[openssl-users] Lattice Ciphers

Colony.three colony.three at protonmail.ch
Mon Dec 18 16:26:21 UTC 2017

>> Okay, FF does ECDHE not DHE/EDH.  The whole industry does that, and most are using X25519 which was developed by Dan Bernstein.
> FF [claims it does DHE/EDH](https://wiki.mozilla.org/Security/Server_Side_TLS#Intermediate_compatibility_.28default.29), but it does not actually, in practice.  It does either EC, or RSA.  I've tested it. (v52)  This does not look like an accident.
>>  The Guardian article you referenced didn’t even have the word curve in it.  My question – do you have a reference that shows Schneier says not to use elliptic curve – was not answered.
> You don't have to read the article if you don't want to.
> "Prefer conventional discrete-log-based systems over elliptic-curve systems; the latter have constants that the NSA influences when they can."
>> - The NSA actually provided the elliptic curves for NIST's standards.  And the Snowden docs now show that those curves are related.
>> No they do not show that the curves are related.  And BTW, NIST just put 25519 and 448 into their recommended list.
> By its nature (secrecy), nothing public will prove the curves are related.  But Snowden documents show that they are.  And related curves have an inherent shortcut to cracking, which any well-funded haqxor or state-sponsored entity will have access to.
> From: noloader at gmail.com
>>> Later I realized that was the best warning Google and Schmidt could
>>> give. He basically told you government has infiltrated their systems,
>>> and you should avoid their systems if security and privacy matters.
> What great PR, that it's become almost instinctive for people to ascribe benevolance to G**gle.  I believe that Schmidt was telling us his true position though.
> The one I am angry with is Mozilla, for not giving us a choice.  Chrome is a choice?!  Safari is a choice?!  IE is a choice?!  No.  They are not.
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