[openssl-dev] Work on a new RNG for OpenSSL

[Ben Laurie]

On 28 June 2017 at 03:41, Theodore Ts'o <tytso at mit.edu> wrote:

> On Wed, Jun 28, 2017 at 11:41:11AM +1000, Peter Waltenberg wrote:
> > And FYI. On systems not backed with hardware RNG's /dev/random is
> > extremely slow. 1-2 bytes/second is a DOS attack on it's own without any
> > other effort required.
>
> Please, stop suggesting the use /dev/random.  The right answer is
> /dev/urandom or getrandom(2).
>

a) On Linux.

b) If its the right answer, why is there a difference between /dev/random
and /dev/urandom?


>
>                                                 - Ted
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