[openssl-project] FW: [openssl/openssl] VMS: lower the entropy demand for this platform specifically (#5904)

Kurt Roeckx kurt at roeckx.be
Sun Apr 8 08:09:42 UTC 2018

On Sun, Apr 08, 2018 at 07:39:30AM +0200, Richard Levitte wrote:
> In message <20180407190250.GA27401 at roeckx.be> on Sat, 7 Apr 2018 21:02:51 +0200, Kurt Roeckx <kurt at roeckx.be> said:
> kurt> On Sat, Apr 07, 2018 at 06:49:50PM +0200, Richard Levitte wrote:
> kurt> > Hmmmm...  case 4 shouldn't pose too much problems unless you restart
> kurt> > the application more than once every second or so (for a 1 second
> kurt> > resolution).  On VMS, the system time is kept with 100 nanosecond
> kurt> > granularity...  this doesn't mean that it's actually updated every 100
> kurt> > nanosecond, but the possibility is there when VMS runs on fast enough
> kurt> > hardware (a VAX is decidedly not in that range, Alpha has a minimum
> kurt> > update rate of 1ms, Itaniums are faster than most Alphas...).  Either
> kurt> > way, the timestamp is 64 bits, it seems that then, we'd add a 64-bit
> kurt> > counter to match the 128 bit nonce requirement, do I get that right?
> kurt> 
> kurt> The requirement is not to have it 128 bit. Just that it doesn't
> kurt> repeat as often as a 128 random number. You're most likely not
> kurt> going to instantiate it 2^64 times. As long as the combination is
> kurt> unique, it should be fine.
> "The requirements" depend on where you look.  Looking at the code, or
> more specifically drbg_ctr_init in drbg_ctr.c, about line 421, I see
> this:
>         drbg->min_noncelen = drbg->min_entropylen / 2;
> So the DRBG CTR code currently requires 128 bits minimum by default,
> unconditionally.

The standard does not require this 128 bit. This 128 bit is only
required for the random value. The example even has a nonce of 32


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