From joshi.sanjaya at gmail.com  Wed Mar  1 05:34:05 2017
From: joshi.sanjaya at gmail.com (Sanjaya Joshi)
Date: Wed, 1 Mar 2017 11:04:05 +0530
Subject: [openssl-users] Reg, TLS over SCTP (SOCK_SEQPACKET)
In-Reply-To: <0cd2f7cd66794e7193596f9788981521@usma1ex-dag1mb1.msg.corp.akamai.com>
References: <CANK1YipAkc3qfsTL5S6RVtymhXF1pP68bwzuLg77z8dA57OLZQ@mail.gmail.com>
 <0cd2f7cd66794e7193596f9788981521@usma1ex-dag1mb1.msg.corp.akamai.com>
Message-ID: <CANK1YirvgCnnYAWddYVDj0S9y3X0WfzMJWztvKjYwp-Xv-9uJw@mail.gmail.com>

Hi,
Thank you Salz Rich for the confirmation.
So, whether application can perform manual TLS handshakes when
SOCK_SEQPACKET is used ?

Regards,
Sanjaya

On Tue, Feb 28, 2017 at 7:03 PM, Salz, Rich <rsalz at akamai.com> wrote:

> > But these calls don't work when SOCK_SEQPACKET (one-to-many connections)
> is used. Does openssl provide any alternatives for these calls ? Or an
> application need to perform the TLS handshakes manually ?
>
> This is not supported, and there are no demo's available.
> --
> openssl-users mailing list
> To unsubscribe: https://mta.openssl.org/mailman/listinfo/openssl-users
>
-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
URL: <http://mta.openssl.org/pipermail/openssl-users/attachments/20170301/14eaffd2/attachment.html>

From sumanpaul1987 at gmail.com  Wed Mar  1 05:55:27 2017
From: sumanpaul1987 at gmail.com (Suman Paul)
Date: Tue, 28 Feb 2017 21:55:27 -0800
Subject: [openssl-users] DTLS handshake in WebRTC
Message-ID: <3A555CBE-9D06-43D3-BE3B-CA06A04575CA@gmail.com>

I have been looking at WebRTC DTLS handshake and don?t understand the logic of how it works.

My Firefox client has support for both RSA and ECDSA ciphers while my DTLS server only supports DHE-RSA-AES128-SHA and has a RSA key. I see that Firefox sends a ECDSA key during client hello. What ends up happening is that DHE-RSA-AES128-SHA is selected. I would have expected the negotiation to fail due to there being no common ciphers. 

I also verified this behavior using the OpenSSL s_server and s_client utilities. Seems to me that as long as s_server has a cert and key of the type of cipher I enforce with ?-cipher? option the negotiation succeeds irrespective of the type of key the s_client (provided that cipher is also supported by the client).

Can someone educate me as to why same kind of key is not required at both ends?

Thanks
Suman

From matt at openssl.org  Wed Mar  1 09:33:06 2017
From: matt at openssl.org (Matt Caswell)
Date: Wed, 1 Mar 2017 09:33:06 +0000
Subject: [openssl-users] DTLS handshake in WebRTC
In-Reply-To: <3A555CBE-9D06-43D3-BE3B-CA06A04575CA@gmail.com>
References: <3A555CBE-9D06-43D3-BE3B-CA06A04575CA@gmail.com>
Message-ID: <35f61a63-9038-a6f9-1dca-45bf3951f967@openssl.org>



On 01/03/17 05:55, Suman Paul wrote:
> I have been looking at WebRTC DTLS handshake and don?t understand the
> logic of how it works.
> 
> My Firefox client has support for both RSA and ECDSA ciphers while my
> DTLS server only supports DHE-RSA-AES128-SHA and has a RSA key. I see
> that Firefox sends a ECDSA key during client hello. What ends up
> happening is that DHE-RSA-AES128-SHA is selected. I would have
> expected the negotiation to fail due to there being no common
> ciphers.
> 
> I also verified this behavior using the OpenSSL s_server and s_client
> utilities. Seems to me that as long as s_server has a cert and key of
> the type of cipher I enforce with ?-cipher? option the negotiation
> succeeds irrespective of the type of key the s_client (provided that
> cipher is also supported by the client).

Your terminology is slightly confusing. No keys are sent in the
ClientHello at all. You should see a list of all the ciphersuites that
the client supports being sent in the ClientHello and then the server
should respond with a ServerHello which picks a ciphersuite from that list.

Matt

From sumanpaul1987 at gmail.com  Wed Mar  1 09:39:30 2017
From: sumanpaul1987 at gmail.com (Suman Paul)
Date: Wed, 1 Mar 2017 01:39:30 -0800
Subject: [openssl-users] DTLS handshake in WebRTC
In-Reply-To: <35f61a63-9038-a6f9-1dca-45bf3951f967@openssl.org>
References: <3A555CBE-9D06-43D3-BE3B-CA06A04575CA@gmail.com>
 <35f61a63-9038-a6f9-1dca-45bf3951f967@openssl.org>
Message-ID: <5A928572-29C4-461F-A5C6-24A6A195A98B@gmail.com>

Sorry, I meant to say when the client sends its certificate, firefox in this case, it has a key of type ECDSA. How does a key of this type work when the  cipher selected is of type RSA?

Suman
> On Mar 1, 2017, at 1:33 AM, Matt Caswell <matt at openssl.org> wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On 01/03/17 05:55, Suman Paul wrote:
>> I have been looking at WebRTC DTLS handshake and don?t understand the
>> logic of how it works.
>> 
>> My Firefox client has support for both RSA and ECDSA ciphers while my
>> DTLS server only supports DHE-RSA-AES128-SHA and has a RSA key. I see
>> that Firefox sends a ECDSA key during client hello. What ends up
>> happening is that DHE-RSA-AES128-SHA is selected. I would have
>> expected the negotiation to fail due to there being no common
>> ciphers.
>> 
>> I also verified this behavior using the OpenSSL s_server and s_client
>> utilities. Seems to me that as long as s_server has a cert and key of
>> the type of cipher I enforce with ?-cipher? option the negotiation
>> succeeds irrespective of the type of key the s_client (provided that
>> cipher is also supported by the client).
> 
> Your terminology is slightly confusing. No keys are sent in the
> ClientHello at all. You should see a list of all the ciphersuites that
> the client supports being sent in the ClientHello and then the server
> should respond with a ServerHello which picks a ciphersuite from that list.
> 
> Matt
> -- 
> openssl-users mailing list
> To unsubscribe: https://mta.openssl.org/mailman/listinfo/openssl-users <https://mta.openssl.org/mailman/listinfo/openssl-users>
-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
URL: <http://mta.openssl.org/pipermail/openssl-users/attachments/20170301/7e433ea4/attachment.html>

From matt at openssl.org  Wed Mar  1 09:51:05 2017
From: matt at openssl.org (Matt Caswell)
Date: Wed, 1 Mar 2017 09:51:05 +0000
Subject: [openssl-users] DTLS handshake in WebRTC
In-Reply-To: <5A928572-29C4-461F-A5C6-24A6A195A98B@gmail.com>
References: <3A555CBE-9D06-43D3-BE3B-CA06A04575CA@gmail.com>
 <35f61a63-9038-a6f9-1dca-45bf3951f967@openssl.org>
 <5A928572-29C4-461F-A5C6-24A6A195A98B@gmail.com>
Message-ID: <bf190a61-0a79-648f-1277-4f25e2a14476@openssl.org>



On 01/03/17 09:39, Suman Paul wrote:
> Sorry, I meant to say when the client sends its certificate, firefox in
> this case, it has a key of type ECDSA. How does a key of this type work
> when the  cipher selected is of type RSA?

Ah, right - you are using client auth. The choice of client certificate
has nothing to do with the underlying ciphersuite - it is chosen
independently. When client auth is in use you should see the server
sending a CertificateRequest message to the client. That
CertificateRequest contains within it the list of acceptable certificate
types.

Matt

> 
> Suman
>> On Mar 1, 2017, at 1:33 AM, Matt Caswell <matt at openssl.org
>> <mailto:matt at openssl.org>> wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On 01/03/17 05:55, Suman Paul wrote:
>>> I have been looking at WebRTC DTLS handshake and don?t understand the
>>> logic of how it works.
>>>
>>> My Firefox client has support for both RSA and ECDSA ciphers while my
>>> DTLS server only supports DHE-RSA-AES128-SHA and has a RSA key. I see
>>> that Firefox sends a ECDSA key during client hello. What ends up
>>> happening is that DHE-RSA-AES128-SHA is selected. I would have
>>> expected the negotiation to fail due to there being no common
>>> ciphers.
>>>
>>> I also verified this behavior using the OpenSSL s_server and s_client
>>> utilities. Seems to me that as long as s_server has a cert and key of
>>> the type of cipher I enforce with ?-cipher? option the negotiation
>>> succeeds irrespective of the type of key the s_client (provided that
>>> cipher is also supported by the client).
>>
>> Your terminology is slightly confusing. No keys are sent in the
>> ClientHello at all. You should see a list of all the ciphersuites that
>> the client supports being sent in the ClientHello and then the server
>> should respond with a ServerHello which picks a ciphersuite from that
>> list.
>>
>> Matt
>> -- 
>> openssl-users mailing list
>> To unsubscribe: https://mta.openssl.org/mailman/listinfo/openssl-users
> 
> 
> 

From rsalz at akamai.com  Wed Mar  1 12:57:11 2017
From: rsalz at akamai.com (Salz, Rich)
Date: Wed, 1 Mar 2017 12:57:11 +0000
Subject: [openssl-users] Reg, TLS over SCTP (SOCK_SEQPACKET)
In-Reply-To: <CANK1YirvgCnnYAWddYVDj0S9y3X0WfzMJWztvKjYwp-Xv-9uJw@mail.gmail.com>
References: <CANK1YipAkc3qfsTL5S6RVtymhXF1pP68bwzuLg77z8dA57OLZQ@mail.gmail.com>
 <0cd2f7cd66794e7193596f9788981521@usma1ex-dag1mb1.msg.corp.akamai.com>
 <CANK1YirvgCnnYAWddYVDj0S9y3X0WfzMJWztvKjYwp-Xv-9uJw@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <b2b3a6b757654afd89008f2becb1021d@usma1ex-dag1mb1.msg.corp.akamai.com>

> So, whether application can perform manual TLS handshakes when SOCK_SEQPACKET is used ?

I said it is not supported by openssl.

I doubt it can be made to work, since TLS handshake wants one client and one server.

From Michael.Tuexen at lurchi.franken.de  Wed Mar  1 13:29:41 2017
From: Michael.Tuexen at lurchi.franken.de (Michael Tuexen)
Date: Wed, 1 Mar 2017 14:29:41 +0100
Subject: [openssl-users] Reg, TLS over SCTP (SOCK_SEQPACKET)
In-Reply-To: <CANK1YirvgCnnYAWddYVDj0S9y3X0WfzMJWztvKjYwp-Xv-9uJw@mail.gmail.com>
References: <CANK1YipAkc3qfsTL5S6RVtymhXF1pP68bwzuLg77z8dA57OLZQ@mail.gmail.com>
 <0cd2f7cd66794e7193596f9788981521@usma1ex-dag1mb1.msg.corp.akamai.com>
 <CANK1YirvgCnnYAWddYVDj0S9y3X0WfzMJWztvKjYwp-Xv-9uJw@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <26E0FB9A-4315-41EF-8345-53DDF4A75474@lurchi.franken.de>

> On 1 Mar 2017, at 06:34, Sanjaya Joshi <joshi.sanjaya at gmail.com> wrote:
> 
> Hi,
> Thank you Salz Rich for the confirmation.
> So, whether application can perform manual TLS handshakes when SOCK_SEQPACKET is used ?
I this the SOCK_SEQPACKET model doesn't fit well to the way the openssl code is layed out.
They basically want a one-to-one relation between a bio (for example a socket bio) and
a TLS connection. So there is no muxing/demuxing ongoing.

I'm wondering why you are sticking to the 1-to-many style sockets and why you are not
considering DTLS over SCTP instead of TLS over SCTP. DTLS over SCTP using one-to-one
style sockets (SOCK_STREAM) is supported by OpenSSL on Linux and FreeBSD.

Best regards
Michael 
> 
> Regards,
> Sanjaya
> 
> On Tue, Feb 28, 2017 at 7:03 PM, Salz, Rich <rsalz at akamai.com> wrote:
> > But these calls don't work when SOCK_SEQPACKET (one-to-many connections) is used. Does openssl provide any alternatives for these calls ? Or an application need to perform the TLS handshakes manually ?
> 
> This is not supported, and there are no demo's available.
> --
> openssl-users mailing list
> To unsubscribe: https://mta.openssl.org/mailman/listinfo/openssl-users
> 
> -- 
> openssl-users mailing list
> To unsubscribe: https://mta.openssl.org/mailman/listinfo/openssl-users


From openssl-users at dukhovni.org  Wed Mar  1 17:26:00 2017
From: openssl-users at dukhovni.org (Viktor Dukhovni)
Date: Wed, 1 Mar 2017 12:26:00 -0500
Subject: [openssl-users] [openssl-dev] [Bug,
 maybe] [master] bin/* no longer find their libraries if installed
 in non-default locations
In-Reply-To: <20170301161324.SoyQL%steffen@sdaoden.eu>
References: <20170301161324.SoyQL%steffen@sdaoden.eu>
Message-ID: <931B809C-BBAB-4020-8FDB-09F46E49D12B@dukhovni.org>


> On Mar 1, 2017, at 11:13 AM, Steffen Nurpmeso <steffen at sdaoden.eu> wrote:
> 
>  $ ldd /home/steffen/usr/opt/.ssl-1.1.0/bin/openssl
>  ...
>  libssl.so.1.1 => not found
>  libcrypto.so.1.1 => not found
> 
> This is new behaviour, until now the installation was always
> self-contained when configured via
> 
>  ./config --prefix=$(MYPREFIX) zlib-dynamic no-hw shared

I sure hope that "$()" was in fact "${}", the former only
works in Makefiles, and means something quite different
in POSIX shells.

You need an "RPATH" setting in the linker flags for the shared
libraries to be found in in $PREFIX/lib.  Perhaps:

    ./config --prefix="${MYPREFIX}" -R "${MYPREFIX}/lib" ...

Or "-rpath ..." or "-Wl,-R,..." ...

-- 
	Viktor.


From openssl-users at dukhovni.org  Wed Mar  1 17:44:18 2017
From: openssl-users at dukhovni.org (Viktor Dukhovni)
Date: Wed, 1 Mar 2017 12:44:18 -0500
Subject: [openssl-users] [openssl-dev] [Bug] apps: -CApath does not fail
 for non-directories (on Linux)
In-Reply-To: <20170301164640.55lz8%steffen@sdaoden.eu>
References: <20170301154318.U0FZ5%steffen@sdaoden.eu>
 <9f399a4828e4479d895aad00cd832ad1@usma1ex-dag1mb1.msg.corp.akamai.com>
 <20170301164640.55lz8%steffen@sdaoden.eu>
Message-ID: <B553A79B-E7AF-40C6-9270-295D16BC9AC7@dukhovni.org>


> On Mar 1, 2017, at 11:46 AM, Steffen Nurpmeso <steffen at sdaoden.eu> wrote:
> 
> No, not that i know.  But this -- thanks -- lead me to the
> following, which is the KISS that you want?
> Ciao!
> 
> diff --git a/apps/apps.c b/apps/apps.c
> index 216bc797d..3afbbaef2 100644
> --- a/apps/apps.c
> +++ b/apps/apps.c
> @@ -1221,7 +1221,8 @@ X509_STORE *setup_verify(const char *CAfile, const char *CApath, int noCAfile, i
>         if (lookup == NULL)
>             goto end;
>         if (CApath) {
> -            if (!X509_LOOKUP_add_dir(lookup, CApath, X509_FILETYPE_PEM)) {
> +            if (!app_isdir(CApath) ||
> +                    !X509_LOOKUP_add_dir(lookup, CApath, X509_FILETYPE_PEM)) {
>                 BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error loading directory %s\n", CApath);
>                 goto end;
>             }

We may need to be careful.  With OpenSSL <= 1.0.2, one way to suppress the
built-in default CApath was to set "-CApath" to a non-existent directory.
Users may have scripts relying on this behaviour.  Now with 1.1.0 on some
platforms OpenSSL already rejects non-existent directories, and we also
provide a "-no-CAfile" option, but this change will extend the change to
what is likely our most popular platform.

So it will at least deserve a comment in the "NEWS"/"CHANGES" files.  

-- 
	Viktor.


From jb-openssl at wisemo.com  Wed Mar  1 18:05:27 2017
From: jb-openssl at wisemo.com (Jakob Bohm)
Date: Wed, 1 Mar 2017 19:05:27 +0100
Subject: [openssl-users] [openssl-dev] [Bug] apps: -CApath does not fail
 for non-directories (on Linux)
In-Reply-To: <B553A79B-E7AF-40C6-9270-295D16BC9AC7@dukhovni.org>
References: <20170301154318.U0FZ5%steffen@sdaoden.eu>
 <9f399a4828e4479d895aad00cd832ad1@usma1ex-dag1mb1.msg.corp.akamai.com>
 <20170301164640.55lz8%steffen@sdaoden.eu>
 <B553A79B-E7AF-40C6-9270-295D16BC9AC7@dukhovni.org>
Message-ID: <40f23502-7774-3a5a-6af0-f90f13843a9e@wisemo.com>

On 01/03/2017 18:44, Viktor Dukhovni wrote:
>> On Mar 1, 2017, at 11:46 AM, Steffen Nurpmeso <steffen at sdaoden.eu> wrote:
>>
>> No, not that i know.  But this -- thanks -- lead me to the
>> following, which is the KISS that you want?
>> Ciao!
>>
>> diff --git a/apps/apps.c b/apps/apps.c
>> index 216bc797d..3afbbaef2 100644
>> --- a/apps/apps.c
>> +++ b/apps/apps.c
>> @@ -1221,7 +1221,8 @@ X509_STORE *setup_verify(const char *CAfile, const char *CApath, int noCAfile, i
>>          if (lookup == NULL)
>>              goto end;
>>          if (CApath) {
>> -            if (!X509_LOOKUP_add_dir(lookup, CApath, X509_FILETYPE_PEM)) {
>> +            if (!app_isdir(CApath) ||
>> +                    !X509_LOOKUP_add_dir(lookup, CApath, X509_FILETYPE_PEM)) {
>>                  BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error loading directory %s\n", CApath);
>>                  goto end;
>>              }
Shouldn't this be in X509_LOOKUP_add_dir() itself?
> We may need to be careful.  With OpenSSL <= 1.0.2, one way to suppress the
> built-in default CApath was to set "-CApath" to a non-existent directory.
> Users may have scripts relying on this behaviour.  Now with 1.1.0 on some
> platforms OpenSSL already rejects non-existent directories, and we also
> provide a "-no-CAfile" option, but this change will extend the change to
> what is likely our most popular platform.
Since compatibility is important, there should be a list of values that
are equivalent to "-no-CApath" for 3rd party apps and scripts that haven't
implemented such an option.  As a minimum I would suggest: NULL (null 
string
pointer), "" (empty string), " " (single space) "X" (single letter uppercase
X with no path) "-" (single dash since stdin/stdout cannot be a path) and
anything that maps to the "/dev/null" device of the platform.
> So it will at least deserve a comment in the "NEWS"/"CHANGES" files.
>
Another case to consider are chroot daemons that call X509_LOOKUP_add_dir()
before doing a chroot() to the tree containing that directory.  Or maybe
that is why you want to only do the check in the openssl command line 
program,
because it is known not to do that.  Anyway, users of such daemons can work
around it by having an empty or arbitrary directory with that name in the
old root, provided they are told to do so.


Enjoy

Jakob
-- 
Jakob Bohm, CIO, Partner, WiseMo A/S.  https://www.wisemo.com
Transformervej 29, 2860 S?borg, Denmark.  Direct +45 31 13 16 10
This public discussion message is non-binding and may contain errors.
WiseMo - Remote Service Management for PCs, Phones and Embedded


From sumanpaul1987 at gmail.com  Wed Mar  1 23:52:06 2017
From: sumanpaul1987 at gmail.com (Suman Paul)
Date: Wed, 1 Mar 2017 15:52:06 -0800
Subject: [openssl-users] DTLS handshake in WebRTC
In-Reply-To: <bf190a61-0a79-648f-1277-4f25e2a14476@openssl.org>
References: <3A555CBE-9D06-43D3-BE3B-CA06A04575CA@gmail.com>
 <35f61a63-9038-a6f9-1dca-45bf3951f967@openssl.org>
 <5A928572-29C4-461F-A5C6-24A6A195A98B@gmail.com>
 <bf190a61-0a79-648f-1277-4f25e2a14476@openssl.org>
Message-ID: <FCBA4E63-B78E-4CC3-BE45-842DCC03FE9C@gmail.com>

What I have seen in my trials with s_server and s_client is that if run s_server with an ECDSA cert/key and I specify one RSA and one ECDSA cipher with the -cipher option, then s_client can only connect to it using the ECDSA cipher. I have been unsuccessful in connecting to this server using a RSA cipher. RSA cipher fail shows up at the s_server as 

140480482967256:error:1408A0C1:SSL routines:ssl3_get_client_hello:no shared cipher:s3_srvr.c:1417:

Your thoughts on this?

Suman

> On Mar 1, 2017, at 1:51 AM, Matt Caswell <matt at openssl.org> wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On 01/03/17 09:39, Suman Paul wrote:
>> Sorry, I meant to say when the client sends its certificate, firefox in
>> this case, it has a key of type ECDSA. How does a key of this type work
>> when the  cipher selected is of type RSA?
> 
> Ah, right - you are using client auth. The choice of client certificate
> has nothing to do with the underlying ciphersuite - it is chosen
> independently. When client auth is in use you should see the server
> sending a CertificateRequest message to the client. That
> CertificateRequest contains within it the list of acceptable certificate
> types.
> 
> Matt
> 
>> 
>> Suman
>>> On Mar 1, 2017, at 1:33 AM, Matt Caswell <matt at openssl.org <mailto:matt at openssl.org>
>>> <mailto:matt at openssl.org <mailto:matt at openssl.org>>> wrote:
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> On 01/03/17 05:55, Suman Paul wrote:
>>>> I have been looking at WebRTC DTLS handshake and don?t understand the
>>>> logic of how it works.
>>>> 
>>>> My Firefox client has support for both RSA and ECDSA ciphers while my
>>>> DTLS server only supports DHE-RSA-AES128-SHA and has a RSA key. I see
>>>> that Firefox sends a ECDSA key during client hello. What ends up
>>>> happening is that DHE-RSA-AES128-SHA is selected. I would have
>>>> expected the negotiation to fail due to there being no common
>>>> ciphers.
>>>> 
>>>> I also verified this behavior using the OpenSSL s_server and s_client
>>>> utilities. Seems to me that as long as s_server has a cert and key of
>>>> the type of cipher I enforce with ?-cipher? option the negotiation
>>>> succeeds irrespective of the type of key the s_client (provided that
>>>> cipher is also supported by the client).
>>> 
>>> Your terminology is slightly confusing. No keys are sent in the
>>> ClientHello at all. You should see a list of all the ciphersuites that
>>> the client supports being sent in the ClientHello and then the server
>>> should respond with a ServerHello which picks a ciphersuite from that
>>> list.
>>> 
>>> Matt
>>> -- 
>>> openssl-users mailing list
>>> To unsubscribe: https://mta.openssl.org/mailman/listinfo/openssl-users
>> 
>> 
>> 
> -- 
> openssl-users mailing list
> To unsubscribe: https://mta.openssl.org/mailman/listinfo/openssl-users <https://mta.openssl.org/mailman/listinfo/openssl-users>
-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
URL: <http://mta.openssl.org/pipermail/openssl-users/attachments/20170301/cc9c0990/attachment-0001.html>

From matt at openssl.org  Thu Mar  2 00:01:02 2017
From: matt at openssl.org (Matt Caswell)
Date: Thu, 2 Mar 2017 00:01:02 +0000
Subject: [openssl-users] DTLS handshake in WebRTC
In-Reply-To: <FCBA4E63-B78E-4CC3-BE45-842DCC03FE9C@gmail.com>
References: <3A555CBE-9D06-43D3-BE3B-CA06A04575CA@gmail.com>
 <35f61a63-9038-a6f9-1dca-45bf3951f967@openssl.org>
 <5A928572-29C4-461F-A5C6-24A6A195A98B@gmail.com>
 <bf190a61-0a79-648f-1277-4f25e2a14476@openssl.org>
 <FCBA4E63-B78E-4CC3-BE45-842DCC03FE9C@gmail.com>
Message-ID: <5dc5a73f-817d-735d-4745-b51a1e1d32f8@openssl.org>



On 01/03/17 23:52, Suman Paul wrote:
> What I have seen in my trials with s_server and s_client is that if run
> s_server with an ECDSA cert/key and I specify one RSA and one ECDSA
> cipher with the -cipher option, then s_client can only connect to it
> using the ECDSA cipher. I have been unsuccessful in connecting to this
> server using a RSA cipher. RSA cipher fail shows up at the s_server as 
> 
> 140480482967256:error:1408A0C1:SSL routines:ssl3_get_client_hello:no
> shared cipher:s3_srvr.c:1417:
> 
> Your thoughts on this?

Yes, this is expected. The ciphersuite selection is limited by the
available server certificate(s). That is different to the client
certificate which is independent of the ciphersuite.

Matt


> 
> Suman
> 
>> On Mar 1, 2017, at 1:51 AM, Matt Caswell <matt at openssl.org
>> <mailto:matt at openssl.org>> wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On 01/03/17 09:39, Suman Paul wrote:
>>> Sorry, I meant to say when the client sends its certificate, firefox in
>>> this case, it has a key of type ECDSA. How does a key of this type work
>>> when the  cipher selected is of type RSA?
>>
>> Ah, right - you are using client auth. The choice of client certificate
>> has nothing to do with the underlying ciphersuite - it is chosen
>> independently. When client auth is in use you should see the server
>> sending a CertificateRequest message to the client. That
>> CertificateRequest contains within it the list of acceptable certificate
>> types.
>>
>> Matt
>>
>>>
>>> Suman
>>>> On Mar 1, 2017, at 1:33 AM, Matt Caswell <matt at openssl.org
>>>> <mailto:matt at openssl.org>
>>>> <mailto:matt at openssl.org>> wrote:
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> On 01/03/17 05:55, Suman Paul wrote:
>>>>> I have been looking at WebRTC DTLS handshake and don?t understand the
>>>>> logic of how it works.
>>>>>
>>>>> My Firefox client has support for both RSA and ECDSA ciphers while my
>>>>> DTLS server only supports DHE-RSA-AES128-SHA and has a RSA key. I see
>>>>> that Firefox sends a ECDSA key during client hello. What ends up
>>>>> happening is that DHE-RSA-AES128-SHA is selected. I would have
>>>>> expected the negotiation to fail due to there being no common
>>>>> ciphers.
>>>>>
>>>>> I also verified this behavior using the OpenSSL s_server and s_client
>>>>> utilities. Seems to me that as long as s_server has a cert and key of
>>>>> the type of cipher I enforce with ?-cipher? option the negotiation
>>>>> succeeds irrespective of the type of key the s_client (provided that
>>>>> cipher is also supported by the client).
>>>>
>>>> Your terminology is slightly confusing. No keys are sent in the
>>>> ClientHello at all. You should see a list of all the ciphersuites that
>>>> the client supports being sent in the ClientHello and then the server
>>>> should respond with a ServerHello which picks a ciphersuite from that
>>>> list.
>>>>
>>>> Matt
>>>> -- 
>>>> openssl-users mailing list
>>>> To unsubscribe: https://mta.openssl.org/mailman/listinfo/openssl-users
>>>
>>>
>>>
>> -- 
>> openssl-users mailing list
>> To unsubscribe: https://mta.openssl.org/mailman/listinfo/openssl-users
> 
> 
> 

From MrUmunhum at CruzIO.com  Thu Mar  2 00:47:44 2017
From: MrUmunhum at CruzIO.com (william estrada)
Date: Wed, 1 Mar 2017 16:47:44 -0800
Subject: [openssl-users] error making Private RSA
Message-ID: <ad2b27e31e5929629c67b54c17719ca6.squirrel@cruziomail.cruzio.com>

Hello group,
I am attempting to create a Private RSA structure with the following code:
 BIO*
  PEM = BIO_new_mem_buf( Key, Key_Len );

  if( Type == 1 )
     PEM_write_bio_RSAPrivateKey( PEM, RSA, NULL, NULL, 0, NULL, NULL );
  else
     PEM_write_bio_RSAPublicKey(  PEM, RSA );

  if( RSA_check_key( RSA ) != 1 )  {
    printf( RED "Make %s RSA Failed\n" OFF, Type==1?"Private":"Public" );
    int Error  = ERR_get_error();
    char *MSG  = ERR_error_string( Error, NULL);
    printf( "%s\n", MSG );  }

and I get this error:
Make Private RSA Failed
error:2007507E:lib(32):func(117):reason(126)
Can anyone tell me what this error is and how to fix it?


-- 
William Estrada
Mt Umunhum, CA, USA, Earth
HTTP:// Mt-Umunhum-Wireless.net
Skype: MrUmunhum


From matt at openssl.org  Thu Mar  2 09:36:55 2017
From: matt at openssl.org (Matt Caswell)
Date: Thu, 2 Mar 2017 09:36:55 +0000
Subject: [openssl-users] error making Private RSA
In-Reply-To: <ad2b27e31e5929629c67b54c17719ca6.squirrel@cruziomail.cruzio.com>
References: <ad2b27e31e5929629c67b54c17719ca6.squirrel@cruziomail.cruzio.com>
Message-ID: <b87733b8-ff07-4f8b-b877-42b398dbfd3e@openssl.org>



On 02/03/17 00:47, william estrada wrote:
> Hello group,
> I am attempting to create a Private RSA structure with the following code:
>  BIO*
>   PEM = BIO_new_mem_buf( Key, Key_Len );
> 
>   if( Type == 1 )
>      PEM_write_bio_RSAPrivateKey( PEM, RSA, NULL, NULL, 0, NULL, NULL );
>   else
>      PEM_write_bio_RSAPublicKey(  PEM, RSA );
> 
>   if( RSA_check_key( RSA ) != 1 )  {
>     printf( RED "Make %s RSA Failed\n" OFF, Type==1?"Private":"Public" );
>     int Error  = ERR_get_error();
>     char *MSG  = ERR_error_string( Error, NULL);
>     printf( "%s\n", MSG );  }
> 
> and I get this error:
> Make Private RSA Failed
> error:2007507E:lib(32):func(117):reason(126)
> Can anyone tell me what this error is and how to fix it?
> 
> 

$ openssl errstr 2007507E
error:2007507E:BIO routines:mem_write:write to read only BIO

BIO_new_mem_buf() gives you a read-only BIO. You probably want
BIO_new(BIO_s_mem()) instead.

See:

https://www.openssl.org/docs/man1.1.0/crypto/BIO_s_mem.html

Although, that error is coming from one of the PEM_write_bio_* calls
(which you are not checking the error return code of), so it doesn't
explain why RSA_check_key() fails. You don't show how you generate the
RSA structure to start with, so I guess you're not generating it properly.

Matt

From rsalz at akamai.com  Thu Mar  2 13:55:14 2017
From: rsalz at akamai.com (Salz, Rich)
Date: Thu, 2 Mar 2017 13:55:14 +0000
Subject: [openssl-users] error making Private RSA
In-Reply-To: <ad2b27e31e5929629c67b54c17719ca6.squirrel@cruziomail.cruzio.com>
References: <ad2b27e31e5929629c67b54c17719ca6.squirrel@cruziomail.cruzio.com>
Message-ID: <bddc6ed2f44e45c2b539d57dc5c00beb@usma1ex-dag1mb1.msg.corp.akamai.com>

What version of openssl?  I'm guessing 1.0.2.

Put this line inyour code
	ERR_load_ERR_strings();
And youll get a more informative message.	

My main guess is that your allocation for the PEM buffer is too small -- is key/key_len pointing to a static buffer? 

From sumanpaul1987 at gmail.com  Thu Mar  2 19:50:08 2017
From: sumanpaul1987 at gmail.com (Suman Paul)
Date: Thu, 2 Mar 2017 11:50:08 -0800
Subject: [openssl-users] DTLS handshake in WebRTC
In-Reply-To: <5dc5a73f-817d-735d-4745-b51a1e1d32f8@openssl.org>
References: <3A555CBE-9D06-43D3-BE3B-CA06A04575CA@gmail.com>
 <35f61a63-9038-a6f9-1dca-45bf3951f967@openssl.org>
 <5A928572-29C4-461F-A5C6-24A6A195A98B@gmail.com>
 <bf190a61-0a79-648f-1277-4f25e2a14476@openssl.org>
 <FCBA4E63-B78E-4CC3-BE45-842DCC03FE9C@gmail.com>
 <5dc5a73f-817d-735d-4745-b51a1e1d32f8@openssl.org>
Message-ID: <94D48CD5-5E87-4A77-8AC8-786299E5B00E@gmail.com>

The last bit of information makes my life a little hard.

In DTLS-SRTP usage, the DTLS server must present it's server fingerprint in SDP before the client support ciphersuites are known, how can a DTLS server support clients that may support only RSA or ECDSA?

Suman

> On Mar 1, 2017, at 4:01 PM, Matt Caswell <matt at openssl.org> wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On 01/03/17 23:52, Suman Paul wrote:
>> What I have seen in my trials with s_server and s_client is that if run
>> s_server with an ECDSA cert/key and I specify one RSA and one ECDSA
>> cipher with the -cipher option, then s_client can only connect to it
>> using the ECDSA cipher. I have been unsuccessful in connecting to this
>> server using a RSA cipher. RSA cipher fail shows up at the s_server as 
>> 
>> 140480482967256:error:1408A0C1:SSL routines:ssl3_get_client_hello:no
>> shared cipher:s3_srvr.c:1417:
>> 
>> Your thoughts on this?
> 
> Yes, this is expected. The ciphersuite selection is limited by the
> available server certificate(s). That is different to the client
> certificate which is independent of the ciphersuite.
> 
> Matt
> 
> 
>> 
>> Suman
>> 
>>> On Mar 1, 2017, at 1:51 AM, Matt Caswell <matt at openssl.org <mailto:matt at openssl.org>
>>> <mailto:matt at openssl.org <mailto:matt at openssl.org>>> wrote:
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> On 01/03/17 09:39, Suman Paul wrote:
>>>> Sorry, I meant to say when the client sends its certificate, firefox in
>>>> this case, it has a key of type ECDSA. How does a key of this type work
>>>> when the  cipher selected is of type RSA?
>>> 
>>> Ah, right - you are using client auth. The choice of client certificate
>>> has nothing to do with the underlying ciphersuite - it is chosen
>>> independently. When client auth is in use you should see the server
>>> sending a CertificateRequest message to the client. That
>>> CertificateRequest contains within it the list of acceptable certificate
>>> types.
>>> 
>>> Matt
>>> 
>>>> 
>>>> Suman
>>>>> On Mar 1, 2017, at 1:33 AM, Matt Caswell <matt at openssl.org <mailto:matt at openssl.org>
>>>>> <mailto:matt at openssl.org <mailto:matt at openssl.org>>
>>>>> <mailto:matt at openssl.org>> wrote:
>>>>> 
>>>>> 
>>>>> 
>>>>> On 01/03/17 05:55, Suman Paul wrote:
>>>>>> I have been looking at WebRTC DTLS handshake and don?t understand the
>>>>>> logic of how it works.
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> My Firefox client has support for both RSA and ECDSA ciphers while my
>>>>>> DTLS server only supports DHE-RSA-AES128-SHA and has a RSA key. I see
>>>>>> that Firefox sends a ECDSA key during client hello. What ends up
>>>>>> happening is that DHE-RSA-AES128-SHA is selected. I would have
>>>>>> expected the negotiation to fail due to there being no common
>>>>>> ciphers.
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> I also verified this behavior using the OpenSSL s_server and s_client
>>>>>> utilities. Seems to me that as long as s_server has a cert and key of
>>>>>> the type of cipher I enforce with ?-cipher? option the negotiation
>>>>>> succeeds irrespective of the type of key the s_client (provided that
>>>>>> cipher is also supported by the client).
>>>>> 
>>>>> Your terminology is slightly confusing. No keys are sent in the
>>>>> ClientHello at all. You should see a list of all the ciphersuites that
>>>>> the client supports being sent in the ClientHello and then the server
>>>>> should respond with a ServerHello which picks a ciphersuite from that
>>>>> list.
>>>>> 
>>>>> Matt
>>>>> -- 
>>>>> openssl-users mailing list
>>>>> To unsubscribe: https://mta.openssl.org/mailman/listinfo/openssl-users
>>>> 
>>>> 
>>>> 
>>> -- 
>>> openssl-users mailing list
>>> To unsubscribe: https://mta.openssl.org/mailman/listinfo/openssl-users
>> 
>> 
>> 
> -- 
> openssl-users mailing list
> To unsubscribe: https://mta.openssl.org/mailman/listinfo/openssl-users <https://mta.openssl.org/mailman/listinfo/openssl-users>
-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
URL: <http://mta.openssl.org/pipermail/openssl-users/attachments/20170302/5e233592/attachment-0001.html>

From noloader at gmail.com  Sun Mar  5 03:41:19 2017
From: noloader at gmail.com (Jeffrey Walton)
Date: Sat, 4 Mar 2017 22:41:19 -0500
Subject: [openssl-users] speed test rdrand
Message-ID: <CAH8yC8=ME0CR43RtDoF7MuVgoaCvsx8Eb2ZYc0hKr0i1QgeQBg@mail.gmail.com>

Hi Everyone,

Is it possible to speed test RDRAND and RDSEED generators? If so, then
how do we do it?

$ openssl speed -engine rdrand
engine "rdrand" set.
Doing md4 for 3s on 16 size blocks: 8339773 md4's in 3.00s
Doing md4 for 3s on 64 size blocks: 6616610 md4's in 3.00s
Doing md4 for 3s on 256 size blocks: 4132167 md4's in 3.00s
...

Jeff

From MrUmunhum at CruzIO.com  Sun Mar  5 06:10:17 2017
From: MrUmunhum at CruzIO.com (william estrada)
Date: Sat, 4 Mar 2017 22:10:17 -0800
Subject: [openssl-users] error making Private RSA
Message-ID: <068d3db176da5818af44330510b9655d.squirrel@cruziomail.cruzio.com>

<p>Not sure this is the proper way to use this mailing system?

My source can be viewed at: mt-umunhum-wireless.net/Sources/rsa/rsa.c
What version of openssl?  I'm guessing 1.0.2.

Put this line inyour code
	ERR_load_ERR_strings();
And youll get a more informative message.

I'm using: openssl version
OpenSSL 1.0.1t  3 May 2016


My main guess is that your allocation for the PEM buffer is too small --
is key/key_len pointing to a static buffer?



From MrUmunhum at CruzIO.com  Sun Mar  5 18:12:00 2017
From: MrUmunhum at CruzIO.com (william estrada)
Date: Sun, 5 Mar 2017 10:12:00 -0800
Subject: [openssl-users] I'm not getting an Emails after posting
Message-ID: <84649d4c71609ed3f22e2d4ba7dbb4bb.squirrel@cruziomail.cruzio.com>

How do I set up to receive Email notices for my post here?


-- 
William Estrada
Mt Umunhum, CA, USA, Earth
HTTP:// Mt-Umunhum-Wireless.net
Skype: MrUmunhum


From MrUmunhum at CruzIO.com  Sun Mar  5 23:11:44 2017
From: MrUmunhum at CruzIO.com (william estrada)
Date: Sun, 5 Mar 2017 15:11:44 -0800
Subject: [openssl-users] I'm not getting an Emails after posting
In-Reply-To: <84649d4c71609ed3f22e2d4ba7dbb4bb.squirrel@cruziomail.cruzio.com>
References: <84649d4c71609ed3f22e2d4ba7dbb4bb.squirrel@cruziomail.cruzio.com>
Message-ID: <d903d67d03c8b8ee19938782d5d00c6b.squirrel@cruziomail.cruzio.com>

It's my SPAM filtering, somehow this list go on it.

> How do I set up to receive Email notices for my post here?
>
>
> --
> William Estrada
> Mt Umunhum, CA, USA, Earth
> HTTP:// Mt-Umunhum-Wireless.net
> Skype: MrUmunhum
>
> --
> openssl-users mailing list
> To unsubscribe: https://mta.openssl.org/mailman/listinfo/openssl-users
>
>


-- 
William Estrada
Mt Umunhum, CA, USA, Earth
HTTP:// Mt-Umunhum-Wireless.net
Skype: MrUmunhum


From traiano at gmail.com  Tue Mar  7 07:21:54 2017
From: traiano at gmail.com (Traiano Welcome)
Date: Tue, 7 Mar 2017 11:21:54 +0400
Subject: [openssl-users] Non-self-signed SSL certificates for private hosted
	DNS zones
Message-ID: <CAFKCRVK-REt8gSfgUUV7+FQD3yCwSq_9d7gaPzuGbLppowNxcw@mail.gmail.com>

Hi List

I have a private DNS zone hosted on AWS route 53, only resolvable from
within some specific VPCs.
It appears some applications require an SSL certificate associated with the
private DNS zone, and this SSL certificate should come from a trusted,
external certificate provider (cannot be self-signed).

My questions are:

a) Is this a known use-case? i.e private dns zones requiring
non-self-signed certificates?
b) Since the DNS zone is not resolvable on the public internet, how would
the certificate validation process occur for applications communicating
with systems in the private zone ?
c) Do SSL certificate providers issue trusted SSL certificates  for private
DNS zones?

Many thanks in advance for any advice here!
Traiano
-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
URL: <http://mta.openssl.org/pipermail/openssl-users/attachments/20170307/abae1975/attachment.html>

From yu.chen.surf at gmail.com  Tue Mar  7 10:28:47 2017
From: yu.chen.surf at gmail.com (Yu Chen)
Date: Tue, 7 Mar 2017 18:28:47 +0800
Subject: [openssl-users] How to compile the static binary version of openssl
Message-ID: <CADjb_WQCOtYZgiPJshccdPNMiH+0q2+umgoEExyP4wn-ONmpYg@mail.gmail.com>

Hi,
Currently I'm trying to get a static binary of openssl command via
compilng the openssl-1.1.0e.
I've tried to configure with no-shared, but the bin/openssl is still
dynamic linked.
Thus I added -static to the end of CFLAG, it just can not get compiled.
Anyone know how to get a static openssl command? thanks in advance.

From openssl-users at dukhovni.org  Tue Mar  7 15:08:09 2017
From: openssl-users at dukhovni.org (Viktor Dukhovni)
Date: Tue, 7 Mar 2017 10:08:09 -0500
Subject: [openssl-users] How to compile the static binary version of
 openssl
In-Reply-To: <CADjb_WQCOtYZgiPJshccdPNMiH+0q2+umgoEExyP4wn-ONmpYg@mail.gmail.com>
References: <CADjb_WQCOtYZgiPJshccdPNMiH+0q2+umgoEExyP4wn-ONmpYg@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <2B126345-F93B-4818-936C-38591AF2E0F6@dukhovni.org>


> On Mar 7, 2017, at 5:28 AM, Yu Chen <yu.chen.surf at gmail.com> wrote:
> 
> Currently I'm trying to get a static binary of openssl command via
> compilng the openssl-1.1.0e.

What do you mean by "static binary"?  Is it enough for the "ssl" and
"crypto" libraries to be statically linked into the "openssl"
executable?  Or do you also want the C-library to be statically
linked?

You may need to disable support for dynamically loadable engines
(the "no-engine" option) and dynamic loading of any kind (via the
"no-dso" option) in order to get a completely static executable.
Is that what you want?

> I've tried to configure with no-shared, but the bin/openssl is still
> dynamic linked.

But it should have static copies of the "ssl" and "crypto" libraries.

> Thus I added -static to the end of CFLAG, it just can not get compiled.
> Anyone know how to get a static openssl command? thanks in advance.

Perhaps "engine" and/or "dso" support requires a dynamic C-library.

-- 
	Viktor.


From openssl-users at dukhovni.org  Tue Mar  7 15:16:35 2017
From: openssl-users at dukhovni.org (Viktor Dukhovni)
Date: Tue, 7 Mar 2017 10:16:35 -0500
Subject: [openssl-users] Non-self-signed SSL certificates for private
 hosted DNS zones
In-Reply-To: <CAFKCRVK-REt8gSfgUUV7+FQD3yCwSq_9d7gaPzuGbLppowNxcw@mail.gmail.com>
References: <CAFKCRVK-REt8gSfgUUV7+FQD3yCwSq_9d7gaPzuGbLppowNxcw@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <1F83670F-F34B-40F2-9B8D-694A7A337F7E@dukhovni.org>


> On Mar 7, 2017, at 2:21 AM, Traiano Welcome <traiano at gmail.com> wrote:
> 
> I have a private DNS zone hosted on AWS route 53, only resolvable from
> within some specific VPCs.
> It appears some applications require an SSL certificate associated with
> the private DNS zone, and this SSL certificate should come from a trusted,
> external certificate provider (cannot be self-signed).

The "trusted external" CA that issues the not-self-signed end-entity cert
can almost certainly (with appropriate configuration of the client app)
be a private CA that you create and provide to the SSL clients.

In which case the question below is moot.

> My questions are:
> 
> a) Is this a known use-case? i.e private dns zones requiring non-self-signed
> certificates?

I usually use private CA certs for use on non-public networks.

> b) Since the DNS zone is not resolvable on the public internet,
> how would the certificate validation process occur for applications
> communicating with systems in the private zone ?

There is some prior history of public CAs issuing certificates for
private namespaces, but IIRC this practice is discouraged and going
away.

> c) Do SSL certificate providers issue trusted SSL certificates  for private DNS zones?

It is not really possible for them to know that the names in question
are used in another "private" deployment elsewhere.

-- 
	Viktor.


From Michael.Wojcik at microfocus.com  Tue Mar  7 18:47:10 2017
From: Michael.Wojcik at microfocus.com (Michael Wojcik)
Date: Tue, 7 Mar 2017 18:47:10 +0000
Subject: [openssl-users] undefined symbol fabs in file test/ct_test.o in
 openssl 1.1.0e on solaris
In-Reply-To: <569820305.50260.1488908956202.JavaMail.administrator@mtom.nabble.com>
References: <569820305.50260.1488908956202.JavaMail.administrator@mtom.nabble.com>
Message-ID: <B550B44BF8AF314BB00C4E2AC1C18088018C44D3A2@prvxmb03.microfocus.com>

> From: markus.sonderegger at juliusbaer.com
> [mailto:markus.sonderegger at juliusbaer.com]
> Sent: Tuesday, March 07, 2017 10:49
> To: Michael Wojcik
> Subject: Re: undefined symbol fabs in file test/ct_test.o in openssl 1.1.0e on
> solaris

For threads that originated on openssl-users, please send messages to the list, rather than to me directly.

> <quote author='Michael Wojcik'>
> 
>> For the record, we've always just changed the Solaris configuration we use
>> in Configure to add -lm.
> 
> I am not an experienced C developer so please can you tell me where in the
> Configure file I have to add -lm.

This has nothing to do with C development. The OpenSSL Configure process, while conceptually related to that used by some other packages, is an OpenSSL invention. And the use of -lm is an artifact of the toolchain (common to many toolchains for UNIX-like systems); it too has nothing to do with the C language.

