[openssl-users] (Probably) Silly Application Programming Question

Karl Denninger karl at denninger.net
Sun Jan 10 22:18:11 UTC 2016


I'm sure this is a function of my lack of understanding of the
documentation, but here it is...

I have an application that implements SSL-encrypted transport between
two or more devices.  For those that are clients without certificates
(e.g. someone connecting with a web browser) it is working fine.

However, I also want certain "things" to connect *with* a certificate. 
Toward that end I have set up a separate context for said connections,
with (simplified a bit):

                master_method = (SSL_METHOD *)
SSLv23_server_method();    /* Create instance */
                master_context = SSL_CTX_new(master_method);  /* Get SSL
context for later */

Then I set up the CA that is going to verify the client certificates
that are presented, with:

                sprintf(tmp, "%s/ssl/ca.pem", CONFIG_DIR);
                if (!SSL_CTX_load_verify_locations(master_context, tmp,
NULL)) {
                        syslog(LOG_ERR, "Cannot load verification;
MASTER will not validate");
                }

and then load the server-side certificate and key, plus tell it to
verify the peer.

                sprintf(tmp, "%s/ssl/%s", CONFIG_DIR, cert);
                if (SSL_CTX_use_certificate_file(master_context, tmp,
SSL_FILETYPE_PEM) < 0) {
                        syslog(LOG_WARNING, "Cannot load SSL Certificate
- SSL MASTER DISABLED");
                } else {
                        sprintf(tmp, "%s/ssl/%s", CONFIG_DIR, pkey);
                        if (SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey_file(master_context,
tmp, SSL_FILETYPE_PEM) < 0) {
                                syslog(LOG_WARNING, "Cannot load SSL Key
- SSL MASTER DISABLED");
                        } else {
                                SSL_CTX_set_verify(master_context,
SSL_VERIFY_PEER, verify_callback);
                                master_ssl_possible = 1;   /* Enable */
                                syslog(LOG_INFO, "SSL MASTER capability
initalized.");
                        }
                }

verify_callback just returns the preverify_ok flag back; I don't care
WHY the verification failed, just whether it did or not.  In other words
looking at the "last reason" is good enough (which I can get once the
accept fails, if it does.)

Now the client has a very similar set of code in it and when it connects
it gets the verification (with the callback set to NULL) and, provided
the certificate verifies against the CA file provided, all is well and
it works.  The client's certificate and key are loaded and the same
basic code as up above is used to load the cert and key without errors
being thrown (except, of course, that I call SSLv23_client_method() to
get the method structure.)  It also connects *and* properly verifies the
server's certificate.

However, on the server side I never get a client certificate back
despite having loaded one into the context on the client and asking for
it with SSL_VERIFY_PEER on the server.

If I INSIST on a client certificate by adding the
SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT, the connections always fail at
SSL_accept() with an error indicating that no client certificate was
provided.

If not, however, the accept succeeds, the verification callback routine
is never called (!) and when I attempt to get the peer certificate with
SSL_get_peer_certificate() so I can walk through it and check the
returned attributes (I wish to use the subjectAltName field among
others) I get back a NULL.

This has to be something stupid on my part, because I should get the
verify_callback in any event, I believe -- but I never do.

-- 
Karl Denninger
karl at denninger.net <mailto:karl at denninger.net>
/The Market Ticker/
/[S/MIME encrypted email preferred]/
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