RAND_DRBG

[Dr Paul Dale]

The RAND_DRBG (crypto/rand/drbg_lib) APIs are quite some mess and sit badly with the move to provider based infrastructure.
They are definitely being deprecated in master but without more, the extra layer of indirection and additional complexity generating random numbers will remain.

The option I see are:

1. Remove, rather than deprecate, RAND_DRBG in 3.0.  This is a breaking change.
2. Bypass RAND_DRBG and live with a breaking change (refer: https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/12509#pullrequestreview-455396828)
3. Leave things as they currently are in master.

The first two are breaking changes and will require an OMC vote.


Some pertinent points:

1. RAND_bytes will continue to work as is — this API is perfect for almost everyone.
2. The RAND_METHOD functionality remains — this allows wholesale replacement of OpenSSL’s RNGs if desired.
3. The name EVP_RAND is the working name and might change — this is not relevant to this discussion.
4. The RAND_DRBG APIs are unlikely to be widely used — they were introduced in 1.1.1.  The two users I know of (Akamai and NCP) are both fine with them being removed.


Thoughts anyone?


Pauli
-- 
Dr Paul Dale | Distinguished Architect | Cryptographic Foundations 
Phone +61 7 3031 7217
Oracle Australia

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