Also, I've just looked at our Configure and apparently I misremembered; we do not add -lm for the Solaris builds. (We make a number of other changes for that platform, though.) It seems it's not needed for the version of OpenSSL we're currently building.

Where you would add -lm depends on what configuration you're using, which in turn depends on which system architecture and toolchain you're using. It also may depend on what version of OpenSSL you're building. I don't have that information, obviously.

In OpensSSL 1.0.2j's Configure (and generally for all the 1.0.2 releases, I believe), all the Solaris configure entries have -ldl in their library list. So you can search Configure for "solaris (with the double-quote) at the beginning of a line, then add -lm (with a space) after -ldl on each such line. For example, in vi:

	:%s/^"solaris.* -ldl/& -lm

Whether this also applies to OpenSSL 1.1.0 or whatever you're building, I can't say.

Michael Wojcik 
Distinguished Engineer, Micro Focus 

From MrUmunhum at CruzIO.com  Tue Mar  7 22:26:57 2017
From: MrUmunhum at CruzIO.com (william estrada)
Date: Tue, 7 Mar 2017 14:26:57 -0800
Subject: [openssl-users] error making Private RSA
In-Reply-To: <068d3db176da5818af44330510b9655d.squirrel@cruziomail.cruzio.com>
References: <068d3db176da5818af44330510b9655d.squirrel@cruziomail.cruzio.com>
Message-ID: <32c8b193118a3e53fdba11b8ba7fb585.squirrel@cruziomail.cruzio.com>


> <p>Not sure this is the proper way to use this mailing system?
>
> My source can be viewed at: mt-umunhum-wireless.net/Sources/rsa/rsa.c
> What version of openssl?  I'm guessing 1.0.2.
>
> Put this line inyour code
> 	ERR_load_ERR_strings();
> And youll get a more informative message.

  Did this and no improvement.
>
> I'm using: openssl version
> OpenSSL 1.0.1t  3 May 2016

openssl version
OpenSSL 1.0.2j-fips  26 Sep 2016

>
>
> My main guess is that your allocation for the PEM buffer is too small --
> is key/key_len pointing to a static buffer?

 It points to a char string

>
>
> --
> openssl-users mailing list
> To unsubscribe: https://mta.openssl.org/mailman/listinfo/openssl-users
>
>


-- 
William Estrada
Mt Umunhum, CA, USA, Earth
HTTP:// Mt-Umunhum-Wireless.net
Skype: MrUmunhum


From rsalz at akamai.com  Tue Mar  7 22:39:29 2017
From: rsalz at akamai.com (Salz, Rich)
Date: Tue, 7 Mar 2017 22:39:29 +0000
Subject: [openssl-users] error making Private RSA
In-Reply-To: <32c8b193118a3e53fdba11b8ba7fb585.squirrel@cruziomail.cruzio.com>
References: <068d3db176da5818af44330510b9655d.squirrel@cruziomail.cruzio.com>
 <32c8b193118a3e53fdba11b8ba7fb585.squirrel@cruziomail.cruzio.com>
Message-ID: <d3f5af76eaf344518c73be026401e27b@usma1ex-dag1mb1.msg.corp.akamai.com>

> > My source can be viewed at: mt-umunhum-wireless.net/Sources/rsa/rsa.c

Gives a 403.

> > My main guess is that your allocation for the PEM buffer is too small
> > -- is key/key_len pointing to a static buffer?
> 
>  It points to a char string

Not sure what that means.  Please post your code here.  It should be something like
	char key[2048];
	int keylen = sizeof key;
 

From traiano at gmail.com  Wed Mar  8 05:56:07 2017
From: traiano at gmail.com (Traiano Welcome)
Date: Wed, 8 Mar 2017 09:56:07 +0400
Subject: [openssl-users] Non-self-signed SSL certificates for private
 hosted DNS zones
In-Reply-To: <1F83670F-F34B-40F2-9B8D-694A7A337F7E@dukhovni.org>
References: <CAFKCRVK-REt8gSfgUUV7+FQD3yCwSq_9d7gaPzuGbLppowNxcw@mail.gmail.com>
 <1F83670F-F34B-40F2-9B8D-694A7A337F7E@dukhovni.org>
Message-ID: <CAFKCRVLR0gup-C7=QRJ0aQ=2uOj+9dEURbsyfxX5L9oFQbp76w@mail.gmail.com>

Hi Viktor

Thanks for this confirmation. I think the correct approach would be to use
our internal CA.


On Tue, Mar 7, 2017 at 7:16 PM, Viktor Dukhovni <openssl-users at dukhovni.org>
wrote:

>
> > On Mar 7, 2017, at 2:21 AM, Traiano Welcome <traiano at gmail.com> wrote:
> >
> > I have a private DNS zone hosted on AWS route 53, only resolvable from
> > within some specific VPCs.
> > It appears some applications require an SSL certificate associated with
> > the private DNS zone, and this SSL certificate should come from a
> trusted,
> > external certificate provider (cannot be self-signed).
>
> The "trusted external" CA that issues the not-self-signed end-entity cert
> can almost certainly (with appropriate configuration of the client app)
> be a private CA that you create and provide to the SSL clients.
>
> In which case the question below is moot.
>
> > My questions are:
> >
> > a) Is this a known use-case? i.e private dns zones requiring
> non-self-signed
> > certificates?
>
> I usually use private CA certs for use on non-public networks.
>
> > b) Since the DNS zone is not resolvable on the public internet,
> > how would the certificate validation process occur for applications
> > communicating with systems in the private zone ?
>
> There is some prior history of public CAs issuing certificates for
> private namespaces, but IIRC this practice is discouraged and going
> away.
>
> > c) Do SSL certificate providers issue trusted SSL certificates  for
> private DNS zones?
>
> It is not really possible for them to know that the names in question
> are used in another "private" deployment elsewhere.
>
> --
>         Viktor.
>
> --
> openssl-users mailing list
> To unsubscribe: https://mta.openssl.org/mailman/listinfo/openssl-users
>
-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
URL: <http://mta.openssl.org/pipermail/openssl-users/attachments/20170308/37d80a14/attachment.html>

From Timothy.Nichols at va.gov  Wed Mar  8 20:57:28 2017
From: Timothy.Nichols at va.gov (Nichols, Timothy (Checkpoint))
Date: Wed, 8 Mar 2017 15:57:28 -0500
Subject: [openssl-users] ca's config options -certs vs. -new_certs_dir
Message-ID: <F617F88F2A73394CB03194DA1ED744BD104B18E0A3@CDCCRBMSGW1.vha.med.va.gov>

Hi, I am not understanding the point of the config file's mandatory default -new_certs_dir into which goes what appears to be a copy of the certificate I specifically locate elsewhere in the file system. I am using the -out option from the command line to generate the file named according to the convention I have chosen...and then in the new_certs directory is deposited the <hex>.pem file. Of course, I haven't found an explanation as to why this happens in the documentation or the Googlie.

Thanks,

Tim
-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
URL: <http://mta.openssl.org/pipermail/openssl-users/attachments/20170308/47361075/attachment.html>

From Michael.Wojcik at microfocus.com  Wed Mar  8 21:39:19 2017
From: Michael.Wojcik at microfocus.com (Michael Wojcik)
Date: Wed, 8 Mar 2017 21:39:19 +0000
Subject: [openssl-users] ca's config options -certs vs. -new_certs_dir
In-Reply-To: <F617F88F2A73394CB03194DA1ED744BD104B18E0A3@CDCCRBMSGW1.vha.med.va.gov>
References: <F617F88F2A73394CB03194DA1ED744BD104B18E0A3@CDCCRBMSGW1.vha.med.va.gov>
Message-ID: <B550B44BF8AF314BB00C4E2AC1C18088018C44DFA8@prvxmb03.microfocus.com>

It's because processing a request can generate multiple certificates. Therefore ca needs a destination where it can write multiple certificates, not just a single one.

Note that new_certs_dir is only used if -outdir wasn't specified on the command line. You could create a temporary directory, pass its pathname with -outdir, then remove the directory and its contents after running ca.

With -out, all the certificates are just concatenated to the file. Usually they're PEM, so that's OK; the exception is if -spkac is used to specify an SPKAC file. SPKAC is mostly used in conjunction with the HTML KEYGEN element, when interpreted by Firefox and some other browsers. So you could argue that -outdir / new_certs_dir should be optional, since usually the single output file is more or less usable.

But it isn't optional, and that's life.

Of course, if you're building OpenSSL from source, it wouldn't be hard to make the necessary changes to ca.c.

Michael Wojcik
Distinguished Engineer, Micro Focus



From: openssl-users [mailto:openssl-users-bounces at openssl.org] On Behalf Of Nichols, Timothy (Checkpoint)
Sent: Wednesday, March 08, 2017 13:57
To: openssl-users at openssl.org
Subject: [openssl-users] ca's config options -certs vs. -new_certs_dir

Hi, I am not understanding the point of the config file?s mandatory default ?new_certs_dir into which goes what appears to be a copy of the certificate I specifically locate elsewhere in the file system. I am using the ?out option from the command line to generate the file named according to the convention I have chosen?and then in the new_certs directory is deposited the <hex>.pem file. Of course, I haven?t found an explanation as to why this happens in the documentation or the Googlie.

Thanks,

Tim
-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
URL: <http://mta.openssl.org/pipermail/openssl-users/attachments/20170308/96687b52/attachment-0001.html>

From akshar.kanak1 at gmail.com  Thu Mar  9 04:35:41 2017
From: akshar.kanak1 at gmail.com (Akshar Kanak)
Date: Thu, 9 Mar 2017 10:05:41 +0530
Subject: [openssl-users] [AES-GCM] TLS packet nounce_explicit overflow
Message-ID: <CALh=J_cC-nrJnZVnNba3y+fe6QFH9gaJ9p089ciUhtSP7vMtNA@mail.gmail.com>

Dear team
    In AES-GCM mode i know that the final counter will be
    [4 bytes salt which is negotiated between client and serevr ]
    +
    [8 bytes of random bytes which are generated using RAND_bytes
(nounce_explicit).
     nounce]
    +
    [32 bit counter ]

    nounce_explicit will be incremented for every TLS packet and will be
sent in the packet .
   * if the nounce _explicit overflows or overlaps , then does openssl code
handles it (atleast by initiating renegotiation )?*
    I know that it will take 2^64 TLS packets in one direction . It is
practically not possible
    but theoritically possible .

    32 bit counter should not be a problem , since individual TLS packet
has to be more than 68GB
    for this counter to overflow or overlap . This will not be possible .
Please correct me if I am wrong ?

    Thanks and regards
    Akshar
-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
URL: <http://mta.openssl.org/pipermail/openssl-users/attachments/20170309/be705795/attachment.html>

From rsalz at akamai.com  Thu Mar  9 12:49:00 2017
From: rsalz at akamai.com (Salz, Rich)
Date: Thu, 9 Mar 2017 12:49:00 +0000
Subject: [openssl-users] [AES-GCM] TLS packet nounce_explicit overflow
In-Reply-To: <CALh=J_cC-nrJnZVnNba3y+fe6QFH9gaJ9p089ciUhtSP7vMtNA@mail.gmail.com>
References: <CALh=J_cC-nrJnZVnNba3y+fe6QFH9gaJ9p089ciUhtSP7vMtNA@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <2c539e663d554fb69e0138af2c454b4d@usma1ex-dag1mb1.msg.corp.akamai.com>

No, it does not do this automatically.

    if the nounce _explicit overflows or overlaps , then does openssl code handles it (atleast by initiating renegotiation )?

-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
URL: <http://mta.openssl.org/pipermail/openssl-users/attachments/20170309/5bdacd73/attachment.html>

From rsalz at akamai.com  Thu Mar  9 13:02:01 2017
From: rsalz at akamai.com (Salz, Rich)
Date: Thu, 9 Mar 2017 13:02:01 +0000
Subject: [openssl-users] [openssl-dev] Openssl 1.0.2 stable SNAP
	20170309 issue
In-Reply-To: <20170309125820.GA27757@doctor.nl2k.ab.ca>
References: <20170309125820.GA27757@doctor.nl2k.ab.ca>
Message-ID: <d74fb3f9ff454607bba0f92f784acfaa@usma1ex-dag1mb1.msg.corp.akamai.com>

Already fixed.



From doctor at doctor.nl2k.ab.ca  Thu Mar  9 12:58:20 2017
From: doctor at doctor.nl2k.ab.ca (The Doctor)
Date: Thu, 9 Mar 2017 05:58:20 -0700
Subject: [openssl-users] Openssl 1.0.2 stable SNAP 20170309 issue
Message-ID: <20170309125820.GA27757@doctor.nl2k.ab.ca>


Script started on Thu Mar  9 05:45:36 2017
root at doctor:/usr/source/openssl-1.0.2-stable-SNAP-20170309 # make

making all in crypto...
making all in crypto/objects...
making all in crypto/md4...
making all in crypto/md5...
making all in crypto/sha...
making all in crypto/mdc2...
making all in crypto/hmac...
making all in crypto/ripemd...
making all in crypto/whrlpool...
making all in crypto/des...
making all in crypto/aes...
making all in crypto/rc2...
making all in crypto/rc4...
making all in crypto/idea...
making all in crypto/bf...
making all in crypto/cast...
making all in crypto/camellia...
making all in crypto/seed...
making all in crypto/modes...
making all in crypto/bn...
making all in crypto/ec...
making all in crypto/rsa...
making all in crypto/dsa...
making all in crypto/ecdsa...
making all in crypto/dh...
making all in crypto/ecdh...
making all in crypto/dso...
making all in crypto/engine...
making all in crypto/buffer...
making all in crypto/bio...
making all in crypto/stack...
making all in crypto/lhash...
making all in crypto/rand...
making all in crypto/err...
making all in crypto/evp...
making all in crypto/asn1...
making all in crypto/pem...
making all in crypto/x509...
making all in crypto/x509v3...
making all in crypto/conf...
making all in crypto/txt_db...
making all in crypto/pkcs7...
making all in crypto/pkcs12...
making all in crypto/comp...
making all in crypto/ocsp...
making all in crypto/ui...
making all in crypto/krb5...
making all in crypto/cms...
making all in crypto/pqueue...
making all in crypto/ts...
making all in crypto/jpake...
making all in crypto/srp...
making all in crypto/store...
making all in crypto/cmac...
if [ -n "libcrypto.so.1.0.0 libssl.so.1.0.0" ]; then  (cd ..; make libcrypto.so.1.0.0);  fi
`libcrypto.so.1.0.0' is up to date.
making all in engines...
echo 

making all in engines/ccgost...
making all in ssl...
if [ -n "libcrypto.so.1.0.0 libssl.so.1.0.0" ]; then  (cd ..; make libssl.so.1.0.0);  fi
`libssl.so.1.0.0' is up to date.
making all in apps...
/usr/local/bin/clang39 -DMONOLITH -I.. -I../include  -fPIC -DOPENSSL_PIC -DZLIB_SHARED -DZLIB -DOPENSSL_THREADS -pthread -D_THREAD_SAFE -D_REENTRANT -DDSO_DLFCN -DHAVE_DLFCN_H -DL_ENDIAN -O3 -Wall -DOPENSSL_EXPERIMENTAL_JPAKE -DOPENSSL_EXPERIMENTAL_STORE -DOPENSSL_IA32_SSE2 -DOPENSSL_BN_ASM_MONT -DOPENSSL_BN_ASM_MONT5 -DOPENSSL_BN_ASM_GF2m -I/usr/local/ssl/fips-2.0/include -DRC4_ASM -DSHA1_ASM -DSHA256_ASM -DSHA512_ASM -DMD5_ASM -DAES_ASM -DVPAES_ASM -DBSAES_ASM -DWHIRLPOOL_ASM -DGHASH_ASM -DECP_NISTZ256_ASM -c enc.c -o enc.o
enc.c:93:5: error: use of undeclared identifier 'cipher'
    cipher = EVP_get_cipherbyname(name->name);
    ^
enc.c:94:9: error: use of undeclared identifier 'cipher'
    if (cipher == NULL ||
        ^
enc.c:95:31: error: use of undeclared identifier 'cipher'
            (EVP_CIPHER_flags(cipher) & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER) != 0 ||
                              ^
enc.c:96:29: error: use of undeclared identifier 'cipher'
            EVP_CIPHER_mode(cipher) == EVP_CIPH_XTS_MODE)
                            ^
4 errors generated.
*** Error code 1

Stop.
make[1]: stopped in /usr/source/openssl-1.0.2-stable-SNAP-20170309/apps
*** Error code 1

Stop.
make: stopped in /usr/source/openssl-1.0.2-stable-SNAP-20170309
root at doctor:/usr/source/openssl-1.0.2-stable-SNAP-20170309 # exzit

exzit: Command not found.
root at doctor:/usr/source/openssl-1.0.2-stable-SNAP-20170309 # exit

exit

Script done on Thu Mar  9 05:46:27 2017

Please fix.

-- 
Member - Liberal International This is doctor@@nl2k.ab.ca Ici doctor@@nl2k.ab.ca
Yahweh, Queen & country!Never Satan President Republic!Beware AntiChrist rising!
http://www.fullyfollow.me/rootnl2k  Look at Psalms 14 and 53 on Atheism
God is dead! Yahweh lives! Jesus his only begotten Son is the Risen Saviour!!

From Michael.Wojcik at microfocus.com  Thu Mar  9 15:26:30 2017
From: Michael.Wojcik at microfocus.com (Michael Wojcik)
Date: Thu, 9 Mar 2017 15:26:30 +0000
Subject: [openssl-users] [AES-GCM] TLS packet nounce_explicit overflow
In-Reply-To: <2c539e663d554fb69e0138af2c454b4d@usma1ex-dag1mb1.msg.corp.akamai.com>
References: <CALh=J_cC-nrJnZVnNba3y+fe6QFH9gaJ9p089ciUhtSP7vMtNA@mail.gmail.com>
 <2c539e663d554fb69e0138af2c454b4d@usma1ex-dag1mb1.msg.corp.akamai.com>
Message-ID: <B550B44BF8AF314BB00C4E2AC1C18088018C44E4A6@prvxmb03.microfocus.com>

And there's no reason for it to do so, because it isn't needed. If you generate one TLS packet every nanosecond, it will take nearly six centuries to overflow, by which time the version of TLS you're using will have been deprecated and all security guarantees are moot anyway.

In general, most security experts recommend against keeping a TLS conversation open for years at a time.

Michael Wojcik
Distinguished Engineer, Micro Focus



From: openssl-users [mailto:openssl-users-bounces at openssl.org] On Behalf Of Salz, Rich via openssl-users
Sent: Thursday, March 09, 2017 05:49
To: openssl-users at openssl.org
Subject: Re: [openssl-users] [AES-GCM] TLS packet nounce_explicit overflow

No, it does not do this automatically.

    if the nounce _explicit overflows or overlaps , then does openssl code handles it (atleast by initiating renegotiation )?
-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
URL: <http://mta.openssl.org/pipermail/openssl-users/attachments/20170309/74c007f4/attachment-0001.html>

From MrUmunhum at CruzIO.com  Thu Mar  9 23:01:16 2017
From: MrUmunhum at CruzIO.com (william estrada)
Date: Thu, 9 Mar 2017 15:01:16 -0800
Subject: [openssl-users] error making Private RSA
Message-ID: <cd1c01dc523edd57d48ad993b4eea631.squirrel@cruziomail.cruzio.com>

I have been tiring to keep my posting to a minim but I am not getting
across  what I am looking to
fix.   And I have been getting reports that my source code is not
viewable.  In my Apache logs I see that some people have be using the
wrong link, they are tiring to use
"http://mt-umunhum-wireless.net/mt-umunhum-wireless.net/Sources"
This is wrong! use:
"http://mt-umunhum-wireless.net/Sources/rsa"
or
"216.173.131.138/Sources/rsa"

The most recent attempt is the rsapost.c with the output rsapost.txt

What I am attempting to do is:
1) generate a RSA key pair, working but always the same keys.
2) remove the public key, working
3) create a RSA structure with the public key, 4 methods, all fail.
4) use the public key to encrypt a sting, don't get here.
5) use the RSA pair to decrypt the string.

The code is not clean but here it is:

#include <openssl/err.h>
#include <openssl/bio.h>
#include <openssl/rsa.h>
#include <openssl/pem.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <ctype.h>
#include <termios.h>
#include <termio.h>

#define OFF               "\x1B[0;0;0m"
#define DEFAULT           "\x1B[0;0;0m"
#define RED               "\x1B[1;31;40m"
#define BLUE              "\x1B[1;34;40m"
#define GREEN             "\x1B[1;32;40m"
#define YELLOW            "\x1B[1;33;40m"
#define CLEAR_EOL         "\x1B[K"

void Dump( char *, int );
typedef unsigned char* UcharP;
typedef unsigned char  uchar;

#define Check_Key( Key, Action )                                     \
  if( RSA_check_key( Key ) != 1 )  {                                 \
     printf( RED "%d %s Make Key Failed!\n" OFF, __LINE__, "(Key)" );\
     printf( RED "%s\n",                                             \
             ERR_error_string( ERR_get_error(), NULL ) );            \
     Action ;  }                                                     \
  else  {                                                            \
    printf( BLUE "%d %s check key good\n" OFF , __LINE__, "Key" );  }

int main() {  // main()

  ERR_load_ERR_strings();

  RSA *My_RSA  = RSA_new();

  char Str[] = "1234567890";
  unsigned  char Out[1024];
  unsigned  char In[ 1024];
  int       RC, L, RSA_Len;

  unsigned long Error = ERR_get_error();
  char  *MSG          = ERR_error_string( Error, NULL);
  const  char *MSG2   = ERR_reason_error_string( Error );
  char  *ErrStr[100];

  BIGNUM *bne = BN_new();
  BN_set_word( bne, RSA_F4 );

  RC = RSA_generate_key_ex( My_RSA, 2048, bne, NULL );
  BN_free( bne );

  Check_Key( My_RSA, "return 1" );

  L = strlen( Str );
  printf ( BLUE "String: %s" OFF, Str );
  Dump( Str, L );

  RSA *Pub_RSA = RSA_new();

  // Extract Key from RSA Key pair
  BIO * Key_Bio = BIO_new( BIO_s_mem() );

  RC = PEM_write_bio_RSAPublicKey(  Key_Bio, My_RSA );

  printf( BLUE  "%d RC: %d\n" OFF, __LINE__ );

  size_t Key_Len = BIO_pending( Key_Bio               );
  char  *Key     = malloc(      Key_Len + 1           );
  RC             = BIO_read(    Key_Bio, Key, Key_Len );
  Key[ Key_Len ] = '\0';

  printf( BLUE  "%d RC: %d, Len: %d\n" OFF, __LINE__, RC, Key_Len );

  // Let's see the data
  printf( BLUE  "\nKey type %s\n" OFF, "Public" );
  Dump( (char*) Key, -Key_Len );

  // Now try to fill in to RSA using the BIO method
  BIO* bio = BIO_new( BIO_s_mem() );
       bio = BIO_new_mem_buf( (void*)Key, -1 ) ;

  // Load the RSA key from the BIO
  printf( "Method 1\n" );
  RSA* RSA1 = NULL;
  RSA1 = PEM_read_bio_RSA_PUBKEY( bio, NULL, NULL, NULL ) ;
  if( !RSA1 )
    printf( RED
	    " ERROR: Could not load PUBLIC KEY!\n"
	    " PEM_read_bio_RSA_PUBKEY FAILED:\n %s\n" OFF,
	    ERR_error_string( ERR_get_error(), NULL ) ) ;

  else Check_Key( RSA1, ";" );

  printf( "Method 2\n" );
  RSA *RSA2 = RSA_new();
  BIO_new_mem_buf( (void*)Key, -1 ) ;
  RC = PEM_write_bio_RSA_PUBKEY( bio, RSA2 ) ;
  if( !RSA2 )
    printf( RED
	    " ERROR: Could not load PUBLIC KEY!\n"
	    " PEM_write_bio_RSA_PUBKEY FAILED:\n %s\n" OFF,
	    ERR_error_string( ERR_get_error(), NULL ) ) ;

  else Check_Key( RSA2, ";" );

  // Try Bio method 3
  printf( OFF "Method 3\n" );
  RSA *RSA3  = RSA_new();
  BIO* Pem = BIO_new( BIO_s_mem() );
  BIO_puts( Pem, Key );
  ERR_print_errors( Pem );

  if( RSA3 )  Check_Key( RSA3, ";" );

  RC = PEM_write_bio_RSA_PUBKEY(  Pem, RSA3 );
  printf( OFF "BIO RC: %d\n", RC );

  if( RSA3 )  Check_Key( RSA3, ";" );

  // Now try to fill in to RSA using the EVP method

  printf( OFF "Method 4\n" );

  RSA *RSA4  = RSA_new();

  EVP_PKEY* EVP_PEM_Key;

  EVP_PKEY* EVP_Pub_Key = d2i_PUBKEY_bio( Pem, NULL);

  ERR_print_errors( Pem );

  if( EVP_Pub_Key == NULL ) {
     Error = ERR_get_error( );
     MSG   = (char*) ERR_reason_error_string( Error );
     printf( RED "EVP Error: %s" OFF "\n", MSG );  }
  else {
     RSA4 = EVP_PKEY_get1_RSA( EVP_Pub_Key );  }

  Check_Key( RSA4, "return 1;" );

  while(1)  {
    if( RSA1  &&  RSA_check_key( RSA1 ) == 1 )  {
       Pub_RSA = RSA1;break;  }
    if( RSA2  &&  RSA_check_key( RSA2 ) == 1 )  {
       Pub_RSA = RSA2;break;  }
    if( RSA3  &&  RSA_check_key( RSA3 ) == 1 )  {
       Pub_RSA = RSA3;break;  }
    if( RSA4  &&  RSA_check_key( RSA4 ) == 1 )  {
       Pub_RSA = RSA4;break;  }
    printf( BLUE " No usable RSA structures, quiting\n" OFF );
    return 1;  }

  // Free used memory
  BIO_free( Key_Bio );
  BIO_free( Pem     );

  int In_Len;
  In_Len = RSA_public_encrypt(  L,
				(uchar*) Str,
				(uchar*) In,
				Pub_RSA,
				RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING );

  printf( BLUE "Encrypted: %d" OFF, In_Len );
  Dump( In, In_Len );

  int Out_Len;
  Out_Len = RSA_private_decrypt( RSA_Len,
				 (uchar*) In,
				 (uchar*) Out,
				 My_RSA,
				 RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING );

  printf( BLUE  "Decrypted: %d" OFF, Out_Len );
  Dump( Out, Out_Len );

  if( !memcmp( (char *)Key, (char *)Out, Out_Len ) )  {
     printf( "Ecrypt/Decrypt failed\n" );    }
  else {
     printf( "Ecrypt/Decrypt Passed\n" );    }

  return 0;  }

/* -------------------------------------------------------------- */

void
Dump( char *P, int Len ) {  // Dump()

  int   I, E, C, L, Done, Min, Max;
  char  Buf[20], S[100];

  unsigned char  D;

  unsigned char  Hex[20] = "0123456789ABCDEF";

  if( Len < 0 )  {
     Len = abs( Len );
     Min = .20 *Len;
     Max = Len-Min;  }
  else  {
     Min = Len;
     Max = 0;   }

  int Note;
  Done  = 0, Note = 0;

  printf( "\n" );
  for( C = 0; C < Len ; C += 16,Done += L )  {  // For()

     //    printf( "C: %d, Min: %d, Max: %d\n", C, Min, Max );
     if( C > Min  &&  C < Max )  {
        if( Note == 0 )
	   printf( RED ".    .     "  "Output trimed.\n" OFF );
	Note = 1;
        continue;  }

     if( (L = Len -C) > 16 ) L = 16;
     if( L < 1 ) break;

     strcpy( Buf, "                " );
     strcpy( S,   "                                     " );
     E = 0;
     for( I = 0; I < L; I++ )  {

        D = P[ ( I +Done ) ];

	if( isprint( D ) ) {  Buf[I] = D;    }
	else               {  Buf[I] = '.';  }

	if( I  &&  !(I % 4) )  {  S[E++] = ' ';  }

	S[E++] = Hex[ D >> 4 ];
	S[E++] = Hex[ D & 15 ];  }

     printf( "%4.4d %4.4x  %-35s" BLUE "/*" YELLOW " %16.16s" BLUE " */\n"
              OFF , Done, Done, S, Buf ); fflush(stdout);

  }

     printf( BLUE "End of block - %3d bytes"
	     YELLOW " --------------------- "
	     BLUE  " /* "
	     YELLOW "---------------- "
	     BLUE "*/\n" OFF, Done );
     printf( OFF ); fflush(NULL);
   return;  }

This outputs:

5 Key check key good
String: 1234567890
0000 0000  31323334 35363738 3930               /* 1234567890       */
End of block -  10 bytes ---------------------  /* ---------------- */
68 RC: -141075560
75 RC: 426, Len: 426

Key type Public

0000 0000  2D2D2D2D 2D424547 494E2052 53412050  /* -----BEGIN RSA P */
0016 0010  55424C49 43204B45 592D2D2D 2D2D0A4D  /* UBLIC KEY-----.M */
0032 0020  49494243 674B4341 5145416F 7142344D  /* IIBCgKCAQEAoqB4M */
0048 0030  32307751 467A4972 634E4E39 31454364  /* 20wQFzIrcNN91ECd */
0064 0040  5344505A 31723259 38346355 43457961  /* SDPZ1r2Y84cUCEya */
0080 0050  394B585A 6C45475A 516B4245 445A6E0A  /* 9KXZlEGZQkBEDZn. */
.    .     Output trimed.
0352 0160  2B494F0A 6F636748 486A6F44 67746A45  /* +IO.ocgHHjoDgtjE */
0368 0170  58677779 646A6D31 725A4369 5459722B  /* Xgwydjm1rZCiTYr+ */
0384 0180  3270506F 6C774944 41514142 0A2D2D2D  /* 2pPolwIDAQAB.--- */
0400 0190  2D2D454E 44205253 41205055 424C4943  /* --END RSA PUBLIC */
0416 01a0  204B4559 2D2D2D2D 2D0A               /*  KEY-----.       */
End of block - 426 bytes ---------------------  /* ---------------- */
Method 1
 ERROR: Could not load PUBLIC KEY!
 PEM_read_bio_RSA_PUBKEY FAILED:
 error:0906D06C:PEM routines:func(109):reason(108)
Method 2
107 (Key) Make Key Failed!
error:2007507E:BIO routines:func(117):reason(126)
Method 3
116 (Key) Make Key Failed!
error:0407B093:rsa routines:func(123):reason(147)
BIO RC: 1
121 (Key) Make Key Failed!
error:0407B093:rsa routines:func(123):reason(147)
Method 4
EVP Error: (null)
142 (Key) Make Key Failed!
error:0407B093:rsa routines:func(123):reason(147)
 No usable RSA structures, quiting

Hope this clarifies what I am attempting to do?

Appreciate any help, thanks for your time.

-- 
William Estrada
Mt Umunhum, CA, USA, Earth
HTTP:// Mt-Umunhum-Wireless.net
Skype: MrUmunhum


From rgm at htt-consult.com  Thu Mar  9 23:49:56 2017
From: rgm at htt-consult.com (Robert Moskowitz)
Date: Thu, 9 Mar 2017 18:49:56 -0500
Subject: [openssl-users] scripting creating a cert
Message-ID: <6708e891-05e0-e1ea-f062-5ee851f25191@htt-consult.com>

I am creating self-signed certs with:

openssl req -new -outform PEM -out certs/$your_host_tld.crt -newkey 
rsa:2048 -nodes -keyout private/$your_host_tld.key -keyform PEM -days 
3650 -x509 -extensions v3_req

Where, for example:

your_host_tld=z9m9z.test.htt-consult.com

Thing is that this then prompts for a number of fields:

Country Name (2 letter code) [XX]:
State or Province Name (full name) []:
Locality Name (eg, city) [Default City]:
Organization Name (eg, company) [Default Company Ltd]:
Organizational Unit Name (eg, section) []:
Common Name (eg, your name or your server's hostname) []:
Email Address []:

Is there some 'simple' way to provide these answers?  Like with env 
variables?

thanks



From dnsands at sandia.gov  Fri Mar 10 00:05:09 2017
From: dnsands at sandia.gov (Sands, Daniel)
Date: Fri, 10 Mar 2017 00:05:09 +0000
Subject: [openssl-users] [EXTERNAL] Re:  error making Private RSA
In-Reply-To: <cd1c01dc523edd57d48ad993b4eea631.squirrel@cruziomail.cruzio.com>
References: <cd1c01dc523edd57d48ad993b4eea631.squirrel@cruziomail.cruzio.com>
Message-ID: <1489104309.19430.28.camel@sandia.gov>

First, to get intelligible text errors, replace your initial call with
ERR_load_crypto_strings().  The ERR_load_ERR_strings call doesn't even
seem to be documented, likely because it only loads the strings
associated with the ERR API, and you likely need PEM and BIO error
strings.  When I did this, the error message was "no start line" for
method 1.

Second, it seems to matter whether you use PEM_load_bio_RSA_PUBKEY vs
PEM_load_bio_RSAPublicKey.

Next, CheckKey will likely only work when the private key is also read
in.  Otherwise it segfaults.

As a side note, the [n]curses library would be more portable with
whatever terminal you run the program over.

As for method 4:
d2i_xxxx and i2d_xxxx are for DER formatted buffers.  You're writing out
as PEM format.  You need to read it back in as PEM format, as attempted
in some of the previous methods.  So it makes sense that this method
fails.

On Thu, 2017-03-09 at 15:01 -0800, william estrada wrote:
> I have been tiring to keep my posting to a minim but I am not getting
> across  what I am looking to
> fix.   And I have been getting reports that my source code is not
> viewable.  In my Apache logs I see that some people have be using the
> wrong link, they are tiring to use
> "http://mt-umunhum-wireless.net/mt-umunhum-wireless.net/Sources"
> This is wrong! use:
> "http://mt-umunhum-wireless.net/Sources/rsa"
> or
> "216.173.131.138/Sources/rsa"
> 
> The most recent attempt is the rsapost.c with the output rsapost.txt
> 
> What I am attempting to do is:
> 1) generate a RSA key pair, working but always the same keys.
> 2) remove the public key, working
> 3) create a RSA structure with the public key, 4 methods, all fail.
> 4) use the public key to encrypt a sting, don't get here.
> 5) use the RSA pair to decrypt the string.
> 
> The code is not clean but here it is:
> 
> #include <openssl/err.h>
> #include <openssl/bio.h>
> #include <openssl/rsa.h>
> #include <openssl/pem.h>
> #include <string.h>
> #include <stdio.h>
> #include <stdlib.h>
> #include <ctype.h>
> #include <termios.h>
> #include <termio.h>
> 
> #define OFF               "\x1B[0;0;0m"
> #define DEFAULT           "\x1B[0;0;0m"
> #define RED               "\x1B[1;31;40m"
> #define BLUE              "\x1B[1;34;40m"
> #define GREEN             "\x1B[1;32;40m"
> #define YELLOW            "\x1B[1;33;40m"
> #define CLEAR_EOL         "\x1B[K"
> 
> void Dump( char *, int );
> typedef unsigned char* UcharP;
> typedef unsigned char  uchar;
> 
> #define Check_Key( Key, Action )                                     \
>   if( RSA_check_key( Key ) != 1 )  {                                 \
>      printf( RED "%d %s Make Key Failed!\n" OFF, __LINE__, "(Key)" );\
>      printf( RED "%s\n",                                             \
>              ERR_error_string( ERR_get_error(), NULL ) );            \
>      Action ;  }                                                     \
>   else  {                                                            \
>     printf( BLUE "%d %s check key good\n" OFF , __LINE__, "Key" );  }
> 
> int main() {  // main()
> 
>   ERR_load_ERR_strings();
> 
>   RSA *My_RSA  = RSA_new();
> 
>   char Str[] = "1234567890";
>   unsigned  char Out[1024];
>   unsigned  char In[ 1024];
>   int       RC, L, RSA_Len;
> 
>   unsigned long Error = ERR_get_error();
>   char  *MSG          = ERR_error_string( Error, NULL);
>   const  char *MSG2   = ERR_reason_error_string( Error );
>   char  *ErrStr[100];
> 
>   BIGNUM *bne = BN_new();
>   BN_set_word( bne, RSA_F4 );
> 
>   RC = RSA_generate_key_ex( My_RSA, 2048, bne, NULL );
>   BN_free( bne );
> 
>   Check_Key( My_RSA, "return 1" );
> 
>   L = strlen( Str );
>   printf ( BLUE "String: %s" OFF, Str );
>   Dump( Str, L );
> 
>   RSA *Pub_RSA = RSA_new();
> 
>   // Extract Key from RSA Key pair
>   BIO * Key_Bio = BIO_new( BIO_s_mem() );
> 
>   RC = PEM_write_bio_RSAPublicKey(  Key_Bio, My_RSA );
> 
>   printf( BLUE  "%d RC: %d\n" OFF, __LINE__ );
> 
>   size_t Key_Len = BIO_pending( Key_Bio               );
>   char  *Key     = malloc(      Key_Len + 1           );
>   RC             = BIO_read(    Key_Bio, Key, Key_Len );
>   Key[ Key_Len ] = '\0';
> 
>   printf( BLUE  "%d RC: %d, Len: %d\n" OFF, __LINE__, RC, Key_Len );
> 
>   // Let's see the data
>   printf( BLUE  "\nKey type %s\n" OFF, "Public" );
>   Dump( (char*) Key, -Key_Len );
> 
>   // Now try to fill in to RSA using the BIO method
>   BIO* bio = BIO_new( BIO_s_mem() );
>        bio = BIO_new_mem_buf( (void*)Key, -1 ) ;
> 
>   // Load the RSA key from the BIO
>   printf( "Method 1\n" );
>   RSA* RSA1 = NULL;
>   RSA1 = PEM_read_bio_RSA_PUBKEY( bio, NULL, NULL, NULL ) ;
>   if( !RSA1 )
>     printf( RED
> 	    " ERROR: Could not load PUBLIC KEY!\n"
> 	    " PEM_read_bio_RSA_PUBKEY FAILED:\n %s\n" OFF,
> 	    ERR_error_string( ERR_get_error(), NULL ) ) ;
> 
>   else Check_Key( RSA1, ";" );
> 
>   printf( "Method 2\n" );
>   RSA *RSA2 = RSA_new();
>   BIO_new_mem_buf( (void*)Key, -1 ) ;
>   RC = PEM_write_bio_RSA_PUBKEY( bio, RSA2 ) ;
>   if( !RSA2 )
>     printf( RED
> 	    " ERROR: Could not load PUBLIC KEY!\n"
> 	    " PEM_write_bio_RSA_PUBKEY FAILED:\n %s\n" OFF,
> 	    ERR_error_string( ERR_get_error(), NULL ) ) ;
> 
>   else Check_Key( RSA2, ";" );
> 
>   // Try Bio method 3
>   printf( OFF "Method 3\n" );
>   RSA *RSA3  = RSA_new();
>   BIO* Pem = BIO_new( BIO_s_mem() );
>   BIO_puts( Pem, Key );
>   ERR_print_errors( Pem );
> 
>   if( RSA3 )  Check_Key( RSA3, ";" );
> 
>   RC = PEM_write_bio_RSA_PUBKEY(  Pem, RSA3 );
>   printf( OFF "BIO RC: %d\n", RC );
> 
>   if( RSA3 )  Check_Key( RSA3, ";" );
> 
>   // Now try to fill in to RSA using the EVP method
> 
>   printf( OFF "Method 4\n" );
> 
>   RSA *RSA4  = RSA_new();
> 
>   EVP_PKEY* EVP_PEM_Key;
> 
>   EVP_PKEY* EVP_Pub_Key = d2i_PUBKEY_bio( Pem, NULL);
> 
>   ERR_print_errors( Pem );
> 
>   if( EVP_Pub_Key == NULL ) {
>      Error = ERR_get_error( );
>      MSG   = (char*) ERR_reason_error_string( Error );
>      printf( RED "EVP Error: %s" OFF "\n", MSG );  }
>   else {
>      RSA4 = EVP_PKEY_get1_RSA( EVP_Pub_Key );  }
> 
>   Check_Key( RSA4, "return 1;" );
> 
>   while(1)  {
>     if( RSA1  &&  RSA_check_key( RSA1 ) == 1 )  {
>        Pub_RSA = RSA1;break;  }
>     if( RSA2  &&  RSA_check_key( RSA2 ) == 1 )  {
>        Pub_RSA = RSA2;break;  }
>     if( RSA3  &&  RSA_check_key( RSA3 ) == 1 )  {
>        Pub_RSA = RSA3;break;  }
>     if( RSA4  &&  RSA_check_key( RSA4 ) == 1 )  {
>        Pub_RSA = RSA4;break;  }
>     printf( BLUE " No usable RSA structures, quiting\n" OFF );
>     return 1;  }
> 
>   // Free used memory
>   BIO_free( Key_Bio );
>   BIO_free( Pem     );
> 
>   int In_Len;
>   In_Len = RSA_public_encrypt(  L,
> 				(uchar*) Str,
> 				(uchar*) In,
> 				Pub_RSA,
> 				RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING );
> 
>   printf( BLUE "Encrypted: %d" OFF, In_Len );
>   Dump( In, In_Len );
> 
>   int Out_Len;
>   Out_Len = RSA_private_decrypt( RSA_Len,
> 				 (uchar*) In,
> 				 (uchar*) Out,
> 				 My_RSA,
> 				 RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING );
> 
>   printf( BLUE  "Decrypted: %d" OFF, Out_Len );
>   Dump( Out, Out_Len );
> 
>   if( !memcmp( (char *)Key, (char *)Out, Out_Len ) )  {
>      printf( "Ecrypt/Decrypt failed\n" );    }
>   else {
>      printf( "Ecrypt/Decrypt Passed\n" );    }
> 
>   return 0;  }
> 
> /* -------------------------------------------------------------- */
> 
> void
> Dump( char *P, int Len ) {  // Dump()
> 
>   int   I, E, C, L, Done, Min, Max;
>   char  Buf[20], S[100];
> 
>   unsigned char  D;
> 
>   unsigned char  Hex[20] = "0123456789ABCDEF";
> 
>   if( Len < 0 )  {
>      Len = abs( Len );
>      Min = .20 *Len;
>      Max = Len-Min;  }
>   else  {
>      Min = Len;
>      Max = 0;   }
> 
>   int Note;
>   Done  = 0, Note = 0;
> 
>   printf( "\n" );
>   for( C = 0; C < Len ; C += 16,Done += L )  {  // For()
> 
>      //    printf( "C: %d, Min: %d, Max: %d\n", C, Min, Max );
>      if( C > Min  &&  C < Max )  {
>         if( Note == 0 )
> 	   printf( RED ".    .     "  "Output trimed.\n" OFF );
> 	Note = 1;
>         continue;  }
> 
>      if( (L = Len -C) > 16 ) L = 16;
>      if( L < 1 ) break;
> 
>      strcpy( Buf, "                " );
>      strcpy( S,   "                                     " );
>      E = 0;
>      for( I = 0; I < L; I++ )  {
> 
>         D = P[ ( I +Done ) ];
> 
> 	if( isprint( D ) ) {  Buf[I] = D;    }
> 	else               {  Buf[I] = '.';  }
> 
> 	if( I  &&  !(I % 4) )  {  S[E++] = ' ';  }
> 
> 	S[E++] = Hex[ D >> 4 ];
> 	S[E++] = Hex[ D & 15 ];  }
> 
>      printf( "%4.4d %4.4x  %-35s" BLUE "/*" YELLOW " %16.16s" BLUE " */\n"
>               OFF , Done, Done, S, Buf ); fflush(stdout);
> 
>   }
> 
>      printf( BLUE "End of block - %3d bytes"
> 	     YELLOW " --------------------- "
> 	     BLUE  " /* "
> 	     YELLOW "---------------- "
> 	     BLUE "*/\n" OFF, Done );
>      printf( OFF ); fflush(NULL);
>    return;  }
> 
> This outputs:
> 
> 5 Key check key good
> String: 1234567890
> 0000 0000  31323334 35363738 3930               /* 1234567890       */
> End of block -  10 bytes ---------------------  /* ---------------- */
> 68 RC: -141075560
> 75 RC: 426, Len: 426
> 
> Key type Public
> 
> 0000 0000  2D2D2D2D 2D424547 494E2052 53412050  /* -----BEGIN RSA P */
> 0016 0010  55424C49 43204B45 592D2D2D 2D2D0A4D  /* UBLIC KEY-----.M */
> 0032 0020  49494243 674B4341 5145416F 7142344D  /* IIBCgKCAQEAoqB4M */
> 0048 0030  32307751 467A4972 634E4E39 31454364  /* 20wQFzIrcNN91ECd */
> 0064 0040  5344505A 31723259 38346355 43457961  /* SDPZ1r2Y84cUCEya */
> 0080 0050  394B585A 6C45475A 516B4245 445A6E0A  /* 9KXZlEGZQkBEDZn. */
> .    .     Output trimed.
> 0352 0160  2B494F0A 6F636748 486A6F44 67746A45  /* +IO.ocgHHjoDgtjE */
> 0368 0170  58677779 646A6D31 725A4369 5459722B  /* Xgwydjm1rZCiTYr+ */
> 0384 0180  3270506F 6C774944 41514142 0A2D2D2D  /* 2pPolwIDAQAB.--- */
> 0400 0190  2D2D454E 44205253 41205055 424C4943  /* --END RSA PUBLIC */
> 0416 01a0  204B4559 2D2D2D2D 2D0A               /*  KEY-----.       */
> End of block - 426 bytes ---------------------  /* ---------------- */
> Method 1
>  ERROR: Could not load PUBLIC KEY!
>  PEM_read_bio_RSA_PUBKEY FAILED:
>  error:0906D06C:PEM routines:func(109):reason(108)
> Method 2
> 107 (Key) Make Key Failed!
> error:2007507E:BIO routines:func(117):reason(126)
> Method 3
> 116 (Key) Make Key Failed!
> error:0407B093:rsa routines:func(123):reason(147)
> BIO RC: 1
> 121 (Key) Make Key Failed!
> error:0407B093:rsa routines:func(123):reason(147)
> Method 4
> EVP Error: (null)
> 142 (Key) Make Key Failed!
> error:0407B093:rsa routines:func(123):reason(147)
>  No usable RSA structures, quiting
> 
> Hope this clarifies what I am attempting to do?
> 
> Appreciate any help, thanks for your time.
> 
> -- 
> William Estrada
> Mt Umunhum, CA, USA, Earth
> HTTP:// Mt-Umunhum-Wireless.net
> Skype: MrUmunhum
> 


From rsalz at akamai.com  Fri Mar 10 00:33:07 2017
From: rsalz at akamai.com (Salz, Rich)
Date: Fri, 10 Mar 2017 00:33:07 +0000
Subject: [openssl-users] scripting creating a cert
In-Reply-To: <6708e891-05e0-e1ea-f062-5ee851f25191@htt-consult.com>
References: <6708e891-05e0-e1ea-f062-5ee851f25191@htt-consult.com>
Message-ID: <2aa6834d141f4244a2c5693483acaa04@usma1ex-dag1mb1.msg.corp.akamai.com>

Yes there are easier ways to do this.  Set up a conf file and use it (via the -conf flag).  You can use env vars, set default values, and so on.  Look at the config manpages, https://www.openssl.org/docs/manmaster/man5/

For a fuller example, see https://www.openssl.org/~rsalz/pki.tgz
 

PS -- find me in Chicago and I can answer questions, Robert :)

From jan.m.danielsson at gmail.com  Fri Mar 10 01:06:54 2017
From: jan.m.danielsson at gmail.com (Jan Danielsson)
Date: Fri, 10 Mar 2017 02:06:54 +0100
Subject: [openssl-users] scripting creating a cert
In-Reply-To: <6708e891-05e0-e1ea-f062-5ee851f25191@htt-consult.com>
References: <6708e891-05e0-e1ea-f062-5ee851f25191@htt-consult.com>
Message-ID: <c0e81a38-13e9-415c-9986-36911358b73a@gmail.com>

On 03/10/17 00:49, Robert Moskowitz wrote:
[---]
> Is there some 'simple' way to provide these answers?  Like with env
> variables?

