[openssl-users] problems with s_client recognizing revoked intermediate/subordinate ca

Jakob Bohm jb-openssl at wisemo.com
Thu Mar 10 22:29:12 UTC 2016

On 10/03/2016 23:06, Viktor Dukhovni wrote:
> On Thu, Mar 10, 2016 at 10:41:28PM +0100, Jakob Bohm wrote:
>>> Any ideas what i could be doing wrong?
>> Make sure the intermediary is not included in the "CA storage"
>> (hashed or single file) used by the client.  Anything in that
>> storage is considered valid and not checked for revocation or
>> validity.
> This is changing in OpenSSL 1.1.0, and may yet change in a future
> OpenSSL 1.0.2 update.  Only the trust-anchor (top-most certificate
> from the trust-store) is not checked for expiration or revocation
> in OpenSSL 1.1.0.
> Intermediate certificates are checked, whether they are from the
> trust-store, or acquired from the peer.  To get previous behaviour,
> one needs to set the X509_V_FLAG_PARTIAL_CHAIN flag so that the
> first certificate found in the trust store becomes the trust-anchor,
> and chain construction stops there.
> Another way (in OpenSSL 1.1.0) to get an intermediate certificate
> to terminate the chain is to decorate it with explicit auxiliary
> trust EKUs via the "-trustout" and "-addtrust" options of "openssl
> x509", and then add the decorated certificate to the trust store.
This will cause a lot of grief when both OpenSSL versions
are used on the same system, (since 1.1.0 is not a drop in
replacement for OpenSSL 1.0.x), with the same default trust
store directory.

It would have been much better to use a separate directory
for untrusted chain-building intermediary certificates, just
like some other libraries do.

This is unlike the hash algorithm change between 0.9.8 and 1.0.x,
since double hashing the shared trust store solved that issue


Jakob Bohm, CIO, Partner, WiseMo A/S.  https://www.wisemo.com
Transformervej 29, 2860 Søborg, Denmark.  Direct +45 31 13 16 10
This public discussion message is non-binding and may contain errors.
WiseMo - Remote Service Management for PCs, Phones and Embedded

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