00:11:39 UTC 2016


Again, you are right, but what's the lesser evil‎ - being unable to use the new OpenSSL because it refuses to deal with the cert that some dim-witten TPM maker screwed up, or accept a certificate with a (minor) violation of DER (but not of BER)? What bad in your opinion could happen if OpenSSL allowed parsing an integer with a leading zero byte (when it shouldn't be there by DER)?

Even in crypto (and that's the area I've been working in for quite a while) there are some shades of gray, not only black and white.

P.S. My platform of choice is Mac, and Apple does not put TPM there - so I won't gain from this decision, whichever way it turns. ;-) 

Sent from my BlackBerry 10 smartphone on the Verizon Wireless 4G LTE network.
  Original Message  
From: Kurt Roeckx
Sent: Thursday, February 11, 2016 18:03‎
To: openssl-dev at openssl.org‎
Reply To: openssl-dev at openssl.org
Cc: Stephen Henson via RT; bcristi at gmail.com
Subject: Re: [openssl-dev] [openssl.org #4301] [BUG] OpenSSL 1.1.0-pre2 fails to	parse x509 certificate in DER format‎

On Thu, Feb 11, 2016 at 10:53:25PM +0000, Blumenthal, Uri - 0553 - MITLL wrote:
> Might I suggest that the right thing in this case would be to keep generation strict, but relax the rules on parsing? "Be conservative in what you send, and liberal with what you receive"?

This might be good advice for some things, but ussually not when it‎
comes to crypto.


Kurt

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