   I tend do create response files (one response per line) and then
simply pipe to openssl:

   $ cat foo.params | openssl ...

   Just make sure openssl doesn't need any password inputs.

-- 
Kind regards,
Jan Danielsson


From rgm at htt-consult.com  Fri Mar 10 01:09:09 2017
From: rgm at htt-consult.com (Robert Moskowitz)
Date: Thu, 9 Mar 2017 20:09:09 -0500
Subject: [openssl-users] scripting creating a cert
In-Reply-To: <2aa6834d141f4244a2c5693483acaa04@usma1ex-dag1mb1.msg.corp.akamai.com>
References: <6708e891-05e0-e1ea-f062-5ee851f25191@htt-consult.com>
 <2aa6834d141f4244a2c5693483acaa04@usma1ex-dag1mb1.msg.corp.akamai.com>
Message-ID: <558eb893-6cef-4d78-d03e-730fa693405f@htt-consult.com>

Hi, Rich.

Fancy meeting you here.

On 03/09/2017 07:33 PM, Salz, Rich via openssl-users wrote:
> Yes there are easier ways to do this.  Set up a conf file and use it (via the -conf flag).  You can use env vars, set default values, and so on.  Look at the config manpages, https://www.openssl.org/docs/manmaster/man5/

Not easy enough for me.  But I will have to read it some more.

> For a fuller example, see https://www.openssl.org/~rsalz/pki.tgz

'Fuller' is putting it mildly.  :)

> PS -- find me in Chicago and I can answer questions, Robert :)

Plan on it!

Bob


From openssl-users at dukhovni.org  Fri Mar 10 01:17:12 2017
From: openssl-users at dukhovni.org (Viktor Dukhovni)
Date: Thu, 9 Mar 2017 20:17:12 -0500
Subject: [openssl-users] scripting creating a cert
In-Reply-To: <6708e891-05e0-e1ea-f062-5ee851f25191@htt-consult.com>
References: <6708e891-05e0-e1ea-f062-5ee851f25191@htt-consult.com>
Message-ID: <608F34F9-1E83-42B1-BBAB-F5E7248A83C8@dukhovni.org>


> On Mar 9, 2017, at 6:49 PM, Robert Moskowitz <rgm at htt-consult.com> wrote:
> 
> I am creating self-signed certs with:
> 
> openssl req -new -outform PEM -out certs/$your_host_tld.crt -newkey rsa:2048 -nodes -keyout private/$your_host_tld.key -keyform PEM -days 3650 -x509 -extensions v3_req
> 
> Where, for example:
> 
> your_host_tld=z9m9z.test.htt-consult.com
> 
> Thing is that this then prompts for a number of fields

The simplest solution is to set the subject DN explicitly on the command-line:

   $ umask 077 # avoid world-readable private keys
   $ openssl req -new -newkey rsa:2048 -nodes -keyout private/$your_host_tld.key \
	-x509 -subj "/CN=$(uname -n)" -out certs/$your_host_tld.crt \
	-days 3650 -extensions v3_req

Fore more advanced related approaches see:

    https://raw.githubusercontent.com/openssl/openssl/master/test/certs/mkcert.sh

-- 
	Viktor.


From rgm at htt-consult.com  Fri Mar 10 01:39:59 2017
From: rgm at htt-consult.com (Robert Moskowitz)
Date: Thu, 9 Mar 2017 20:39:59 -0500
Subject: [openssl-users] scripting creating a cert
In-Reply-To: <c0e81a38-13e9-415c-9986-36911358b73a@gmail.com>
References: <6708e891-05e0-e1ea-f062-5ee851f25191@htt-consult.com>
 <c0e81a38-13e9-415c-9986-36911358b73a@gmail.com>
Message-ID: <1e04464f-44e8-30f1-bd75-5a2b2913f13b@htt-consult.com>

Jan,

On 03/09/2017 08:06 PM, Jan Danielsson wrote:
> On 03/10/17 00:49, Robert Moskowitz wrote:
> [---]
>> Is there some 'simple' way to provide these answers?  Like with env
>> variables?
>     I tend do create response files (one response per line) and then
> simply pipe to openssl:
>
>     $ cat foo.params | openssl ...

I will try a few things out with this.

thanks

>     Just make sure openssl doesn't need any password inputs.
>

It doesn't for this command.



From rgm at htt-consult.com  Fri Mar 10 01:43:38 2017
From: rgm at htt-consult.com (Robert Moskowitz)
Date: Thu, 9 Mar 2017 20:43:38 -0500
Subject: [openssl-users] scripting creating a cert
In-Reply-To: <608F34F9-1E83-42B1-BBAB-F5E7248A83C8@dukhovni.org>
References: <6708e891-05e0-e1ea-f062-5ee851f25191@htt-consult.com>
 <608F34F9-1E83-42B1-BBAB-F5E7248A83C8@dukhovni.org>
Message-ID: <aaff5a23-0ebd-405f-3d3b-71469b7c70af@htt-consult.com>

Viktor,

On 03/09/2017 08:17 PM, Viktor Dukhovni wrote:
>> On Mar 9, 2017, at 6:49 PM, Robert Moskowitz <rgm at htt-consult.com> wrote:
>>
>> I am creating self-signed certs with:
>>
>> openssl req -new -outform PEM -out certs/$your_host_tld.crt -newkey rsa:2048 -nodes -keyout private/$your_host_tld.key -keyform PEM -days 3650 -x509 -extensions v3_req
>>
>> Where, for example:
>>
>> your_host_tld=z9m9z.test.htt-consult.com
>>
>> Thing is that this then prompts for a number of fields
> The simplest solution is to set the subject DN explicitly on the command-line:
>
>     $ umask 077 # avoid world-readable private keys

Perhaps (no perhaps about it) this is old information, but I picked up 
that I needed:

chmod 640 for the private keys for Apache.  (and postfix and others use 
these certs; at least they are in their confs)

>     $ openssl req -new -newkey rsa:2048 -nodes -keyout private/$your_host_tld.key \
> 	-x509 -subj "/CN=$(uname -n)" -out certs/$your_host_tld.crt \
> 	-days 3650 -extensions v3_req
>
> Fore more advanced related approaches see:
>
>      https://raw.githubusercontent.com/openssl/openssl/master/test/certs/mkcert.sh

Looks like this is pointing me in the direction I want to go.  I will 
dig more into this approach.

thank you



From openssl-users at dukhovni.org  Fri Mar 10 01:53:33 2017
From: openssl-users at dukhovni.org (Viktor Dukhovni)
Date: Thu, 9 Mar 2017 20:53:33 -0500
Subject: [openssl-users] scripting creating a cert
In-Reply-To: <aaff5a23-0ebd-405f-3d3b-71469b7c70af@htt-consult.com>
References: <6708e891-05e0-e1ea-f062-5ee851f25191@htt-consult.com>
 <608F34F9-1E83-42B1-BBAB-F5E7248A83C8@dukhovni.org>
 <aaff5a23-0ebd-405f-3d3b-71469b7c70af@htt-consult.com>
Message-ID: <EE81D958-FB07-428F-BE0D-A8070BDA8C82@dukhovni.org>


> On Mar 9, 2017, at 8:43 PM, Robert Moskowitz <rgm at htt-consult.com> wrote:
> 
>>   $ umask 077 # avoid world-readable private keys
> 
> Perhaps (no perhaps about it) this is old information, but I picked up that I needed:
> 
> chmod 640 for the private keys for Apache.  (and postfix and others use these certs; at least they are in their confs)

I strive to avoid the private disclosure race of first creating
a world-readable file, and then trying to do a quick chmod before
the bad guys get around to opening it.  That's why I recommend the
umask approach.

You can adjust the umask to suit your needs.  With OpenSSL 1.1.0,
if I recall correctly "keyout" files and the like are automatically
opened mode "0600". Rich Salz, who wrote the CLI option processing
code for 1.1.0 will correct me, if my memory if faulty.  There are
still a lot of users with 1.0.2 or earlier, and OpenSSL cannot
always figure out which files end up having private keys in them,
so the umask approach is a good precaution to keep using.

-- 
	Viktor.


From jb-openssl at wisemo.com  Fri Mar 10 02:04:58 2017
From: jb-openssl at wisemo.com (Jakob Bohm)
Date: Fri, 10 Mar 2017 03:04:58 +0100
Subject: [openssl-users] [AES-GCM] TLS packet nounce_explicit overflow
In-Reply-To: <B550B44BF8AF314BB00C4E2AC1C18088018C44E4A6@prvxmb03.microfocus.com>
References: <CALh=J_cC-nrJnZVnNba3y+fe6QFH9gaJ9p089ciUhtSP7vMtNA@mail.gmail.com>
 <2c539e663d554fb69e0138af2c454b4d@usma1ex-dag1mb1.msg.corp.akamai.com>
 <B550B44BF8AF314BB00C4E2AC1C18088018C44E4A6@prvxmb03.microfocus.com>
Message-ID: <7d399906-36a1-c480-2edf-570d286526ab@wisemo.com>

But if the starting value is random, the number of increments
before overflow or wrap will be random too (and could
hypothetically, but rarely, be as little as 1).

Anyway, I thought TLS records were limited to slightly more than
16K each, so the in-record block counter would not count very far.

On 09/03/2017 16:26, Michael Wojcik wrote:
>
> And there's no reason for it to do so, because it isn't needed. If you 
> generate one TLS packet every nanosecond, it will take nearly six 
> centuries to overflow, by which time the version of TLS you're using 
> will have been deprecated and all security guarantees are moot anyway.
>
> In general, most security experts recommend against keeping a TLS 
> conversation open for years at a time.
>
> Michael Wojcik
> Distinguished Engineer, Micro Focus
>
> *From:*openssl-users [mailto:openssl-users-bounces at openssl.org] *On 
> Behalf Of *Salz, Rich via openssl-users
> *Sent:* Thursday, March 09, 2017 05:49
> *To:* openssl-users at openssl.org
> *Subject:* Re: [openssl-users] [AES-GCM] TLS packet nounce_explicit 
> overflow
>
> No, it does not do this automatically.
>
> *if the nounce _explicit overflows or overlaps , then does openssl 
> code handles it (atleast by initiating renegotiation )?*
>
Enjoy

Jakob
-- 
Jakob Bohm, CIO, Partner, WiseMo A/S.  https://www.wisemo.com
Transformervej 29, 2860 S?borg, Denmark.  Direct +45 31 13 16 10
This public discussion message is non-binding and may contain errors.
WiseMo - Remote Service Management for PCs, Phones and Embedded


From rgm at htt-consult.com  Fri Mar 10 02:08:30 2017
From: rgm at htt-consult.com (Robert Moskowitz)
Date: Thu, 9 Mar 2017 21:08:30 -0500
Subject: [openssl-users] scripting creating a cert
In-Reply-To: <EE81D958-FB07-428F-BE0D-A8070BDA8C82@dukhovni.org>
References: <6708e891-05e0-e1ea-f062-5ee851f25191@htt-consult.com>
 <608F34F9-1E83-42B1-BBAB-F5E7248A83C8@dukhovni.org>
 <aaff5a23-0ebd-405f-3d3b-71469b7c70af@htt-consult.com>
 <EE81D958-FB07-428F-BE0D-A8070BDA8C82@dukhovni.org>
Message-ID: <01401a5e-5e1b-c3c6-6784-04f3067a18f6@htt-consult.com>



On 03/09/2017 08:53 PM, Viktor Dukhovni wrote:
>> On Mar 9, 2017, at 8:43 PM, Robert Moskowitz <rgm at htt-consult.com> wrote:
>>
>>>    $ umask 077 # avoid world-readable private keys
>> Perhaps (no perhaps about it) this is old information, but I picked up that I needed:
>>
>> chmod 640 for the private keys for Apache.  (and postfix and others use these certs; at least they are in their confs)
> I strive to avoid the private disclosure race of first creating
> a world-readable file, and then trying to do a quick chmod before
> the bad guys get around to opening it.  That's why I recommend the
> umask approach.
>
> You can adjust the umask to suit your needs.  With OpenSSL 1.1.0,
> if I recall correctly "keyout" files and the like are automatically
> opened mode "0600". Rich Salz, who wrote the CLI option processing
> code for 1.1.0 will correct me, if my memory if faulty.  There are
> still a lot of users with 1.0.2 or earlier, and OpenSSL cannot
> always figure out which files end up having private keys in them,
> so the umask approach is a good precaution to keep using.

And Rich and I sit down and talk about things all the time at IETF. This 
time we will have some other items to discuss.

And since this will go into a world-readable (eventually) howto, this is 
good advice that I will work on incorporating.

Thanks


From Michael.Wojcik at microfocus.com  Fri Mar 10 03:34:16 2017
From: Michael.Wojcik at microfocus.com (Michael Wojcik)
Date: Fri, 10 Mar 2017 03:34:16 +0000
Subject: [openssl-users] [AES-GCM] TLS packet nounce_explicit overflow
In-Reply-To: <7d399906-36a1-c480-2edf-570d286526ab@wisemo.com>
References: <CALh=J_cC-nrJnZVnNba3y+fe6QFH9gaJ9p089ciUhtSP7vMtNA@mail.gmail.com>
 <2c539e663d554fb69e0138af2c454b4d@usma1ex-dag1mb1.msg.corp.akamai.com>
 <B550B44BF8AF314BB00C4E2AC1C18088018C44E4A6@prvxmb03.microfocus.com>
 <7d399906-36a1-c480-2edf-570d286526ab@wisemo.com>
Message-ID: <B550B44BF8AF314BB00C4E2AC1C18088018C44EB8C@prvxmb03.microfocus.com>

> From: openssl-users [mailto:openssl-users-bounces at openssl.org] On Behalf
> Of Jakob Bohm
> Sent: Thursday, March 09, 2017 19:05
> To: openssl-users at openssl.org
> Subject: Re: [openssl-users] [AES-GCM] TLS packet nounce_explicit overflow

First, note my original calculation was wrong - I was thinking the counter was 64 bits. In fact the nonce is 64 bits, and the counter is 32. So even if you only generate one packet per millisecond, you could wrap in under 50 days.

Can you send a packet per millisecond? Let's assume Ethernet framing, TCP, and IPv4. That's 64 bytes of overhead. TLS adds around 45 bytes of overhead to each packet. I can't be bothered to check now, but let's assume you can send a TLS packet with no application data, so that's 109 bytes per packet. At one per millisecond that's 8.72e5 b/s, so network bandwith isn't a problem (we'll assume this is over a LAN). Can the receiver keep up? (We can't sustain the rate if the receiver's window keeps filling.) Let's hope so; the node's not much use if it can't keep up with its network interface. (Also assume we've disabled Nagle.)

Now, 50 days is still a rather long-lived conversation. Maybe we can do one or two orders of magnitude better. We're still fine on bandwidth (for a LAN), so should still be OK on the receiver's stack as well. OpenSSL should be able to verify and decrypt 100,000 messages a second on modern hardware, I'd think; I've never bothered to benchmark that, but it can certainly do the individual operations much faster.

So now we're down to about 11 hours. At this point we seem to have a legitimate concern; not for every application, but for some, certainly.

I haven't looked to see what the RFC says about AES with GCM combining and what measures implementations should take to avoid the counter wrapping. In any case, my apologies to Akshar Kanak. (And, of course, I may have bungled my back-of-the-envelope calculations again...)

> But if the starting value is random, the number of increments
> before overflow or wrap will be random too (and could
> hypothetically, but rarely, be as little as 1).

It should be computed modulo 2**32 (i.e. as an unsigned 64-bit integer). It's not overflow or wrapping past the maximum value that would be a problem; it's wrapping all the way back around so a value is repeated.

I note that the recently revealed CIA guidelines for using cryptography (part of Year Zero) say the counter should always start at 0. (The explicit nonce is supposed to avoid ever using the same IV twice with a given key in GCM.)

> Anyway, I thought TLS records were limited to slightly more than
> 16K each, so the in-record block counter would not count very far.

Perhaps it's too late, or perhaps I'm just being dense, but I'm not sure what you're getting at with this.

RFC 5246 says the TLSv1.2 record sequence number is a 64-bit value, that it starts at 0, and that if it would wrap you have to renegotiate (or start another six-hundred-year conversation, I guess).

Probably I'm just misunderstanding your point here though.

Michael Wojcik 
Distinguished Engineer, Micro Focus 


From jb-openssl at wisemo.com  Fri Mar 10 04:42:45 2017
From: jb-openssl at wisemo.com (Jakob Bohm)
Date: Fri, 10 Mar 2017 05:42:45 +0100
Subject: [openssl-users] [AES-GCM] TLS packet nounce_explicit overflow
In-Reply-To: <B550B44BF8AF314BB00C4E2AC1C18088018C44EB8C@prvxmb03.microfocus.com>
References: <CALh=J_cC-nrJnZVnNba3y+fe6QFH9gaJ9p089ciUhtSP7vMtNA@mail.gmail.com>
 <2c539e663d554fb69e0138af2c454b4d@usma1ex-dag1mb1.msg.corp.akamai.com>
 <B550B44BF8AF314BB00C4E2AC1C18088018C44E4A6@prvxmb03.microfocus.com>
 <7d399906-36a1-c480-2edf-570d286526ab@wisemo.com>
 <B550B44BF8AF314BB00C4E2AC1C18088018C44EB8C@prvxmb03.microfocus.com>
Message-ID: <eb7edfa3-9ce1-5f49-10fd-e6df14cebdaa@wisemo.com>

On 10/03/2017 04:34, Michael Wojcik wrote:
>> From: openssl-users [mailto:openssl-users-bounces at openssl.org] On Behalf
>> Of Jakob Bohm
>> Sent: Thursday, March 09, 2017 19:05
>> To: openssl-users at openssl.org
>> Subject: Re: [openssl-users] [AES-GCM] TLS packet nounce_explicit overflow
> First, note my original calculation was wrong - I was thinking the counter was 64 bits. In fact the nonce is 64 bits, and the counter is 32. So even if you only generate one packet per millisecond, you could wrap in under 50 days.
>
> Can you send a packet per millisecond? Let's assume Ethernet framing, TCP, and IPv4. That's 64 bytes of overhead. TLS adds around 45 bytes of overhead to each packet. I can't be bothered to check now, but let's assume you can send a TLS packet with no application data, so that's 109 bytes per packet. At one per millisecond that's 8.72e5 b/s, so network bandwith isn't a problem (we'll assume this is over a LAN). Can the receiver keep up? (We can't sustain the rate if the receiver's window keeps filling.) Let's hope so; the node's not much use if it can't keep up with its network interface. (Also assume we've disabled Nagle.)
>
> Now, 50 days is still a rather long-lived conversation. Maybe we can do one or two orders of magnitude better. We're still fine on bandwidth (for a LAN), so should still be OK on the receiver's stack as well. OpenSSL should be able to verify and decrypt 100,000 messages a second on modern hardware, I'd think; I've never bothered to benchmark that, but it can certainly do the individual operations much faster.
>
> So now we're down to about 11 hours. At this point we seem to have a legitimate concern; not for every application, but for some, certainly.
>
> I haven't looked to see what the RFC says about AES with GCM combining and what measures implementations should take to avoid the counter wrapping. In any case, my apologies to Akshar Kanak. (And, of course, I may have bungled my back-of-the-envelope calculations again...)
>
>> But if the starting value is random, the number of increments
>> before overflow or wrap will be random too (and could
>> hypothetically, but rarely, be as little as 1).
> It should be computed modulo 2**32 (i.e. as an unsigned 64-bit integer). It's not overflow or wrapping past the maximum value that would be a problem; it's wrapping all the way back around so a value is repeated.
But that's not what you asked, and doing circular mod 2**bitsize is
a good solution as long as you don't go full circle.
> I note that the recently revealed CIA guidelines for using cryptography (part of Year Zero) say the counter should always start at 0. (The explicit nonce is supposed to avoid ever using the same IV twice with a given key in GCM.)
I assumed the counter started at 0 for each record and the 64 bit
value was the one incremented.

>> Anyway, I thought TLS records were limited to slightly more than
>> 16K each, so the in-record block counter would not count very far.
> Perhaps it's too late, or perhaps I'm just being dense, but I'm not sure what you're getting at with this.
>
> RFC 5246 says the TLSv1.2 record sequence number is a 64-bit value, that it starts at 0, and that if it would wrap you have to renegotiate (or start another six-hundred-year conversation, I guess).
>
> Probably I'm just misunderstanding your point here though.
I seem to recall (I haven't looked at GCM details in years) that
the 128 bit value is incremented for each 128 bit block of plaintext,
plus once more for the mac-like tag.

 From this I assumed the 32 bit field was the per-128-bit counter and the
64 bit field you asked about was the per-record counter.

Enjoy

Jakob
-- 
Jakob Bohm, CIO, Partner, WiseMo A/S.  https://www.wisemo.com
Transformervej 29, 2860 S?borg, Denmark.  Direct +45 31 13 16 10
This public discussion message is non-binding and may contain errors.
WiseMo - Remote Service Management for PCs, Phones and Embedded


From Jochen.Bern at binect.de  Fri Mar 10 11:58:24 2017
From: Jochen.Bern at binect.de (Jochen Bern)
Date: Fri, 10 Mar 2017 12:58:24 +0100
Subject: [openssl-users] scripting creating a cert
In-Reply-To: <mailman.577.1489104643.2180.openssl-users@openssl.org>
References: <mailman.577.1489104643.2180.openssl-users@openssl.org>
Message-ID: <54ed6a10-5815-b26e-00b9-2fb1d0ecb457@binect.de>

On 03/10/2017 01:10 AM, openssl-users-request at openssl.org digested:
> Thing is that this then prompts for a number of fields:
[...]
> Is there some 'simple' way to provide these answers?  Like with env 
> variables?

Yes, and as others have already pointed out, there's also the
possibility of command line parameters given to OpenSSL.

A publicly available set of scripts that makes heavy use of the env var
method and might serve as an example would be easyRSA (here, version 3):

> # grep EASYRSA_REQ_ openssl-1.0.cnf 
> commonName_default      = $ENV::EASYRSA_REQ_CN
> countryName_default             = $ENV::EASYRSA_REQ_COUNTRY
> stateOrProvinceName_default     = $ENV::EASYRSA_REQ_PROVINCE
> localityName_default            = $ENV::EASYRSA_REQ_CITY
> 0.organizationName_default      = $ENV::EASYRSA_REQ_ORG
> organizationalUnitName_default  = $ENV::EASYRSA_REQ_OU
> commonName_default              = $ENV::EASYRSA_REQ_CN
> emailAddress_default            = $ENV::EASYRSA_REQ_EMAIL

> # grep EASYRSA_REQ_ easyrsa | grep -v ';;'
>         [ $EASYRSA_BATCH ] && opts="$opts -batch" || export EASYRSA_REQ_CN="Easy-RSA CA"
>         [ ! $EASYRSA_BATCH ] && EASYRSA_REQ_CN="$1"
>         EASYRSA_REQ_CN="$name"
>         set_var EASYRSA_REQ_COUNTRY     "US"
>         set_var EASYRSA_REQ_PROVINCE    "California"
>         set_var EASYRSA_REQ_CITY        "San Francisco"
>         set_var EASYRSA_REQ_ORG         "Copyleft Certificate Co"
>         set_var EASYRSA_REQ_EMAIL       me at example.net
>         set_var EASYRSA_REQ_OU          "My Organizational Unit"
>         set_var EASYRSA_REQ_CN          ChangeMe

https://github.com/OpenVPN/easy-rsa

Kind regards,
-- 
Jochen Bern
Systemingenieur

-------------- next part --------------
A non-text attachment was scrubbed...
Name: smime.p7s
Type: application/pkcs7-signature
Size: 4278 bytes
Desc: S/MIME Cryptographic Signature
URL: <http://mta.openssl.org/pipermail/openssl-users/attachments/20170310/4fe9e4b3/attachment.bin>

From rgm at htt-consult.com  Fri Mar 10 13:24:57 2017
From: rgm at htt-consult.com (Robert Moskowitz)
Date: Fri, 10 Mar 2017 08:24:57 -0500
Subject: [openssl-users] scripting creating a cert
In-Reply-To: <54ed6a10-5815-b26e-00b9-2fb1d0ecb457@binect.de>
References: <mailman.577.1489104643.2180.openssl-users@openssl.org>
 <54ed6a10-5815-b26e-00b9-2fb1d0ecb457@binect.de>
Message-ID: <709e17e7-f1dd-6c22-dfef-63cff87ab0d0@htt-consult.com>

Very nice.  But this looks like it as part of the whole easyRSA effort, 
not something I can easily feed into the openssl command to create the 
cert.  It would take a fair bit of digging to dig out what I need for now.

Definitely something I will look into soon, as providing a simple PKI 
for a small installation has long been on my list.  But the effort name 
is limiting.  What about ECDSA and EDDSA certs?  :)

On 03/10/2017 06:58 AM, Jochen Bern wrote:
> On 03/10/2017 01:10 AM, openssl-users-request at openssl.org digested:
>> Thing is that this then prompts for a number of fields:
> [...]
>> Is there some 'simple' way to provide these answers?  Like with env
>> variables?
> Yes, and as others have already pointed out, there's also the
> possibility of command line parameters given to OpenSSL.
>
> A publicly available set of scripts that makes heavy use of the env var
> method and might serve as an example would be easyRSA (here, version 3):
>
>> # grep EASYRSA_REQ_ openssl-1.0.cnf
>> commonName_default      = $ENV::EASYRSA_REQ_CN
>> countryName_default             = $ENV::EASYRSA_REQ_COUNTRY
>> stateOrProvinceName_default     = $ENV::EASYRSA_REQ_PROVINCE
>> localityName_default            = $ENV::EASYRSA_REQ_CITY
>> 0.organizationName_default      = $ENV::EASYRSA_REQ_ORG
>> organizationalUnitName_default  = $ENV::EASYRSA_REQ_OU
>> commonName_default              = $ENV::EASYRSA_REQ_CN
>> emailAddress_default            = $ENV::EASYRSA_REQ_EMAIL
>> # grep EASYRSA_REQ_ easyrsa | grep -v ';;'
>>          [ $EASYRSA_BATCH ] && opts="$opts -batch" || export EASYRSA_REQ_CN="Easy-RSA CA"
>>          [ ! $EASYRSA_BATCH ] && EASYRSA_REQ_CN="$1"
>>          EASYRSA_REQ_CN="$name"
>>          set_var EASYRSA_REQ_COUNTRY     "US"
>>          set_var EASYRSA_REQ_PROVINCE    "California"
>>          set_var EASYRSA_REQ_CITY        "San Francisco"
>>          set_var EASYRSA_REQ_ORG         "Copyleft Certificate Co"
>>          set_var EASYRSA_REQ_EMAIL       me at example.net
>>          set_var EASYRSA_REQ_OU          "My Organizational Unit"
>>          set_var EASYRSA_REQ_CN          ChangeMe
> https://github.com/OpenVPN/easy-rsa
>
> Kind regards,
>
>

-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
URL: <http://mta.openssl.org/pipermail/openssl-users/attachments/20170310/df1bde47/attachment-0001.html>

From Michael.Wojcik at microfocus.com  Fri Mar 10 14:55:54 2017
From: Michael.Wojcik at microfocus.com (Michael Wojcik)
Date: Fri, 10 Mar 2017 14:55:54 +0000
Subject: [openssl-users] [AES-GCM] TLS packet nounce_explicit overflow
In-Reply-To: <eb7edfa3-9ce1-5f49-10fd-e6df14cebdaa@wisemo.com>
References: <CALh=J_cC-nrJnZVnNba3y+fe6QFH9gaJ9p089ciUhtSP7vMtNA@mail.gmail.com>
 <2c539e663d554fb69e0138af2c454b4d@usma1ex-dag1mb1.msg.corp.akamai.com>
 <B550B44BF8AF314BB00C4E2AC1C18088018C44E4A6@prvxmb03.microfocus.com>
 <7d399906-36a1-c480-2edf-570d286526ab@wisemo.com>
 <B550B44BF8AF314BB00C4E2AC1C18088018C44EB8C@prvxmb03.microfocus.com>
 <eb7edfa3-9ce1-5f49-10fd-e6df14cebdaa@wisemo.com>
Message-ID: <B550B44BF8AF314BB00C4E2AC1C18088018C44F2CD@prvxmb03.microfocus.com>

> From: openssl-users [mailto:openssl-users-bounces at openssl.org] On Behalf
> Of Jakob Bohm
> Sent: Thursday, March 09, 2017 21:43
> To: openssl-users at openssl.org
> Subject: Re: [openssl-users] [AES-GCM] TLS packet nounce_explicit overflow
> 
> I seem to recall (I haven't looked at GCM details in years) that
> the 128 bit value is incremented for each 128 bit block of plaintext,
> plus once more for the mac-like tag.

I'll have to check the spec myself; I haven't read it in years either.

>  From this I assumed the 32 bit field was the per-128-bit counter and the
> 64 bit field you asked about was the per-record counter.

A minor correction - it wasn't my question. I had followed up after Rich's initial reply. But no matter; it's a discussion now.

Thanks,
Michael Wojcik 
Distinguished Engineer, Micro Focus 




From tantalum73 at gmail.com  Fri Mar 10 20:42:01 2017
From: tantalum73 at gmail.com (Ta Chen)
Date: Fri, 10 Mar 2017 15:42:01 -0500
Subject: [openssl-users] using OpenSSL on Android
Message-ID: <034a01d299de$c5e4eeb0$51aecc10$@gmail.com>

Hi,

 

I am trying to write a JAVA program to establish a TLS client connection to
a server using openssl FIPS object module on an Android platform.

I understand on a high level that I will have to build the FIPS module and
write a JNI wrapper to allow the openssl routines to be invoked from JAVA
and pass results back. But I am not quite clear about the specifics. In
particular, since the private key cannot be extracted in JAVA, how does one
give openssl the necessary key materials to use in the TLS handshaking? Do I
have to go into the handshaking process and graft the the JAVA part into it?

 

Any help will be appreciated.

 

Thanks

Jason

 

-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
URL: <http://mta.openssl.org/pipermail/openssl-users/attachments/20170310/b266f499/attachment.html>

From ethan.rahn at gmail.com  Fri Mar 10 20:58:41 2017
From: ethan.rahn at gmail.com (Ethan Rahn)
Date: Fri, 10 Mar 2017 12:58:41 -0800
Subject: [openssl-users] EVP_PKEY_set1_EC_KEY seems to not set something
	that EVP_PKEY_derive needs
Message-ID: <CAEW9rAjmZ4bdr0YTkicidkT3DL+b205zJLjCTX02BYGjDXCsYg@mail.gmail.com>

Hello Openssl-users,

I'm trying to write some code that derives the shared secret for 2 elliptic
curve keys ( i.e. does ECDH )

I am doing the following to load up both the local and remote EC key ( code
shown for local side ):

EC_KEY* localEC = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name( curveName );
EC_KEY_set_private_key( localEC, privateKeyLocal )
EC_KEY_set_public_key_affine_coordinates( localEC, publicXCoordLocal,
publicYCoordLocal )

I check the return values for all of these, as well as EC_KEY_check_key at
the end. Everything returns non-zero, so I assume that it is good to go. I
then do the following to turn the EC_KEY into an EVP_PKEY for ECDH:

pkey = EVP_PKEY_new();
EVP_PKEY_set1_EC_KEY( *pkey, localEC );

The same is done for the remote EC, except that the private key is not
loaded up.

Now this is where things get weird.

I run code pretty similar to the example given here ( starting from
EVP_PKEY_CTX_new() since I already have the pkey and peerkey. (
https://wiki.openssl.org/index.php/Elliptic_Curve_Diffie_Hellman ) and it
fails on the call to EVP_PKEY_derive()without an error message. I tried
running into under gdb() and it gets to ecdh_check() before it's unable to
fill in the ecdh_data structure, i.e. it returns it as NULL.

If I use the example code to generate the local EVP_PKEY with a random set
of points on the correct curve, then run the following line, the key
derivation will work with the parameters I read in:
( in this example, pkey is as in the example code, i.e. generated randomly.
pkey2 is the one I made via EVP_PKEY_set1_EC_KEY )

EVP_PKEY_set1_EC_KEY( pkey, EVP_PKEY_get1_EC_KEY( pkey2 ) );

It would appear that there is something that EVP_PKEY_set1_EC_KEY is not
setting, or perhaps that I need to add, but I'm unclear what that would be.
Does anyone on this list have any ideas?

Much thanks,

Ethan
-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
URL: <http://mta.openssl.org/pipermail/openssl-users/attachments/20170310/696dfb15/attachment.html>

From matt at openssl.org  Fri Mar 10 21:44:29 2017
From: matt at openssl.org (Matt Caswell)
Date: Fri, 10 Mar 2017 21:44:29 +0000
Subject: [openssl-users] EVP_PKEY_set1_EC_KEY seems to not set something
 that EVP_PKEY_derive needs
In-Reply-To: <CAEW9rAjmZ4bdr0YTkicidkT3DL+b205zJLjCTX02BYGjDXCsYg@mail.gmail.com>
References: <CAEW9rAjmZ4bdr0YTkicidkT3DL+b205zJLjCTX02BYGjDXCsYg@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <2ef2d91b-75c6-8e33-fcf3-8a85810cc00d@openssl.org>



On 10/03/17 20:58, Ethan Rahn wrote:
> Hello Openssl-users,
> 
> I'm trying to write some code that derives the shared secret for 2
> elliptic curve keys ( i.e. does ECDH )
> 
> I am doing the following to load up both the local and remote EC key (
> code shown for local side ):
> 
> EC_KEY* localEC = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name( curveName );
> EC_KEY_set_private_key( localEC, privateKeyLocal )
> EC_KEY_set_public_key_affine_coordinates( localEC, publicXCoordLocal,
> publicYCoordLocal ) 
> 
> I check the return values for all of these, as well as EC_KEY_check_key
> at the end. Everything returns non-zero, so I assume that it is good to
> go. I then do the following to turn the EC_KEY into an EVP_PKEY for ECDH:
> 
> pkey = EVP_PKEY_new();
> EVP_PKEY_set1_EC_KEY( *pkey, localEC );
> 
> The same is done for the remote EC, except that the private key is not
> loaded up.
> 
> Now this is where things get weird.
> 
> I run code pretty similar to the example given here ( starting from
> EVP_PKEY_CTX_new() since I already have the pkey and peerkey. (
> https://wiki.openssl.org/index.php/Elliptic_Curve_Diffie_Hellman ) and
> it fails on the call to EVP_PKEY_derive()without an error message. I
> tried running into under gdb() and it gets to ecdh_check() before it's
> unable to fill in the ecdh_data structure, i.e. it returns it as NULL.
> 
> If I use the example code to generate the local EVP_PKEY with a random
> set of points on the correct curve, then run the following line, the key
> derivation will work with the parameters I read in:
> ( in this example, pkey is as in the example code, i.e. generated
> randomly. pkey2 is the one I made via EVP_PKEY_set1_EC_KEY )
> 
> EVP_PKEY_set1_EC_KEY( pkey, EVP_PKEY_get1_EC_KEY( pkey2 ) );
> 
> It would appear that there is something that EVP_PKEY_set1_EC_KEY is not
> setting, or perhaps that I need to add, but I'm unclear what that would
> be. Does anyone on this list have any ideas?

Which version of OpenSSL are you using?

Can you provide a simple reproducer of the problem?

Matt


From brian at virtru.com  Fri Mar 10 22:40:21 2017
From: brian at virtru.com (Brian Jost)
Date: Fri, 10 Mar 2017 15:40:21 -0700
Subject: [openssl-users] fips_premain arch invalid
Message-ID: <CAK0RZ3ouHHXCGDfgDKhDvaPN4uZyfApQ9VouaBxB_v7QMaTjqw@mail.gmail.com>

I have updated my iOS scripts to build for all archs now using the latest
fips-2.0.14 and openssl-1.1.0e.

Before I was using 1.0.2h I believe and fips-2.0.12 and didn't have armv7s
support added. I needed to add it so I upgrade and adjusted my script
accordingly
https://gist.github.com/jostster/ebbc6925c668b632d8b185293080256c

This works great, however I now get an error when building my application
in xcode.

Undefined symbols for architecture armv7:

  "_FIPS_text_start", referenced from:

      _FINGERPRINT_premain in fips_premain.o

  "_FIPS_signature", referenced from:

      _FINGERPRINT_premain in fips_premain.o

      +[VTFipsInfo getEmbeddedFingerprint] in VTFipsInfo.o

  "_FIPS_incore_fingerprint", referenced from:

      _FINGERPRINT_premain in fips_premain.o

      +[VTFipsInfo getExpectedFingerprint] in VTFipsInfo.o

ld: symbol(s) not found for architecture armv7


VTFipsInfo.o is my objective-c files that get if FIPS is enabled and gets
the hashes to display to the end user. If I try this on our buildkite
server it replaces armv7 with x86_64. However running lipo --info on my
libssl and libcrypt.a returns

Architectures in the fat file: libssl.a are: armv7 i386 armv7s x86_64 arm64
Architectures in the fat file: libcrypto.a are: armv7 i386 armv7s x86_64
arm64

My valid architectures in xcode are armv7, armv7s and armv64. Before I
upgraded my openssl and added armv7s support, this wasn't an issue.


Any ideas how to fix this?
-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
URL: <http://mta.openssl.org/pipermail/openssl-users/attachments/20170310/08d43fbe/attachment.html>

From doctor at doctor.nl2k.ab.ca  Sat Mar 11 06:38:06 2017
From: doctor at doctor.nl2k.ab.ca (The Doctor)
Date: Fri, 10 Mar 2017 23:38:06 -0700
Subject: [openssl-users] Openssl 1.0.2 snap STABLE 20170311 issue
Message-ID: <20170311063806.GA39422@doctor.nl2k.ab.ca>


Script started on Fri Mar 10 23:31:39 2017
You have mail.
root at doctor:/usr/source/openssl-1.0.2-stable-SNAP-20170311 # make

making all in crypto...
making all in crypto/objects...
making all in crypto/md4...
making all in crypto/md5...
making all in crypto/sha...
making all in crypto/mdc2...
making all in crypto/hmac...
making all in crypto/ripemd...
making all in crypto/whrlpool...
making all in crypto/des...
making all in crypto/aes...
making all in crypto/rc2...
making all in crypto/rc4...
making all in crypto/idea...
making all in crypto/bf...
making all in crypto/cast...
making all in crypto/camellia...
making all in crypto/seed...
making all in crypto/modes...
making all in crypto/bn...
making all in crypto/ec...
making all in crypto/rsa...
making all in crypto/dsa...
making all in crypto/ecdsa...
making all in crypto/dh...
making all in crypto/ecdh...
making all in crypto/dso...
making all in crypto/engine...
making all in crypto/buffer...
making all in crypto/bio...
making all in crypto/stack...
making all in crypto/lhash...
making all in crypto/rand...
making all in crypto/err...
making all in crypto/evp...
making all in crypto/asn1...
making all in crypto/pem...
making all in crypto/x509...
making all in crypto/x509v3...
making all in crypto/conf...
making all in crypto/txt_db...
making all in crypto/pkcs7...
making all in crypto/pkcs12...
making all in crypto/comp...
making all in crypto/ocsp...
making all in crypto/ui...
making all in crypto/krb5...
making all in crypto/cms...
making all in crypto/pqueue...
making all in crypto/ts...
making all in crypto/jpake...
making all in crypto/srp...
making all in crypto/store...
making all in crypto/cmac...
if [ -n "libcrypto.so.1.0.0 libssl.so.1.0.0" ]; then  (cd ..; make libcrypto.so.1.0.0);  fi
`libcrypto.so.1.0.0' is up to date.
making all in engines...
echo 

making all in engines/ccgost...
making all in ssl...
/usr/local/bin/clang39 -I../crypto -I.. -I../include  -fPIC -DOPENSSL_PIC -DZLIB_SHARED -DZLIB -DOPENSSL_THREADS -pthread -D_THREAD_SAFE -D_REENTRANT -DDSO_DLFCN -DHAVE_DLFCN_H -DL_ENDIAN -O3 -Wall -DOPENSSL_EXPERIMENTAL_JPAKE -DOPENSSL_EXPERIMENTAL_STORE -DOPENSSL_IA32_SSE2 -DOPENSSL_BN_ASM_MONT -DOPENSSL_BN_ASM_MONT5 -DOPENSSL_BN_ASM_GF2m -I/usr/local/ssl/fips-2.0/include -DRC4_ASM -DSHA1_ASM -DSHA256_ASM -DSHA512_ASM -DMD5_ASM -DAES_ASM -DVPAES_ASM -DBSAES_ASM -DWHIRLPOOL_ASM -DGHASH_ASM -DECP_NISTZ256_ASM -c ssl_rsa.c -o ssl_rsa.o
ssl_rsa.c:105:46: error: no member named 'default_passwd_callback' in
      'struct ssl_st'
        x = PEM_read_bio_X509(in, NULL, ssl->default_passwd_callback,
                                        ~~~  ^
ssl_rsa.c:106:36: error: no member named 'default_passwd_callback_userdata' in
      'struct ssl_st'
                              ssl->default_passwd_callback_userdata);
                              ~~~  ^
ssl_rsa.c:264:47: error: no member named 'default_passwd_callback' in
      'struct ssl_st'
                                         ssl->default_passwd_callback,
                                         ~~~  ^
ssl_rsa.c:265:47: error: no member named 'default_passwd_callback_userdata' in
      'struct ssl_st'
                                         ssl->default_passwd_callback_userdata);
                                         ~~~  ^
ssl_rsa.c:337:45: error: no member named 'default_passwd_callback' in
      'struct ssl_st'
                                       ssl->default_passwd_callback,
                                       ~~~  ^
ssl_rsa.c:338:45: error: no member named 'default_passwd_callback_userdata' in
      'struct ssl_st'
                                       ssl->default_passwd_callback_userdata);
                                       ~~~  ^
6 errors generated.
*** Error code 1

Stop.
make[1]: stopped in /usr/source/openssl-1.0.2-stable-SNAP-20170311/ssl
*** Error code 1

Stop.
make: stopped in /usr/source/openssl-1.0.2-stable-SNAP-20170311
root at doctor:/usr/source/openssl-1.0.2-stable-SNAP-20170311 # exit

exit

Script done on Fri Mar 10 23:36:32 2017

Please fix.

-- 
Member - Liberal International This is doctor@@nl2k.ab.ca Ici doctor@@nl2k.ab.ca
Yahweh, Queen & country!Never Satan President Republic!Beware AntiChrist rising!
http://www.fullyfollow.me/rootnl2k  Look at Psalms 14 and 53 on Atheism
God is dead! Yahweh lives! Jesus his only begotten Son is the Risen Saviour!!

From levitte at openssl.org  Sat Mar 11 10:28:01 2017
From: levitte at openssl.org (Richard Levitte)
Date: Sat, 11 Mar 2017 11:28:01 +0100 (CET)
Subject: [openssl-users] [openssl-dev] Openssl 1.0.2 snap STABLE
	20170311 issue
In-Reply-To: <20170311063806.GA39422@doctor.nl2k.ab.ca>
References: <20170311063806.GA39422@doctor.nl2k.ab.ca>
Message-ID: <20170311.112801.1371123433919726889.levitte@openssl.org>

Fixed:

    commit 6fe43af8d77b119f8af913c284149bca482ee58c
    Author: Richard Levitte <levitte at openssl.org>
    Date:   Sat Mar 11 11:19:20 2017 +0100
    
        Revert "Use the callbacks from the SSL object instead of the SSL_CTX object"
        
        This shouldn't have been applied to the 1.0.2 branch.
        
        This reverts commit 5247c0388610bfdcc8f44b777d75ab681120753d.
        
        Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh at openssl.org>
        (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/2907)

Cheers,
Richard

In message <20170311063806.GA39422 at doctor.nl2k.ab.ca> on Fri, 10 Mar 2017 23:38:06 -0700, The Doctor <doctor at doctor.nl2k.ab.ca> said:

doctor> 
doctor> Script started on Fri Mar 10 23:31:39 2017
doctor> You have mail.
doctor> root at doctor:/usr/source/openssl-1.0.2-stable-SNAP-20170311 # make
doctor> 
doctor> making all in crypto...
doctor> making all in crypto/objects...
doctor> making all in crypto/md4...
doctor> making all in crypto/md5...
doctor> making all in crypto/sha...
doctor> making all in crypto/mdc2...
doctor> making all in crypto/hmac...
doctor> making all in crypto/ripemd...
doctor> making all in crypto/whrlpool...
doctor> making all in crypto/des...
doctor> making all in crypto/aes...
doctor> making all in crypto/rc2...
doctor> making all in crypto/rc4...
doctor> making all in crypto/idea...
doctor> making all in crypto/bf...
doctor> making all in crypto/cast...
doctor> making all in crypto/camellia...
doctor> making all in crypto/seed...
doctor> making all in crypto/modes...
doctor> making all in crypto/bn...
doctor> making all in crypto/ec...
doctor> making all in crypto/rsa...
doctor> making all in crypto/dsa...
doctor> making all in crypto/ecdsa...
doctor> making all in crypto/dh...
doctor> making all in crypto/ecdh...
doctor> making all in crypto/dso...
doctor> making all in crypto/engine...
doctor> making all in crypto/buffer...
doctor> making all in crypto/bio...
doctor> making all in crypto/stack...
doctor> making all in crypto/lhash...
doctor> making all in crypto/rand...
doctor> making all in crypto/err...
doctor> making all in crypto/evp...
doctor> making all in crypto/asn1...
doctor> making all in crypto/pem...
doctor> making all in crypto/x509...
doctor> making all in crypto/x509v3...
doctor> making all in crypto/conf...
doctor> making all in crypto/txt_db...
doctor> making all in crypto/pkcs7...
doctor> making all in crypto/pkcs12...
doctor> making all in crypto/comp...
doctor> making all in crypto/ocsp...
doctor> making all in crypto/ui...
doctor> making all in crypto/krb5...
doctor> making all in crypto/cms...
doctor> making all in crypto/pqueue...
doctor> making all in crypto/ts...
doctor> making all in crypto/jpake...
doctor> making all in crypto/srp...
doctor> making all in crypto/store...
doctor> making all in crypto/cmac...
doctor> if [ -n "libcrypto.so.1.0.0 libssl.so.1.0.0" ]; then  (cd ..; make libcrypto.so.1.0.0);  fi
doctor> `libcrypto.so.1.0.0' is up to date.
doctor> making all in engines...
doctor> echo 
doctor> 
doctor> making all in engines/ccgost...
doctor> making all in ssl...
doctor> /usr/local/bin/clang39 -I../crypto -I.. -I../include  -fPIC -DOPENSSL_PIC -DZLIB_SHARED -DZLIB -DOPENSSL_THREADS -pthread -D_THREAD_SAFE -D_REENTRANT -DDSO_DLFCN -DHAVE_DLFCN_H -DL_ENDIAN -O3 -Wall -DOPENSSL_EXPERIMENTAL_JPAKE -DOPENSSL_EXPERIMENTAL_STORE -DOPENSSL_IA32_SSE2 -DOPENSSL_BN_ASM_MONT -DOPENSSL_BN_ASM_MONT5 -DOPENSSL_BN_ASM_GF2m -I/usr/local/ssl/fips-2.0/include -DRC4_ASM -DSHA1_ASM -DSHA256_ASM -DSHA512_ASM -DMD5_ASM -DAES_ASM -DVPAES_ASM -DBSAES_ASM -DWHIRLPOOL_ASM -DGHASH_ASM -DECP_NISTZ256_ASM -c ssl_rsa.c -o ssl_rsa.o
doctor> ssl_rsa.c:105:46: error: no member named 'default_passwd_callback' in
doctor>       'struct ssl_st'
doctor>         x = PEM_read_bio_X509(in, NULL, ssl->default_passwd_callback,
doctor>                                         ~~~  ^
doctor> ssl_rsa.c:106:36: error: no member named 'default_passwd_callback_userdata' in
doctor>       'struct ssl_st'
doctor>                               ssl->default_passwd_callback_userdata);
doctor>                               ~~~  ^
doctor> ssl_rsa.c:264:47: error: no member named 'default_passwd_callback' in
doctor>       'struct ssl_st'
doctor>                                          ssl->default_passwd_callback,
doctor>                                          ~~~  ^
doctor> ssl_rsa.c:265:47: error: no member named 'default_passwd_callback_userdata' in
doctor>       'struct ssl_st'
doctor>                                          ssl->default_passwd_callback_userdata);
doctor>                                          ~~~  ^
doctor> ssl_rsa.c:337:45: error: no member named 'default_passwd_callback' in
doctor>       'struct ssl_st'
doctor>                                        ssl->default_passwd_callback,
doctor>                                        ~~~  ^
doctor> ssl_rsa.c:338:45: error: no member named 'default_passwd_callback_userdata' in
doctor>       'struct ssl_st'
doctor>                                        ssl->default_passwd_callback_userdata);
doctor>                                        ~~~  ^
doctor> 6 errors generated.
doctor> *** Error code 1
doctor> 
doctor> Stop.
doctor> make[1]: stopped in /usr/source/openssl-1.0.2-stable-SNAP-20170311/ssl
doctor> *** Error code 1
doctor> 
doctor> Stop.
doctor> make: stopped in /usr/source/openssl-1.0.2-stable-SNAP-20170311
doctor> root at doctor:/usr/source/openssl-1.0.2-stable-SNAP-20170311 # exit
doctor> 
doctor> exit
doctor> 
doctor> Script done on Fri Mar 10 23:36:32 2017
doctor> 
doctor> Please fix.
doctor> 
doctor> -- 
doctor> Member - Liberal International This is doctor@@nl2k.ab.ca Ici doctor@@nl2k.ab.ca
doctor> Yahweh, Queen & country!Never Satan President Republic!Beware AntiChrist rising!
doctor> http://www.fullyfollow.me/rootnl2k  Look at Psalms 14 and 53 on Atheism
doctor> God is dead! Yahweh lives! Jesus his only begotten Son is the Risen Saviour!!
doctor> -- 
doctor> openssl-dev mailing list
doctor> To unsubscribe: https://mta.openssl.org/mailman/listinfo/openssl-dev
doctor> 

From sisyphus1 at optusnet.com.au  Sat Mar 11 11:21:05 2017
From: sisyphus1 at optusnet.com.au (sisyphus1 at optusnet.com.au)
Date: Sat, 11 Mar 2017 22:21:05 +1100
Subject: [openssl-users] mingw 64-bit build of 1.1.0e
Message-ID: <947E3E0C7B5E4C5A97C3506B97EBC133@OwnerPC311012>

Hi,

Having a spot of bother trying to build a static openssl-1.1.0e using a
mingw-w64 64-bit compiler - namely, gcc version 6.3.0
(x86_64-posix-sjlj-rev1, Built by MinGW-W64 project).

In the msys2 shell, I run:

./config no-shared
zlib -IC:/_64/msys_630/1.0/local/include -LC:/_64/msys_630/1.0/local/lib --prefix=C:/_64/msys_630/1.0/local
&& make && make test && make install

Works beautifully ... except that libssl.a and libcrypto.a turn out to be
32-bit builds !!
That is, the built library works fine with the same vendor's 32-bit compiler
(gcc version 6.3.0 (i686-posix-sjlj-rev1, Built by MinGW-W64 project)), but
the x64 compiler that built the damned things regards them as incompatible.

I'm thinking that I just need to specify an -m64 switch in there. How do I
do that ?

I did try adding the 'os/compiler:mingw64' to the ./config args, but that
resulted in:

$ ./config no-shared
zlib -IC:/_64/msys_630/1.0/local/include -LC:/_64/msys_630/1.0/local/lib --prefix=C:/_64/msys_630/1.0/local
os/compiler:mingw64 && make && make test && make install
Operating system: x86_64-whatever-mingw
Configuring for mingw
Configuring OpenSSL version 1.1.0e (0x1010005fL)
target already defined - mingw (offending arg: os/compiler:mingw64)

Having spent quite a few hours just getting to this diagnosis, I've now
settled for simply asking the dumb question.
(Sorry.)

Cheers,
Rob 


From ethan.rahn at gmail.com  Sat Mar 11 18:38:14 2017
From: ethan.rahn at gmail.com (Ethan Rahn)
Date: Sat, 11 Mar 2017 10:38:14 -0800
Subject: [openssl-users] EVP_PKEY_set1_EC_KEY seems to not set something
 that EVP_PKEY_derive needs
In-Reply-To: <2ef2d91b-75c6-8e33-fcf3-8a85810cc00d@openssl.org>
References: <CAEW9rAjmZ4bdr0YTkicidkT3DL+b205zJLjCTX02BYGjDXCsYg@mail.gmail.com>
 <2ef2d91b-75c6-8e33-fcf3-8a85810cc00d@openssl.org>
Message-ID: <CAEW9rAhSpwWNj1zd35n5Vt0o19V-oqka-a7rS3xDv_T0ZPnRqA@mail.gmail.com>

Hey Matt,

I'm using openssl-1.0.2j to do this.

After a lot of debugging and poking around, I realized that my initial
thoughts were not quite correct. Somewhere in trying to come up with an
example, I noticed that the problem actually appears to be the buffer I am
passing in..

If I use a char array, it will fail to derive the shared secret, if I use a
char* it will succeed. I'm not quite sure what is going on there, but I
have some code below that shows the issue:

static int deriveSharedSecret( EVP_PKEY *pkey, EVP_PKEY *peerkey,
                               char *sharedSecretHex ){
   /*
    * Generalized function to derive shared secret and return the hex
format of it.
    */
   unsigned char sharedSecret[ 4096 ] = {0};
   size_t sharedSecretLen = 0;

   // Now derive the Shared Secret
   EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx;

   ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey, NULL);
   if (!ctx){
      fprintf( stderr, "Failed to make EVP_PKEY ctx\n" );
      ERR_load_crypto_strings();
      ERR_print_errors(BIO_new_fp(stderr, BIO_NOCLOSE));
      return 0;
   }
   if (EVP_PKEY_derive_init(ctx) <= 0){
      fprintf( stderr, "Failed to init EVP_PKEY ctx\n" );
      ERR_load_crypto_strings();
      ERR_print_errors(BIO_new_fp(stderr, BIO_NOCLOSE));
      return 0;
   }
   if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(ctx, peerkey) <= 0) {
      fprintf( stderr, "Failed to set EVP_PKEY peer\n" );
      ERR_load_crypto_strings();
      ERR_print_errors(BIO_new_fp(stderr, BIO_NOCLOSE));
      return 0;
   }

   int secretLen = 2048;
   unsigned char *skey;

   /* Create the buffer */
   if(NULL == (skey = OPENSSL_malloc(secretLen))){
      fprintf( stderr, "Failed to malloc buffer for secret\n" );
      return;
   }

   /* Derive the shared secret */
   if(1 != (EVP_PKEY_derive(ctx, skey, &secretLen))){
      fprintf( stderr, "Failed to derive secret and place into buffer\n" );
      return;
   } else {
      fprintf( stderr, "Found the darn secret!\n" );
   }
   if (EVP_PKEY_derive(ctx, sharedSecret, &sharedSecretLen) <= 0){
      fprintf( stderr, "Failed to derive shared secret\n" );
      ERR_load_crypto_strings();
      ERR_print_errors(BIO_new_fp(stderr, BIO_NOCLOSE));
      return 0;
   } else {
      fprintf( stderr, "FOUND IT!!!!!\n" );
   }

   bin2hex( sharedSecret, sharedSecretHex, sharedSecretLen );
   return 1;
}



On Fri, Mar 10, 2017 at 1:44 PM, Matt Caswell <matt at openssl.org> wrote:

>
>
> On 10/03/17 20:58, Ethan Rahn wrote:
> > Hello Openssl-users,
> >
> > I'm trying to write some code that derives the shared secret for 2
> > elliptic curve keys ( i.e. does ECDH )
> >
> > I am doing the following to load up both the local and remote EC key (
> > code shown for local side ):
> >
> > EC_KEY* localEC = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name( curveName );
> > EC_KEY_set_private_key( localEC, privateKeyLocal )
> > EC_KEY_set_public_key_affine_coordinates( localEC, publicXCoordLocal,
> > publicYCoordLocal )
> >
> > I check the return values for all of these, as well as EC_KEY_check_key
> > at the end. Everything returns non-zero, so I assume that it is good to
> > go. I then do the following to turn the EC_KEY into an EVP_PKEY for ECDH:
> >
> > pkey = EVP_PKEY_new();
> > EVP_PKEY_set1_EC_KEY( *pkey, localEC );
> >
> > The same is done for the remote EC, except that the private key is not
> > loaded up.
> >
> > Now this is where things get weird.
> >
> > I run code pretty similar to the example given here ( starting from
> > EVP_PKEY_CTX_new() since I already have the pkey and peerkey. (
> > https://wiki.openssl.org/index.php/Elliptic_Curve_Diffie_Hellman ) and
> > it fails on the call to EVP_PKEY_derive()without an error message. I
> > tried running into under gdb() and it gets to ecdh_check() before it's
> > unable to fill in the ecdh_data structure, i.e. it returns it as NULL.
> >
> > If I use the example code to generate the local EVP_PKEY with a random
> > set of points on the correct curve, then run the following line, the key
> > derivation will work with the parameters I read in:
> > ( in this example, pkey is as in the example code, i.e. generated
> > randomly. pkey2 is the one I made via EVP_PKEY_set1_EC_KEY )
> >
> > EVP_PKEY_set1_EC_KEY( pkey, EVP_PKEY_get1_EC_KEY( pkey2 ) );
> >
> > It would appear that there is something that EVP_PKEY_set1_EC_KEY is not
> > setting, or perhaps that I need to add, but I'm unclear what that would
> > be. Does anyone on this list have any ideas?
>
> Which version of OpenSSL are you using?
>
> Can you provide a simple reproducer of the problem?
>
> Matt
>
> --
> openssl-users mailing list
> To unsubscribe: https://mta.openssl.org/mailman/listinfo/openssl-users
>
-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
URL: <http://mta.openssl.org/pipermail/openssl-users/attachments/20170311/f7b0d1e0/attachment.html>

From matt at openssl.org  Sat Mar 11 20:28:41 2017
From: matt at openssl.org (Matt Caswell)
Date: Sat, 11 Mar 2017 20:28:41 +0000
Subject: [openssl-users] EVP_PKEY_set1_EC_KEY seems to not set something
 that EVP_PKEY_derive needs
In-Reply-To: <CAEW9rAhSpwWNj1zd35n5Vt0o19V-oqka-a7rS3xDv_T0ZPnRqA@mail.gmail.com>
References: <CAEW9rAjmZ4bdr0YTkicidkT3DL+b205zJLjCTX02BYGjDXCsYg@mail.gmail.com>
 <2ef2d91b-75c6-8e33-fcf3-8a85810cc00d@openssl.org>
 <CAEW9rAhSpwWNj1zd35n5Vt0o19V-oqka-a7rS3xDv_T0ZPnRqA@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <619c9426-7ab0-73da-3041-a454b610134c@openssl.org>



On 11/03/17 18:38, Ethan Rahn wrote:
>    size_t sharedSecretLen = 0;

Set this to sizeof(sharedSecret).

> 
>    // Now derive the Shared Secret
>    EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx;
> 
>    ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey, NULL);
>    if (!ctx){
>       fprintf( stderr, "Failed to make EVP_PKEY ctx\n" );
>       ERR_load_crypto_strings();

This should be called once at the start of your program - *before* any
calls that might generate an error.

>    if (EVP_PKEY_derive(ctx, sharedSecret, &sharedSecretLen) <= 0){

>From the EVP_PKEY_derive documentation:

https://www.openssl.org/docs/man1.0.2/crypto/EVP_PKEY_derive.html

"If key is not NULL then before the call the keylen parameter should
contain the length of the key buffer, if the call is successful the
shared secret is written to key and the amount of data written to keylen."

Matt


From ethan.rahn at gmail.com  Sat Mar 11 20:47:58 2017
From: ethan.rahn at gmail.com (Ethan Rahn)
Date: Sat, 11 Mar 2017 12:47:58 -0800
Subject: [openssl-users] EVP_PKEY_set1_EC_KEY seems to not set something
 that EVP_PKEY_derive needs
In-Reply-To: <619c9426-7ab0-73da-3041-a454b610134c@openssl.org>
References: <CAEW9rAjmZ4bdr0YTkicidkT3DL+b205zJLjCTX02BYGjDXCsYg@mail.gmail.com>
 <2ef2d91b-75c6-8e33-fcf3-8a85810cc00d@openssl.org>
 <CAEW9rAhSpwWNj1zd35n5Vt0o19V-oqka-a7rS3xDv_T0ZPnRqA@mail.gmail.com>
 <619c9426-7ab0-73da-3041-a454b610134c@openssl.org>
Message-ID: <CAEW9rAjx8SrZObHVb7Ktj6LDCjaz2=7KFnnG5pm=OotJuhvWeQ@mail.gmail.com>

Wow,

That was quite the oversight of mine. That fixed the issue. Thanks so much,
I appreciate your patience in dealing with my confusion over the APIs!

Cheers,

Ethan

On Sat, Mar 11, 2017 at 12:28 PM, Matt Caswell <matt at openssl.org> wrote:

>
>
> On 11/03/17 18:38, Ethan Rahn wrote:
> >    size_t sharedSecretLen = 0;
>
> Set this to sizeof(sharedSecret).
>
> >
> >    // Now derive the Shared Secret
> >    EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx;
> >
> >    ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey, NULL);
> >    if (!ctx){
> >       fprintf( stderr, "Failed to make EVP_PKEY ctx\n" );
> >       ERR_load_crypto_strings();
>
> This should be called once at the start of your program - *before* any
> calls that might generate an error.
>
> >    if (EVP_PKEY_derive(ctx, sharedSecret, &sharedSecretLen) <= 0){
>
> From the EVP_PKEY_derive documentation:
>
> https://www.openssl.org/docs/man1.0.2/crypto/EVP_PKEY_derive.html
>
> "If key is not NULL then before the call the keylen parameter should
> contain the length of the key buffer, if the call is successful the
> shared secret is written to key and the amount of data written to keylen."
>
> Matt
>
> --
> openssl-users mailing list
> To unsubscribe: https://mta.openssl.org/mailman/listinfo/openssl-users
>
-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
URL: <http://mta.openssl.org/pipermail/openssl-users/attachments/20170311/0550748f/attachment-0001.html>

From sisyphus1 at optusnet.com.au  Sun Mar 12 00:06:35 2017
From: sisyphus1 at optusnet.com.au (sisyphus1 at optusnet.com.au)
Date: Sun, 12 Mar 2017 11:06:35 +1100
Subject: [openssl-users] mingw 64-bit build of 1.1.0e
In-Reply-To: <947E3E0C7B5E4C5A97C3506B97EBC133@OwnerPC311012>
References: <947E3E0C7B5E4C5A97C3506B97EBC133@OwnerPC311012>
Message-ID: <FD22706D2C6E467C90561FC37394BAE7@OwnerPC311012>

-----Original Message----- 
From: sisyphus1 at optusnet.com.au
Sent: Saturday, March 11, 2017 10:21 PM
To: openssl-users at openssl.org
Subject: [openssl-users] mingw 64-bit build of 1.1.0e

> In the msys2 shell, I run:
>
> ./config no-shared 
> zlib -IC:/_64/msys_630/1.0/local/include -LC:/_64/msys_630/1.0/local/lib --prefix=C:/_64/msys_630/1.0/local 
> && make && make test && make install
>
> Works beautifully ... except that libssl.a and libcrypto.a turn out to be 
> 32-bit builds !!
> That is, the built library works fine with the same vendor's 32-bit 
> compiler (gcc version 6.3.0 (i686-posix-sjlj-rev1, Built by MinGW-W64 
> project)), but the x64 compiler that built the damned things regards them 
> as incompatible.
>
> I'm thinking that I just need to specify an -m64 switch in there. How do I 
> do that ?

After another couple of hours fossicking about, I did it by firstly setting 
the CC environment variable to 'gcc -m64'. (I would normally do that by 
specifying 'CC="gcc -m64"' as part of the ./config command, but ./config 
found that to be objectionable, so I pre-set it in a separate command prior 
to running ./config.)
And I added '-m64' as a ./config arg.

I don't know if *both* of those steps were necessary, but it did the trick.

Disconcertingly, the summary at the end of ./config still announces 
"THIRTY_TWO_BIT mode" but, at the end of the build, I definitely have the 
X64 libraries that I wanted.

Cheers,
Rob 


From matt at openssl.org  Sun Mar 12 00:13:57 2017
From: matt at openssl.org (Matt Caswell)
Date: Sun, 12 Mar 2017 00:13:57 +0000
Subject: [openssl-users] mingw 64-bit build of 1.1.0e
In-Reply-To: <FD22706D2C6E467C90561FC37394BAE7@OwnerPC311012>
References: <947E3E0C7B5E4C5A97C3506B97EBC133@OwnerPC311012>
 <FD22706D2C6E467C90561FC37394BAE7@OwnerPC311012>
Message-ID: <c1e97a92-b83c-ceb9-bd4d-a867b4f46613@openssl.org>



On 12/03/17 00:06, sisyphus1 at optusnet.com.au wrote:
> -----Original Message----- From: sisyphus1 at optusnet.com.au
> Sent: Saturday, March 11, 2017 10:21 PM
> To: openssl-users at openssl.org
> Subject: [openssl-users] mingw 64-bit build of 1.1.0e
> 
>> In the msys2 shell, I run:
>>
>> ./config no-shared zlib -IC:/_64/msys_630/1.0/local/include
>> -LC:/_64/msys_630/1.0/local/lib --prefix=C:/_64/msys_630/1.0/local &&
>> make && make test && make install
>>
>> Works beautifully ... except that libssl.a and libcrypto.a turn out to
>> be 32-bit builds !!
>> That is, the built library works fine with the same vendor's 32-bit
>> compiler (gcc version 6.3.0 (i686-posix-sjlj-rev1, Built by MinGW-W64
>> project)), but the x64 compiler that built the damned things regards
>> them as incompatible.
>>
>> I'm thinking that I just need to specify an -m64 switch in there. How
>> do I do that ?
> 
> After another couple of hours fossicking about, I did it by firstly
> setting the CC environment variable to 'gcc -m64'. (I would normally do
> that by specifying 'CC="gcc -m64"' as part of the ./config command, but
> ./config found that to be objectionable, so I pre-set it in a separate
> command prior to running ./config.)
> And I added '-m64' as a ./config arg.
> 
> I don't know if *both* of those steps were necessary, but it did the trick.
> 
> Disconcertingly, the summary at the end of ./config still announces
> "THIRTY_TWO_BIT mode" but, at the end of the build, I definitely have
> the X64 libraries that I wanted.

Did you just try:

perl Configure mingw64 no-shared zlib


Matt


From sisyphus1 at optusnet.com.au  Sun Mar 12 02:18:39 2017
From: sisyphus1 at optusnet.com.au (sisyphus1 at optusnet.com.au)
Date: Sun, 12 Mar 2017 13:18:39 +1100
Subject: [openssl-users] mingw 64-bit build of 1.1.0e
In-Reply-To: <c1e97a92-b83c-ceb9-bd4d-a867b4f46613@openssl.org>
References: <947E3E0C7B5E4C5A97C3506B97EBC133@OwnerPC311012>
 <FD22706D2C6E467C90561FC37394BAE7@OwnerPC311012>
 <c1e97a92-b83c-ceb9-bd4d-a867b4f46613@openssl.org>
Message-ID: <48187B2179B1447EBAB01B229C060684@OwnerPC311012>

-----Original Message----- 
From: Matt Caswell
Sent: Sunday, March 12, 2017 11:13 AM
To: openssl-users at openssl.org
Subject: Re: [openssl-users] mingw 64-bit build of 1.1.0e



> On 12/03/17 00:06, sisyphus1 at optusnet.com.au wrote:

>> Disconcertingly, the summary at the end of ./config still announces 
>> "THIRTY_TWO_BIT mode" but, at the end of the build, I definitely have the 
>> X64 libraries that I wanted.
>
>Did you just try:
>
> perl Configure mingw64 no-shared zlib


Aaah ... that looks better.
I now get "SIXTY_FOUR_BIT mode".
And I don't have to do 'no-asm' which (I forgot to mention) I had to do with 
my previous incantation.
Also, I can clear the CC environment variable.

I added '--prefix=C:/_64/msys_630/1.0/local' to ensure that the built 
library would be installed where I wanted it. That, too, worked fine.

But where did it find libz ?
I don't see anything in the command that will point to any of the libz 
installations that I know of.

Thanks, Matt !!

Cheers,
Rob 


From levitte at openssl.org  Sun Mar 12 04:25:37 2017
From: levitte at openssl.org (Richard Levitte)
Date: Sun, 12 Mar 2017 05:25:37 +0100 (CET)
Subject: [openssl-users] mingw 64-bit build of 1.1.0e
In-Reply-To: <947E3E0C7B5E4C5A97C3506B97EBC133@OwnerPC311012>
References: <947E3E0C7B5E4C5A97C3506B97EBC133@OwnerPC311012>
Message-ID: <20170312.052537.1356614519220878741.levitte@openssl.org>

Just add -m64 on the config line, like this:

./config no-shared zlib -m64 -IC:/_64/msys_630/1.0/local/include \
-LC:/_64/msys_630/1.0/local/lib --prefix=C:/_64/msys_630/1.0/local

This is weird, though...  what config target did you get when
configuring?  Ideally, you should have gotten 'mingw64', which already
uses the -m64 flag, so what gives?  If you show us the config output,
maybe we can help you figure out what actually goes wrong...

Cheers,
Richard

In message <947E3E0C7B5E4C5A97C3506B97EBC133 at OwnerPC311012> on Sat, 11 Mar 2017 22:21:05 +1100, <sisyphus1 at optusnet.com.au> said:

sisyphus1> Hi,
sisyphus1> 
sisyphus1> Having a spot of bother trying to build a static openssl-1.1.0e using
sisyphus1> a
sisyphus1> mingw-w64 64-bit compiler - namely, gcc version 6.3.0
sisyphus1> (x86_64-posix-sjlj-rev1, Built by MinGW-W64 project).
sisyphus1> 
sisyphus1> In the msys2 shell, I run:
sisyphus1> 
sisyphus1> ./config no-shared
sisyphus1> zlib -IC:/_64/msys_630/1.0/local/include
sisyphus1> -LC:/_64/msys_630/1.0/local/lib --prefix=C:/_64/msys_630/1.0/local
sisyphus1> && make && make test && make install
sisyphus1> 
sisyphus1> Works beautifully ... except that libssl.a and libcrypto.a turn out to
sisyphus1> be
sisyphus1> 32-bit builds !!
sisyphus1> That is, the built library works fine with the same vendor's 32-bit
sisyphus1> compiler
sisyphus1> (gcc version 6.3.0 (i686-posix-sjlj-rev1, Built by MinGW-W64
sisyphus1> project)), but
sisyphus1> the x64 compiler that built the damned things regards them as
sisyphus1> incompatible.
sisyphus1> 
sisyphus1> I'm thinking that I just need to specify an -m64 switch in there. How
sisyphus1> do I
sisyphus1> do that ?
sisyphus1> 
sisyphus1> I did try adding the 'os/compiler:mingw64' to the ./config args, but
sisyphus1> that
sisyphus1> resulted in:
sisyphus1> 
sisyphus1> $ ./config no-shared
sisyphus1> zlib -IC:/_64/msys_630/1.0/local/include
sisyphus1> -LC:/_64/msys_630/1.0/local/lib --prefix=C:/_64/msys_630/1.0/local
sisyphus1> os/compiler:mingw64 && make && make test && make install
sisyphus1> Operating system: x86_64-whatever-mingw
sisyphus1> Configuring for mingw
sisyphus1> Configuring OpenSSL version 1.1.0e (0x1010005fL)
sisyphus1> target already defined - mingw (offending arg: os/compiler:mingw64)
sisyphus1> 
sisyphus1> Having spent quite a few hours just getting to this diagnosis, I've
sisyphus1> now
sisyphus1> settled for simply asking the dumb question.
sisyphus1> (Sorry.)
sisyphus1> 
sisyphus1> Cheers,
sisyphus1> Rob 
sisyphus1> 
sisyphus1> 

From sisyphus1 at optusnet.com.au  Sun Mar 12 05:15:47 2017
From: sisyphus1 at optusnet.com.au (sisyphus1 at optusnet.com.au)
Date: Sun, 12 Mar 2017 16:15:47 +1100
Subject: [openssl-users] mingw 64-bit build of 1.1.0e
In-Reply-To: <20170312.052537.1356614519220878741.levitte@openssl.org>
References: <947E3E0C7B5E4C5A97C3506B97EBC133@OwnerPC311012>
 <20170312.052537.1356614519220878741.levitte@openssl.org>
Message-ID: <8CD5EEA9CC3F4643AAFC6D7DDF6EB449@OwnerPC311012>

-----Original Message----- 
From: Richard Levitte
Sent: Sunday, March 12, 2017 3:25 PM
To: openssl-users at openssl.org
Subject: Re: [openssl-users] mingw 64-bit build of 1.1.0e

> Just add -m64 on the config line, like this:
>
> ./config no-shared zlib -m64 -IC:/_64/msys_630/1.0/local/include \
> -LC:/_64/msys_630/1.0/local/lib --prefix=C:/_64/msys_630/1.0/local
>
> This is weird, though...  what config target did you get when configuring? 
> Ideally, you should have gotten 'mingw64', which already uses the -m64 
> flag, so what gives?  If you show us the config output, maybe we can help 
> you figure out what actually goes wrong...
>

Hi Richard,

The command I originally tried was
./config no-shared 
zlib -IC:/_64/msys_630/1.0/local/include -LC:/_64/msys_630/1.0/local/lib --prefix=C:/_64/msys_630/1.0/local

For that command, the config is in the attached conf0.txt.

If I add the '-m64' switch, then the output (see conf1.txt) changes very 
little.
According to diff, the only change is the insertion of '-m64' in the "CFLAG" 
line.

Having included the '-m64' switch, if I then proceed to run 'make', I very 
quickly get a long list of assembler error messages pertaining to push, pop, 
pushf and popf:

crypto/aes/aes-586.s: Assembler messages:
crypto/aes/aes-586.s:969: Error: invalid instruction suffix for `push'
...
crypto/aes/aes-586.s:970: Error: invalid instruction suffix for `pop'
...
crypto/aes/aes-586.s:2233: Error: invalid instruction suffix for `pushf'
...
crypto/aes/aes-586.s:2350: Error: invalid instruction suffix for `popf'
...

(Adding the no-asm switch to ./config works around that particular problem.)

Matt suggested running 'perl Configure mingw64 no-shared zlib'.
The config output for it is in the attached conf2.txt, and is much more in 
keeping with expectations.

I'm quite happy to continue building openssl by running that perl command.
I'm also happy to assist with investigating the problem that led to my 
original post.

Cheers,
Rob
-------------- next part --------------
An embedded and charset-unspecified text was scrubbed...
Name: conf0.txt
URL: <http://mta.openssl.org/pipermail/openssl-users/attachments/20170312/ffd161f4/attachment.txt>
-------------- next part --------------
An embedded and charset-unspecified text was scrubbed...
Name: conf1.txt
URL: <http://mta.openssl.org/pipermail/openssl-users/attachments/20170312/ffd161f4/attachment-0001.txt>
-------------- next part --------------
An embedded and charset-unspecified text was scrubbed...
Name: conf2.txt
URL: <http://mta.openssl.org/pipermail/openssl-users/attachments/20170312/ffd161f4/attachment-0002.txt>

From sisyphus1 at optusnet.com.au  Sun Mar 12 07:57:03 2017
From: sisyphus1 at optusnet.com.au (sisyphus1 at optusnet.com.au)
Date: Sun, 12 Mar 2017 18:57:03 +1100
Subject: [openssl-users] mingw 64-bit build of 1.1.0e
In-Reply-To: <48187B2179B1447EBAB01B229C060684@OwnerPC311012>
References: <947E3E0C7B5E4C5A97C3506B97EBC133@OwnerPC311012>
 <FD22706D2C6E467C90561FC37394BAE7@OwnerPC311012>
 <c1e97a92-b83c-ceb9-bd4d-a867b4f46613@openssl.org>
 <48187B2179B1447EBAB01B229C060684@OwnerPC311012>
Message-ID: <376FC8FDF8144B52B4905E5C9EE207C4@OwnerPC311012>



-----Original Message----- 
From: sisyphus1 at optusnet.com.au

>>Did you just try:
>>
>> perl Configure mingw64 no-shared zlib


> Aaah ... that looks better.

[snip]

> But where did it find libz ?

Heh ... this compiler ships with libz.a (x86_64-w64-mingw32/lib/libz.a).
I don't know how long they've been doing that - probably for years.
Remove (or rename) that file and 'make' fails because -lz can't be resolved.

Cheers,
Rob 


From levitte at openssl.org  Sun Mar 12 11:58:06 2017
From: levitte at openssl.org (Richard Levitte)
Date: Sun, 12 Mar 2017 12:58:06 +0100 (CET)
Subject: [openssl-users] mingw 64-bit build of 1.1.0e
In-Reply-To: <8CD5EEA9CC3F4643AAFC6D7DDF6EB449@OwnerPC311012>
References: <947E3E0C7B5E4C5A97C3506B97EBC133@OwnerPC311012>
 <20170312.052537.1356614519220878741.levitte@openssl.org>
 <8CD5EEA9CC3F4643AAFC6D7DDF6EB449@OwnerPC311012>
Message-ID: <20170312.125806.131010014169874240.levitte@openssl.org>

In message <8CD5EEA9CC3F4643AAFC6D7DDF6EB449 at OwnerPC311012> on Sun, 12 Mar 2017 16:15:47 +1100, <sisyphus1 at optusnet.com.au> said:

sisyphus1> -----Original Message----- From: Richard Levitte
sisyphus1> Sent: Sunday, March 12, 2017 3:25 PM
sisyphus1> To: openssl-users at openssl.org
sisyphus1> Subject: Re: [openssl-users] mingw 64-bit build of 1.1.0e
sisyphus1> 
sisyphus1> > Just add -m64 on the config line, like this:
sisyphus1> >
sisyphus1> > ./config no-shared zlib -m64 -IC:/_64/msys_630/1.0/local/include \
sisyphus1> > -LC:/_64/msys_630/1.0/local/lib --prefix=C:/_64/msys_630/1.0/local
sisyphus1> >
sisyphus1> > This is weird, though...  what config target did you get when
sisyphus1> > configuring? Ideally, you should have gotten 'mingw64', which already
sisyphus1> > uses the -m64 flag, so what gives?  If you show us the config output,
sisyphus1> > maybe we can help you figure out what actually goes wrong...
sisyphus1> >
sisyphus1> 
sisyphus1> Hi Richard,
sisyphus1> 
sisyphus1> The command I originally tried was
sisyphus1> ./config no-shared zlib -IC:/_64/msys_630/1.0/local/include
sisyphus1> -LC:/_64/msys_630/1.0/local/lib --prefix=C:/_64/msys_630/1.0/local
sisyphus1> 
sisyphus1> For that command, the config is in the attached conf0.txt.

Thanks for the output, that explains to me what's happening.  More
precisely, these first two lines:

    Operating system: x86_64-whatever-mingw
    Configuring for mingw

I just had a look in the script 'config', and learned that it doesn't
do anything special with 'x86_64-whatever-mingw', except using its
last part ('mingw') as the target to 'Configure'...  which seems a bit
wrong in my mind, as I would expect (like you've noticed yourself)
that 'mingw64' would be a better target specifically on 'x86_64'.  So
it seems that the 'config' script is a bit lacking, and obviously
unusable in a 64-bit mingw environment.

Time for a fix, methinks.

Cheers,
Richard

-- 
Richard Levitte         levitte at openssl.org
OpenSSL Project         http://www.openssl.org/~levitte/

From openssl-users at dukhovni.org  Sun Mar 12 20:16:35 2017
From: openssl-users at dukhovni.org (Viktor Dukhovni)
Date: Sun, 12 Mar 2017 16:16:35 -0400
Subject: [openssl-users] [openssl-security] Removal of 3DES in 1.0.2
	Version
In-Reply-To: <BN4PR13MB046806A9FEA0823D175EF1C9C1220@BN4PR13MB0468.namprd13.prod.outlook.com>
References: <9BE3802FCF53CE48AC59E463ED37258C01929C7C2C@TLVMBX1.verint.corp.verintsystems.com>
 <BN4PR13MB046806A9FEA0823D175EF1C9C1220@BN4PR13MB0468.namprd13.prod.outlook.com>
Message-ID: <564159B6-B503-4DAF-AD45-AF0E892AD623@dukhovni.org>


[ The openssl-security is for reporting security issues
  in OpenSSL.  Answer redirected to openssl-users. ]

> On Mar 12, 2017, at 3:55 PM, Oren Rosenmann <rozenman at hotmail.com> wrote:
> 
> As part of our software, we use OpenSSL 1.0.2 stream.
> Due to Sweet32 attacks, security scanners are suggesting
> upgrade to 1.1.0, despite the fact that we actually
> disable 3DES ciphers in configuration.

If you explicitly disable 3DES (in TLS) then you're not
vulnerable to Sweet32, and security scanners should not
be reporting Sweet32 exposure.

> I wanted to ask if the same change done in 1.1.0 is
> also planned sometime for 1.0.2 stream (i.e. disable
> by default, not just change from High to Medium)?

No.  That's too big a change for a stable release,
and the Sweet32 issue is not a practical issue for
most users.  It is a reason to walk not run away
from 3DES.

> https://www.openssl.org/blog/blog/2016/08/24/sweet32/
>  
> Also, is the change affecting only ciphers used for
> communication?  If we use DES to encrypt internal
> data, is it also being blocked?

Sweet32 is an attack on TLS in browsers, where attackers
are able to inject known-plaintext traffic.  It is not
relevant to encryption of data at rest.  That said, do
migrate from 3DES to AES.

The deprecation of ciphersuites from TLS does not affect
the availability of the underlying cryptographic functions.
The 3DES algorithm is still available in OpenSSL 1.1.0.

You can still use 3DES with CMS, or "openssl enc", but
don't forget that "openssl enc" does not include integrity
protection, so use CMS, or arrange for some sort of MAC
on the underlying data or the output of "enc".  For
large data streams, you'll probably want to generate
a "chunked" encoding with a MAC over every chunk.

-- 
	Viktor.


From MrUmunhum at CruzIO.com  Mon Mar 13 00:44:57 2017
From: MrUmunhum at CruzIO.com (william estrada)
Date: Sun, 12 Mar 2017 17:44:57 -0700
Subject: [openssl-users] error making Private RSA
Message-ID: <7038c703c48eeeb712c798dd40217231.squirrel@cruziomail.cruzio.com>

I have solved my create public RSA problem with this code:
  printf( "Method 1\n" );
  RSA* RSA1 = RSA_new();
  RSA* RSA2 = RSA_new();

  RSA2->n = RSA1->n = My_RSA->n;
  RSA2->e = RSA1->e = My_RSA->e;
  RSA2->d = RSA1->d = My_RSA->d;
  RSA2->p = RSA1->p = My_RSA->p;
  RSA2->q = RSA1->q = My_RSA->q;

  RC = PEM_write_bio_RSAPublicKey( bio, RSA1 ) ;
  printf( "%d RC: %d\n", __LINE__, RC );

  RC = PEM_write_bio_RSAPrivateKey( bio, RSA2,
				    NULL, NULL, 0, NULL, NULL ) ;
  printf( "%d RC: %d\n", __LINE__, RC );

  if( !RSA1 )
    printf( RED
	    " ERROR: Could not load Public KEY!\n"
	    " PEM_read_bio_RSA_PUBKEY FAILED:\n %s\n" OFF,
	    ERR_error_string( ERR_get_error(), NULL ) ) ;

  else Check_Key( RSA1, ";" );

  if( !RSA2 )
    printf( RED
	    " ERROR: Could not load Private KEY!\n"
	    " PEM_read_bio_RSA_PUBKEY FAILED:\n %s\n" OFF,
	    ERR_error_string( ERR_get_error(), NULL ) ) ;

  else Check_Key( RSA2, ";" );




-- 
William Estrada
Mt Umunhum, CA, USA, Earth
HTTP:// Mt-Umunhum-Wireless.net
Skype: MrUmunhum

-- 
William Estrada
Mt Umunhum, CA, USA, Earth
HTTP:// Mt-Umunhum-Wireless.net
Skype: MrUmunhum



-- 
William Estrada
Mt Umunhum, CA, USA, Earth
HTTP:// Mt-Umunhum-Wireless.net
Skype: MrUmunhum


From vsraja at gmail.com  Mon Mar 13 06:45:50 2017
From: vsraja at gmail.com (Senthil Raja Velu)
Date: Mon, 13 Mar 2017 12:15:50 +0530
Subject: [openssl-users] OpenSSL handshake failure with RSA bad
	signature error
In-Reply-To: <CAJ-5c6uaW1iQ7xLD7L0qPcePqfVvqOw3VZQFFSiJX41xTuN8qQ@mail.gmail.com>
References: <CAJ-5c6uaW1iQ7xLD7L0qPcePqfVvqOw3VZQFFSiJX41xTuN8qQ@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <CAJ-5c6vU5H5eQ+S2YOFu5M9CND3pq5-=wSt7HBJeER4zeHArgw@mail.gmail.com>

Hi,
Could someone shed some light on this above mentioned RSA bad signature
issue.

Thanks,
Senthil.


On Thu, Feb 23, 2017 at 12:31 AM, Senthil Raja Velu <vsraja at gmail.com>
wrote:

> Hi,
> I have recently updated my openssl server version from 1.0.1m to 1.0.2j.
> After updating the handshake fails with the client. The client still use
> openssl version 1.0.1e-fips.
>
> Note: With older openssl server version (1.0.1m) the handshake works with
> the same set of certificates.
>
> Here is the complete handshake message sequence from the server side with
> all debugs:
>
> TlsInfoCB HANDSHAKE_START(time:4849) sCount(0) cCount(1)
> undefined:before/accept initialization
>
> TlsInfoCB SSL_accept:before/accept initialization
>
> TlsMsgCB TLS-MSG: <<< ???  len=5
>
> TlsHexDumpCB
> 0000 - 16 03 01 00 94                                    .....
>
> TlsMsgCB TLS-MSG: <<< TLSv1.2 Handshake len=148  ClientHello
>
> TlsHexDumpCB
> 0000 - 01 00 00 90 03 03 58 ad-d7 b5 64 af 9e d2 38 c4   ......X...d...8.
> 0010 - 4a 8b fc 7c 3b 2f 12 64-68 70 c4 57 73 54 54 ce   J..|;/.dhp.WsTT.
> 0020 - 82 dd f2 58 c7 85 00 00-24 00 0a 00 2f 00 32 00   ...X....$.../.2.
> 0030 - 33 00 35 c0 14 c0 03 c0-04 c0 05 c0 08 c0 09 c0   3.5.............
> 0040 - 0a c0 0d c0 0e c0 0f c0-12 c0 13 00 ff 01 00 00   ................
> 0050 - 43 00 0b 00 04 03 00 01-02 00 0a 00 08 00 06 00   C...............
> 0060 - 19 00 18 00 17 00 23 00-00 00 0d 00 22 00 20 06   ......#.....". .
> 0070 - 01 06 02 06 03 05 01 05-02 05 03 04 01 04 02 04   ................
> 0080 - 03 03 01 03 02 03 03 02-01 02 02 02 03 01 01 00   ................
> 0090 - 0f 00 01 01                                       ....
>
> TlsExtCB TLS-EXT: client "EC point formats" (id=11) len=4
>
> TlsHexDumpCB
> 0000 - 03 00 01 02                                       ....
>
> TlsExtCB TLS-EXT: client "elliptic curves" (id=10) len=8
>
> TlsHexDumpCB
> 0000 - 00 06 00 19 00 18 00 17-                          ........
>
> TlsExtCB TLS-EXT: client "session ticket" (id=35) len=0
>
> TlsExtCB TLS-EXT: client "signature algorithms" (id=13) len=34
>
> TlsHexDumpCB
> 0000 - 00 20 06 01 06 02 06 03-05 01 05 02 05 03 04 01   . ..............
> 0010 - 04 02 04 03 03 01 03 02-03 03 02 01 02 02 02 03   ................
> 0020 - 01 01                                             ..
>
> TlsExtCB TLS-EXT: client "heartbeat" (id=15) len=1
>
> TlsHexDumpCB
> 0000 - 01                                                .
>
> TlsInfoCB SSL_accept:SSLv3 read client hello A
>
> TlsMsgCB TLS-MSG: >>> ???  len=5
>
> TlsHexDumpCB
> 0000 - 16 03 03 00 3a                                    ....:
>
> TlsMsgCB TLS-MSG: >>> TLSv1.2 Handshake len=58  ServerHello
>
> TlsHexDumpCB
> 0000 - 02 00 00 36 03 03 b6 97-ce 9a 96 74 98 52 c0 4a   ...6.......t.R.J
> 0010 - c4 2e f4 20 1f 47 c0 b3-2e e4 8c ed 79 9e 22 e1   ... .G......y.".
> 0020 - 57 f9 1f 56 c4 b5 00 00-0a 00 00 0e ff 01 00 01   W..V............
> 0030 - 00 00 23 00 00 00 0f 00-01 01                     ..#.......
>
> TlsInfoCB SSL_accept:SSLv3 write server hello A
>
> TlsMsgCB TLS-MSG: >>> ???  len=5
>
> TlsHexDumpCB
> 0000 - 16 03 03 04 f1                                    .....
>
> TlsMsgCB TLS-MSG: >>> TLSv1.2 Handshake len=1265  Certificate
>
> TlsHexDumpCB
> 0000 - 0b 00 04 ed 00 04 ea 00-02 15 30 82 02 11 30 82   ..........0...0.
> 0010 - 01 7a 02 09 00 aa f8 6d-8b 4d d8 0f f0 30 0d 06   .z.....m.M...0..
> 0020 - 09 2a 86 48 86 f7 0d 01-01 05 05 00 30 4e 31 0b   .*.H........0N1.
> 0030 - 30 09 06 03 55 04 06 13-02 55 53 31 13 30 11 06   0...U....US1.0..
> 0040 - 03 55 04 08 13 0a 43 61-6c 69 66 6f 72 6e 69 61   .U....California
> 0050 - 31 10 30 0e 06 03 55 04-07 13 07 53 61 6e 4a 6f   1.0...U....SanJo
> 0060 - 73 65 31 18 30 16 06 03-55 04 03 13 0f 77 77 77   se1.0...U....www
> 0070 - 2e 6e 75 61 67 65 43 41-2e 63 6f 6d 30 1e 17 0d   .nuageCA.com0...
> 0080 - 31 34 30 39 30 34 30 39-35 37 35 30 5a 17 0d 32   140904095750Z..2
> 0090 - 34 30 39 30 31 30 39 35-37 35 30 5a 30 4c 31 0b   40901095750Z0L1.
> 00a0 - 30 09 06 03 55 04 06 13-02 55 53 31 13 30 11 06   0...U....US1.0..
> 00b0 - 03 55 04 08 13 0a 43 61-6c 69 66 6f 72 6e 69 61   .U....California
> 00c0 - 31 10 30 0e 06 03 55 04-07 13 07 53 61 6e 4a 6f   1.0...U....SanJo
> 00d0 - 73 65 31 16 30 14 06 03-55 04 03 13 0d 77 77 77   se1.0...U....www
> 00e0 - 2e 6e 75 61 67 65 2e 63-6f 6d 30 81 9f 30 0d 06   .nuage.com0..0..
> 00f0 - 09 2a 86 48 86 f7 0d 01-01 01 05 00 03 81 8d 00   .*.H............
> 0100 - 30 81 89 02 81 81 00 d1-2f 3b 18 80 af 87 aa f3   0......./;......
> 0110 - dd 62 5f 96 d6 69 ba 28-cf f6 56 7f c8 56 62 de   .b_..i.(..V..Vb.
> 0120 - 7a 9d fc 6d 26 17 df 0d-5f 09 15 5e 24 68 04 37   z..m&..._..^$h.7
> 0130 - e0 02 47 e3 18 64 5c 2e-0a 2e 89 57 f9 54 b0 97   ..G..d\....W.T..
> 0140 - 93 24 06 8b 22 55 54 68-89 ea 8d 1d 97 b0 d2 8b   .$.."UTh........
> 0150 - 5b 34 19 ba 41 c0 da ca-49 82 d4 76 a3 de 5f fc   [4..A...I..v.._.
> 0160 - cf fa 6b 22 6c 8c c9 af-c2 e4 2b 08 75 cf 3d 5a   ..k"l.....+.u.=Z
> 0170 - eb 32 9c 23 ac 6a 09 a7-7a 7b 67 36 08 17 e0 76   .2.#.j..z{g6...v
> 0180 - a0 9c f5 5b dc 0a a1 02-03 01 00 01 30 0d 06 09   ...[........0...
> 0190 - 2a 86 48 86 f7 0d 01 01-05 05 00 03 81 81 00 09   *.H.............
> 01a0 - ef 65 ee e8 3d b9 5f 11-5c 8a 8b 97 f7 3f 75 78   .e..=._.\....?ux
> 01b0 - f3 11 5f 09 0e b8 fe a0-6b 70 53 1e 34 1b 66 55   .._.....kpS.4.fU
> 01c0 - c5 7c d6 00 e4 ef 2f 56-7e 0b 0e fe d1 2b f9 42   .|..../V~....+.B
> 01d0 - d5 b7 3d 54 52 05 72 52-0b c2 89 3f 0a 5b ad e9   ..=TR.rR...?.[..
> 01e0 - 04 98 c8 c2 0a b7 ec 7c-15 5d 4e 9f 45 70 a5 92   .......|.]N.Ep..
> 01f0 - 3c 7e 1f 59 3b 03 97 c6-8a 45 a7 02 81 f8 4a 35   <~.Y;....E....J5
> 0200 - 24 ed 97 f2 89 0a 23 d2-ea b8 2e ff 12 ec e4 20   $.....#........
> 0210 - 3d ab b4 ae e2 a6 ee a2-92 2b fb 9e b6 f6 3a 00   =........+....:.
> 0220 - 02 cf 30 82 02 cb 30 82-02 34 a0 03 02 01 02 02   ..0...0..4......
> 0230 - 09 00 e4 51 8c 52 e2 ce-56 6f 30 0d 06 09 2a 86   ...Q.R..Vo0...*.
> 0240 - 48 86 f7 0d 01 01 05 05-00 30 4e 31 0b 30 09 06   H........0N1.0..
> 0250 - 03 55 04 06 13 02 55 53-31 13 30 11 06 03 55 04   .U....US1.0...U.
> 0260 - 08 13 0a 43 61 6c 69 66-6f 72 6e 69 61 31 10 30   ...California1.0
> 0270 - 0e 06 03 55 04 07 13 07-53 61 6e 4a 6f 73 65 31   ...U....SanJose1
> 0280 - 18 30 16 06 03 55 04 03-13 0f 77 77 77 2e 6e 75   .0...U....www.nu
> 0290 - 61 67 65 43 41 2e 63 6f-6d 30 1e 17 0d 31 34 30   ageCA.com0...140
> 02a0 - 39 30 34 30 39 35 36 32-36 5a 17 0d 32 34 30 39   904095626Z..2409
> 02b0 - 30 31 30 39 35 36 32 36-5a 30 4e 31 0b 30 09 06   01095626Z0N1.0..
> 02c0 - 03 55 04 06 13 02 55 53-31 13 30 11 06 03 55 04   .U....US1.0...U.
> 02d0 - 08 13 0a 43 61 6c 69 66-6f 72 6e 69 61 31 10 30   ...California1.0
> 02e0 - 0e 06 03 55 04 07 13 07-53 61 6e 4a 6f 73 65 31   ...U....SanJose1
> 02f0 - 18 30 16 06 03 55 04 03-13 0f 77 77 77 2e 6e 75   .0...U....www.nu
> 0300 - 61 67 65 43 41 2e 63 6f-6d 30 81 9f 30 0d 06 09   ageCA.com0..0...
> 0310 - 2a 86 48 86 f7 0d 01 01-01 05 00 03 81 8d 00 30   *.H............0
> 0320 - 81 89 02 81 81 00 ac 55-1b d9 c1 d6 17 da 27 fd   .......U......'.
> 0330 - e8 fb f6 54 88 f0 6a b7-26 60 b3 81 c2 51 57 be   ...T..j.&`...QW.
> 0340 - 3d 2c 80 1c d2 94 02 90-f2 10 31 af a7 4e 5a c1   =,........1..NZ.
> 0350 - fe e7 10 62 f2 2a 52 2f-d1 03 2a 8a 1a 33 8a 11   ...b.*R/..*..3..
> 0360 - e1 c4 96 bd 15 51 a2 f6-23 0f fb 66 3f 3e d9 4e   .....Q..#..f?>.N
> 0370 - 5d 7b f4 df 77 c6 8b 58-3e bf 09 f9 61 2e 33 40   ]{..w..X>...a.3@
> 0380 - e5 28 6a 42 87 59 02 c0-be 89 7f 9b bc 8b 06 ea   .(jB.Y..........
> 0390 - 40 60 1a 44 80 cd 15 e1-9d e7 2b e6 a8 de d7 11   @`.D......+.....
> 03a0 - 09 9c 17 b8 7b 07 02 03-01 00 01 a3 81 b0 30 81   ....{.........0.
> 03b0 - ad 30 1d 06 03 55 1d 0e-04 16 04 14 7a 59 61 56   .0...U......zYaV
> 03c0 - b4 cd 2c 8b b4 b1 03 cf-5b 84 d8 3a 14 76 d8 38   ..,.....[..:.v.8
> 03d0 - 30 7e 06 03 55 1d 23 04-77 30 75 80 14 7a 59 61   0~..U.#.w0u..zYa
> 03e0 - 56 b4 cd 2c 8b b4 b1 03-cf 5b 84 d8 3a 14 76 d8   V..,.....[..:.v.
> 03f0 - 38 a1 52 a4 50 30 4e 31-0b 30 09 06 03 55 04 06   8.R.P0N1.0...U..
> 0400 - 13 02 55 53 31 13 30 11-06 03 55 04 08 13 0a 43   ..US1.0...U....C
> 0410 - 61 6c 69 66 6f 72 6e 69-61 31 10 30 0e 06 03 55   alifornia1.0...U
> 0420 - 04 07 13 07 53 61 6e 4a-6f 73 65 31 18 30 16 06   ....SanJose1.0..
> 0430 - 03 55 04 03 13 0f 77 77-77 2e 6e 75 61 67 65 43   .U....www.nuageC
> 0440 - 41 2e 63 6f 6d 82 09 00-e4 51 8c 52 e2 ce 56 6f   A.com....Q.R..Vo
> 0450 - 30 0c 06 03 55 1d 13 04-05 30 03 01 01 ff 30 0d   0...U....0....0.
> 0460 - 06 09 2a 86 48 86 f7 0d-01 01 05 05 00 03 81 81   ..*.H...........
> 0470 - 00 09 2b 89 da 1c 40 72-c6 17 1b 71 f0 53 bd d8   ..+... at r...q.S..
> 0480 - cc fb c3 fd 50 ae 92 f1-38 3d 8f 83 15 b3 bf 82   ....P...8=......
> 0490 - 1d cf d5 29 91 31 95 a5-13 80 a0 c8 41 35 fc 51   ...).1......A5.Q
> 04a0 - 8c 89 eb 42 64 c6 a9 d5-bf 1e b2 1f 99 ce 5c 56   ...Bd.........\V
> 04b0 - 12 2d 53 da 7c d5 06 2b-89 cf 59 a4 4b 15 89 ea   .-S.|..+..Y.K...
> 04c0 - 02 fc 75 c4 92 08 15 ae-79 89 f6 1b b4 98 fe 36   ..u.....y......6
> 04d0 - 5b 74 51 26 46 c7 e0 0b-25 18 8a 55 8b d8 07 78   [tQ&F...%..U...x
> 04e0 - 95 9c fa 9e 5c 2c 4c cc-1e c3 ba 99 78 7e 08 36   ....\,L.....x~.6
> 04f0 - 46                                                F
>
> TlsInfoCB SSL_accept:SSLv3 write certificate A
>
> TlsMsgCB TLS-MSG: >>> ???  len=5
>
> TlsHexDumpCB
> 0000 - 16 03 03 00 2e                                    .....
>
> TlsMsgCB TLS-MSG: >>> TLSv1.2 Handshake len=46  CertificateRequest
>
> TlsHexDumpCB
> 0000 - 0d 00 00 26 03 01 02 40-00 1e 06 01 06 02 06 03   ...&... at ........
> 0010 - 05 01 05 02 05 03 04 01-04 02 04 03 03 01 03 02   ................
> 0020 - 03 03 02 01 02 02 02 03-00 00 0e                  ...........
> 002e - <SPACES/NULS>
>
> TlsInfoCB SSL_accept:SSLv3 write certificate request A
>
> TlsInfoCB SSL_accept:SSLv3 flush data
>
> TlsInfoCB SSL_accept:error in SSLv3 read client certificate A
>
> TlsInfoCB SSL_accept:error in SSLv3 read client certificate A
>
> TlsConnAccept SSL state after:  SSLv3 read client certificate A
>
> TlsMsgCB TLS-MSG: <<< ???  len=5
>
> TlsHexDumpCB
> 0000 - 16 03 03 04 f1                                    .....
>
> TlsMsgCB TLS-MSG: <<< TLSv1.2 Handshake len=1265  Certificate
>
> TlsHexDumpCB
> 0000 - 0b 00 04 ed 00 04 ea 00-02 15 30 82 02 11 30 82   ..........0...0.
> 0010 - 01 7a 02 09 00 aa f8 6d-8b 4d d8 0f f1 30 0d 06   .z.....m.M...0..
> 0020 - 09 2a 86 48 86 f7 0d 01-01 05 05 00 30 4e 31 0b   .*.H........0N1.
> 0030 - 30 09 06 03 55 04 06 13-02 55 53 31 13 30 11 06   0...U....US1.0..
> 0040 - 03 55 04 08 13 0a 43 61-6c 69 66 6f 72 6e 69 61   .U....California
> 0050 - 31 10 30 0e 06 03 55 04-07 13 07 53 61 6e 4a 6f   1.0...U....SanJo
> 0060 - 73 65 31 18 30 16 06 03-55 04 03 13 0f 77 77 77   se1.0...U....www
> 0070 - 2e 6e 75 61 67 65 43 41-2e 63 6f 6d 30 1e 17 0d   .nuageCA.com0...
> 0080 - 31 34 30 39 30 34 30 39-35 37 35 30 5a 17 0d 32   140904095750Z..2
> 0090 - 34 30 39 30 31 30 39 35-37 35 30 5a 30 4c 31 0b   40901095750Z0L1.
> 00a0 - 30 09 06 03 55 04 06 13-02 55 53 31 13 30 11 06   0...U....US1.0..
> 00b0 - 03 55 04 08 13 0a 43 61-6c 69 66 6f 72 6e 69 61   .U....California
> 00c0 - 31 10 30 0e 06 03 55 04-07 13 07 53 61 6e 4a 6f   1.0...U....SanJo
> 00d0 - 73 65 31 16 30 14 06 03-55 04 03 13 0d 77 77 77   se1.0...U....www
> 00e0 - 2e 6e 75 61 67 65 2e 63-6f 6d 30 81 9f 30 0d 06   .nuage.com0..0..
> 00f0 - 09 2a 86 48 86 f7 0d 01-01 01 05 00 03 81 8d 00   .*.H............
> 0100 - 30 81 89 02 81 81 00 a8-76 3f f4 6d d1 08 fe 7c   0.......v?.m...|
> 0110 - 2a 58 f1 36 68 61 ea 63-c0 7b 05 ba da 76 27 e5   *X.6ha.c.{...v'.
> 0120 - ef 6f f2 c4 e2 f4 ee bc-eb 48 21 f0 94 7e 9e 48   .o.......H!..~.H
> 0130 - 63 a7 a7 e2 58 d8 41 af-eb ad d4 97 e6 50 af c1   c...X.A......P..
> 0140 - 63 2a 05 19 08 82 cf 79-13 c0 78 4f 0b d7 39 64   c*.....y..xO..9d
> 0150 - d8 e0 1e f1 4e 69 8f 41-a9 3a 63 77 2c 9a 8b d5   ....Ni.A.:cw,...
> 0160 - 21 65 df f1 30 97 6f 57-93 0e 2b 8d 05 1d 74 d1   !e..0.oW..+...t.
> 0170 - 66 61 e7 d4 a4 d4 e1 be-8c d5 67 a8 36 82 63 11   fa........g.6.c.
> 0180 - 50 4f fa 7d ad 28 ff 02-03 01 00 01 30 0d 06 09   PO.}.(......0...
> 0190 - 2a 86 48 86 f7 0d 01 01-05 05 00 03 81 81 00 4f   *.H............O
> 01a0 - 33 50 c1 e0 97 48 d3 ad-e0 13 0f 82 62 75 bf 3b   3P...H......bu.;
> 01b0 - b9 69 42 f7 5d 60 5f 8a-52 38 80 32 13 b9 81 de   .iB.]`_.R8.2....
> 01c0 - 1f 8e e3 6e 35 85 e6 92-51 8d 68 4b aa c0 d9 86   ...n5...Q.hK....
> 01d0 - b8 5a 82 3a 5e 7f 15 56-69 94 33 52 81 0e 59 c9   .Z.:^..Vi.3R..Y.
> 01e0 - ea c2 b4 e0 7c c2 74 3d-5b a7 53 d7 63 98 f5 60   ....|.t=[.S.c..`
> 01f0 - c2 19 83 f5 b7 54 9e 1d-c8 c4 05 89 80 4f cc a5   .....T.......O..
> 0200 - 02 99 76 5f 67 e8 56 13-76 03 7c cc 85 d1 a3 26   ..v_g.V.v.|....&
> 0210 - 3d 7b 67 10 04 d1 54 76-ef 63 7c 4b e0 a3 e3 00   ={g...Tv.c|K....
> 0220 - 02 cf 30 82 02 cb 30 82-02 34 a0 03 02 01 02 02   ..0...0..4......
> 0230 - 09 00 e4 51 8c 52 e2 ce-56 6f 30 0d 06 09 2a 86   ...Q.R..Vo0...*.
> 0240 - 48 86 f7 0d 01 01 05 05-00 30 4e 31 0b 30 09 06   H........0N1.0..
> 0250 - 03 55 04 06 13 02 55 53-31 13 30 11 06 03 55 04   .U....US1.0...U.
> 0260 - 08 13 0a 43 61 6c 69 66-6f 72 6e 69 61 31 10 30   ...California1.0
> 0270 - 0e 06 03 55 04 07 13 07-53 61 6e 4a 6f 73 65 31   ...U....SanJose1
> 0280 - 18 30 16 06 03 55 04 03-13 0f 77 77 77 2e 6e 75   .0...U....www.nu
> 0290 - 61 67 65 43 41 2e 63 6f-6d 30 1e 17 0d 31 34 30   ageCA.com0...140
> 02a0 - 39 30 34 30 39 35 36 32-36 5a 17 0d 32 34 30 39   904095626Z..2409
> 02b0 - 30 31 30 39 35 36 32 36-5a 30 4e 31 0b 30 09 06   01095626Z0N1.0..
> 02c0 - 03 55 04 06 13 02 55 53-31 13 30 11 06 03 55 04   .U....US1.0...U.
> 02d0 - 08 13 0a 43 61 6c 69 66-6f 72 6e 69 61 31 10 30   ...California1.0
> 02e0 - 0e 06 03 55 04 07 13 07-53 61 6e 4a 6f 73 65 31   ...U....SanJose1
> 02f0 - 18 30 16 06 03 55 04 03-13 0f 77 77 77 2e 6e 75   .0...U....www.nu
> 0300 - 61 67 65 43 41 2e 63 6f-6d 30 81 9f 30 0d 06 09   ageCA.com0..0...
> 0310 - 2a 86 48 86 f7 0d 01 01-01 05 00 03 81 8d 00 30   *.H............0
> 0320 - 81 89 02 81 81 00 ac 55-1b d9 c1 d6 17 da 27 fd   .......U......'.
> 0330 - e8 fb f6 54 88 f0 6a b7-26 60 b3 81 c2 51 57 be   ...T..j.&`...QW.
> 0340 - 3d 2c 80 1c d2 94 02 90-f2 10 31 af a7 4e 5a c1   =,........1..NZ.
> 0350 - fe e7 10 62 f2 2a 52 2f-d1 03 2a 8a 1a 33 8a 11   ...b.*R/..*..3..
> 0360 - e1 c4 96 bd 15 51 a2 f6-23 0f fb 66 3f 3e d9 4e   .....Q..#..f?>.N
> 0370 - 5d 7b f4 df 77 c6 8b 58-3e bf 09 f9 61 2e 33 40   ]{..w..X>...a.3@
> 0380 - e5 28 6a 42 87 59 02 c0-be 89 7f 9b bc 8b 06 ea   .(jB.Y..........
> 0390 - 40 60 1a 44 80 cd 15 e1-9d e7 2b e6 a8 de d7 11   @`.D......+.....
> 03a0 - 09 9c 17 b8 7b 07 02 03-01 00 01 a3 81 b0 30 81   ....{.........0.
> 03b0 - ad 30 1d 06 03 55 1d 0e-04 16 04 14 7a 59 61 56   .0...U......zYaV
> 03c0 - b4 cd 2c 8b b4 b1 03 cf-5b 84 d8 3a 14 76 d8 38   ..,.....[..:.v.8
> 03d0 - 30 7e 06 03 55 1d 23 04-77 30 75 80 14 7a 59 61   0~..U.#.w0u..zYa
> 03e0 - 56 b4 cd 2c 8b b4 b1 03-cf 5b 84 d8 3a 14 76 d8   V..,.....[..:.v.
> 03f0 - 38 a1 52 a4 50 30 4e 31-0b 30 09 06 03 55 04 06   8.R.P0N1.0...U..
> 0400 - 13 02 55 53 31 13 30 11-06 03 55 04 08 13 0a 43   ..US1.0...U....C
> 0410 - 61 6c 69 66 6f 72 6e 69-61 31 10 30 0e 06 03 55   alifornia1.0...U
> 0420 - 04 07 13 07 53 61 6e 4a-6f 73 65 31 18 30 16 06   ....SanJose1.0..
> 0430 - 03 55 04 03 13 0f 77 77-77 2e 6e 75 61 67 65 43   .U....www.nuageC
> 0440 - 41 2e 63 6f 6d 82 09 00-e4 51 8c 52 e2 ce 56 6f   A.com....Q.R..Vo
> 0450 - 30 0c 06 03 55 1d 13 04-05 30 03 01 01 ff 30 0d   0...U....0....0.
> 0460 - 06 09 2a 86 48 86 f7 0d-01 01 05 05 00 03 81 81   ..*.H...........
> 0470 - 00 09 2b 89 da 1c 40 72-c6 17 1b 71 f0 53 bd d8   ..+... at r...q.S..
> 0480 - cc fb c3 fd 50 ae 92 f1-38 3d 8f 83 15 b3 bf 82   ....P...8=......
> 0490 - 1d cf d5 29 91 31 95 a5-13 80 a0 c8 41 35 fc 51   ...).1......A5.Q
> 04a0 - 8c 89 eb 42 64 c6 a9 d5-bf 1e b2 1f 99 ce 5c 56   ...Bd.........\V
> 04b0 - 12 2d 53 da 7c d5 06 2b-89 cf 59 a4 4b 15 89 ea   .-S.|..+..Y.K...
> 04c0 - 02 fc 75 c4 92 08 15 ae-79 89 f6 1b b4 98 fe 36   ..u.....y......6
> 04d0 - 5b 74 51 26 46 c7 e0 0b-25 18 8a 55 8b d8 07 78   [tQ&F...%..U...x
> 04e0 - 95 9c fa 9e 5c 2c 4c cc-1e c3 ba 99 78 7e 08 36   ....\,L.....x~.6
> 04f0 - 46                                                F
>
> TlsInfoCB SSL_accept:SSLv3 read client certificate A
>
> TlsMsgCB TLS-MSG: <<< ???  len=5
>
> TlsHexDumpCB
> 0000 - 16 03 03 00 86                                    .....
>
> TlsMsgCB TLS-MSG: <<< TLSv1.2 Handshake len=134  ClientKeyExchange
>
> TlsHexDumpCB
> 0000 - 10 00 00 82 00 80 62 63-f6 b8 00 19 3d 68 8c cd   ......bc....=h..
> 0010 - f7 e0 ca b8 d7 d8 f0 15-45 48 fd ca e9 53 27 45   ........EH...S'E
> 0020 - b5 ae a0 af 43 05 ec b4-88 12 5d 9b e9 3d 94 c9   ....C.....]..=..
> 0030 - 72 cb 63 47 af e7 a5 a9-de 91 ba 52 fc b4 fc 17   r.cG.......R....
> 0040 - 5c 51 59 4d 43 b3 2e 23-4d 75 fa 4f a9 5b bb 5b   \QYMC..#Mu.O.[.[
> 0050 - 20 10 87 9f a8 2e c7 5c-ed 51 30 b2 61 60 c7 ca    ......\.Q0.a`..
> 0060 - 7c 2b df ae dd ce 37 d3-55 b2 ec e3 af 10 f3 ce   |+....7.U.......
> 0070 - 85 c7 5c 46 61 6c b3 33-cb a8 fb 93 22 db 5e 25   ..\Fal.3....".^%
> 0080 - 47 11 0d 6b 9c 53                                 G..k.S
>
> TlsInfoCB SSL_accept:SSLv3 read client key exchange A
>
> TlsMsgCB TLS-MSG: <<< ???  len=5
>
> TlsHexDumpCB
> 0000 - 16 03 03 00 88                                    .....
>
> TlsMsgCB TLS-MSG: <<< TLSv1.2 Handshake len=136  CertificateVerify
>
> TlsHexDumpCB
> 0000 - 0f 00 00 84 06 01 00 80-26 20 60 8a 42 c3 b0 98   ........& `.B...
> 0010 - b6 28 04 ab 76 39 0b 9d-41 47 32 d3 29 65 3e c3   .(..v9..AG2.)e>.
> 0020 - f6 78 89 b1 09 df a4 fe-9f 6a 4a d0 99 11 27 88   .x.......jJ...'.
> 0030 - 76 db 95 ba d1 77 4a 35-7f ae 67 6a cb a6 a7 b7   v....wJ5..gj....
> 0040 - 79 c2 78 63 14 49 e2 2b-68 72 8c 08 02 fa 51 35   y.xc.I.+hr....Q5
> 0050 - 98 4e 70 3b 7a ab 4d e4-c0 3e 49 0d a8 33 58 11   .Np;z.M..>I..3X.
> 0060 - 31 23 cd bc 4b 77 55 b6-d3 f5 f1 e3 5c da a6 96   1#..KwU.....\...
> 0070 - b8 41 d2 ac df b8 36 43-62 b4 df b4 e6 86 42 5e   .A....6Cb.....B^
> 0080 - eb 5c 89 18 51 64 9a 31-                          .\..Qd.1
>
> TlsMsgCB TLS-MSG: >>> ???  len=5
>
> TlsHexDumpCB
> 0000 - 15 03 03 00 02                                    .....
>
> TlsMsgCB TLS-MSG: >>> TLSv1.2 Alert len=2  fatal decrypt_error
>
> TlsHexDumpCB
> 0000 - 02 33                                             .3
>
> TlsInfoCB SSL3 alert write:fatal:decrypt error
>
> TlsPrintCB 058880:error:04091068:rsa routines:INT_RSA_VERIFY:bad
> signature:/workspace/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_sign.c:300:
>
> TlsInfoCB SSL_accept:failed in error
>
> TlsPrintCB 058880:error:1408807B:SSL routines:ssl3_get_cert_verify:bad
> signature:/workspace/openssl/ssl/s3_srvr.c:3100:
>
>
> Appreciate any pointers on addressing this issue.
>
> Thanks,
> Senthil.
>
>
>
-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
URL: <http://mta.openssl.org/pipermail/openssl-users/attachments/20170313/7f6cd6c3/attachment-0001.html>

From matt at openssl.org  Mon Mar 13 09:26:50 2017
From: matt at openssl.org (Matt Caswell)
Date: Mon, 13 Mar 2017 09:26:50 +0000
Subject: [openssl-users] mingw 64-bit build of 1.1.0e
In-Reply-To: <376FC8FDF8144B52B4905E5C9EE207C4@OwnerPC311012>
References: <947E3E0C7B5E4C5A97C3506B97EBC133@OwnerPC311012>
 <FD22706D2C6E467C90561FC37394BAE7@OwnerPC311012>
 <c1e97a92-b83c-ceb9-bd4d-a867b4f46613@openssl.org>
 <48187B2179B1447EBAB01B229C060684@OwnerPC311012>
 <376FC8FDF8144B52B4905E5C9EE207C4@OwnerPC311012>
Message-ID: <5d0839d5-30c0-4358-6b1e-a2e3587cc182@openssl.org>



On 12/03/17 07:57, sisyphus1 at optusnet.com.au wrote:
>> But where did it find libz ?
> 
> Heh ... this compiler ships with libz.a (x86_64-w64-mingw32/lib/libz.a).
> I don't know how long they've been doing that - probably for years.
> Remove (or rename) that file and 'make' fails because -lz can't be
> resolved.

You can specify where to find libz with the following Configure options:

  --with-zlib-include=DIR
  --with-zlib-lib=LIB

Check the INSTALL file for details.


Matt


From pepone.onrez at gmail.com  Mon Mar 13 11:42:00 2017
From: pepone.onrez at gmail.com (pepone.onrez)
Date: Mon, 13 Mar 2017 12:42:00 +0100
Subject: [openssl-users] Visual Studio 2015 build failure
Message-ID: <CAPwwpXH5ukZmv6xcDNM+P+jp9Vad1ZSEjiMNwbW7jin=QC_Qyg@mail.gmail.com>

I trying to build openssl 1.0.2 from OpenSSL_1_0_2-stable branch and
keep getting this error


perl Configure VC-WIN32 no-asm enable-static-engine
ms\do_ms
nmake -f ms\ntdll.mak
....

        link /nologo /subsystem:console /opt:ref /debug /dll
/out:out32dll\libeay32.dll /def:ms/LIBEAY32.def
@C:\Users\ppgut\AppData\Local\Temp\nmE41E.tmp
     Creating library out32dll\libeay32.lib and object out32dll\libeay32.exp
bss_fd.obj : error LNK2001: unresolved external symbol
OPENSSL_UplinkTable [D:\3.7\openssl\msbuild\openssl.build.targets]
bss_file.obj : error LNK2001: unresolved external symbol
OPENSSL_UplinkTable [D:\3.7\openssl\msbuild\openssl.build.targets]
b_dump.obj : error LNK2001: unresolved external symbol
OPENSSL_UplinkTable [D:\3.7\openssl\msbuild\openssl.build.targets]
out32dll\libeay32.dll : fatal error LNK1120: 1 unresolved externals
[D:\3.7\openssl\msbuild\openssl.build.targets]
NMAKE : fatal error U1077: '"C:\Program Files (x86)\Microsoft Visual
Studio 14.0\VC\BIN\amd64\link.EXE"' : return code '0x460'
[D:\3.7\openssl\msbuild\openssl.build.targets]
  Stop.
D:\3.7\openssl\msbuild\openssl.build.targets(20,3): error MSB3073: The
command "nmake -f ms\ntdll.mak" exited with code 2.

From darshanmody at avaya.com  Mon Mar 13 12:48:59 2017
From: darshanmody at avaya.com (Mody, Darshan (Darshan))
Date: Mon, 13 Mar 2017 12:48:59 +0000
Subject: [openssl-users] CRL implementation caching
Message-ID: <25D2EC755404B4409F263AC6D050FEBB2A1023CD@AZ-FFEXMB03.global.avaya.com>

Hi,

We have modified our codebase to have CRL verification on the incoming certificates. While doing a negative testing with load of certificates I find that the resident memory for the module.

My query is when we have CRL verification enabled does openssl caches incoming certificates?

Please note that we have set SSL_CTX_set_session_cache_mode(ctx, SSL_SESS_CACHE_OFF);

>From the core file generated I am observing many entries of the far-end certificate serial number.

Thanks in Advance

Regards
Darshan
-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
URL: <http://mta.openssl.org/pipermail/openssl-users/attachments/20170313/981debca/attachment.html>

From garyp at firstech.com  Mon Mar 13 14:39:08 2017
From: garyp at firstech.com (Gary L Peskin)
Date: Mon, 13 Mar 2017 07:39:08 -0700
Subject: [openssl-users] Cannot read exported PKCS12 cert and private key
Message-ID: <00e101d29c07$934bd3d0$b9e37b70$@firstech.com>

My original message accidently included an attachment.  Please ignore the
attachment.  That was not related to this issue.

 

Thanks,

Gary

 

From: Gary L Peskin [mailto:garyp at firstech.com] 
Sent: Monday, March 13, 2017 2:28 AM
To: 'openssl-users at openssl.org' <openssl-users at openssl.org>
Subject: Cannot read exported PKCS12 cert and private key

 

Hello all

 

I exported a certificate and corresponding private key in base 64 encoded
DER format from a mainframe system and FTP'd it to my Windows desktop.

 

I tried to read it using OpenSSL 1.0.2.k and 1.1.0d 32-bit and 64-bit on
Windows with 

 

openssl pkcs12  -in mycert.p12  -noout

 

But I get the following messages:

 

15956:error:0D0680A8:asn1 encoding routines:ASN1_CHECK_TLEN:wrong
tag:.\crypto\asn1\tasn_dec.c:1199:

15956:error:0D07803A:asn1 encoding routines:ASN1_ITEM_EX_D2I:nested asn1
error:.\crypto\asn1\tasn_dec.c:374:Type=PKCS12

 

I'm able to import this with the private key into the Windows certificate
store with no issues.

 

Can someone please advise as to what I'm doing wrong?

 

Thanks,

Gary

 

PS Here is the file:

 

-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----

MIIKCAIBAzCCCcQGCSqGSIb3DQEHAaCCCbUEggmxMIIJrTCCBE8GCSqGSIb3DQEH

BqCCBEAwggQ8AgEAMIIENQYJKoZIhvcNAQcBMBwGCiqGSIb3DQEMAQMwDgQIjdBS

+TZF+xQCAgP5gIIECNtJIUg23ab7AXi33MKueO03S1pUkHCQk+kByNK/6f1FgEvu

XRqhniR3mdyzeMVBCrCBSx3GhZlpLcW/d6OAd3z8hbXjvw5OC5OLavemfRNtsi+R

q9LggkcWT2oCszc2nglKzHYaFnkG80vwxLwUXmROL+UK4ZlYmqp46EjuNAEo/yqQ

yEwgia3iP84wiZRfY9kBJMq9yUm+LvowO/1E9v/ycgE6IWe1CrThQzrD6Vm9LaTy

0oZqAbTbzbedZwGsuWZoedw2FtmRijkH5EbRNRpTrUUO/qQMO19v5IKtd4kUAWea

dpYrwn1kkD2aInKKsjycCFtGopXPbmrqj2cm335cESN4XePBHQuzaywHgd0WjU5O

++UM+B/5Kpx3af53E412pGAcgnPH/ZQKMa5Zkp73pcFmViLEC7Tn9eNB2iNUfX9p

rV3RNRnrEPZlD1MuYEkmBIWA5czUiDKrpyYA1fmrSsFthFMhD5fTVoDMSTBmNXPz

5B8HYW4+aDbo7N2a+BtFNcbMqYJqYwVL7xE2rL6nUedMyN2uKeZfOnLLQuYoUCg7

iYO5k7D/jQNsviyZg022Nzwy4agdPBKqok8oanQge8/pr3NeMrNDDKVyWy8ZBVBv

KGi3qaX45ejJxP8XaJxxw88+KOc1OvAMhWhAHlHqpw9d7OiAP1oCV+vRuYnD5N9a

YyLspoKy1nk+Htl71QQ4GYCRRGXMl7YsxtRrUSOAZa2+V/5h6ljUsTsib3VhO0eL

/jf+BlBxhpWw1J9L0r6sFMYvVS3AsqfqnBLJUFLxeQxYvVsV0Gpx8BonpZACQC91

DB4oV0l6whqtAQ4dJMJEk9nNnP0NYsVceKybF5NvgL3lzALw/Ezv8K7Y69FJaM35

LrT9JlGSt/BJ0oXp4wxqH4UbHikhGpSCteh7k3ZQkbE4fokVhH9lYkMXqBRXqXlI

nV9b7hR26NeJY0C7a9VyNXtzIVsP+JiBhDzc7GDafIF99fUHPVfqh15CPnTb5liZ

A6QlYw1aVvyhS8ST4I117kALKWUdl9xhe+ui0IFCEQY/mNuQ8O13nlcx+DvGtPxc

WCUG0VpP6AkE9Mkd67CghF6sFh/8FqdE1jU2Asj+iCZVU/s0ngH3hAXwMVUwOW9S

voxYParz1b0sF7vgrhLteHOZ03TEra7rh7OiOVUCOE6CACG1qV8QXDvpkZp2mGTx

5T7ob8nNF8XQWhIHjULVdKdOBuMh/4dOrHTuU5cFosR29mbzAZDDi0myuzTv37GJ

OgyiX0XXvwn5jCmAoaE0ji1fgxrWUs8yVYYHOj3IyQwzU+FydfKtlnhh8ZxHKDBo

8wPqrEAzTXT49bsxvy3cYxUp4Dd1G2ymkoTZonEi7Vir0kN7qjCCBVYGCSqGSIb3

DQEHAaCCBUcEggVDMIIFPzCCBTsGCyqGSIb3DQEMCgECoIIE7jCCBOowHAYKKoZI

hvcNAQwBAzAOBAh2oqSgVyE4cwICA/EEggTInCkEbWknH/Vojqzmn1jIPRGb7dG+

egxS5YDtk14LxnQuwACTQef2wQnKlosYbfH8dJVIvXRYB19MXroGpd5KJA8Dftqa

dWFVAcDIrzV/ZS252aita0fKOVeqjKWo7TkA9jnwDeekAcK+1R5ioIcfXPLJDSUX

gdEaza88oQ+g+34+B2o+mnTPT/PM/o1n6cifVRURn2jMASwiB/cwLn58UZibCSgL

h3CrcKamWi8AF3eJ2rkpPuK41s8SfqZ1ByNEFSgnsX5UQzJpn8FoBPBOmFnR8FTr

XNwtT7GcJJuWDSnf+On2PI2LYT6XAhNeCkfMwdnUa6N1YV2Okelmae4J21sldQlw

ATZFiuigyPMFF1X3wUfdvZTwQGC17YFTN+OIYF9/62XTiZUEJ6y0I3nRvAxpaRHS

VVyh2KA89e5Llxv+bArgA6brykRHFk5I7e7krrflPoQJ0o1oKhb8DshnxAk65v/H

xTPLq9gac81AY8rWnrTCZcO+inCan/IlOKDXnVCUfZATtAOOIQ6Mf9KwuAeyE9xu

4dUO0vF5juFU6hK8SR//apf0JF+zejq5wnEhc1o/sWVpKQkakYayJ+4Hnlx+G6Ra

bJ3ZYQv4U/kUx0Q43qvvwhx0qdZ79BUpqPTxLeBzwVG6q5ys8eZY988YcIg11NY9

+qC4cFGBsbMuWSispichDN5wEJ9C9UrdKRGsAztz0j1GTiJcXPnBH+vTeULh7Spx

GmLbJWyj3tg+QaefDPo4aaIpZCZV0BFSy41fgoBB+rZ45wNgRiDuDuHue2WY28PC

dGrAuXzQTUeEUYqN2zL2DhiYD/6/Y+/BCUS/kO0w3x0J7ityoSlyVJ+cf84FYmtB

zmPIqgjDZS/NGC0OWgUBWxzspADETmwpZDCz8MJHK99nbAcYz3AybW6307NCJTKp

gPfH6RyTrDzoijIweHUeU2pANpDjbp53UKV5/WyEvbjvy9maf1Jze60zS7EFgZ/n

ZEe+eQbSY5SGtTWCB3mMbOTFvDH0QKGbfj6EX2Z+P+RZEeU/xzMOejcBbOO7XpgV

+Uryt+NgcocTtg/5YjVkAdMeVz9A/XdGydAy7hE2FwFI1hJTl/aI4ZaAKV34xH2r

J4/VstlG8ongv9zMNaS4Xl1n3wk6W3oAUmqWdoYYyDsocIBl1he1oP588Capa7OL

NLYDl3llQXbyah1A//xJsH5M8KiB0MlJ0qSSp0U7LXmxDP3dw3kcR9XgOX835Bpi

NlOPQDfzYZyKN6sIGDcuxwQPdOg2EQZxI3W5xp+oHTM/yTuqo/5vpOIlMdwqfQ/R

HGLVyyQ0yO3oIMxiE56jSnrhjj/H/bJJAMMUBXI6pi18JCv24cTjVsXGjsf4jH7g

9uGmoecX/Sx77Sx+814aO0Qkm0WzadLagKoz1nOV1hmeSan1nFnXkE94VqIJ9YTV

qnLrY0JYjpI2ywkW4wCscjVMIxkAfhifc31v4LWUnTMO0Y+xqO89v1hKbSYkZYYs

psrxnomXJq/RqjfZBhF3f+0aTNxpvlJnGOjnlT0qX1yHBOr+bmkcTIhL7pKA+qK1

fZD8834wTLrRcFiPD7pX6/zglMEG4PUf1RoDC0+3Ud8qa2SqfyYZeFm8+9yFsFnZ

RYFkMTowIwYJKoZIhvcNAQkUMRYeFABDAEEAQwBUAEUAUwBUACAAQwBBMBMGCSqG

SIb3DQEJFTEGBAQAAAABMDswHzAHBgUrDgMCGgQUoiKIky5oqgCxt5DnJxWNQvZ1

WecEFDabnXfA8sLdfwIXx9AexvOOS0gpAgID+w==

-----END CERTIFICATE-----

-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
URL: <http://mta.openssl.org/pipermail/openssl-users/attachments/20170313/f6c9f53f/attachment-0001.html>

From Michael.Wojcik at microfocus.com  Mon Mar 13 15:58:23 2017
From: Michael.Wojcik at microfocus.com (Michael Wojcik)
Date: Mon, 13 Mar 2017 15:58:23 +0000
Subject: [openssl-users] Cannot read exported PKCS12 cert and private key
In-Reply-To: <00e101d29c07$934bd3d0$b9e37b70$@firstech.com>
References: <00e101d29c07$934bd3d0$b9e37b70$@firstech.com>
Message-ID: <B550B44BF8AF314BB00C4E2AC1C18088018C450671@prvxmb03.microfocus.com>

I'll assume you mean you exported it "from a mainframe system" using RACF. RACF has half a dozen export formats for certificates and keys; they're not all supported by OpenSSL.

In particular (and despite the PEM delimiters), I suspect what you have here is a PKCS#12 file in PEM format. The openssl pkcs12 utility doesn't support PEM encoding, because that's not normally done. RACF will do it, though, just to be difficult.

openssl asn1parse -in file -inform pem shows you have valid ASN.1 data, with a big ol' blob at offset 26; adding -strparse 26 shows encrypted data. So yes, looks like PKCS#12.

So, try this:
1. Edit the file and remove the PEM delimiters ("---- BEGIN CERTIFICATE ----" and "----- END CERTIFICATE ----").
2. Convert the data from Base64 to binary:
                openssl base64 -d -in file -out file.der
3. Unpack it:
                openssl pkcs12 -in file.der -nokeys -out file-cert.pem
                openssl pkcs12 -in file.der -nocerts -out file-key.pem

Note the final openssl command will prompt you for the password to encrypt the key file with; if you don't want your private key encrypted, you can also specify -nodes.

You can use openssl pkcs12 just once, without the -nokeys / -nocerts options, but that will put your certificate and key in the same file, which is generally not what you want with OpenSSL.

Of course, you haven't told us what you're trying to do, so I'm just guessing.

Also, I can't verify this, because I don't have the import password for your PKCS#12 file.


Michael Wojcik
Distinguished Engineer, Micro Focus



From: openssl-users [mailto:openssl-users-bounces at openssl.org] On Behalf Of Gary L Peskin
Sent: Monday, March 13, 2017 08:39
To: openssl-users at openssl.org
Subject: Re: [openssl-users] Cannot read exported PKCS12 cert and private key

My original message accidently included an attachment.  Please ignore the attachment.  That was not related to this issue.

Thanks,
Gary

From: Gary L Peskin [mailto:garyp at firstech.com]
Sent: Monday, March 13, 2017 2:28 AM
To: 'openssl-users at openssl.org' <openssl-users at openssl.org<mailto:openssl-users at openssl.org>>
Subject: Cannot read exported PKCS12 cert and private key

Hello all

I exported a certificate and corresponding private key in base 64 encoded DER format from a mainframe system and FTP?d it to my Windows desktop.

I tried to read it using OpenSSL 1.0.2.k and 1.1.0d 32-bit and 64-bit on Windows with

openssl pkcs12  -in mycert.p12  -noout

But I get the following messages:

15956:error:0D0680A8:asn1 encoding routines:ASN1_CHECK_TLEN:wrong tag:.\crypto\asn1\tasn_dec.c:1199:
15956:error:0D07803A:asn1 encoding routines:ASN1_ITEM_EX_D2I:nested asn1 error:.\crypto\asn1\tasn_dec.c:374:Type=PKCS12

I?m able to import this with the private key into the Windows certificate store with no issues.

Can someone please advise as to what I?m doing wrong?

Thanks,
Gary

PS Here is the file:

-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----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-----END CERTIFICATE-----
-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
URL: <http://mta.openssl.org/pipermail/openssl-users/attachments/20170313/a46c4bfa/attachment.html>

From garyp at firstech.com  Mon Mar 13 16:26:21 2017
From: garyp at firstech.com (Gary L Peskin)
Date: Mon, 13 Mar 2017 09:26:21 -0700
Subject: [openssl-users] Cannot read exported PKCS12 cert and private key
In-Reply-To: <B550B44BF8AF314BB00C4E2AC1C18088018C450671@prvxmb03.microfocus.com>
References: <00e101d29c07$934bd3d0$b9e37b70$@firstech.com>
 <B550B44BF8AF314BB00C4E2AC1C18088018C450671@prvxmb03.microfocus.com>
Message-ID: <013001d29c16$8d4e2cd0$a7ea8670$@firstech.com>

Thanks VERY much Michael.  That did the trick.  This was a homegrown CA cert and I needed it to sign a certificate request for testing purposes.

 

I didn?t realize that the openssl pkcs12 utility didn?t support PEM encoding for input.  I was a little confused I guess by the documentation which shows PEM encoding for ?-in filename? but I see now that that?s for when exporting a PKCS#12 file, not for parsing one.

 

Thanks again for clearing this up.  It?s weird that MS supports this input format but openssl does not. I thought openssl could do EVERYTHING.  ?

 

Thanks,

Gary

 

From: openssl-users [mailto:openssl-users-bounces at openssl.org] On Behalf Of Michael Wojcik
Sent: Monday, March 13, 2017 8:58 AM
To: openssl-users at openssl.org
Subject: Re: [openssl-users] Cannot read exported PKCS12 cert and private key

 

I'll assume you mean you exported it "from a mainframe system" using RACF. RACF has half a dozen export formats for certificates and keys; they're not all supported by OpenSSL.

 

In particular (and despite the PEM delimiters), I suspect what you have here is a PKCS#12 file in PEM format. The openssl pkcs12 utility doesn't support PEM encoding, because that's not normally done. RACF will do it, though, just to be difficult.

 

openssl asn1parse -in file -inform pem shows you have valid ASN.1 data, with a big ol' blob at offset 26; adding -strparse 26 shows encrypted data. So yes, looks like PKCS#12.

 

So, try this:

1. Edit the file and remove the PEM delimiters ("---- BEGIN CERTIFICATE ----" and "----- END CERTIFICATE ----").

2. Convert the data from Base64 to binary:
                openssl base64 -d -in file -out file.der

3. Unpack it:

                openssl pkcs12 -in file.der -nokeys -out file-cert.pem

                openssl pkcs12 -in file.der -nocerts -out file-key.pem

 

Note the final openssl command will prompt you for the password to encrypt the key file with; if you don't want your private key encrypted, you can also specify -nodes.

 

You can use openssl pkcs12 just once, without the -nokeys / -nocerts options, but that will put your certificate and key in the same file, which is generally not what you want with OpenSSL.

 

Of course, you haven't told us what you're trying to do, so I'm just guessing.

 

Also, I can't verify this, because I don't have the import password for your PKCS#12 file.

 

 

Michael Wojcik 
Distinguished Engineer, Micro Focus 

 

 

 

From: openssl-users [mailto:openssl-users-bounces at openssl.org] On Behalf Of Gary L Peskin
Sent: Monday, March 13, 2017 08:39
To: openssl-users at openssl.org <mailto:openssl-users at openssl.org> 
Subject: Re: [openssl-users] Cannot read exported PKCS12 cert and private key

 

My original message accidently included an attachment.  Please ignore the attachment.  That was not related to this issue.

 

Thanks,

Gary

 

From: Gary L Peskin [mailto:garyp at firstech.com] 
Sent: Monday, March 13, 2017 2:28 AM
To: 'openssl-users at openssl.org' <openssl-users at openssl.org <mailto:openssl-users at openssl.org> >
Subject: Cannot read exported PKCS12 cert and private key

 

Hello all

 

I exported a certificate and corresponding private key in base 64 encoded DER format from a mainframe system and FTP?d it to my Windows desktop.

 

I tried to read it using OpenSSL 1.0.2.k and 1.1.0d 32-bit and 64-bit on Windows with 

 

openssl pkcs12  -in mycert.p12  -noout

 

But I get the following messages:

 

15956:error:0D0680A8:asn1 encoding routines:ASN1_CHECK_TLEN:wrong tag:.\crypto\asn1\tasn_dec.c:1199:

15956:error:0D07803A:asn1 encoding routines:ASN1_ITEM_EX_D2I:nested asn1 error:.\crypto\asn1\tasn_dec.c:374:Type=PKCS12

 

I?m able to import this with the private key into the Windows certificate store with no issues.

 

Can someone please advise as to what I?m doing wrong?

 

Thanks,

Gary

 

PS Here is the file:

 

-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----

MIIKCAIBAzCCCcQGCSqGSIb3DQEHAaCCCbUEggmxMIIJrTCCBE8GCSqGSIb3DQEH

BqCCBEAwggQ8AgEAMIIENQYJKoZIhvcNAQcBMBwGCiqGSIb3DQEMAQMwDgQIjdBS

+TZF+xQCAgP5gIIECNtJIUg23ab7AXi33MKueO03S1pUkHCQk+kByNK/6f1FgEvu

XRqhniR3mdyzeMVBCrCBSx3GhZlpLcW/d6OAd3z8hbXjvw5OC5OLavemfRNtsi+R

q9LggkcWT2oCszc2nglKzHYaFnkG80vwxLwUXmROL+UK4ZlYmqp46EjuNAEo/yqQ

yEwgia3iP84wiZRfY9kBJMq9yUm+LvowO/1E9v/ycgE6IWe1CrThQzrD6Vm9LaTy

0oZqAbTbzbedZwGsuWZoedw2FtmRijkH5EbRNRpTrUUO/qQMO19v5IKtd4kUAWea

dpYrwn1kkD2aInKKsjycCFtGopXPbmrqj2cm335cESN4XePBHQuzaywHgd0WjU5O

++UM+B/5Kpx3af53E412pGAcgnPH/ZQKMa5Zkp73pcFmViLEC7Tn9eNB2iNUfX9p

rV3RNRnrEPZlD1MuYEkmBIWA5czUiDKrpyYA1fmrSsFthFMhD5fTVoDMSTBmNXPz

5B8HYW4+aDbo7N2a+BtFNcbMqYJqYwVL7xE2rL6nUedMyN2uKeZfOnLLQuYoUCg7

iYO5k7D/jQNsviyZg022Nzwy4agdPBKqok8oanQge8/pr3NeMrNDDKVyWy8ZBVBv

KGi3qaX45ejJxP8XaJxxw88+KOc1OvAMhWhAHlHqpw9d7OiAP1oCV+vRuYnD5N9a

YyLspoKy1nk+Htl71QQ4GYCRRGXMl7YsxtRrUSOAZa2+V/5h6ljUsTsib3VhO0eL

/jf+BlBxhpWw1J9L0r6sFMYvVS3AsqfqnBLJUFLxeQxYvVsV0Gpx8BonpZACQC91

DB4oV0l6whqtAQ4dJMJEk9nNnP0NYsVceKybF5NvgL3lzALw/Ezv8K7Y69FJaM35

LrT9JlGSt/BJ0oXp4wxqH4UbHikhGpSCteh7k3ZQkbE4fokVhH9lYkMXqBRXqXlI

nV9b7hR26NeJY0C7a9VyNXtzIVsP+JiBhDzc7GDafIF99fUHPVfqh15CPnTb5liZ

A6QlYw1aVvyhS8ST4I117kALKWUdl9xhe+ui0IFCEQY/mNuQ8O13nlcx+DvGtPxc

WCUG0VpP6AkE9Mkd67CghF6sFh/8FqdE1jU2Asj+iCZVU/s0ngH3hAXwMVUwOW9S

voxYParz1b0sF7vgrhLteHOZ03TEra7rh7OiOVUCOE6CACG1qV8QXDvpkZp2mGTx

5T7ob8nNF8XQWhIHjULVdKdOBuMh/4dOrHTuU5cFosR29mbzAZDDi0myuzTv37GJ

OgyiX0XXvwn5jCmAoaE0ji1fgxrWUs8yVYYHOj3IyQwzU+FydfKtlnhh8ZxHKDBo

8wPqrEAzTXT49bsxvy3cYxUp4Dd1G2ymkoTZonEi7Vir0kN7qjCCBVYGCSqGSIb3

DQEHAaCCBUcEggVDMIIFPzCCBTsGCyqGSIb3DQEMCgECoIIE7jCCBOowHAYKKoZI

hvcNAQwBAzAOBAh2oqSgVyE4cwICA/EEggTInCkEbWknH/Vojqzmn1jIPRGb7dG+

egxS5YDtk14LxnQuwACTQef2wQnKlosYbfH8dJVIvXRYB19MXroGpd5KJA8Dftqa

dWFVAcDIrzV/ZS252aita0fKOVeqjKWo7TkA9jnwDeekAcK+1R5ioIcfXPLJDSUX

gdEaza88oQ+g+34+B2o+mnTPT/PM/o1n6cifVRURn2jMASwiB/cwLn58UZibCSgL

h3CrcKamWi8AF3eJ2rkpPuK41s8SfqZ1ByNEFSgnsX5UQzJpn8FoBPBOmFnR8FTr

XNwtT7GcJJuWDSnf+On2PI2LYT6XAhNeCkfMwdnUa6N1YV2Okelmae4J21sldQlw

ATZFiuigyPMFF1X3wUfdvZTwQGC17YFTN+OIYF9/62XTiZUEJ6y0I3nRvAxpaRHS

VVyh2KA89e5Llxv+bArgA6brykRHFk5I7e7krrflPoQJ0o1oKhb8DshnxAk65v/H

xTPLq9gac81AY8rWnrTCZcO+inCan/IlOKDXnVCUfZATtAOOIQ6Mf9KwuAeyE9xu

4dUO0vF5juFU6hK8SR//apf0JF+zejq5wnEhc1o/sWVpKQkakYayJ+4Hnlx+G6Ra

bJ3ZYQv4U/kUx0Q43qvvwhx0qdZ79BUpqPTxLeBzwVG6q5ys8eZY988YcIg11NY9

+qC4cFGBsbMuWSispichDN5wEJ9C9UrdKRGsAztz0j1GTiJcXPnBH+vTeULh7Spx

GmLbJWyj3tg+QaefDPo4aaIpZCZV0BFSy41fgoBB+rZ45wNgRiDuDuHue2WY28PC

dGrAuXzQTUeEUYqN2zL2DhiYD/6/Y+/BCUS/kO0w3x0J7ityoSlyVJ+cf84FYmtB

zmPIqgjDZS/NGC0OWgUBWxzspADETmwpZDCz8MJHK99nbAcYz3AybW6307NCJTKp

gPfH6RyTrDzoijIweHUeU2pANpDjbp53UKV5/WyEvbjvy9maf1Jze60zS7EFgZ/n

ZEe+eQbSY5SGtTWCB3mMbOTFvDH0QKGbfj6EX2Z+P+RZEeU/xzMOejcBbOO7XpgV

+Uryt+NgcocTtg/5YjVkAdMeVz9A/XdGydAy7hE2FwFI1hJTl/aI4ZaAKV34xH2r

J4/VstlG8ongv9zMNaS4Xl1n3wk6W3oAUmqWdoYYyDsocIBl1he1oP588Capa7OL

NLYDl3llQXbyah1A//xJsH5M8KiB0MlJ0qSSp0U7LXmxDP3dw3kcR9XgOX835Bpi

NlOPQDfzYZyKN6sIGDcuxwQPdOg2EQZxI3W5xp+oHTM/yTuqo/5vpOIlMdwqfQ/R

HGLVyyQ0yO3oIMxiE56jSnrhjj/H/bJJAMMUBXI6pi18JCv24cTjVsXGjsf4jH7g

9uGmoecX/Sx77Sx+814aO0Qkm0WzadLagKoz1nOV1hmeSan1nFnXkE94VqIJ9YTV

qnLrY0JYjpI2ywkW4wCscjVMIxkAfhifc31v4LWUnTMO0Y+xqO89v1hKbSYkZYYs

psrxnomXJq/RqjfZBhF3f+0aTNxpvlJnGOjnlT0qX1yHBOr+bmkcTIhL7pKA+qK1

fZD8834wTLrRcFiPD7pX6/zglMEG4PUf1RoDC0+3Ud8qa2SqfyYZeFm8+9yFsFnZ

RYFkMTowIwYJKoZIhvcNAQkUMRYeFABDAEEAQwBUAEUAUwBUACAAQwBBMBMGCSqG

SIb3DQEJFTEGBAQAAAABMDswHzAHBgUrDgMCGgQUoiKIky5oqgCxt5DnJxWNQvZ1

WecEFDabnXfA8sLdfwIXx9AexvOOS0gpAgID+w==

-----END CERTIFICATE-----

-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
URL: <http://mta.openssl.org/pipermail/openssl-users/attachments/20170313/052e03e8/attachment-0001.html>

From aerowolf at gmail.com  Mon Mar 13 16:56:21 2017
From: aerowolf at gmail.com (Kyle Hamilton)
Date: Mon, 13 Mar 2017 09:56:21 -0700
Subject: [openssl-users] Cannot read exported PKCS12 cert and private key
In-Reply-To: <013001d29c16$8d4e2cd0$a7ea8670$@firstech.com>
References: <00e101d29c07$934bd3d0$b9e37b70$@firstech.com>
 <B550B44BF8AF314BB00C4E2AC1C18088018C450671@prvxmb03.microfocus.com>
 <013001d29c16$8d4e2cd0$a7ea8670$@firstech.com>
Message-ID: <CAPMEXDZhtxSrOncUU1XJYQiye-hiqZD4zXTVsm9ri=A5_0yrkQ@mail.gmail.com>

Enhancement request:

make 'pkcs12' support -inform and -outform.

On Mon, Mar 13, 2017 at 9:26 AM, Gary L Peskin <garyp at firstech.com> wrote:

> Thanks VERY much Michael.  That did the trick.  This was a homegrown CA
> cert and I needed it to sign a certificate request for testing purposes.
>
>
>
> I didn?t realize that the openssl pkcs12 utility didn?t support PEM
> encoding for input.  I was a little confused I guess by the documentation
> which shows PEM encoding for ?-in filename? but I see now that that?s for
> when exporting a PKCS#12 file, not for parsing one.
>
>
>
> Thanks again for clearing this up.  It?s weird that MS supports this input
> format but openssl does not. I thought openssl could do EVERYTHING.  ?
>
>
>
> Thanks,
>
> Gary
>
>
>
> *From:* openssl-users [mailto:openssl-users-bounces at openssl.org] *On
> Behalf Of *Michael Wojcik
> *Sent:* Monday, March 13, 2017 8:58 AM
>
> *To:* openssl-users at openssl.org
> *Subject:* Re: [openssl-users] Cannot read exported PKCS12 cert and
> private key
>
>
>
> I'll assume you mean you exported it "from a mainframe system" using RACF.
> RACF has half a dozen export formats for certificates and keys; they're not
> all supported by OpenSSL.
>
>
>
> In particular (and despite the PEM delimiters), I suspect what you have
> here is a PKCS#12 file in PEM format. The openssl pkcs12 utility doesn't
> support PEM encoding, because that's not normally done. RACF will do it,
> though, just to be difficult.
>
>
>
> openssl asn1parse -in *file* -inform pem shows you have valid ASN.1 data,
> with a big ol' blob at offset 26; adding -strparse 26 shows encrypted data.
> So yes, looks like PKCS#12.
>
>
>
> So, try this:
>
> 1. Edit the file and remove the PEM delimiters ("---- BEGIN CERTIFICATE
> ----" and "----- END CERTIFICATE ----").
>
> 2. Convert the data from Base64 to binary:
>                 openssl base64 -d -in *file* -out *file.der*
>
> 3. Unpack it:
>
>                 openssl pkcs12 -in *file*.der -nokeys -out *file*-cert.pem
>
>                 openssl pkcs12 -in *file*.der -nocerts -out *file*-key.pem
>
>
>
> Note the final openssl command will prompt you for the password to encrypt
> the key file with; if you don't want your private key encrypted, you can
> also specify -nodes.
>
>
>
> You can use openssl pkcs12 just once, without the -nokeys / -nocerts
> options, but that will put your certificate and key in the same file, which
> is generally not what you want with OpenSSL.
>
>
>
> Of course, you haven't told us what you're trying to do, so I'm just
> guessing.
>
>
>
> Also, I can't verify this, because I don't have the import password for
> your PKCS#12 file.
>
>
>
>
>
> Michael Wojcik
> Distinguished Engineer, Micro Focus
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> *From:* openssl-users [mailto:openssl-users-bounces at openssl.org
> <openssl-users-bounces at openssl.org>] *On Behalf Of *Gary L Peskin
> *Sent:* Monday, March 13, 2017 08:39
> *To:* openssl-users at openssl.org
> *Subject:* Re: [openssl-users] Cannot read exported PKCS12 cert and
> private key
>
>
>
> My original message accidently included an attachment.  Please ignore the
> attachment.  That was not related to this issue.
>
>
>
> Thanks,
>
> Gary
>
>
>
> *From:* Gary L Peskin [mailto:garyp at firstech.com <garyp at firstech.com>]
> *Sent:* Monday, March 13, 2017 2:28 AM
> *To:* 'openssl-users at openssl.org' <openssl-users at openssl.org>
> *Subject:* Cannot read exported PKCS12 cert and private key
>
>
>
> Hello all
>
>
>
> I exported a certificate and corresponding private key in base 64 encoded
> DER format from a mainframe system and FTP?d it to my Windows desktop.
>
>
>
> I tried to read it using OpenSSL 1.0.2.k and 1.1.0d 32-bit and 64-bit on
> Windows with
>
>
>
> openssl pkcs12  -in mycert.p12  -noout
>
>
>
> But I get the following messages:
>
>
>
> 15956:error:0D0680A8:asn1 encoding routines:ASN1_CHECK_TLEN:wrong
> tag:.\crypto\asn1\tasn_dec.c:1199:
>
> 15956:error:0D07803A:asn1 encoding routines:ASN1_ITEM_EX_D2I:nested asn1
> error:.\crypto\asn1\tasn_dec.c:374:Type=PKCS12
>
>
>
> I?m able to import this with the private key into the Windows certificate
> store with no issues.
>
>
>
> Can someone please advise as to what I?m doing wrong?
>
>
>
> Thanks,
>
> Gary
>
>
>
> PS Here is the file:
>
>
>
> -----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
>
> MIIKCAIBAzCCCcQGCSqGSIb3DQEHAaCCCbUEggmxMIIJrTCCBE8GCSqGSIb3DQEH
>
> BqCCBEAwggQ8AgEAMIIENQYJKoZIhvcNAQcBMBwGCiqGSIb3DQEMAQMwDgQIjdBS
>
> +TZF+xQCAgP5gIIECNtJIUg23ab7AXi33MKueO03S1pUkHCQk+kByNK/6f1FgEvu
>
> XRqhniR3mdyzeMVBCrCBSx3GhZlpLcW/d6OAd3z8hbXjvw5OC5OLavemfRNtsi+R
>
> q9LggkcWT2oCszc2nglKzHYaFnkG80vwxLwUXmROL+UK4ZlYmqp46EjuNAEo/yqQ
>
> yEwgia3iP84wiZRfY9kBJMq9yUm+LvowO/1E9v/ycgE6IWe1CrThQzrD6Vm9LaTy
>
> 0oZqAbTbzbedZwGsuWZoedw2FtmRijkH5EbRNRpTrUUO/qQMO19v5IKtd4kUAWea
>
> dpYrwn1kkD2aInKKsjycCFtGopXPbmrqj2cm335cESN4XePBHQuzaywHgd0WjU5O
>
> ++UM+B/5Kpx3af53E412pGAcgnPH/ZQKMa5Zkp73pcFmViLEC7Tn9eNB2iNUfX9p
>
> rV3RNRnrEPZlD1MuYEkmBIWA5czUiDKrpyYA1fmrSsFthFMhD5fTVoDMSTBmNXPz
>
> 5B8HYW4+aDbo7N2a+BtFNcbMqYJqYwVL7xE2rL6nUedMyN2uKeZfOnLLQuYoUCg7
>
> iYO5k7D/jQNsviyZg022Nzwy4agdPBKqok8oanQge8/pr3NeMrNDDKVyWy8ZBVBv
>
> KGi3qaX45ejJxP8XaJxxw88+KOc1OvAMhWhAHlHqpw9d7OiAP1oCV+vRuYnD5N9a
>
> YyLspoKy1nk+Htl71QQ4GYCRRGXMl7YsxtRrUSOAZa2+V/5h6ljUsTsib3VhO0eL
>
> /jf+BlBxhpWw1J9L0r6sFMYvVS3AsqfqnBLJUFLxeQxYvVsV0Gpx8BonpZACQC91
>
> DB4oV0l6whqtAQ4dJMJEk9nNnP0NYsVceKybF5NvgL3lzALw/Ezv8K7Y69FJaM35
>
> LrT9JlGSt/BJ0oXp4wxqH4UbHikhGpSCteh7k3ZQkbE4fokVhH9lYkMXqBRXqXlI
>
> nV9b7hR26NeJY0C7a9VyNXtzIVsP+JiBhDzc7GDafIF99fUHPVfqh15CPnTb5liZ
>
> A6QlYw1aVvyhS8ST4I117kALKWUdl9xhe+ui0IFCEQY/mNuQ8O13nlcx+DvGtPxc
>
> WCUG0VpP6AkE9Mkd67CghF6sFh/8FqdE1jU2Asj+iCZVU/s0ngH3hAXwMVUwOW9S
>
> voxYParz1b0sF7vgrhLteHOZ03TEra7rh7OiOVUCOE6CACG1qV8QXDvpkZp2mGTx
>
> 5T7ob8nNF8XQWhIHjULVdKdOBuMh/4dOrHTuU5cFosR29mbzAZDDi0myuzTv37GJ
>
> OgyiX0XXvwn5jCmAoaE0ji1fgxrWUs8yVYYHOj3IyQwzU+FydfKtlnhh8ZxHKDBo
>
> 8wPqrEAzTXT49bsxvy3cYxUp4Dd1G2ymkoTZonEi7Vir0kN7qjCCBVYGCSqGSIb3
>
> DQEHAaCCBUcEggVDMIIFPzCCBTsGCyqGSIb3DQEMCgECoIIE7jCCBOowHAYKKoZI
>
> hvcNAQwBAzAOBAh2oqSgVyE4cwICA/EEggTInCkEbWknH/Vojqzmn1jIPRGb7dG+
>
> egxS5YDtk14LxnQuwACTQef2wQnKlosYbfH8dJVIvXRYB19MXroGpd5KJA8Dftqa
>
> dWFVAcDIrzV/ZS252aita0fKOVeqjKWo7TkA9jnwDeekAcK+1R5ioIcfXPLJDSUX
>
> gdEaza88oQ+g+34+B2o+mnTPT/PM/o1n6cifVRURn2jMASwiB/cwLn58UZibCSgL
>
> h3CrcKamWi8AF3eJ2rkpPuK41s8SfqZ1ByNEFSgnsX5UQzJpn8FoBPBOmFnR8FTr
>
> XNwtT7GcJJuWDSnf+On2PI2LYT6XAhNeCkfMwdnUa6N1YV2Okelmae4J21sldQlw
>
> ATZFiuigyPMFF1X3wUfdvZTwQGC17YFTN+OIYF9/62XTiZUEJ6y0I3nRvAxpaRHS
>
> VVyh2KA89e5Llxv+bArgA6brykRHFk5I7e7krrflPoQJ0o1oKhb8DshnxAk65v/H
>
> xTPLq9gac81AY8rWnrTCZcO+inCan/IlOKDXnVCUfZATtAOOIQ6Mf9KwuAeyE9xu
>
> 4dUO0vF5juFU6hK8SR//apf0JF+zejq5wnEhc1o/sWVpKQkakYayJ+4Hnlx+G6Ra
>
> bJ3ZYQv4U/kUx0Q43qvvwhx0qdZ79BUpqPTxLeBzwVG6q5ys8eZY988YcIg11NY9
>
> +qC4cFGBsbMuWSispichDN5wEJ9C9UrdKRGsAztz0j1GTiJcXPnBH+vTeULh7Spx
>
> GmLbJWyj3tg+QaefDPo4aaIpZCZV0BFSy41fgoBB+rZ45wNgRiDuDuHue2WY28PC
>
> dGrAuXzQTUeEUYqN2zL2DhiYD/6/Y+/BCUS/kO0w3x0J7ityoSlyVJ+cf84FYmtB
>
> zmPIqgjDZS/NGC0OWgUBWxzspADETmwpZDCz8MJHK99nbAcYz3AybW6307NCJTKp
>
> gPfH6RyTrDzoijIweHUeU2pANpDjbp53UKV5/WyEvbjvy9maf1Jze60zS7EFgZ/n
>
> ZEe+eQbSY5SGtTWCB3mMbOTFvDH0QKGbfj6EX2Z+P+RZEeU/xzMOejcBbOO7XpgV
>
> +Uryt+NgcocTtg/5YjVkAdMeVz9A/XdGydAy7hE2FwFI1hJTl/aI4ZaAKV34xH2r
>
> J4/VstlG8ongv9zMNaS4Xl1n3wk6W3oAUmqWdoYYyDsocIBl1he1oP588Capa7OL
>
> NLYDl3llQXbyah1A//xJsH5M8KiB0MlJ0qSSp0U7LXmxDP3dw3kcR9XgOX835Bpi
>
> NlOPQDfzYZyKN6sIGDcuxwQPdOg2EQZxI3W5xp+oHTM/yTuqo/5vpOIlMdwqfQ/R
>
> HGLVyyQ0yO3oIMxiE56jSnrhjj/H/bJJAMMUBXI6pi18JCv24cTjVsXGjsf4jH7g
>
> 9uGmoecX/Sx77Sx+814aO0Qkm0WzadLagKoz1nOV1hmeSan1nFnXkE94VqIJ9YTV
>
> qnLrY0JYjpI2ywkW4wCscjVMIxkAfhifc31v4LWUnTMO0Y+xqO89v1hKbSYkZYYs
>
> psrxnomXJq/RqjfZBhF3f+0aTNxpvlJnGOjnlT0qX1yHBOr+bmkcTIhL7pKA+qK1
>
> fZD8834wTLrRcFiPD7pX6/zglMEG4PUf1RoDC0+3Ud8qa2SqfyYZeFm8+9yFsFnZ
>
> RYFkMTowIwYJKoZIhvcNAQkUMRYeFABDAEEAQwBUAEUAUwBUACAAQwBBMBMGCSqG
>
> SIb3DQEJFTEGBAQAAAABMDswHzAHBgUrDgMCGgQUoiKIky5oqgCxt5DnJxWNQvZ1
>
> WecEFDabnXfA8sLdfwIXx9AexvOOS0gpAgID+w==
>
> -----END CERTIFICATE-----
>
> --
> openssl-users mailing list
> To unsubscribe: https://mta.openssl.org/mailman/listinfo/openssl-users
>
>
-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
URL: <http://mta.openssl.org/pipermail/openssl-users/attachments/20170313/52743246/attachment.html>

From Michael.Wojcik at microfocus.com  Mon Mar 13 18:05:01 2017
From: Michael.Wojcik at microfocus.com (Michael Wojcik)
Date: Mon, 13 Mar 2017 18:05:01 +0000
Subject: [openssl-users] Cannot read exported PKCS12 cert and private key
In-Reply-To: <013001d29c16$8d4e2cd0$a7ea8670$@firstech.com>
References: <00e101d29c07$934bd3d0$b9e37b70$@firstech.com>
 <B550B44BF8AF314BB00C4E2AC1C18088018C450671@prvxmb03.microfocus.com>
 <013001d29c16$8d4e2cd0$a7ea8670$@firstech.com>
Message-ID: <B550B44BF8AF314BB00C4E2AC1C18088018C4507D2@prvxmb03.microfocus.com>

Glad I could help. To be honest, I had to play around with it for a bit before I remembered that RACF can export PEM-encoded PKCS#12, and how I had handled that the last time I went through this myself.

Also, having experience with figuring out what a file is using openssl asn1parse definitely helps. The last time I taught a class on key and certificate handling, we did an entire exercise on this, because we're always getting this sort of thing from customers. "Here's a zip with our key and certificate files", they say, and then there are files in it with names like "file0" and "key1", and it turns out "key1" is actually a certificate. Learning how to match private keys to certificates is also very useful; I actually ended up giving one customer a script to do that, because they'd been copying things from machine to machine and had really confused the situation.

Someone needs to write a book like Surviving Cryptography with OpenSSL that covers these things, along the lines of Ivan Risti?'s OpenSSL Cookbook. (I'd volunteer but to be honest it'd never get done.) I guess this sort of thing should go on the wiki; maybe some of it's there already.
Anyway, back on the subject: I suppose technically this is not really PEM encoding, because the PEM delimiters lie. "----- BEGIN CERTIFICATE -----" claims that what follows is a Base64-encoded DER-encoded X.509 certificate, not a Base64-encoded DER-encoded PKCS#12 structure. Those are rather different things. I suspect RACF supports this because 1) it was easy and 2) it's convenient to have a text representation (that converts cleanly between EBCDIC and ASCII). But it's not technically correct.

That's probably why OpenSSL doesn't support it; fake-PEM-PKCS#12 is a RACF idiosyncracy, as far as I know. I'm guessing Windows just takes whatever's between the PEM delimiters, decodes the Base64, parses it as ASN.1 DER, and then decides what to do.

You could argue, by Postel's Interoperability Principle, that openssl should have a "-figure-out-the-format" option for every command that takes files. On the other hand, the Interoperability Principle is a security risk; many vulnerabilities are eliminated simply by requiring inputs that satisfy the specification.

With a decent scripting language it's pretty easy to recognize one of these files and automatically extract it into something sensible.


Michael Wojcik
Distinguished Engineer, Micro Focus



From: openssl-users [mailto:openssl-users-bounces at openssl.org] On Behalf Of Gary L Peskin
Sent: Monday, March 13, 2017 10:26
To: openssl-users at openssl.org
Subject: Re: [openssl-users] Cannot read exported PKCS12 cert and private key

Thanks VERY much Michael.  That did the trick.  This was a homegrown CA cert and I needed it to sign a certificate request for testing purposes.

I didn?t realize that the openssl pkcs12 utility didn?t support PEM encoding for input.  I was a little confused I guess by the documentation which shows PEM encoding for ?-in filename? but I see now that that?s for when exporting a PKCS#12 file, not for parsing one.

Thanks again for clearing this up.  It?s weird that MS supports this input format but openssl does not. I thought openssl could do EVERYTHING.  ?


-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
URL: <http://mta.openssl.org/pipermail/openssl-users/attachments/20170313/3d608cbe/attachment-0001.html>

From garyp at firstech.com  Mon Mar 13 18:29:35 2017
From: garyp at firstech.com (Gary L Peskin)
Date: Mon, 13 Mar 2017 11:29:35 -0700
Subject: [openssl-users] Cannot read exported PKCS12 cert and private key
In-Reply-To: <B550B44BF8AF314BB00C4E2AC1C18088018C4507D2@prvxmb03.microfocus.com>
References: <00e101d29c07$934bd3d0$b9e37b70$@firstech.com>
 <B550B44BF8AF314BB00C4E2AC1C18088018C450671@prvxmb03.microfocus.com>
 <013001d29c16$8d4e2cd0$a7ea8670$@firstech.com>
 <B550B44BF8AF314BB00C4E2AC1C18088018C4507D2@prvxmb03.microfocus.com>
Message-ID: <000601d29c27$c472ef50$4d58cdf0$@firstech.com>

Thanks again.  Very clear.  I?m thinking maybe of a small utility or even a web site were you could upload the thing and it would tell you what it was looking it.  I?ll add that to my never-ending to do list on the off chance that I?ll ever have spare time.

 

Gary

 

 

From: openssl-users [mailto:openssl-users-bounces at openssl.org] On Behalf Of Michael Wojcik
Sent: Monday, March 13, 2017 11:05 AM
To: openssl-users at openssl.org
Subject: Re: [openssl-users] Cannot read exported PKCS12 cert and private key

 

Glad I could help. To be honest, I had to play around with it for a bit before I remembered that RACF can export PEM-encoded PKCS#12, and how I had handled that the last time I went through this myself.

 

Also, having experience with figuring out what a file is using openssl asn1parse definitely helps. The last time I taught a class on key and certificate handling, we did an entire exercise on this, because we're always getting this sort of thing from customers. "Here's a zip with our key and certificate files", they say, and then there are files in it with names like "file0" and "key1", and it turns out "key1" is actually a certificate. Learning how to match private keys to certificates is also very useful; I actually ended up giving one customer a script to do that, because they'd been copying things from machine to machine and had really confused the situation.

 

Someone needs to write a book like Surviving Cryptography with OpenSSL that covers these things, along the lines of Ivan Risti?'s OpenSSL Cookbook. (I'd volunteer but to be honest it'd never get done.) I guess this sort of thing should go on the wiki; maybe some of it's there already.

 

Anyway, back on the subject: I suppose technically this is not really PEM encoding, because the PEM delimiters lie. "----- BEGIN CERTIFICATE -----" claims that what follows is a Base64-encoded DER-encoded X.509 certificate, not a Base64-encoded DER-encoded PKCS#12 structure. Those are rather different things. I suspect RACF supports this because 1) it was easy and 2) it's convenient to have a text representation (that converts cleanly between EBCDIC and ASCII). But it's not technically correct.

 

That's probably why OpenSSL doesn't support it; fake-PEM-PKCS#12 is a RACF idiosyncracy, as far as I know. I'm guessing Windows just takes whatever's between the PEM delimiters, decodes the Base64, parses it as ASN.1 DER, and then decides what to do.

 

You could argue, by Postel's Interoperability Principle, that openssl should have a "-figure-out-the-format" option for every command that takes files. On the other hand, the Interoperability Principle is a security risk; many vulnerabilities are eliminated simply by requiring inputs that satisfy the specification.

 

With a decent scripting language it's pretty easy to recognize one of these files and automatically extract it into something sensible.

 

 

Michael Wojcik 
Distinguished Engineer, Micro Focus 

 

 

 

From: openssl-users [mailto:openssl-users-bounces at openssl.org] On Behalf Of Gary L Peskin
Sent: Monday, March 13, 2017 10:26
To: openssl-users at openssl.org <mailto:openssl-users at openssl.org> 
Subject: Re: [openssl-users] Cannot read exported PKCS12 cert and private key

 

Thanks VERY much Michael.  That did the trick.  This was a homegrown CA cert and I needed it to sign a certificate request for testing purposes.

 

I didn?t realize that the openssl pkcs12 utility didn?t support PEM encoding for input.  I was a little confused I guess by the documentation which shows PEM encoding for ?-in filename? but I see now that that?s for when exporting a PKCS#12 file, not for parsing one.

 

Thanks again for clearing this up.  It?s weird that MS supports this input format but openssl does not. I thought openssl could do EVERYTHING.  ?

 

 

-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
URL: <http://mta.openssl.org/pipermail/openssl-users/attachments/20170313/b4349251/attachment.html>

From vkaliape at gmail.com  Mon Mar 13 18:37:07 2017
From: vkaliape at gmail.com (Vijayakumar Kaliaperumal)
Date: Tue, 14 Mar 2017 00:07:07 +0530
Subject: [openssl-users] Extracting Handshake Information
Message-ID: <CADNrMSJtDtGZ15VXmz3zp5j17zT7X703RVGCSHyEkJdw2+n92Q@mail.gmail.com>

Hello,

Is there a way in openssl we can extract the protocol(TLS/DTLS ) handshake
information, like in clienthello,  the protocol version, ciphersuites
offered, Random,  session id etc.

Regards,
Vijay
-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
URL: <http://mta.openssl.org/pipermail/openssl-users/attachments/20170314/eaf736f0/attachment.html>

From rsalz at akamai.com  Mon Mar 13 18:42:11 2017
From: rsalz at akamai.com (Salz, Rich)
Date: Mon, 13 Mar 2017 18:42:11 +0000
Subject: [openssl-users] Extracting Handshake Information
In-Reply-To: <CADNrMSJtDtGZ15VXmz3zp5j17zT7X703RVGCSHyEkJdw2+n92Q@mail.gmail.com>
References: <CADNrMSJtDtGZ15VXmz3zp5j17zT7X703RVGCSHyEkJdw2+n92Q@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <73971cd5a82f49d5b4eadd34045cfacb@usma1ex-dag1mb1.msg.corp.akamai.com>

> Is there a way in openssl we can extract the protocol(TLS/DTLS ) handshake information, like in clienthello, ?the protocol version, ciphersuites offered, Random, ?session id etc.

Look at the code in apps/s_client and apps/s_server and see what it prints in various debug modes.

From steve at openssl.org  Mon Mar 13 19:08:39 2017
From: steve at openssl.org (Dr. Stephen Henson)
Date: Mon, 13 Mar 2017 19:08:39 +0000
Subject: [openssl-users] Extracting Handshake Information
In-Reply-To: <CADNrMSJtDtGZ15VXmz3zp5j17zT7X703RVGCSHyEkJdw2+n92Q@mail.gmail.com>
References: <CADNrMSJtDtGZ15VXmz3zp5j17zT7X703RVGCSHyEkJdw2+n92Q@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <20170313190839.GA20222@openssl.org>

On Tue, Mar 14, 2017, Vijayakumar Kaliaperumal wrote:

> Hello,
> 
> Is there a way in openssl we can extract the protocol(TLS/DTLS ) handshake
> information, like in clienthello,  the protocol version, ciphersuites
> offered, Random,  session id etc.
> 

You can get some useful information with the -trace option to
s_client/s_server which needs the configuration option enable-ssl-trace

Steve.
--
Dr Stephen N. Henson. OpenSSL project core developer.
Commercial tech support now available see: http://www.openssl.org

From rgm at htt-consult.com  Mon Mar 13 21:26:29 2017
From: rgm at htt-consult.com (Robert Moskowitz)
Date: Mon, 13 Mar 2017 14:26:29 -0700
Subject: [openssl-users] scripting creating a cert
In-Reply-To: <EE81D958-FB07-428F-BE0D-A8070BDA8C82@dukhovni.org>
References: <6708e891-05e0-e1ea-f062-5ee851f25191@htt-consult.com>
 <608F34F9-1E83-42B1-BBAB-F5E7248A83C8@dukhovni.org>
 <aaff5a23-0ebd-405f-3d3b-71469b7c70af@htt-consult.com>
 <EE81D958-FB07-428F-BE0D-A8070BDA8C82@dukhovni.org>
Message-ID: <353d05ec-f456-8f89-44f4-4d5e0680a2a2@htt-consult.com>

Viktor,

On 03/09/2017 05:53 PM, Viktor Dukhovni wrote:
>> On Mar 9, 2017, at 8:43 PM, Robert Moskowitz <rgm at htt-consult.com> wrote:
>>
>>>    $ umask 077 # avoid world-readable private keys
>> Perhaps (no perhaps about it) this is old information, but I picked up that I needed:
>>
>> chmod 640 for the private keys for Apache.  (and postfix and others use these certs; at least they are in their confs)
> I strive to avoid the private disclosure race of first creating
> a world-readable file, and then trying to do a quick chmod before
> the bad guys get around to opening it.  That's why I recommend the
> umask approach.
>
> You can adjust the umask to suit your needs.  With OpenSSL 1.1.0,
> if I recall correctly "keyout" files and the like are automatically
> opened mode "0600". Rich Salz, who wrote the CLI option processing
> code for 1.1.0 will correct me, if my memory if faulty.  There are
> still a lot of users with 1.0.2 or earlier, and OpenSSL cannot
> always figure out which files end up having private keys in them,
> so the umask approach is a good precaution to keep using.

Rich got me some help and I have put the following together:

Set the following variables:

countryName=
stateOrProvinceName=
localityName=
organizationName=
organizationalUnitName=
emailAddress=postmaster@$your_domain_tld

Then the following commands create the certs:

restore_mask=$(umask -p)
umask 077
cd /etc/pki/tls
commonName=$your_host_tld

openssl req -new -outform PEM -out certs/$commonName.crt -newkey 
rsa:2048 -nodes -keyout private/$commonName.key -keyform PEM -days 3650 
-x509 -extensions v3_req -subj 
"/countryName=$countryName/stateOrProvinceName=$stateOrProvinceName/localityName=$localityName/organizationName=$organizationName/organizationalUnitName=$organizationalUnitName/commonName=$commonName/emailAddress=$emailAddress"

chmod 640 private/$commonName.key
commonName=webmail$your_domain_tld

openssl req -new -outform PEM -out certs/$commonName.crt -newkey 
rsa:2048 -nodes -keyout private/$commonName.key -keyform PEM -days 3650 
-x509 -extensions v3_req -subj 
"/countryName=$countryName/stateOrProvinceName=$stateOrProvinceName/localityName=$localityName/organizationName=$organizationName/organizationalUnitName=$organizationalUnitName/commonName=$commonName/emailAddress=$emailAddress"

chmod 640 private/$commonName.key
commonName=localhost

openssl req -new -outform PEM -out certs/$commonName.crt -newkey 
rsa:2048 -nodes -keyout private/$commonName.key -keyform PEM -days 3650 
-x509 -extensions v3_req -subj 
"/countryName=$countryName/stateOrProvinceName=$stateOrProvinceName/localityName=$localityName/organizationName=$organizationName/organizationalUnitName=$organizationalUnitName/commonName=$commonName/emailAddress=$emailAddress"

chmod 640 private/$commonName.key
$restore_mask



From musicoliv at gmail.com  Tue Mar 14 10:49:05 2017
From: musicoliv at gmail.com (Olivier Meunier)
Date: Tue, 14 Mar 2017 11:49:05 +0100
Subject: [openssl-users] X25519: how to generate public key?
Message-ID: <d198719e-e9b8-dc60-d162-c47a266f1f2f@gmail.com>

Hi,

using openSSL 1.1.0e, I generate my private key using:
openssl genpkey -algorithm x25519 -out x25519.key.pem

But I cannot find how to generate the public key. I tried:
openssl ec -in x25519.key.pem -pubout -out x25519.key.pub.pem
but got the errors:
read EC key
unable to load Key
16084:error:0608308E:digital envelope 
routines:EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY:expecting a ec key:crypto\evp\p_lib.c:319:

What is the right command to get the public key?
Thanks,

Olivier


From steve at openssl.org  Tue Mar 14 12:43:17 2017
From: steve at openssl.org (Dr. Stephen Henson)
Date: Tue, 14 Mar 2017 12:43:17 +0000
Subject: [openssl-users] X25519: how to generate public key?
In-Reply-To: <d198719e-e9b8-dc60-d162-c47a266f1f2f@gmail.com>
References: <d198719e-e9b8-dc60-d162-c47a266f1f2f@gmail.com>
Message-ID: <20170314124317.GA5780@openssl.org>

On Tue, Mar 14, 2017, Olivier Meunier wrote:

> Hi,
> 
> using openSSL 1.1.0e, I generate my private key using:
> openssl genpkey -algorithm x25519 -out x25519.key.pem
> 
> But I cannot find how to generate the public key. I tried:
> openssl ec -in x25519.key.pem -pubout -out x25519.key.pub.pem
> but got the errors:
> read EC key
> unable to load Key
> 16084:error:0608308E:digital envelope
> routines:EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY:expecting a ec
> key:crypto\evp\p_lib.c:319:
> 
> What is the right command to get the public key?
> Thanks,
> 

X25519 is trteated as a distinct algorithm, not as an EC curve.

You don't actually "generate" the public key you can extract or calculate the
public key corresponding to a private key though. 

The pkey command can do this for any supported algorithm:

openssl pkey -in privkey.pem -pubout -out pubkey.pem

Steve.
--
Dr Stephen N. Henson. OpenSSL project core developer.
Commercial tech support now available see: http://www.openssl.org

From steve at openssl.org  Tue Mar 14 13:00:29 2017
From: steve at openssl.org (Dr. Stephen Henson)
Date: Tue, 14 Mar 2017 13:00:29 +0000
Subject: [openssl-users] Cannot read exported PKCS12 cert and private key
In-Reply-To: <B550B44BF8AF314BB00C4E2AC1C18088018C450671@prvxmb03.microfocus.com>
References: <00e101d29c07$934bd3d0$b9e37b70$@firstech.com>
 <B550B44BF8AF314BB00C4E2AC1C18088018C450671@prvxmb03.microfocus.com>
Message-ID: <20170314130029.GA6374@openssl.org>

On Mon, Mar 13, 2017, Michael Wojcik wrote:

> I'll assume you mean you exported it "from a mainframe system" using RACF. RACF has half a dozen export formats for certificates and keys; they're not all supported by OpenSSL.
> 
> In particular (and despite the PEM delimiters), I suspect what you have here is a PKCS#12 file in PEM format. The openssl pkcs12 utility doesn't support PEM encoding, because that's not normally done. RACF will do it, though, just to be difficult.
> 
> openssl asn1parse -in file -inform pem shows you have valid ASN.1 data, with a big ol' blob at offset 26; adding -strparse 26 shows encrypted data. So yes, looks like PKCS#12.
> 
> So, try this:
> 1. Edit the file and remove the PEM delimiters ("---- BEGIN CERTIFICATE ----" and "----- END CERTIFICATE ----").
> 2. Convert the data from Base64 to binary:
>                 openssl base64 -d -in file -out file.der

Note this can be simplified a bit with:

openssl asn1parse -in file.pem -out file.der

That should work for any PEM ASN.1 structure.

Steve.
--
Dr Stephen N. Henson. OpenSSL project core developer.
Commercial tech support now available see: http://www.openssl.org

From vsbrin at gmail.com  Tue Mar 14 13:43:50 2017
From: vsbrin at gmail.com (=?UTF-8?Q?val=C3=A9ry?=)
Date: Tue, 14 Mar 2017 14:43:50 +0100
Subject: [openssl-users] PKCS#7
Message-ID: <CAMkdoSE1gux8E2zjMY9Pxmq-ZKT2pcw8-GLtLM2iea4Z8MROUA@mail.gmail.com>

Hi,

is the following picture correct ?
when creating an encrypted PKCS#7 envelope, a random AES key is generated
and encrypted with the provided RSA private key. The AES key is used to
encrypt the envelope content. The X509 certificate containing the
associated public key is included in the envelope attributes.

If so, would it be possible in principle to decrypt an encrypted PKCS#7
envelope only knowing which AES key was used ?

Thank you-
-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
URL: <http://mta.openssl.org/pipermail/openssl-users/attachments/20170314/ffc85598/attachment.html>

From rsalz at akamai.com  Tue Mar 14 14:12:41 2017
From: rsalz at akamai.com (Salz, Rich)
Date: Tue, 14 Mar 2017 14:12:41 +0000
Subject: [openssl-users] PKCS#7
In-Reply-To: <CAMkdoSE1gux8E2zjMY9Pxmq-ZKT2pcw8-GLtLM2iea4Z8MROUA@mail.gmail.com>
References: <CAMkdoSE1gux8E2zjMY9Pxmq-ZKT2pcw8-GLtLM2iea4Z8MROUA@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <1c59de5d768f43bf8f0f789d71c0fcab@usma1ex-dag1mb1.msg.corp.akamai.com>

> If so, would it be possible in principle to decrypt an encrypted PKCS#7 envelope only knowing which AES key was used ?

Yes.  But maybe not with the openssl api's :)

From musicoliv at gmail.com  Tue Mar 14 14:26:19 2017
From: musicoliv at gmail.com (Olivier Meunier)
Date: Tue, 14 Mar 2017 15:26:19 +0100
Subject: [openssl-users] X25519: how to generate public key?
In-Reply-To: <20170314124317.GA5780@openssl.org>
References: <d198719e-e9b8-dc60-d162-c47a266f1f2f@gmail.com>
 <20170314124317.GA5780@openssl.org>
Message-ID: <630271cf-af14-32f6-2ded-910681c2b4ea@gmail.com>

Thank you for your quick answer.
Olivier

Le 14/03/2017 ? 13:43, Dr. Stephen Henson a ?crit :
> On Tue, Mar 14, 2017, Olivier Meunier wrote:
>
>> Hi,
>>
>> using openSSL 1.1.0e, I generate my private key using:
>> openssl genpkey -algorithm x25519 -out x25519.key.pem
>>
>> But I cannot find how to generate the public key. I tried:
>> openssl ec -in x25519.key.pem -pubout -out x25519.key.pub.pem
>> but got the errors:
>> read EC key
>> unable to load Key
>> 16084:error:0608308E:digital envelope
>> routines:EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY:expecting a ec
>> key:crypto\evp\p_lib.c:319:
>>
>> What is the right command to get the public key?
>> Thanks,
>>
> X25519 is trteated as a distinct algorithm, not as an EC curve.
>
> You don't actually "generate" the public key you can extract or calculate the
> public key corresponding to a private key though.
>
> The pkey command can do this for any supported algorithm:
>
> openssl pkey -in privkey.pem -pubout -out pubkey.pem
>
> Steve.
> --
> Dr Stephen N. Henson. OpenSSL project core developer.
> Commercial tech support now available see: http://www.openssl.org


From raja.ashok at huawei.com  Tue Mar 14 14:32:27 2017
From: raja.ashok at huawei.com (Raja ashok)
Date: Tue, 14 Mar 2017 14:32:27 +0000
Subject: [openssl-users] Doubt regarding Export keying material
Message-ID: <FDFEA8C9B9B6BD4685DCC959079C81F5E192206D@BLREML509-MBX.china.huawei.com>

Hi All,

I am having a doubt in usage of Exporting keying material API (SSL_export_keying_material) in OpenSSL. Please provide your suggestions.

As per Section 4 in RFC 5705, context length should be passed as uint16_t to PRF function. In that case we should allow only upto max of 2^16 (65535). So user should not pass more than 65535 value to ?plen? in SSL_export_keying_material right ?

Please provide your valuable suggestion on this. I am referring 1.0.2k version of OpenSSL.

Thanks & Regards,
Ashok

________________________________
[Company_logo]

Raja Ashok V K
Huawei Technologies
Bangalore, India
http://www.huawei.com
________________________________
????????????????????????????????????????
????????????????????????????????????????
???????????????????????????????????
This e-mail and its attachments contain confidential information from HUAWEI, which
is intended only for the person or entity whose address is listed above. Any use of the
information contained herein in any way (including, but not limited to, total or partial
disclosure, reproduction, or dissemination) by persons other than the intended
recipient(s) is prohibited. If you receive this e-mail in error, please notify the sender by
phone or email immediately and delete it!

-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
URL: <http://mta.openssl.org/pipermail/openssl-users/attachments/20170314/713aab2c/attachment-0001.html>
-------------- next part --------------
A non-text attachment was scrubbed...
Name: image001.jpg
Type: image/jpeg
Size: 6737 bytes
Desc: image001.jpg
URL: <http://mta.openssl.org/pipermail/openssl-users/attachments/20170314/713aab2c/attachment-0001.jpg>

From vsbrin at gmail.com  Wed Mar 15 04:13:49 2017
From: vsbrin at gmail.com (=?UTF-8?Q?val=C3=A9ry?=)
Date: Wed, 15 Mar 2017 05:13:49 +0100
Subject: [openssl-users] PKCS#7
In-Reply-To: <1c59de5d768f43bf8f0f789d71c0fcab@usma1ex-dag1mb1.msg.corp.akamai.com>
References: <CAMkdoSE1gux8E2zjMY9Pxmq-ZKT2pcw8-GLtLM2iea4Z8MROUA@mail.gmail.com>
 <1c59de5d768f43bf8f0f789d71c0fcab@usma1ex-dag1mb1.msg.corp.akamai.com>
Message-ID: <CAMkdoSHAuTMQURvPhrZDnafxJSsm1Xshgq+BcbF=Mky5EjntNw@mail.gmail.com>

Hi,

thank you very much for your response.
Say someone would be able to gather several clear text AES keys and their
respective asymmetrically encrypted RSA blocks. Would it weakens the
security of the RSA key pair ? I mean could it be easier for someone using
that information to brute force an RSA key pair ?

Thank you



On Tue, Mar 14, 2017 at 3:12 PM, Salz, Rich via openssl-users <
openssl-users at openssl.org> wrote:

> > If so, would it be possible in principle to decrypt an encrypted PKCS#7
> envelope only knowing which AES key was used ?
>
> Yes.  But maybe not with the openssl api's :)
> --
> openssl-users mailing list
> To unsubscribe: https://mta.openssl.org/mailman/listinfo/openssl-users
>
-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
URL: <http://mta.openssl.org/pipermail/openssl-users/attachments/20170315/e5dace87/attachment.html>

From bhat.jayalakshmi at gmail.com  Wed Mar 15 09:50:15 2017
From: bhat.jayalakshmi at gmail.com (Jayalakshmi bhat)
Date: Wed, 15 Mar 2017 03:50:15 -0600
Subject: [openssl-users] OpenSSL DRBG in FIPS mode confusion.
Message-ID: <CALq8Rv+JxY-0eVEUVBE-y11DhSFMVtzGeXKjmyzPK2y53gbZMA@mail.gmail.com>

Hi All,

OpenSSL uses 256 bit AES-CTR DRBG as default DRBG in FIPS mode. I have
question associated with this.

1. OpenSSL wiki says  : Default DRBG is 256-bit CTR AES *using a derivation
function*
2. Where as the document
http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/STM/cmvp/documents/140-1/140sp/140sp1747.pdf
 mentions "no derivation function" in one place and in another sections
mentions both
*Section 4 Modes of Operation and Cryptographic Functionality*
Random Number  Generation;    [SP 800?90] DRBG5
Hash DRBG
Symmetric key  generation        Prediction resistance
  HMAC DRBG, no reseed
                                               supported for all variations
              CTR DRBG (AES), no derivation function
*Section 6 Self?test *
DRBG  KAT  CTR_DRBG: AES, 256 bit with and without derivation function

Please can any one let me know what is the default behavior? Is there any
way to toggle between using and not using derivation function.

Regards
Jayalakshmi
-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
URL: <http://mta.openssl.org/pipermail/openssl-users/attachments/20170315/a0484068/attachment.html>

From Matthias.St.Pierre at ncp-e.com  Wed Mar 15 10:37:27 2017
From: Matthias.St.Pierre at ncp-e.com (Matthias St. Pierre)
Date: Wed, 15 Mar 2017 11:37:27 +0100
Subject: [openssl-users] OpenSSL DRBG in FIPS mode confusion.
In-Reply-To: <CALq8Rv+JxY-0eVEUVBE-y11DhSFMVtzGeXKjmyzPK2y53gbZMA@mail.gmail.com>
References: <CALq8Rv+JxY-0eVEUVBE-y11DhSFMVtzGeXKjmyzPK2y53gbZMA@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <c9d5a959-6ae7-68ce-566a-c16f789a6289@ncp-e.com>



On 15.03.2017 10:50, Jayalakshmi bhat wrote:
> Hi All,
>
> OpenSSL uses 256 bit AES-CTR DRBG as default DRBG in FIPS mode. I have question associated with this. 
>
> 1. OpenSSL wiki says  : Default DRBG is 256-bit CTR AES *using a derivation function*
> 2. Where as the document http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/STM/cmvp/documents/140-1/140sp/140sp1747.pdf  mentions "no derivation function" in one place and in another sections mentions both
> *Section 4 Modes of Operation and Cryptographic Functionality*
> Random Number  Generation;    [SP 800?90] DRBG5                         Hash DRBG  
> Symmetric key  generation        Prediction resistance                       HMAC DRBG, no reseed 
>                                                supported for all variations               CTR DRBG (AES), no derivation function 
> *Section 6 Self?test *
> DRBG  KAT  CTR_DRBG: AES, 256 bit with and without derivation function *
> *
>
> Please can any one let me know what is the default behavior? Is there any way to toggle between using and not using derivation function.
>
> Regards
> Jayalakshmi
>

The default is set by the FIPS enabled OpenSSL crypto library (not by the OpenSSL  FIPS object module itself) in RAND_init_fips(), rand_lib.c:277:

openssl-1.0.2k/crypto/rand/rand_lib.c:277:    if (FIPS_drbg_init(dctx, fips_drbg_type, fips_drbg_flags) <= 0) {


The default value is DRBG_FLAG_CTR_USE_DF, wich  follows from

openssl-1.0.2k/crypto/rand/rand_lib.c:251:# ifndef OPENSSL_DRBG_DEFAULT_FLAGS
openssl-1.0.2k/crypto/rand/rand_lib.c:252:#  define OPENSSL_DRBG_DEFAULT_FLAGS      DRBG_FLAG_CTR_USE_DF
openssl-1.0.2k/crypto/rand/rand_lib.c:256:static int fips_drbg_flags = OPENSSL_DRBG_DEFAULT_FLAGS;
openssl-1.0.2k/crypto/rand/rand_lib.c:261:    fips_drbg_flags = flags;

and you can change it using void RAND_set_fips_drbg_type(int type, int flags).


Regards,
Matthias St. Pierre





From rsalz at akamai.com  Wed Mar 15 11:03:48 2017
From: rsalz at akamai.com (Salz, Rich)
Date: Wed, 15 Mar 2017 11:03:48 +0000
Subject: [openssl-users] PKCS#7
In-Reply-To: <CAMkdoSHAuTMQURvPhrZDnafxJSsm1Xshgq+BcbF=Mky5EjntNw@mail.gmail.com>
References: <CAMkdoSE1gux8E2zjMY9Pxmq-ZKT2pcw8-GLtLM2iea4Z8MROUA@mail.gmail.com>
 <1c59de5d768f43bf8f0f789d71c0fcab@usma1ex-dag1mb1.msg.corp.akamai.com>
 <CAMkdoSHAuTMQURvPhrZDnafxJSsm1Xshgq+BcbF=Mky5EjntNw@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <c8442676e3f044c383e91545387afed5@usma1ex-dag1mb1.msg.corp.akamai.com>

> Say someone would be able to gather several clear text AES keys and their respective asymmetrically encrypted RSA blocks. Would it weakens the security of the RSA key pair ? I mean could it be easier for someone using that information to brute force an RSA key pair ?

No

From wouter.verhelst at fedict.be  Wed Mar 15 12:01:32 2017
From: wouter.verhelst at fedict.be (Wouter Verhelst)
Date: Wed, 15 Mar 2017 13:01:32 +0100
Subject: [openssl-users] PKCS#7
In-Reply-To: <CAMkdoSHAuTMQURvPhrZDnafxJSsm1Xshgq+BcbF=Mky5EjntNw@mail.gmail.com>
References: <CAMkdoSE1gux8E2zjMY9Pxmq-ZKT2pcw8-GLtLM2iea4Z8MROUA@mail.gmail.com>
 <1c59de5d768f43bf8f0f789d71c0fcab@usma1ex-dag1mb1.msg.corp.akamai.com>
 <CAMkdoSHAuTMQURvPhrZDnafxJSsm1Xshgq+BcbF=Mky5EjntNw@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <d4aff4a3-aa30-2750-7e3b-f8978c0fd8ff@fedict.be>

On 15-03-17 05:13, val?ry wrote:
> Hi,
>
> thank you very much for your response.
> Say someone would be able to gather several clear text AES keys and
> their respective asymmetrically encrypted RSA blocks. Would it weakens
> the security of the RSA key pair ? I mean could it be easier for someone
> using that information to brute force an RSA key pair ?

Think of it this way:

As far as the RSA algorithm is concerned, the AES keys are just data. 
They happen to be AES keys, but they might have been a hash value, an 
image, or somebody's date of birth.

If getting the cleartext as well as the encrypted text for an RSA 
message would allow you to more easily guess the RSA key, then the RSA 
algorithm would be seriously flawed.

There is no known attack against RSA for which this is true, however, as 
Rich pointed out.

-- 
Wouter Verhelst

From christian_adja at yahoo.it  Wed Mar 15 18:03:44 2017
From: christian_adja at yahoo.it (Christian Adja)
Date: Wed, 15 Mar 2017 18:03:44 +0000 (UTC)
Subject: [openssl-users] Request for adding new ciphers
References: <1576557894.1332584.1489601024241.ref@mail.yahoo.com>
Message-ID: <1576557894.1332584.1489601024241@mail.yahoo.com>

Hi everyone,
Someone can help for adding the ciphersuite " ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM " and "ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM " in openssl? 
I tried adding in the file tls1.h??? # define TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM??????????? 0x0300C0AC
??? # define TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM??????????? 0x0300C0AD
And modifing the file? ssl_ciph.c the functions??? ssl_load_ciphers() ... And modifing the file evp_cipher.c and sssl_locl.cand finaly ssl_algs.c.
There are no way to make it works. It continue to give me? error: ssl3_get_client_hello:no shared cipher:s3_srvr.c:1420
thanks.


-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
URL: <http://mta.openssl.org/pipermail/openssl-users/attachments/20170315/5ea926a1/attachment.html>

From matt at openssl.org  Wed Mar 15 18:18:52 2017
From: matt at openssl.org (Matt Caswell)
Date: Wed, 15 Mar 2017 18:18:52 +0000
Subject: [openssl-users] Request for adding new ciphers
In-Reply-To: <1576557894.1332584.1489601024241@mail.yahoo.com>
References: <1576557894.1332584.1489601024241.ref@mail.yahoo.com>
 <1576557894.1332584.1489601024241@mail.yahoo.com>
Message-ID: <e507eba7-b0c6-d85a-78aa-2af36c2e487e@openssl.org>



On 15/03/17 18:03, Christian Adja via openssl-users wrote:
> Hi everyone,
> 
> Someone can help for adding the ciphersuite "
> ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM " and "ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM " in
> openssl?
> I tried adding in the file tls1.h
>     # define TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM            0x0300C0AC
>     # define TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM            0x0300C0AD
> 
> And modifing the file  ssl_ciph.c the functions
>     ssl_load_ciphers() ...
> And modifing the file evp_cipher.c and sssl_locl.c
> and finaly ssl_algs.c.
> 
> There are no way to make it works. It continue to give me  error:
> ssl3_get_client_hello:no shared cipher:s3_srvr.c:1420


These ciphersuites already exist in OpenSSL (from version 1.1.0).

Matt


From jsouthwell at serengeti.com  Wed Mar 15 18:18:38 2017
From: jsouthwell at serengeti.com (Joseph Southwell)
Date: Wed, 15 Mar 2017 14:18:38 -0400
Subject: [openssl-users] Generating dh parameters multithreaded?
Message-ID: <56015584-6EDC-4BD6-AA21-F27835281A99@serengeti.com>

On any new install of our software we generate new dh parameters as follows?

DH *dh = DH_new();
!DH_generate_parameters_ex(dh, 2048, 2, NULL);
int codes = 0;
DH_check(dh, &codes);
DH_generate_key(dh);

It takes a long time. Is there some way to have it use all available cores instead of just the one?
-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
URL: <http://mta.openssl.org/pipermail/openssl-users/attachments/20170315/abdcfd11/attachment.html>

From rsalz at akamai.com  Wed Mar 15 18:21:05 2017
From: rsalz at akamai.com (Salz, Rich)
Date: Wed, 15 Mar 2017 18:21:05 +0000
Subject: [openssl-users] Generating dh parameters multithreaded?
In-Reply-To: <56015584-6EDC-4BD6-AA21-F27835281A99@serengeti.com>
References: <56015584-6EDC-4BD6-AA21-F27835281A99@serengeti.com>
Message-ID: <9ff829cd17f74e4a910ca067196f7d62@usma1ex-dag1mb1.msg.corp.akamai.com>

> It takes a long time. Is there some way to have it use all available cores instead of just the one?

You'll have to write the code to do that parallelism yourself.

From mw at flanga.io  Wed Mar 15 18:46:07 2017
From: mw at flanga.io (Moritz Wirth)
Date: Wed, 15 Mar 2017 19:46:07 +0100
Subject: [openssl-users] OpenSSL Certificate Cross Signing
Message-ID: <c879dec1-9fab-5ecc-de01-4e033c690690@flanga.io>

Good Evening all,


I have 2 Root Certificate Authorities which I want to use to cross sign
an intermediate certificate. I created a certificate request and signed
it with both CAs.

I issued an end user certificate with the intermediate CA and added both
intermediate CA Certificates (the one from Root1 and the one signed by
Root2). If only one CA is trusted, the certificate is still recognized
as trusted in Firefox regardless which certificate is on top of the
chain (Which is exactly what I want.)

I wondered if I can connect both intermediate Certificates to a single
certificate or do I always need both certificates?


Best Regards,

Moritz


From vsbrin at gmail.com  Wed Mar 15 20:42:50 2017
From: vsbrin at gmail.com (=?UTF-8?Q?val=C3=A9ry?=)
Date: Wed, 15 Mar 2017 21:42:50 +0100
Subject: [openssl-users] PKCS#7
In-Reply-To: <d4aff4a3-aa30-2750-7e3b-f8978c0fd8ff@fedict.be>
References: <CAMkdoSE1gux8E2zjMY9Pxmq-ZKT2pcw8-GLtLM2iea4Z8MROUA@mail.gmail.com>
 <1c59de5d768f43bf8f0f789d71c0fcab@usma1ex-dag1mb1.msg.corp.akamai.com>
 <CAMkdoSHAuTMQURvPhrZDnafxJSsm1Xshgq+BcbF=Mky5EjntNw@mail.gmail.com>
 <d4aff4a3-aa30-2750-7e3b-f8978c0fd8ff@fedict.be>
Message-ID: <CAMkdoSFR_kT=wxt5jAFMENwN3dXEhzVr=VkJmh-7=ocaHj14OA@mail.gmail.com>

Alright, big thanks to both of you for your input!

On Mar 15, 2017 23:01, "Wouter Verhelst" <wouter.verhelst at fedict.be> wrote:

On 15-03-17 05:13, val?ry wrote:

> Hi,
>
> thank you very much for your response.
> Say someone would be able to gather several clear text AES keys and
> their respective asymmetrically encrypted RSA blocks. Would it weakens
> the security of the RSA key pair ? I mean could it be easier for someone
> using that information to brute force an RSA key pair ?
>

Think of it this way:

As far as the RSA algorithm is concerned, the AES keys are just data. They
happen to be AES keys, but they might have been a hash value, an image, or
somebody's date of birth.

If getting the cleartext as well as the encrypted text for an RSA message
would allow you to more easily guess the RSA key, then the RSA algorithm
would be seriously flawed.

There is no known attack against RSA for which this is true, however, as
Rich pointed out.

-- 
Wouter Verhelst

-- 
openssl-users mailing list
To unsubscribe: https://mta.openssl.org/mailman/listinfo/openssl-users
-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
URL: <http://mta.openssl.org/pipermail/openssl-users/attachments/20170315/c5426a43/attachment.html>

From jsouthwell at serengeti.com  Wed Mar 15 21:08:50 2017
From: jsouthwell at serengeti.com (Joseph Southwell)
Date: Wed, 15 Mar 2017 17:08:50 -0400
Subject: [openssl-users] Generating dh parameters multithreaded?
In-Reply-To: <9ff829cd17f74e4a910ca067196f7d62@usma1ex-dag1mb1.msg.corp.akamai.com>
References: <56015584-6EDC-4BD6-AA21-F27835281A99@serengeti.com>
 <9ff829cd17f74e4a910ca067196f7d62@usma1ex-dag1mb1.msg.corp.akamai.com>
Message-ID: <F3ADE150-0FAA-46B8-B481-816C1DD1B984@serengeti.com>

Are you suggesting that I should modify openssl myself to expose that functionality or are suggesting that there is a way to do that given the already exposed functionality? If it is the latter could you point me in the right direction?

> On Mar 15, 2017, at 2:21 PM, Salz, Rich via openssl-users <openssl-users at openssl.org> wrote:
> 
>> It takes a long time. Is there some way to have it use all available cores instead of just the one?
> 
> You'll have to write the code to do that parallelism yourself.
> -- 
> openssl-users mailing list
> To unsubscribe: https://mta.openssl.org/mailman/listinfo/openssl-users
> 


From rsalz at akamai.com  Wed Mar 15 21:15:11 2017
From: rsalz at akamai.com (Salz, Rich)
Date: Wed, 15 Mar 2017 21:15:11 +0000
Subject: [openssl-users] Generating dh parameters multithreaded?
In-Reply-To: <F3ADE150-0FAA-46B8-B481-816C1DD1B984@serengeti.com>
References: <56015584-6EDC-4BD6-AA21-F27835281A99@serengeti.com>
 <9ff829cd17f74e4a910ca067196f7d62@usma1ex-dag1mb1.msg.corp.akamai.com>
 <F3ADE150-0FAA-46B8-B481-816C1DD1B984@serengeti.com>
Message-ID: <2a86a335027d437ba9531551ce0ea897@usma1ex-dag1mb1.msg.corp.akamai.com>

> Are you suggesting that I should modify openssl myself to expose that
> functionality or are suggesting that there is a way to do that given the already
> exposed functionality? If it is the latter could you point me in the right
> direction?

OpenSSL code does not do what you want.  You'll have to write it

From Michael.Wojcik at microfocus.com  Wed Mar 15 22:28:34 2017
From: Michael.Wojcik at microfocus.com (Michael Wojcik)
Date: Wed, 15 Mar 2017 22:28:34 +0000
Subject: [openssl-users] Generating dh parameters multithreaded?
In-Reply-To: <2a86a335027d437ba9531551ce0ea897@usma1ex-dag1mb1.msg.corp.akamai.com>
References: <56015584-6EDC-4BD6-AA21-F27835281A99@serengeti.com>
 <9ff829cd17f74e4a910ca067196f7d62@usma1ex-dag1mb1.msg.corp.akamai.com>
 <F3ADE150-0FAA-46B8-B481-816C1DD1B984@serengeti.com>
 <2a86a335027d437ba9531551ce0ea897@usma1ex-dag1mb1.msg.corp.akamai.com>
Message-ID: <B550B44BF8AF314BB00C4E2AC1C18088018C452E4F@prvxmb03.microfocus.com>

> From: openssl-users [mailto:openssl-users-bounces at openssl.org] On Behalf
> Of Salz, Rich via openssl-users
> Sent: Wednesday, March 15, 2017 15:15
> To: Joseph Southwell; openssl-users at openssl.org
> Subject: Re: [openssl-users] Generating dh parameters multithreaded?
> 
> > Are you suggesting that I should modify openssl myself to expose that
> > functionality or are suggesting that there is a way to do that given the already
> > exposed functionality? If it is the latter could you point me in the right
> > direction?
> 
> OpenSSL code does not do what you want.  You'll have to write it

My suggestion, if you were to take that route, would be to use the Engine interface rather than modifying the OpenSSL source. You could take the existing OpenSSL implementation of the functionality, move it into an engine (using one of the existing ones as a template), get that working, and then see about parallelizing it.

I created a modified version of the existing CAPI engine, and it wasn't particularly difficult. If memory serves, the OpenSSL wiki has some material on the subject too.

-- 
Michael Wojcik 
Distinguished Engineer, Micro Focus 



From rgm at htt-consult.com  Thu Mar 16 22:50:56 2017
From: rgm at htt-consult.com (Robert Moskowitz)
Date: Thu, 16 Mar 2017 15:50:56 -0700
Subject: [openssl-users] EDDSA certificates
Message-ID: <b3bd575f-c65a-25c8-52e2-5601f2ccf75e@htt-consult.com>

Does any version of OpenSSL provide support for EDDSA, particularly 
creating and displaying the content of them?

Right now my interest is seeing what is involved in creating them with 
EC25519 and evaluating their size and how they parse.

Or meet me at the IETF and talk to me about them.

thank you


From rsalz at akamai.com  Thu Mar 16 23:04:57 2017
From: rsalz at akamai.com (Salz, Rich)
Date: Thu, 16 Mar 2017 23:04:57 +0000
Subject: [openssl-users] EDDSA certificates
In-Reply-To: <b3bd575f-c65a-25c8-52e2-5601f2ccf75e@htt-consult.com>
References: <b3bd575f-c65a-25c8-52e2-5601f2ccf75e@htt-consult.com>
Message-ID: <275dad3d0ada432d9c7b2b5f30db2b8f@usma1ex-dag1mb1.msg.corp.akamai.com>

 
> Does any version of OpenSSL provide support for EDDSA, particularly creating
> and displaying the content of them?

Not yet.  EDDSA for 25519 and 448 would be great to have in the next relese, tho.

From rgm at htt-consult.com  Thu Mar 16 23:33:19 2017
From: rgm at htt-consult.com (Robert Moskowitz)
Date: Thu, 16 Mar 2017 16:33:19 -0700
Subject: [openssl-users] EDDSA certificates
In-Reply-To: <275dad3d0ada432d9c7b2b5f30db2b8f@usma1ex-dag1mb1.msg.corp.akamai.com>
References: <b3bd575f-c65a-25c8-52e2-5601f2ccf75e@htt-consult.com>
 <275dad3d0ada432d9c7b2b5f30db2b8f@usma1ex-dag1mb1.msg.corp.akamai.com>
Message-ID: <e2f1b38a-b9f4-84f9-4785-73322e0256d5@htt-consult.com>



On 03/16/2017 04:04 PM, Salz, Rich via openssl-users wrote:
>   
>> Does any version of OpenSSL provide support for EDDSA, particularly creating
>> and displaying the content of them?
> Not yet.  EDDSA for 25519 and 448 would be great to have in the next relese, tho.
Let's talk about it at IETF.



From pdrotter at us.ibm.com  Fri Mar 17 15:25:36 2017
From: pdrotter at us.ibm.com (Neptune)
Date: Fri, 17 Mar 2017 08:25:36 -0700 (MST)
Subject: [openssl-users] Static FIPS Library with Address Randomization
Message-ID: <1489764336528-70129.post@n7.nabble.com>

Platform: Win32
FIPS Object Module: 2.0.13
OpenSSL: 1.0.2j

We've been using FIPS-capable OpenSSL for over a year now. Some of our
components are .dlls that statically link the libraries. Using the BASE:xxxx
linker flag (but not /FIXED) has worked well with only very occasional
address clashes.
The new year has brought a new requirement: NIAP. One of the NIAP
requirements is ASLR - address space layout randomization. Since turning on
these linker flags, the FIPS POST has been failing due to dll address being
randomized and no longer respecting the requested address in the BASE:xxxxx
linker flag. In order to get around this, I've had to add the /FIXED flag.
The address is no longer being randomized and the POST succeeds if the dll
loads...but therein lies the problem. When linking with the /FIXED flag, if
the BASE:xxxx address is not available, the dll will not load which is an
unacceptable problem and it is happening far too frequenctly.
It seems as though the requirements of FIPS-capable OpenSSL and NIAP address
randomization are at odds. Is there any way to satisfy both of these
requirements on Win32 and guarantee that the dll load?

Thanks - any ideas are greatly appreciated. Even if this is mission
impossible, at least I'll have something to report. If we need to apply for
an exception to one or more NIAP requirements so be it, but I want to
exhaust all possibilities.

Thanks,
Paul



--
View this message in context: http://openssl.6102.n7.nabble.com/Static-FIPS-Library-with-Address-Randomization-tp70129.html
Sent from the OpenSSL - User mailing list archive at Nabble.com.

From Michael.Wojcik at microfocus.com  Fri Mar 17 17:06:19 2017
From: Michael.Wojcik at microfocus.com (Michael Wojcik)
Date: Fri, 17 Mar 2017 17:06:19 +0000
Subject: [openssl-users] Static FIPS Library with Address Randomization
In-Reply-To: <1489764336528-70129.post@n7.nabble.com>
References: <1489764336528-70129.post@n7.nabble.com>
Message-ID: <B550B44BF8AF314BB00C4E2AC1C18088018C454B05@prvxmb03.microfocus.com>


> From: openssl-users [mailto:openssl-users-bounces at openssl.org] On Behalf
> Of Neptune
> Sent: Friday, March 17, 2017 09:26
> To: openssl-users at openssl.org
> Subject: [openssl-users] Static FIPS Library with Address Randomization
> 
> Platform: Win32
> FIPS Object Module: 2.0.13
> OpenSSL: 1.0.2j
> 
> We've been using FIPS-capable OpenSSL for over a year now. Some of our
> components are .dlls that statically link the libraries. Using the BASE:xxxx
> linker flag (but not /FIXED) has worked well with only very occasional
> address clashes.
> The new year has brought a new requirement: NIAP. One of the NIAP
> requirements is ASLR - address space layout randomization. Since turning on
> these linker flags, the FIPS POST has been failing due to dll address being
> randomized and no longer respecting the requested address in the BASE:xxxxx
> linker flag. In order to get around this, I've had to add the /FIXED flag.
> The address is no longer being randomized and the POST succeeds if the dll
> loads...but therein lies the problem. When linking with the /FIXED flag, if
> the BASE:xxxx address is not available, the dll will not load which is an
> unacceptable problem and it is happening far too frequenctly.
> It seems as though the requirements of FIPS-capable OpenSSL and NIAP address
> randomization are at odds. Is there any way to satisfy both of these
> requirements on Win32 and guarantee that the dll load?

AIUI, NIAP is just the US implementation of Common Criteria; you're better off using the latter term in general discussion, I think.

I don't believe there is a solution to this problem, generally speaking, for 32-bit processes. (A 64-bit address space gives you a much better chance of finding a base address with a very low probability of conflicts.)

This is simply one of the many problems with FIPS 140-2, particularly for software implementations. Those problems have been discussed extensively on this list; you can find many others weighing in on them, such as:

https://blogs.oracle.com/darren/entry/fips_140_2_actively_harmful

For OpenSSL specifically, this specific question has also been discussed elsewhere, for example:

http://stackoverflow.com/questions/36268301/consequences-for-adding-relocation-information-in-fips-validated-libeay32-dll/36271778

I'm aware of a few solutions, which probably won't help you at all:
- Switch to 64-bit.
- Switch to Linux or UNIX. This is primarily (exclusively?) a Windows problem, because of how the PE loader handles relocations; I'm not aware of another OpenSSL platform that has it. Though without looking I don't know which platforms have a recent OpenSSL FIPS validation, either.
- Switch to a FIPS-validated hardware crypto implementation, and either wire OpenSSL to it using the ENGINE mechanism, or use a different TLS implementation.
- Put more constraints on the loader, for example by statically linking what you can, and forcing other DLLs to load at other addresses (e.g. by setting preferred bases, etc). In specific cases this may give you sufficient control; in the general case it's a losing battle. Load libeay as early as possible.
- Put all your TLS processing in a separate service process that includes the bare minimum of code and no DLLs other than OpenSSL; you might even link OpenSSL statically. Use IPC to communicate between this TLS service process and your application. Obviously there are performance and security issues, though they're acceptable for some applications. You can control how the stripped-down service process lays out its memory.

All that said, I've never looked into this problem closely (I avoid the FIPS-validated build as much as I possibly can), so someone else may well have better suggestions.


Michael Wojcik 
Distinguished Engineer, Micro Focus 

From wrowe at rowe-clan.net  Tue Mar 21 00:58:39 2017
From: wrowe at rowe-clan.net (William A Rowe Jr)
Date: Mon, 20 Mar 2017 19:58:39 -0500
Subject: [openssl-users] Static FIPS Library with Address Randomization
In-Reply-To: <B550B44BF8AF314BB00C4E2AC1C18088018C454B05@prvxmb03.microfocus.com>
References: <1489764336528-70129.post@n7.nabble.com>
 <B550B44BF8AF314BB00C4E2AC1C18088018C454B05@prvxmb03.microfocus.com>
Message-ID: <CACsi252z+k=orTa-5Lko4Gw0BMe7nNkcSBPEBD84piqyhU8GbQ@mail.gmail.com>

On Fri, Mar 17, 2017 at 12:06 PM, Michael Wojcik
<Michael.Wojcik at microfocus.com> wrote:
>
>> From: openssl-users [mailto:openssl-users-bounces at openssl.org] On Behalf
>> Of Neptune
>> Sent: Friday, March 17, 2017 09:26
>> To: openssl-users at openssl.org
>> Subject: [openssl-users] Static FIPS Library with Address Randomization
>>
>> Platform: Win32
>> FIPS Object Module: 2.0.13
>> OpenSSL: 1.0.2j
>>
>> We've been using FIPS-capable OpenSSL for over a year now. Some of our
>> components are .dlls that statically link the libraries. Using the BASE:xxxx
>> linker flag (but not /FIXED) has worked well with only very occasional
>> address clashes.
>> The new year has brought a new requirement: NIAP. One of the NIAP
>> requirements is ASLR - address space layout randomization. Since turning on
>> these linker flags, the FIPS POST has been failing due to dll address being
>> randomized and no longer respecting the requested address in the BASE:xxxxx
>> linker flag. In order to get around this, I've had to add the /FIXED flag.
>> The address is no longer being randomized and the POST succeeds if the dll
>> loads...but therein lies the problem. When linking with the /FIXED flag, if
>> the BASE:xxxx address is not available, the dll will not load which is an
>> unacceptable problem and it is happening far too frequenctly.
>> It seems as though the requirements of FIPS-capable OpenSSL and NIAP address
>> randomization are at odds. Is there any way to satisfy both of these
>> requirements on Win32 and guarantee that the dll load?
>
> AIUI, NIAP is just the US implementation of Common Criteria; you're better off using the latter term in general discussion, I think.
>
> I don't believe there is a solution to this problem, generally speaking, for 32-bit processes. (A 64-bit address space gives you a much better chance of finding a base address with a very low probability of conflicts.)
>
> This is simply one of the many problems with FIPS 140-2, particularly for software implementations. Those problems have been discussed extensively on this list; you can find many others weighing in on them, such as:
>
> https://blogs.oracle.com/darren/entry/fips_140_2_actively_harmful
>
> For OpenSSL specifically, this specific question has also been discussed elsewhere, for example:
>
> http://stackoverflow.com/questions/36268301/consequences-for-adding-relocation-information-in-fips-validated-libeay32-dll/36271778
>
> I'm aware of a few solutions, which probably won't help you at all:
> - Switch to 64-bit.
> - Switch to Linux or UNIX. This is primarily (exclusively?) a Windows problem, because of how the PE loader handles relocations; I'm not aware of another OpenSSL platform that has it. Though without looking I don't know which platforms have a recent OpenSSL FIPS validation, either.
> - Switch to a FIPS-validated hardware crypto implementation, and either wire OpenSSL to it using the ENGINE mechanism, or use a different TLS implementation.
> - Put more constraints on the loader, for example by statically linking what you can, and forcing other DLLs to load at other addresses (e.g. by setting preferred bases, etc). In specific cases this may give you sufficient control; in the general case it's a losing battle. Load libeay as early as possible.
> - Put all your TLS processing in a separate service process that includes the bare minimum of code and no DLLs other than OpenSSL; you might even link OpenSSL statically. Use IPC to communicate between this TLS service process and your application. Obviously there are performance and security issues, though they're acceptable for some applications. You can control how the stripped-down service process lays out its memory.
>
> All that said, I've never looked into this problem closely (I avoid the FIPS-validated build as much as I possibly can), so someone else may well have better suggestions.

Note you may not modify the openssl-FIPS build files or process.

However, building the openssl host container of the FIPS library build,
you may pin the DLL file with link flags and dodge this relocation.

From lists at rustichelli.net  Tue Mar 21 06:35:51 2017
From: lists at rustichelli.net (lists)
Date: Tue, 21 Mar 2017 07:35:51 +0100
Subject: [openssl-users] how to implement functions for STACK OF custom type?
Message-ID: <ON5JNR$B02EEBE404DCBF50AF8E30BB1C768924@rustichelli.net>

Sorry, I first posted this on the -dev list, likely inappropriate... now with an update:

I am exploring my options with OpenSSL and specifically I am trying to manage the stacks for some custom objects.
Currently, I have this code (sort of) in the headers:

typedef struct myThingA_st
{
???? ASN1_OBJECT aID;
???? ASN1_OCTET_STRING aOCST;
}
???? myThingA;

DECLARE_ASN1_ITEM(myThingA)
DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(myThingA)
DECLARE_STACK_OF(myThingA)
// the next one seems to be ininfluent for my purpose, is it?
DECLARE_ASN1_SET_OF(myThingA)

typedef struct myThingB_st
{
???? // SEQUENCE OF { ... }
???? STACK_OF(myThingA) myThingA_sk;
}
???? myThingB;

// DECLARE_ASN1_ITEM(myThingB)
DECLARE_STACK_OF(myThingB)
// DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(myThingB)
// the next one seems to be ininfluent for my purpose, is it?
DECLARE_ASN1_SET_OF(myThingB)

Then, in the .c file...

IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(myThingA)
IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(myThingB)

I thought that the basic functions for the stacks to be available (such as sk_myThingA_new, sk_myThingA_push...), yet by compiling a main, for 
the first one that I try to use I get:

?????? undefined reference to `sk_myThingA_value'

What am I doing wrong here?
-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
URL: <http://mta.openssl.org/pipermail/openssl-users/attachments/20170321/5a0c1ae5/attachment.html>

From yu2003w at hotmail.com  Mon Mar 20 10:22:18 2017
From: yu2003w at hotmail.com (Yu Wei)
Date: Mon, 20 Mar 2017 10:22:18 +0000
Subject: [openssl-users] Is crypto library thread-safe?
Message-ID: <HK2PR03MB0561478530D3D1E7E46CFCBAB53A0@HK2PR03MB0561.apcprd03.prod.outlook.com>

Hi guys,


I want to use some ciphers such as RSA, DES in my application provided by crypto library.


However, is crypto library thread-safe?


Thanks,

Jared, (???
Software developer
Interested in open source software, big data, Linux
-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
URL: <http://mta.openssl.org/pipermail/openssl-users/attachments/20170320/1a2f10f1/attachment.html>

From Michael.Wojcik at microfocus.com  Tue Mar 21 13:02:22 2017
From: Michael.Wojcik at microfocus.com (Michael Wojcik)
Date: Tue, 21 Mar 2017 13:02:22 +0000
Subject: [openssl-users] Static FIPS Library with Address Randomization
In-Reply-To: <CACsi252z+k=orTa-5Lko4Gw0BMe7nNkcSBPEBD84piqyhU8GbQ@mail.gmail.com>
References: <1489764336528-70129.post@n7.nabble.com>
 <B550B44BF8AF314BB00C4E2AC1C18088018C454B05@prvxmb03.microfocus.com>
 <CACsi252z+k=orTa-5Lko4Gw0BMe7nNkcSBPEBD84piqyhU8GbQ@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <B550B44BF8AF314BB00C4E2AC1C1808801A9A2D76D@prvxmb03.microfocus.com>

> From: openssl-users [mailto:openssl-users-bounces at openssl.org] On Behalf
> Of William A Rowe Jr
> Sent: Monday, March 20, 2017 20:59
> To: openssl-users at openssl.org
> Subject: Re: [openssl-users] Static FIPS Library with Address Randomization
> 
> Note you may not modify the openssl-FIPS build files or process.
> 
> However, building the openssl host container of the FIPS library build,
> you may pin the DLL file with link flags and dodge this relocation.

Yes. That's what /BASE:x /FIXED does, which causes the problem (address not available at runtime) which the OP was trying to work around. We're just back where we started.

The simple fact of the matter is that the FIPS requirements do not play well with the PE DLL design. Arguably the PE DLL design itself is at fault (PE relocations also inhibit sharing text pages among processes, for example), but it is what it is. In 32-bit, address space is a scarce resource, and OSes make various compromises in managing it. The real problem is that FIPS 140-2 was written primarily for hardware and doesn't accommodate software well. And, many have argued, doesn't really do anything useful anyway - which is no help whatsoever if your customer is required to have it, or insists on it anyway.

-- 
Michael Wojcik 
Distinguished Engineer, Micro Focus 



From svineet at kodiakptt.com  Tue Mar 21 10:30:32 2017
From: svineet at kodiakptt.com (Vineet Kumar Srivastava)
Date: Tue, 21 Mar 2017 10:30:32 +0000
Subject: [openssl-users] regarding memory cleanup at end of each DTLS session
Message-ID: <BN6PR10MB179510E3AA0B5556869E697BB03D0@BN6PR10MB1795.namprd10.prod.outlook.com>

Hi Guys,
  I have a server implementation of DTLS Server using OPENSSL.
  At the end of each DTLS Session however I see that memory usage of process keeps on increasing.
  However on running Valgrind with the process no significant leak is observed.

  So, wanted to know that whether the function calls being done by me on getting DTLS Alerts are proper or not.

  Version being used is OpenSSL 1.0.1e-fips 11 Feb 2013

  On getting DTLS Alert following function calls are being done.

      SSL_set_shutdown(ssl, SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN|SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN);
      SSL_free (ssl);
      ERR_remove_thread_state(0);

  Where ssl is the SSL* which was created when server got Client Hello for the handshake.

Please advise if I am required to do anymore cleanup on getting DTLS Alert.

  Your advise is highly appreciated.

Thanks,
Vineet

-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
URL: <http://mta.openssl.org/pipermail/openssl-users/attachments/20170321/9d44845d/attachment.html>

From rsalz at akamai.com  Tue Mar 21 13:38:52 2017
From: rsalz at akamai.com (Salz, Rich)
Date: Tue, 21 Mar 2017 13:38:52 +0000
Subject: [openssl-users] Is crypto library thread-safe?
In-Reply-To: <HK2PR03MB0561478530D3D1E7E46CFCBAB53A0@HK2PR03MB0561.apcprd03.prod.outlook.com>
References: <HK2PR03MB0561478530D3D1E7E46CFCBAB53A0@HK2PR03MB0561.apcprd03.prod.outlook.com>
Message-ID: <8a3472fb6575453089ce1a3b7202b787@usma1ex-dag1mb1.msg.corp.akamai.com>

> However, is crypto library thread-safe? 

Check out this blog entry:  https://www.openssl.org/blog/blog/2017/02/21/threads/


From jb-openssl at wisemo.com  Tue Mar 21 14:17:35 2017
From: jb-openssl at wisemo.com (Jakob Bohm)
Date: Tue, 21 Mar 2017 15:17:35 +0100
Subject: [openssl-users] Static FIPS Library with Address Randomization
In-Reply-To: <B550B44BF8AF314BB00C4E2AC1C1808801A9A2D76D@prvxmb03.microfocus.com>
References: <1489764336528-70129.post@n7.nabble.com>
 <B550B44BF8AF314BB00C4E2AC1C18088018C454B05@prvxmb03.microfocus.com>
 <CACsi252z+k=orTa-5Lko4Gw0BMe7nNkcSBPEBD84piqyhU8GbQ@mail.gmail.com>
 <B550B44BF8AF314BB00C4E2AC1C1808801A9A2D76D@prvxmb03.microfocus.com>
Message-ID: <1a24f29c-1b12-5e43-e932-453e39b47817@wisemo.com>

On 21/03/2017 14:02, Michael Wojcik wrote:
>> From: openssl-users [mailto:openssl-users-bounces at openssl.org] On Behalf
>> Of William A Rowe Jr
>> Sent: Monday, March 20, 2017 20:59
>> To: openssl-users at openssl.org
>> Subject: Re: [openssl-users] Static FIPS Library with Address Randomization
>>
>> Note you may not modify the openssl-FIPS build files or process.
>>
>> However, building the openssl host container of the FIPS library build,
>> you may pin the DLL file with link flags and dodge this relocation.
> Yes. That's what /BASE:x /FIXED does, which causes the problem (address not available at runtime) which the OP was trying to work around. We're just back where we started.
>
> The simple fact of the matter is that the FIPS requirements do not play well with the PE DLL design. Arguably the PE DLL design itself is at fault (PE relocations also inhibit sharing text pages among processes, for example), but it is what it is. In 32-bit, address space is a scarce resource, and OSes make various compromises in managing it. The real problem is that FIPS 140-2 was written primarily for hardware and doesn't accommodate software well. And, many have argued, doesn't really do anything useful anyway - which is no help whatsoever if your customer is required to have it, or insists on it anyway.
>
I don't believe it is a shortcoming of FIPS 140-2 as much as it
is a shortcoming of how the OpenSSL library verifies the hash of
the FIPS blob.  Specifically, that the has verification is done
on the runtime-relocated code block, not on it's
unrelocated/normalized form.

If there is a conformant way to change the code that checks the
FIPS blob, so it checks the "relocated-to-base-0" form along with
the list of blob-relative relocation offsets used for that
normalization, then the blob hash should work fine with runtime
relocation to an available address, address-layout randomization
etc.  The list of relocation offsets could be trivially extracted
from the relocation data in any non-fixed PE file linked against
that particular blob, sorted by address and filtered to only
include those offsets that fall within the blob.

Enjoy

Jakob
-- 
Jakob Bohm, CIO, Partner, WiseMo A/S.  https://www.wisemo.com
Transformervej 29, 2860 S?borg, Denmark.  Direct +45 31 13 16 10
This public discussion message is non-binding and may contain errors.
WiseMo - Remote Service Management for PCs, Phones and Embedded


From marquess at openssl.com  Tue Mar 21 15:06:26 2017
From: marquess at openssl.com (Steve Marquess)
Date: Tue, 21 Mar 2017 11:06:26 -0400
Subject: [openssl-users] Static FIPS Library with Address Randomization
In-Reply-To: <1a24f29c-1b12-5e43-e932-453e39b47817@wisemo.com>
References: <1489764336528-70129.post@n7.nabble.com>
 <B550B44BF8AF314BB00C4E2AC1C18088018C454B05@prvxmb03.microfocus.com>
 <CACsi252z+k=orTa-5Lko4Gw0BMe7nNkcSBPEBD84piqyhU8GbQ@mail.gmail.com>
 <B550B44BF8AF314BB00C4E2AC1C1808801A9A2D76D@prvxmb03.microfocus.com>
 <1a24f29c-1b12-5e43-e932-453e39b47817@wisemo.com>
Message-ID: <5db7e913-c9f9-66cf-7157-92189f02c154@openssl.com>

On 03/21/2017 10:17 AM, Jakob Bohm wrote:
> On 21/03/2017 14:02, Michael Wojcik wrote:
>>> From: openssl-users [mailto:openssl-users-bounces at openssl.org] On Behalf
>>> Of William A Rowe Jr
>>> Sent: Monday, March 20, 2017 20:59
>>> To: openssl-users at openssl.org
>>> Subject: Re: [openssl-users] Static FIPS Library with Address
>>> Randomization
>>>
>>> Note you may not modify the openssl-FIPS build files or process.
>>>
>>> However, building the openssl host container of the FIPS library build,
>>> you may pin the DLL file with link flags and dodge this relocation.
>> Yes. That's what /BASE:x /FIXED does, which causes the problem
>> (address not available at runtime) which the OP was trying to work
>> around. We're just back where we started.
>>
>> The simple fact of the matter is that the FIPS requirements do not
>> play well with the PE DLL design. Arguably the PE DLL design itself is
>> at fault (PE relocations also inhibit sharing text pages among
>> processes, for example), but it is what it is. In 32-bit, address
>> space is a scarce resource, and OSes make various compromises in
>> managing it. The real problem is that FIPS 140-2 was written primarily
>> for hardware and doesn't accommodate software well. And, many have
>> argued, doesn't really do anything useful anyway - which is no help
>> whatsoever if your customer is required to have it, or insists on it
>> anyway.
>>
> I don't believe it is a shortcoming of FIPS 140-2 as much as it
> is a shortcoming of how the OpenSSL library verifies the hash of
> the FIPS blob.  Specifically, that the has verification is done
> on the runtime-relocated code block, not on it's
> unrelocated/normalized form.
> 
> If there is a conformant way to change the code ...

And therein lies the rub, because converging on the "incore" scheme we
use was a long and tortuous process that left us with what the CMVP
would accept, not what we preferred. We discovered that the CMVP had
some rather subtle ideological requirements for the integrity digest.

The scheme they are most familiar with is a digest over a shared library
file. Our first thought was just to do a digest over the application
executable file containing the FIPS module (which in many cases would be
a shared library), but that was specifically rejected (see section 2.2
of the OpenSSL FIPS module user guide,
https://www.openssl.org/docs/fips/UserGuide-2.0.pdf).

-Steve M.

-- 
Steve Marquess
OpenSSL Validation Services, Inc.
1829 Mount Ephraim Road
Adamstown, MD  21710
USA
+1 301 874 2571
marquess at openssl.com
gpg/pgp key: http://openssl.com/docs/0x6D1892F5.asc

From jb-openssl at wisemo.com  Tue Mar 21 15:41:12 2017
From: jb-openssl at wisemo.com (Jakob Bohm)
Date: Tue, 21 Mar 2017 16:41:12 +0100
Subject: [openssl-users] Static FIPS Library with Address Randomization
In-Reply-To: <5db7e913-c9f9-66cf-7157-92189f02c154@openssl.com>
References: <1489764336528-70129.post@n7.nabble.com>
 <B550B44BF8AF314BB00C4E2AC1C18088018C454B05@prvxmb03.microfocus.com>
 <CACsi252z+k=orTa-5Lko4Gw0BMe7nNkcSBPEBD84piqyhU8GbQ@mail.gmail.com>
 <B550B44BF8AF314BB00C4E2AC1C1808801A9A2D76D@prvxmb03.microfocus.com>
 <1a24f29c-1b12-5e43-e932-453e39b47817@wisemo.com>
 <5db7e913-c9f9-66cf-7157-92189f02c154@openssl.com>
Message-ID: <64f43bce-8a32-dd38-c3c2-dfe4b7f6410d@wisemo.com>

On 21/03/2017 16:06, Steve Marquess wrote:
> On 03/21/2017 10:17 AM, Jakob Bohm wrote:
>> On 21/03/2017 14:02, Michael Wojcik wrote:
>>>> From: openssl-users [mailto:openssl-users-bounces at openssl.org] On Behalf
>>>> Of William A Rowe Jr
>>>> Sent: Monday, March 20, 2017 20:59
>>>> To: openssl-users at openssl.org
>>>> Subject: Re: [openssl-users] Static FIPS Library with Address
>>>> Randomization
>>>>
>>>> Note you may not modify the openssl-FIPS build files or process.
>>>>
>>>> However, building the openssl host container of the FIPS library build,
>>>> you may pin the DLL file with link flags and dodge this relocation.
>>> Yes. That's what /BASE:x /FIXED does, which causes the problem
>>> (address not available at runtime) which the OP was trying to work
>>> around. We're just back where we started.
>>>
>>> The simple fact of the matter is that the FIPS requirements do not
>>> play well with the PE DLL design. Arguably the PE DLL design itself is
>>> at fault (PE relocations also inhibit sharing text pages among
>>> processes, for example), but it is what it is. In 32-bit, address
>>> space is a scarce resource, and OSes make various compromises in
>>> managing it. The real problem is that FIPS 140-2 was written primarily
>>> for hardware and doesn't accommodate software well. And, many have
>>> argued, doesn't really do anything useful anyway - which is no help
>>> whatsoever if your customer is required to have it, or insists on it
>>> anyway.
>>>
>> I don't believe it is a shortcoming of FIPS 140-2 as much as it
>> is a shortcoming of how the OpenSSL library verifies the hash of
>> the FIPS blob.  Specifically, that the has verification is done
>> on the runtime-relocated code block, not on it's
>> unrelocated/normalized form.
>>
>> If there is a conformant way to change the code ...
> And therein lies the rub, because converging on the "incore" scheme we
> use was a long and tortuous process that left us with what the CMVP
> would accept, not what we preferred. We discovered that the CMVP had
> some rather subtle ideological requirements for the integrity digest.
>
> The scheme they are most familiar with is a digest over a shared library
> file. Our first thought was just to do a digest over the application
> executable file containing the FIPS module (which in many cases would be
> a shared library), but that was specifically rejected (see section 2.2
> of the OpenSSL FIPS module user guide,
> https://www.openssl.org/docs/fips/UserGuide-2.0.pdf).
>
> -Steve M.
>
Rereading section 2.2 and 2.3 of the UserGuide didn't really give any
reason preventing the creation of an algorithm that checks the required
code and data segment portions (as it does today), but applies a
"normalization" conceptually similar to how signature checking on S/MIME
requires line ending normalization before passing data to the hash
algorithm.

The text did however seem to indicate that the checking code is inside
the blob and thus requires an updated validation in order to be modified.

An alternative approach would be to somehow coach some Windows compiler
into generating truly position-independent code and data for the blob,
however that too would probably require revalidation.

Enjoy

Jakob
-- 
Jakob Bohm, CIO, Partner, WiseMo A/S.  https://www.wisemo.com
Transformervej 29, 2860 S?borg, Denmark.  Direct +45 31 13 16 10
This public discussion message is non-binding and may contain errors.
WiseMo - Remote Service Management for PCs, Phones and Embedded


From raja.ashok at huawei.com  Tue Mar 21 15:24:57 2017
From: raja.ashok at huawei.com (Raja ashok)
Date: Tue, 21 Mar 2017 15:24:57 +0000
Subject: [openssl-users] DTLS is not sending alert in case of BAD CCS
Message-ID: <FDFEA8C9B9B6BD4685DCC959079C81F5E192EA6D@blreml509-mbx>

Hi All,

Looks like there is a typo mistake in dtls1_read_bytes, because of this alert is not send for bad CCS.

In dtls1_read_bytes, incase of bad change cipher spec we are setting alert code (SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER) to variable ?i? and doing ?goto err?. I feel we are trying to send alert in this case, so we need to set the alert in ?al? and do ?goto f_err?.

In case of TLS we are sending alert.

Note : I am referring 1.0.2.k version of OpenSSL

Regards,
Ashok

________________________________
[Company_logo]

Raja Ashok V K
Huawei Technologies
Bangalore, India
http://www.huawei.com
________________________________
????????????????????????????????????????
????????????????????????????????????????
???????????????????????????????????
This e-mail and its attachments contain confidential information from HUAWEI, which
is intended only for the person or entity whose address is listed above. Any use of the
information contained herein in any way (including, but not limited to, total or partial
disclosure, reproduction, or dissemination) by persons other than the intended
recipient(s) is prohibited. If you receive this e-mail in error, please notify the sender by
phone or email immediately and delete it!

-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
URL: <http://mta.openssl.org/pipermail/openssl-users/attachments/20170321/8426b62c/attachment-0001.html>
-------------- next part --------------
A non-text attachment was scrubbed...
Name: image001.jpg
Type: image/jpeg
Size: 6737 bytes
Desc: image001.jpg
URL: <http://mta.openssl.org/pipermail/openssl-users/attachments/20170321/8426b62c/attachment-0001.jpg>

From christian_adja at yahoo.it  Wed Mar 22 17:48:08 2017
From: christian_adja at yahoo.it (Christian Adja)
Date: Wed, 22 Mar 2017 17:48:08 +0000 (UTC)
Subject: [openssl-users] openssl-users Digest, Vol 28, Issue 21
In-Reply-To: <mailman.904.1489612978.2180.openssl-users@openssl.org>
References: <mailman.904.1489612978.2180.openssl-users@openssl.org>
Message-ID: <776809560.1321367.1490204889018@mail.yahoo.com>

Good evening everybody,I need help about to transform public key (unsigned char *) retrieved from IEEE cert in EVP_PKEY o EC_KEY. The public key is an ecdsaNistP256 in compressed form (compressedy1). 
The public key form in hex = 
|00|80|83|x point (32 bytes)|
Thanks,
Best Regards
 

    Il Mercoled? 15 Marzo 2017 22:23, "openssl-users-request at openssl.org" <openssl-users-request at openssl.org> ha scritto:
 

 Send openssl-users mailing list submissions to
??? openssl-users at openssl.org

To subscribe or unsubscribe via the World Wide Web, visit
??? https://mta.openssl.org/mailman/listinfo/openssl-users
or, via email, send a message with subject or body 'help' to
??? openssl-users-request at openssl.org

You can reach the person managing the list at
??? openssl-users-owner at openssl.org

When replying, please edit your Subject line so it is more specific
than "Re: Contents of openssl-users digest..."


Today's Topics:

? 1. Request for adding new ciphers (Christian Adja)
? 2. Re: Request for adding new ciphers (Matt Caswell)
? 3. Generating dh parameters multithreaded? (Joseph Southwell)
? 4. Re: Generating dh parameters multithreaded? (Salz, Rich)
? 5. OpenSSL Certificate Cross Signing (Moritz Wirth)
? 6. Re: PKCS#7 (val?ry)
? 7. Re: Generating dh parameters multithreaded? (Joseph Southwell)
? 8. Re: Generating dh parameters multithreaded? (Salz, Rich)


----------------------------------------------------------------------

Message: 1
Date: Wed, 15 Mar 2017 18:03:44 +0000 (UTC)
From: Christian Adja <christian_adja at yahoo.it>
To: "openssl-users at openssl.org" <openssl-users at openssl.org>
Subject: [openssl-users] Request for adding new ciphers
Message-ID: <1576557894.1332584.1489601024241 at mail.yahoo.com>
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8"

Hi everyone,
Someone can help for adding the ciphersuite " ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM " and "ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM " in openssl? 
I tried adding in the file tls1.h??? # define TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM??????????? 0x0300C0AC
??? # define TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM??????????? 0x0300C0AD
And modifing the file? ssl_ciph.c the functions??? ssl_load_ciphers() ... And modifing the file evp_cipher.c and sssl_locl.cand finaly ssl_algs.c.
There are no way to make it works. It continue to give me? error: ssl3_get_client_hello:no shared cipher:s3_srvr.c:1420
thanks.


-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
URL: <http://mta.openssl.org/pipermail/openssl-users/attachments/20170315/5ea926a1/attachment-0001.html>

------------------------------

Message: 2
Date: Wed, 15 Mar 2017 18:18:52 +0000
From: Matt Caswell <matt at openssl.org>
To: openssl-users at openssl.org
Subject: Re: [openssl-users] Request for adding new ciphers
Message-ID: <e507eba7-b0c6-d85a-78aa-2af36c2e487e at openssl.org>
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=windows-1252



On 15/03/17 18:03, Christian Adja via openssl-users wrote:
> Hi everyone,
> 
> Someone can help for adding the ciphersuite "
> ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM " and "ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM " in
> openssl?
> I tried adding in the file tls1.h
>? ? # define TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM? ? ? ? ? ? 0x0300C0AC
>? ? # define TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM? ? ? ? ? ? 0x0300C0AD
> 
> And modifing the file? ssl_ciph.c the functions
>? ? ssl_load_ciphers() ...
> And modifing the file evp_cipher.c and sssl_locl.c
> and finaly ssl_algs.c.
> 
> There are no way to make it works. It continue to give me? error:
> ssl3_get_client_hello:no shared cipher:s3_srvr.c:1420


These ciphersuites already exist in OpenSSL (from version 1.1.0).

Matt



------------------------------

Message: 3
Date: Wed, 15 Mar 2017 14:18:38 -0400
From: Joseph Southwell <jsouthwell at serengeti.com>
To: openssl-users at openssl.org
Subject: [openssl-users] Generating dh parameters multithreaded?
Message-ID: <56015584-6EDC-4BD6-AA21-F27835281A99 at serengeti.com>
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8"

On any new install of our software we generate new dh parameters as follows?

DH *dh = DH_new();
!DH_generate_parameters_ex(dh, 2048, 2, NULL);
int codes = 0;
DH_check(dh, &codes);
DH_generate_key(dh);

It takes a long time. Is there some way to have it use all available cores instead of just the one?
-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
URL: <http://mta.openssl.org/pipermail/openssl-users/attachments/20170315/abdcfd11/attachment-0001.html>

------------------------------

Message: 4
Date: Wed, 15 Mar 2017 18:21:05 +0000
From: "Salz, Rich" <rsalz at akamai.com>
To: "openssl-users at openssl.org" <openssl-users at openssl.org>
Subject: Re: [openssl-users] Generating dh parameters multithreaded?
Message-ID:
??? <9ff829cd17f74e4a910ca067196f7d62 at usma1ex-dag1mb1.msg.corp.akamai.com>
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8"

> It takes a long time. Is there some way to have it use all available cores instead of just the one?

You'll have to write the code to do that parallelism yourself.

------------------------------

Message: 5
Date: Wed, 15 Mar 2017 19:46:07 +0100
From: Moritz Wirth <mw at flanga.io>
To: openssl-users at openssl.org
Subject: [openssl-users] OpenSSL Certificate Cross Signing
Message-ID: <c879dec1-9fab-5ecc-de01-4e033c690690 at flanga.io>
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8

Good Evening all,


I have 2 Root Certificate Authorities which I want to use to cross sign
an intermediate certificate. I created a certificate request and signed
it with both CAs.

I issued an end user certificate with the intermediate CA and added both
intermediate CA Certificates (the one from Root1 and the one signed by
Root2). If only one CA is trusted, the certificate is still recognized
as trusted in Firefox regardless which certificate is on top of the
chain (Which is exactly what I want.)

I wondered if I can connect both intermediate Certificates to a single
certificate or do I always need both certificates?


Best Regards,

Moritz



------------------------------

Message: 6
Date: Wed, 15 Mar 2017 21:42:50 +0100
From: val?ry <vsbrin at gmail.com>
To: openssl-users at openssl.org
Subject: Re: [openssl-users] PKCS#7
Message-ID:
??? <CAMkdoSFR_kT=wxt5jAFMENwN3dXEhzVr=VkJmh-7=ocaHj14OA at mail.gmail.com>
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8"

Alright, big thanks to both of you for your input!

On Mar 15, 2017 23:01, "Wouter Verhelst" <wouter.verhelst at fedict.be> wrote:

On 15-03-17 05:13, val?ry wrote:

> Hi,
>
> thank you very much for your response.
> Say someone would be able to gather several clear text AES keys and
> their respective asymmetrically encrypted RSA blocks. Would it weakens
> the security of the RSA key pair ? I mean could it be easier for someone
> using that information to brute force an RSA key pair ?
>

Think of it this way:

As far as the RSA algorithm is concerned, the AES keys are just data. They
happen to be AES keys, but they might have been a hash value, an image, or
somebody's date of birth.

If getting the cleartext as well as the encrypted text for an RSA message
would allow you to more easily guess the RSA key, then the RSA algorithm
would be seriously flawed.

There is no known attack against RSA for which this is true, however, as
Rich pointed out.

-- 
Wouter Verhelst

-- 
openssl-users mailing list
To unsubscribe: https://mta.openssl.org/mailman/listinfo/openssl-users
-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
URL: <http://mta.openssl.org/pipermail/openssl-users/attachments/20170315/c5426a43/attachment-0001.html>

------------------------------

Message: 7
Date: Wed, 15 Mar 2017 17:08:50 -0400
From: Joseph Southwell <jsouthwell at serengeti.com>
To: "Salz, Rich" <rsalz at akamai.com>, openssl-users at openssl.org
Subject: Re: [openssl-users] Generating dh parameters multithreaded?
Message-ID: <F3ADE150-0FAA-46B8-B481-816C1DD1B984 at serengeti.com>
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii

Are you suggesting that I should modify openssl myself to expose that functionality or are suggesting that there is a way to do that given the already exposed functionality? If it is the latter could you point me in the right direction?

> On Mar 15, 2017, at 2:21 PM, Salz, Rich via openssl-users <openssl-users at openssl.org> wrote:
> 
>> It takes a long time. Is there some way to have it use all available cores instead of just the one?
> 
> You'll have to write the code to do that parallelism yourself.
> -- 
> openssl-users mailing list
> To unsubscribe: https://mta.openssl.org/mailman/listinfo/openssl-users
> 



------------------------------

Message: 8
Date: Wed, 15 Mar 2017 21:15:11 +0000
From: "Salz, Rich" <rsalz at akamai.com>
To: Joseph Southwell <jsouthwell at serengeti.com>,
??? "openssl-users at openssl.org" <openssl-users at openssl.org>
Subject: Re: [openssl-users] Generating dh parameters multithreaded?
Message-ID:
??? <2a86a335027d437ba9531551ce0ea897 at usma1ex-dag1mb1.msg.corp.akamai.com>
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="Windows-1252"

> Are you suggesting that I should modify openssl myself to expose that
> functionality or are suggesting that there is a way to do that given the already
> exposed functionality? If it is the latter could you point me in the right
> direction?

OpenSSL code does not do what you want.? You'll have to write it


------------------------------

Subject: Digest Footer

_______________________________________________
openssl-users mailing list
openssl-users at openssl.org
https://mta.openssl.org/mailman/listinfo/openssl-users


------------------------------

End of openssl-users Digest, Vol 28, Issue 21
*********************************************


   
-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
URL: <http://mta.openssl.org/pipermail/openssl-users/attachments/20170322/4a392c45/attachment-0001.html>

From christian_adja at yahoo.it  Wed Mar 22 17:59:11 2017
From: christian_adja at yahoo.it (Christian Adja)
Date: Wed, 22 Mar 2017 17:59:11 +0000 (UTC)
Subject: [openssl-users] unsigned char * public key to evp_pkey o ec_key
In-Reply-To: <mailman.1204.1490204900.2180.openssl-users@openssl.org>
References: <mailman.1204.1490204900.2180.openssl-users@openssl.org>
Message-ID: <808829684.2632458.1490205551640@mail.yahoo.com>

Good evening everybody,I need help about to transform public key (unsigned char *) retrieved from IEEE cert in EVP_PKEY o EC_KEY. The public key is an ecdsaNistP256 in compressed form (compressedy1). 
The public key form in hex = 
|00|80|83|x point (32 bytes)|
Thanks,
Best Regards 

    Il Mercoled? 22 Marzo 2017 18:48, "openssl-users-request at openssl.org" <openssl-users-request at openssl.org> ha scritto:
 

 Send openssl-users mailing list submissions to
??? openssl-users at openssl.org

To subscribe or unsubscribe via the World Wide Web, visit
??? https://mta.openssl.org/mailman/listinfo/openssl-users
or, via email, send a message with subject or body 'help' to
??? openssl-users-request at openssl.org

You can reach the person managing the list at
??? openssl-users-owner at openssl.org

When replying, please edit your Subject line so it is more specific
than "Re: Contents of openssl-users digest..."


Today's Topics:

? 1. Re: openssl-users Digest, Vol 28, Issue 21 (Christian Adja)


----------------------------------------------------------------------

Message: 1
Date: Wed, 22 Mar 2017 17:48:08 +0000 (UTC)
From: Christian Adja <christian_adja at yahoo.it>
To: "openssl-users at openssl.org" <openssl-users at openssl.org>
Subject: Re: [openssl-users] openssl-users Digest, Vol 28, Issue 21
Message-ID: <776809560.1321367.1490204889018 at mail.yahoo.com>
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8"

Good evening everybody,I need help about to transform public key (unsigned char *) retrieved from IEEE cert in EVP_PKEY o EC_KEY. The public key is an ecdsaNistP256 in compressed form (compressedy1). 
The public key form in hex = 
|00|80|83|x point (32 bytes)|
Thanks,
Best Regards
 

? ? Il Mercoled? 15 Marzo 2017 22:23, "openssl-users-request at openssl.org" <openssl-users-request at openssl.org> ha scritto:
 

 Send openssl-users mailing list submissions to
??? openssl-users at openssl.org

To subscribe or unsubscribe via the World Wide Web, visit
??? https://mta.openssl.org/mailman/listinfo/openssl-users
or, via email, send a message with subject or body 'help' to
??? openssl-users-request at openssl.org

You can reach the person managing the list at
??? openssl-users-owner at openssl.org

When replying, please edit your Subject line so it is more specific
than "Re: Contents of openssl-users digest..."


Today's Topics:

? 1. Request for adding new ciphers (Christian Adja)
? 2. Re: Request for adding new ciphers (Matt Caswell)
? 3. Generating dh parameters multithreaded? (Joseph Southwell)
? 4. Re: Generating dh parameters multithreaded? (Salz, Rich)
? 5. OpenSSL Certificate Cross Signing (Moritz Wirth)
? 6. Re: PKCS#7 (val?ry)
? 7. Re: Generating dh parameters multithreaded? (Joseph Southwell)
? 8. Re: Generating dh parameters multithreaded? (Salz, Rich)


----------------------------------------------------------------------

Message: 1
Date: Wed, 15 Mar 2017 18:03:44 +0000 (UTC)
From: Christian Adja <christian_adja at yahoo.it>
To: "openssl-users at openssl.org" <openssl-users at openssl.org>
Subject: [openssl-users] Request for adding new ciphers
Message-ID: <1576557894.1332584.1489601024241 at mail.yahoo.com>
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8"

Hi everyone,
Someone can help for adding the ciphersuite " ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM " and "ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM " in openssl? 
I tried adding in the file tls1.h??? # define TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM??????????? 0x0300C0AC
??? # define TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM??????????? 0x0300C0AD
And modifing the file? ssl_ciph.c the functions??? ssl_load_ciphers() ... And modifing the file evp_cipher.c and sssl_locl.cand finaly ssl_algs.c.
There are no way to make it works. It continue to give me? error: ssl3_get_client_hello:no shared cipher:s3_srvr.c:1420
thanks.


-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
URL: <http://mta.openssl.org/pipermail/openssl-users/attachments/20170315/5ea926a1/attachment-0001.html>

------------------------------

Message: 2
Date: Wed, 15 Mar 2017 18:18:52 +0000
From: Matt Caswell <matt at openssl.org>
To: openssl-users at openssl.org
Subject: Re: [openssl-users] Request for adding new ciphers
Message-ID: <e507eba7-b0c6-d85a-78aa-2af36c2e487e at openssl.org>
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=windows-1252



On 15/03/17 18:03, Christian Adja via openssl-users wrote:
> Hi everyone,
> 
> Someone can help for adding the ciphersuite "
> ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM " and "ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM " in
> openssl?
> I tried adding in the file tls1.h
>? ? # define TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM? ? ? ? ? ? 0x0300C0AC
>? ? # define TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM? ? ? ? ? ? 0x0300C0AD
> 
> And modifing the file? ssl_ciph.c the functions
>? ? ssl_load_ciphers() ...
> And modifing the file evp_cipher.c and sssl_locl.c
> and finaly ssl_algs.c.
> 
> There are no way to make it works. It continue to give me? error:
> ssl3_get_client_hello:no shared cipher:s3_srvr.c:1420


These ciphersuites already exist in OpenSSL (from version 1.1.0).

Matt



------------------------------

Message: 3
Date: Wed, 15 Mar 2017 14:18:38 -0400
From: Joseph Southwell <jsouthwell at serengeti.com>
To: openssl-users at openssl.org
Subject: [openssl-users] Generating dh parameters multithreaded?
Message-ID: <56015584-6EDC-4BD6-AA21-F27835281A99 at serengeti.com>
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8"

On any new install of our software we generate new dh parameters as follows?

DH *dh = DH_new();
!DH_generate_parameters_ex(dh, 2048, 2, NULL);
int codes = 0;
DH_check(dh, &codes);
DH_generate_key(dh);

It takes a long time. Is there some way to have it use all available cores instead of just the one?
-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
URL: <http://mta.openssl.org/pipermail/openssl-users/attachments/20170315/abdcfd11/attachment-0001.html>

------------------------------

Message: 4
Date: Wed, 15 Mar 2017 18:21:05 +0000
From: "Salz, Rich" <rsalz at akamai.com>
To: "openssl-users at openssl.org" <openssl-users at openssl.org>
Subject: Re: [openssl-users] Generating dh parameters multithreaded?
Message-ID:
??? <9ff829cd17f74e4a910ca067196f7d62 at usma1ex-dag1mb1.msg.corp.akamai.com>
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8"

> It takes a long time. Is there some way to have it use all available cores instead of just the one?

You'll have to write the code to do that parallelism yourself.

------------------------------

Message: 5
Date: Wed, 15 Mar 2017 19:46:07 +0100
From: Moritz Wirth <mw at flanga.io>
To: openssl-users at openssl.org
Subject: [openssl-users] OpenSSL Certificate Cross Signing
Message-ID: <c879dec1-9fab-5ecc-de01-4e033c690690 at flanga.io>
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8

Good Evening all,


I have 2 Root Certificate Authorities which I want to use to cross sign
an intermediate certificate. I created a certificate request and signed
it with both CAs.

I issued an end user certificate with the intermediate CA and added both
intermediate CA Certificates (the one from Root1 and the one signed by
Root2). If only one CA is trusted, the certificate is still recognized
as trusted in Firefox regardless which certificate is on top of the
chain (Which is exactly what I want.)

I wondered if I can connect both intermediate Certificates to a single
certificate or do I always need both certificates?


Best Regards,

Moritz



------------------------------

Message: 6
Date: Wed, 15 Mar 2017 21:42:50 +0100
From: val?ry <vsbrin at gmail.com>
To: openssl-users at openssl.org
Subject: Re: [openssl-users] PKCS#7
Message-ID:
??? <CAMkdoSFR_kT=wxt5jAFMENwN3dXEhzVr=VkJmh-7=ocaHj14OA at mail.gmail.com>
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8"

Alright, big thanks to both of you for your input!

On Mar 15, 2017 23:01, "Wouter Verhelst" <wouter.verhelst at fedict.be> wrote:

On 15-03-17 05:13, val?ry wrote:

> Hi,
>
> thank you very much for your response.
> Say someone would be able to gather several clear text AES keys and
> their respective asymmetrically encrypted RSA blocks. Would it weakens
> the security of the RSA key pair ? I mean could it be easier for someone
> using that information to brute force an RSA key pair ?
>

Think of it this way:

As far as the RSA algorithm is concerned, the AES keys are just data. They
happen to be AES keys, but they might have been a hash value, an image, or
somebody's date of birth.

If getting the cleartext as well as the encrypted text for an RSA message
would allow you to more easily guess the RSA key, then the RSA algorithm
would be seriously flawed.

There is no known attack against RSA for which this is true, however, as
Rich pointed out.

-- 
Wouter Verhelst

-- 
openssl-users mailing list
To unsubscribe: https://mta.openssl.org/mailman/listinfo/openssl-users
-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
URL: <http://mta.openssl.org/pipermail/openssl-users/attachments/20170315/c5426a43/attachment-0001.html>

------------------------------

Message: 7
Date: Wed, 15 Mar 2017 17:08:50 -0400
From: Joseph Southwell <jsouthwell at serengeti.com>
To: "Salz, Rich" <rsalz at akamai.com>, openssl-users at openssl.org
Subject: Re: [openssl-users] Generating dh parameters multithreaded?
Message-ID: <F3ADE150-0FAA-46B8-B481-816C1DD1B984 at serengeti.com>
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii

Are you suggesting that I should modify openssl myself to expose that functionality or are suggesting that there is a way to do that given the already exposed functionality? If it is the latter could you point me in the right direction?

> On Mar 15, 2017, at 2:21 PM, Salz, Rich via openssl-users <openssl-users at openssl.org> wrote:
> 
>> It takes a long time. Is there some way to have it use all available cores instead of just the one?
> 
> You'll have to write the code to do that parallelism yourself.
> -- 
> openssl-users mailing list
> To unsubscribe: https://mta.openssl.org/mailman/listinfo/openssl-users
> 



------------------------------

Message: 8
Date: Wed, 15 Mar 2017 21:15:11 +0000
From: "Salz, Rich" <rsalz at akamai.com>
To: Joseph Southwell <jsouthwell at serengeti.com>,
??? "openssl-users at openssl.org" <openssl-users at openssl.org>
Subject: Re: [openssl-users] Generating dh parameters multithreaded?
Message-ID:
??? <2a86a335027d437ba9531551ce0ea897 at usma1ex-dag1mb1.msg.corp.akamai.com>
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="Windows-1252"

> Are you suggesting that I should modify openssl myself to expose that
> functionality or are suggesting that there is a way to do that given the already
> exposed functionality? If it is the latter could you point me in the right
> direction?

OpenSSL code does not do what you want.? You'll have to write it


------------------------------

Subject: Digest Footer

_______________________________________________
openssl-users mailing list
openssl-users at openssl.org
https://mta.openssl.org/mailman/listinfo/openssl-users


------------------------------

End of openssl-users Digest, Vol 28, Issue 21
*********************************************


? 
-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
URL: <http://mta.openssl.org/pipermail/openssl-users/attachments/20170322/4a392c45/attachment.html>

------------------------------

Subject: Digest Footer

_______________________________________________
openssl-users mailing list
openssl-users at openssl.org
https://mta.openssl.org/mailman/listinfo/openssl-users


------------------------------

End of openssl-users Digest, Vol 28, Issue 25
*********************************************


   
-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
URL: <http://mta.openssl.org/pipermail/openssl-users/attachments/20170322/5aa755a6/attachment-0001.html>

From ethan.rahn at gmail.com  Wed Mar 22 18:01:41 2017
From: ethan.rahn at gmail.com (Ethan Rahn)
Date: Wed, 22 Mar 2017 11:01:41 -0700
Subject: [openssl-users] openssl-users Digest, Vol 28, Issue 21
In-Reply-To: <776809560.1321367.1490204889018@mail.yahoo.com>
References: <mailman.904.1489612978.2180.openssl-users@openssl.org>
 <776809560.1321367.1490204889018@mail.yahoo.com>
Message-ID: <CAEW9rAggwSSVCScRs_0T0BgXWokz354Qe2A3cYP-C=MNZ2vYyQ@mail.gmail.com>

Couldn't you just use EVP_PKEY_get1_EC_KEY?

https://www.openssl.org/docs/man1.0.2/crypto/EVP_PKEY_get1_EC_KEY.html

Cheers,

Ethan

On Wed, Mar 22, 2017 at 10:48 AM, Christian Adja via openssl-users <
openssl-users at openssl.org> wrote:

> Good evening everybody,
> I need help about to transform public key (unsigned char *) retrieved from
> IEEE cert in EVP_PKEY o EC_KEY. The public key is an ecdsaNistP256 in
> compressed form (compressedy1).
> The public key form in hex =
> |00|80|83|x point (32 bytes)|
>
> Thanks,
>
> Best Regards
>
>
> Il Mercoled? 15 Marzo 2017 22:23, "openssl-users-request at openssl.org" <
> openssl-users-request at openssl.org> ha scritto:
>
>
> Send openssl-users mailing list submissions to
>     openssl-users at openssl.org
>
> To subscribe or unsubscribe via the World Wide Web, visit
>     https://mta.openssl.org/mailman/listinfo/openssl-users
> or, via email, send a message with subject or body 'help' to
>     openssl-users-request at openssl.org
>
> You can reach the person managing the list at
>     openssl-users-owner at openssl.org
>
> When replying, please edit your Subject line so it is more specific
> than "Re: Contents of openssl-users digest..."
>
>
> Today's Topics:
>
>   1. Request for adding new ciphers (Christian Adja)
>   2. Re: Request for adding new ciphers (Matt Caswell)
>   3. Generating dh parameters multithreaded? (Joseph Southwell)
>   4. Re: Generating dh parameters multithreaded? (Salz, Rich)
>   5. OpenSSL Certificate Cross Signing (Moritz Wirth)
>   6. Re: PKCS#7 (val?ry)
>   7. Re: Generating dh parameters multithreaded? (Joseph Southwell)
>   8. Re: Generating dh parameters multithreaded? (Salz, Rich)
>
>
> ----------------------------------------------------------------------
>
> Message: 1
> Date: Wed, 15 Mar 2017 18:03:44 +0000 (UTC)
> From: Christian Adja <christian_adja at yahoo.it>
> To: "openssl-users at openssl.org" <openssl-users at openssl.org>
> Subject: [openssl-users] Request for adding new ciphers
> Message-ID: <1576557894.1332584.1489601024241 at mail.yahoo.com>
> Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8"
>
> Hi everyone,
> Someone can help for adding the ciphersuite " ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM
> " and "ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM " in openssl?
> I tried adding in the file tls1.h??? # define TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM???????????
> 0x0300C0AC
> ??? # define TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM??????????? 0x0300C0AD
> And modifing the file? ssl_ciph.c the functions??? ssl_load_ciphers() ...
> And modifing the file evp_cipher.c and sssl_locl.cand finaly ssl_algs.c.
> There are no way to make it works. It continue to give me? error:
> ssl3_get_client_hello:no shared cipher:s3_srvr.c:1420
> thanks.
>
>
> -------------- next part --------------
> An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
> URL: <http://mta.openssl.org/pipermail/openssl-users/
> attachments/20170315/5ea926a1/attachment-0001.html>
>
> ------------------------------
>
> Message: 2
> Date: Wed, 15 Mar 2017 18:18:52 +0000
> From: Matt Caswell <matt at openssl.org>
> To: openssl-users at openssl.org
> Subject: Re: [openssl-users] Request for adding new ciphers
> Message-ID: <e507eba7-b0c6-d85a-78aa-2af36c2e487e at openssl.org>
> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=windows-1252
>
>
>
> On 15/03/17 18:03, Christian Adja via openssl-users wrote:
> > Hi everyone,
> >
> > Someone can help for adding the ciphersuite "
> > ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM " and "ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM " in
> > openssl?
> > I tried adding in the file tls1.h
> >    # define TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM            0x0300C0AC
> >    # define TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM            0x0300C0AD
> >
> > And modifing the file  ssl_ciph.c the functions
> >    ssl_load_ciphers() ...
> > And modifing the file evp_cipher.c and sssl_locl.c
> > and finaly ssl_algs.c.
> >
> > There are no way to make it works. It continue to give me  error:
> > ssl3_get_client_hello:no shared cipher:s3_srvr.c:1420
>
>
> These ciphersuites already exist in OpenSSL (from version 1.1.0).
>
> Matt
>
>
>
> ------------------------------
>
> Message: 3
> Date: Wed, 15 Mar 2017 14:18:38 -0400
> From: Joseph Southwell <jsouthwell at serengeti.com>
> To: openssl-users at openssl.org
> Subject: [openssl-users] Generating dh parameters multithreaded?
> Message-ID: <56015584-6EDC-4BD6-AA21-F27835281A99 at serengeti.com>
> Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8"
>
> On any new install of our software we generate new dh parameters as
> follows?
>
> DH *dh = DH_new();
> !DH_generate_parameters_ex(dh, 2048, 2, NULL);
> int codes = 0;
> DH_check(dh, &codes);
> DH_generate_key(dh);
>
> It takes a long time. Is there some way to have it use all available cores
> instead of just the one?
> -------------- next part --------------
> An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
> URL: <http://mta.openssl.org/pipermail/openssl-users/
> attachments/20170315/abdcfd11/attachment-0001.html>
>
> ------------------------------
>
> Message: 4
> Date: Wed, 15 Mar 2017 18:21:05 +0000
> From: "Salz, Rich" <rsalz at akamai.com>
> To: "openssl-users at openssl.org" <openssl-users at openssl.org>
> Subject: Re: [openssl-users] Generating dh parameters multithreaded?
> Message-ID:
>     <9ff829cd17f74e4a910ca067196f7d62 at usma1ex-dag1mb1.msg.corp.akamai.com>
> Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8"
>
> > It takes a long time. Is there some way to have it use all available
> cores instead of just the one?
>
> You'll have to write the code to do that parallelism yourself.
>
> ------------------------------
>
> Message: 5
> Date: Wed, 15 Mar 2017 19:46:07 +0100
> From: Moritz Wirth <mw at flanga.io>
> To: openssl-users at openssl.org
> Subject: [openssl-users] OpenSSL Certificate Cross Signing
> Message-ID: <c879dec1-9fab-5ecc-de01-4e033c690690 at flanga.io>
> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8
>
> Good Evening all,
>
>
> I have 2 Root Certificate Authorities which I want to use to cross sign
> an intermediate certificate. I created a certificate request and signed
> it with both CAs.
>
> I issued an end user certificate with the intermediate CA and added both
> intermediate CA Certificates (the one from Root1 and the one signed by
> Root2). If only one CA is trusted, the certificate is still recognized
> as trusted in Firefox regardless which certificate is on top of the
> chain (Which is exactly what I want.)
>
> I wondered if I can connect both intermediate Certificates to a single
> certificate or do I always need both certificates?
>
>
> Best Regards,
>
> Moritz
>
>
>
> ------------------------------
>
> Message: 6
> Date: Wed, 15 Mar 2017 21:42:50 +0100
> From: val?ry <vsbrin at gmail.com>
> To: openssl-users at openssl.org
> Subject: Re: [openssl-users] PKCS#7
> Message-ID:
>     <CAMkdoSFR_kT=wxt5jAFMENwN3dXEhzVr=VkJmh-7=ocaHj14OA at mail.gmail.com>
> Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8"
>
> Alright, big thanks to both of you for your input!
>
> On Mar 15, 2017 23:01, "Wouter Verhelst" <wouter.verhelst at fedict.be>
> wrote:
>
> On 15-03-17 05:13, val?ry wrote:
>
> > Hi,
> >
> > thank you very much for your response.
> > Say someone would be able to gather several clear text AES keys and
> > their respective asymmetrically encrypted RSA blocks. Would it weakens
> > the security of the RSA key pair ? I mean could it be easier for someone
> > using that information to brute force an RSA key pair ?
> >
>
> Think of it this way:
>
> As far as the RSA algorithm is concerned, the AES keys are just data. They
> happen to be AES keys, but they might have been a hash value, an image, or
> somebody's date of birth.
>
> If getting the cleartext as well as the encrypted text for an RSA message
> would allow you to more easily guess the RSA key, then the RSA algorithm
> would be seriously flawed.
>
> There is no known attack against RSA for which this is true, however, as
> Rich pointed out.
>
> --
> Wouter Verhelst
>
> --
> openssl-users mailing list
> To unsubscribe: https://mta.openssl.org/mailman/listinfo/openssl-users
> -------------- next part --------------
> An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
> URL: <http://mta.openssl.org/pipermail/openssl-users/
> attachments/20170315/c5426a43/attachment-0001.html>
>
> ------------------------------
>
> Message: 7
> Date: Wed, 15 Mar 2017 17:08:50 -0400
> From: Joseph Southwell <jsouthwell at serengeti.com>
> To: "Salz, Rich" <rsalz at akamai.com>, openssl-users at openssl.org
> Subject: Re: [openssl-users] Generating dh parameters multithreaded?
> Message-ID: <F3ADE150-0FAA-46B8-B481-816C1DD1B984 at serengeti.com>
> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii
>
> Are you suggesting that I should modify openssl myself to expose that
> functionality or are suggesting that there is a way to do that given the
> already exposed functionality? If it is the latter could you point me in
> the right direction?
>
> > On Mar 15, 2017, at 2:21 PM, Salz, Rich via openssl-users <
> openssl-users at openssl.org> wrote:
> >
> >> It takes a long time. Is there some way to have it use all available
> cores instead of just the one?
> >
> > You'll have to write the code to do that parallelism yourself.
> > --
> > openssl-users mailing list
> > To unsubscribe: https://mta.openssl.org/mailman/listinfo/openssl-users
> >
>
>
>
> ------------------------------
>
> Message: 8
> Date: Wed, 15 Mar 2017 21:15:11 +0000
> From: "Salz, Rich" <rsalz at akamai.com>
> To: Joseph Southwell <jsouthwell at serengeti.com>,
>     "openssl-users at openssl.org" <openssl-users at openssl.org>
> Subject: Re: [openssl-users] Generating dh parameters multithreaded?
> Message-ID:
>     <2a86a335027d437ba9531551ce0ea897 at usma1ex-dag1mb1.msg.corp.akamai.com>
> Content-Type: text/plain; charset="Windows-1252"
>
> > Are you suggesting that I should modify openssl myself to expose that
> > functionality or are suggesting that there is a way to do that given the
> already
> > exposed functionality? If it is the latter could you point me in the
> right
> > direction?
>
> OpenSSL code does not do what you want.  You'll have to write it
>
>
> ------------------------------
>
> Subject: Digest Footer
>
> _______________________________________________
> openssl-users mailing list
> openssl-users at openssl.org
> https://mta.openssl.org/mailman/listinfo/openssl-users
>
>
> ------------------------------
>
> End of openssl-users Digest, Vol 28, Issue 21
> *********************************************
>
>
>
> --
> openssl-users mailing list
> To unsubscribe: https://mta.openssl.org/mailman/listinfo/openssl-users
>
>
-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
URL: <http://mta.openssl.org/pipermail/openssl-users/attachments/20170322/2ad48abe/attachment-0001.html>

From christian_adja at yahoo.it  Wed Mar 22 18:11:27 2017
From: christian_adja at yahoo.it (Christian Adja)
Date: Wed, 22 Mar 2017 18:11:27 +0000 (UTC)
Subject: [openssl-users] openssl-users Digest, Vol 28, Issue 21
In-Reply-To: <CAEW9rAggwSSVCScRs_0T0BgXWokz354Qe2A3cYP-C=MNZ2vYyQ@mail.gmail.com>
References: <mailman.904.1489612978.2180.openssl-users@openssl.org>
 <776809560.1321367.1490204889018@mail.yahoo.com>
 <CAEW9rAggwSSVCScRs_0T0BgXWokz354Qe2A3cYP-C=MNZ2vYyQ@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <787239451.2530096.1490206287248@mail.yahoo.com>

cheers,
Thanks for the response, but haven't the evp_pkey struct of the public key. I' ve only the an bytes string that i retrieved from IEEE cert with "PEM_bytes_read_bio()". Now in want to form the ec_key struct and then the? evp_pkey struct.
Thanks
Best regards
Christian Adja
 

    Il Mercoled? 22 Marzo 2017 19:01, Ethan Rahn <ethan.rahn at gmail.com> ha scritto:
 

 Couldn't you just use EVP_PKEY_get1_EC_KEY?
https://www.openssl.org/docs/man1.0.2/crypto/EVP_PKEY_get1_EC_KEY.html

Cheers,
Ethan
On Wed, Mar 22, 2017 at 10:48 AM, Christian Adja via openssl-users <openssl-users at openssl.org> wrote:

Good evening everybody,I need help about to transform public key (unsigned char *) retrieved from IEEE cert in EVP_PKEY o EC_KEY. The public key is an ecdsaNistP256 in compressed form (compressedy1). 
The public key form in hex = 
|00|80|83|x point (32 bytes)|
Thanks,
Best Regards
 

    Il Mercoled? 15 Marzo 2017 22:23, "openssl-users-request@ openssl.org" <openssl-users-request@ openssl.org> ha scritto:
 

 Send openssl-users mailing list submissions to
??? openssl-users at openssl.org

To subscribe or unsubscribe via the World Wide Web, visit
??? https://mta.openssl.org/ mailman/listinfo/openssl-users
or, via email, send a message with subject or body 'help' to
??? openssl-users-request at openssl. org

You can reach the person managing the list at
??? openssl-users-owner at openssl. org

When replying, please edit your Subject line so it is more specific
than "Re: Contents of openssl-users digest..."


Today's Topics:

? 1. Request for adding new ciphers (Christian Adja)
? 2. Re: Request for adding new ciphers (Matt Caswell)
? 3. Generating dh parameters multithreaded? (Joseph Southwell)
? 4. Re: Generating dh parameters multithreaded? (Salz, Rich)
? 5. OpenSSL Certificate Cross Signing (Moritz Wirth)
? 6. Re: PKCS#7 (val?ry)
? 7. Re: Generating dh parameters multithreaded? (Joseph Southwell)
? 8. Re: Generating dh parameters multithreaded? (Salz, Rich)


------------------------------ ------------------------------ ----------

Message: 1
Date: Wed, 15 Mar 2017 18:03:44 +0000 (UTC)
From: Christian Adja <christian_adja at yahoo.it>
To: "openssl-users at openssl.org" <openssl-users at openssl.org>
Subject: [openssl-users] Request for adding new ciphers
Message-ID: <1576557894.1332584. 1489601024241 at mail.yahoo.com>
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8"

Hi everyone,
Someone can help for adding the ciphersuite " ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM " and "ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM " in openssl? 
I tried adding in the file tls1.h??? # define TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_ 128_CCM??????????? 0x0300C0AC
??? # define TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_ 256_CCM??????????? 0x0300C0AD
And modifing the file? ssl_ciph.c the functions??? ssl_load_ciphers() ... And modifing the file evp_cipher.c and sssl_locl.cand finaly ssl_algs.c.
There are no way to make it works. It continue to give me? error: ssl3_get_client_hello:no shared cipher:s3_srvr.c:1420
thanks.


-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
URL: <http://mta.openssl.org/ pipermail/openssl-users/ attachments/20170315/5ea926a1/ attachment-0001.html>

------------------------------

Message: 2
Date: Wed, 15 Mar 2017 18:18:52 +0000
From: Matt Caswell <matt at openssl.org>
To: openssl-users at openssl.org
Subject: Re: [openssl-users] Request for adding new ciphers
Message-ID: <e507eba7-b0c6-d85a-78aa- 2af36c2e487e at openssl.org>
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=windows-1252



On 15/03/17 18:03, Christian Adja via openssl-users wrote:
> Hi everyone,
> 
> Someone can help for adding the ciphersuite "
> ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM " and "ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM " in
> openssl?
> I tried adding in the file tls1.h
>? ? # define TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_ 128_CCM? ? ? ? ? ? 0x0300C0AC
>? ? # define TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_ 256_CCM? ? ? ? ? ? 0x0300C0AD
> 
> And modifing the file? ssl_ciph.c the functions
>? ? ssl_load_ciphers() ...
> And modifing the file evp_cipher.c and sssl_locl.c
> and finaly ssl_algs.c.
> 
> There are no way to make it works. It continue to give me? error:
> ssl3_get_client_hello:no shared cipher:s3_srvr.c:1420


These ciphersuites already exist in OpenSSL (from version 1.1.0).

Matt



------------------------------

Message: 3
Date: Wed, 15 Mar 2017 14:18:38 -0400
From: Joseph Southwell <jsouthwell at serengeti.com>
To: openssl-users at openssl.org
Subject: [openssl-users] Generating dh parameters multithreaded?
Message-ID: <56015584-6EDC-4BD6-AA21- F27835281A99 at serengeti.com>
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8"

On any new install of our software we generate new dh parameters as follows?

DH *dh = DH_new();
!DH_generate_parameters_ex(dh, 2048, 2, NULL);
int codes = 0;
DH_check(dh, &codes);
DH_generate_key(dh);

It takes a long time. Is there some way to have it use all available cores instead of just the one?
-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
URL: <http://mta.openssl.org/ pipermail/openssl-users/ attachments/20170315/abdcfd11/ attachment-0001.html>

------------------------------

Message: 4
Date: Wed, 15 Mar 2017 18:21:05 +0000
From: "Salz, Rich" <rsalz at akamai.com>
To: "openssl-users at openssl.org" <openssl-users at openssl.org>
Subject: Re: [openssl-users] Generating dh parameters multithreaded?
Message-ID:
??? <9ff829cd17f74e4a910ca067196f7 d62 at usma1ex-dag1mb1.msg.corp. akamai.com>
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8"

> It takes a long time. Is there some way to have it use all available cores instead of just the one?

You'll have to write the code to do that parallelism yourself.

------------------------------

Message: 5
Date: Wed, 15 Mar 2017 19:46:07 +0100
From: Moritz Wirth <mw at flanga.io>
To: openssl-users at openssl.org
Subject: [openssl-users] OpenSSL Certificate Cross Signing
Message-ID: <c879dec1-9fab-5ecc-de01- 4e033c690690 at flanga.io>
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8

Good Evening all,


I have 2 Root Certificate Authorities which I want to use to cross sign
an intermediate certificate. I created a certificate request and signed
it with both CAs.

I issued an end user certificate with the intermediate CA and added both
intermediate CA Certificates (the one from Root1 and the one signed by
Root2). If only one CA is trusted, the certificate is still recognized
as trusted in Firefox regardless which certificate is on top of the
chain (Which is exactly what I want.)

I wondered if I can connect both intermediate Certificates to a single
certificate or do I always need both certificates?


Best Regards,

Moritz



------------------------------

Message: 6
Date: Wed, 15 Mar 2017 21:42:50 +0100
From: val?ry <vsbrin at gmail.com>
To: openssl-users at openssl.org
Subject: Re: [openssl-users] PKCS#7
Message-ID:
??? <CAMkdoSFR_kT= wxt5jAFMENwN3dXEhzVr=VkJmh-7=o caHj14OA at mail.gmail.com>
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8"

Alright, big thanks to both of you for your input!

On Mar 15, 2017 23:01, "Wouter Verhelst" <wouter.verhelst at fedict.be> wrote:

On 15-03-17 05:13, val?ry wrote:

> Hi,
>
> thank you very much for your response.
> Say someone would be able to gather several clear text AES keys and
> their respective asymmetrically encrypted RSA blocks. Would it weakens
> the security of the RSA key pair ? I mean could it be easier for someone
> using that information to brute force an RSA key pair ?
>

Think of it this way:

As far as the RSA algorithm is concerned, the AES keys are just data. They
happen to be AES keys, but they might have been a hash value, an image, or
somebody's date of birth.

If getting the cleartext as well as the encrypted text for an RSA message
would allow you to more easily guess the RSA key, then the RSA algorithm
would be seriously flawed.

There is no known attack against RSA for which this is true, however, as
Rich pointed out.

-- 
Wouter Verhelst

-- 
openssl-users mailing list
To unsubscribe: https://mta.openssl.org/ mailman/listinfo/openssl-users
-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
URL: <http://mta.openssl.org/ pipermail/openssl-users/ attachments/20170315/c5426a43/ attachment-0001.html>

------------------------------

Message: 7
Date: Wed, 15 Mar 2017 17:08:50 -0400
From: Joseph Southwell <jsouthwell at serengeti.com>
To: "Salz, Rich" <rsalz at akamai.com>, openssl-users at openssl.org
Subject: Re: [openssl-users] Generating dh parameters multithreaded?
Message-ID: <F3ADE150-0FAA-46B8-B481- 816C1DD1B984 at serengeti.com>
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii

Are you suggesting that I should modify openssl myself to expose that functionality or are suggesting that there is a way to do that given the already exposed functionality? If it is the latter could you point me in the right direction?

> On Mar 15, 2017, at 2:21 PM, Salz, Rich via openssl-users <openssl-users at openssl.org> wrote:
> 
>> It takes a long time. Is there some way to have it use all available cores instead of just the one?
> 
> You'll have to write the code to do that parallelism yourself.
> -- 
> openssl-users mailing list
> To unsubscribe: https://mta.openssl.org/ mailman/listinfo/openssl-users
> 



------------------------------

Message: 8
Date: Wed, 15 Mar 2017 21:15:11 +0000
From: "Salz, Rich" <rsalz at akamai.com>
To: Joseph Southwell <jsouthwell at serengeti.com>,
??? "openssl-users at openssl.org" <openssl-users at openssl.org>
Subject: Re: [openssl-users] Generating dh parameters multithreaded?
Message-ID:
??? <2a86a335027d437ba9531551ce0ea 897 at usma1ex-dag1mb1.msg.corp. akamai.com>
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="Windows-1252"

> Are you suggesting that I should modify openssl myself to expose that
> functionality or are suggesting that there is a way to do that given the already
> exposed functionality? If it is the latter could you point me in the right
> direction?

OpenSSL code does not do what you want.? You'll have to write it


------------------------------

Subject: Digest Footer

______________________________ _________________
openssl-users mailing list
openssl-users at openssl.org
https://mta.openssl.org/ mailman/listinfo/openssl-users


------------------------------

End of openssl-users Digest, Vol 28, Issue 21
****************************** ***************


   
--
openssl-users mailing list
To unsubscribe: https://mta.openssl.org/ mailman/listinfo/openssl-users





   
-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
URL: <http://mta.openssl.org/pipermail/openssl-users/attachments/20170322/f846069d/attachment-0001.html>

From levitte at openssl.org  Wed Mar 22 19:08:37 2017
From: levitte at openssl.org (Richard Levitte)
Date: Wed, 22 Mar 2017 20:08:37 +0100 (CET)
Subject: [openssl-users] openssl-users Digest, Vol 28, Issue 21
In-Reply-To: <787239451.2530096.1490206287248@mail.yahoo.com>
References: <776809560.1321367.1490204889018@mail.yahoo.com>
 <CAEW9rAggwSSVCScRs_0T0BgXWokz354Qe2A3cYP-C=MNZ2vYyQ@mail.gmail.com>
 <787239451.2530096.1490206287248@mail.yahoo.com>
Message-ID: <20170322.200837.1672873963772680746.levitte@openssl.org>

In message <787239451.2530096.1490206287248 at mail.yahoo.com> on Wed, 22 Mar 2017 18:11:27 +0000 (UTC), Christian Adja <christian_adja at yahoo.it> said:

christian_adja> Thanks for the response, but haven't the evp_pkey struct of the public
christian_adja> key. I' ve only the an bytes string that i retrieved from IEEE cert
christian_adja> with "PEM_bytes_read_bio()". Now in want to form the ec_key struct and
christian_adja> then the evp_pkey struct.

I'm not sure how IEEE certs differ from X.509 certs...  if they don't,
you're better off reading the cert with PEM_read_bio_X509() and
extracting the public key with X509_get0_pubkey() or X509_get0_pubkey().

If IEEE certs differ in format, you must first know the exact byte
content, where the public key is in there, make sure it's encoded in
DER, and use d2i_EC_PUBKEY() to make a EC_KEY from those bytes.

Cheers,
Richard

-- 
Richard Levitte         levitte at openssl.org
OpenSSL Project         http://www.openssl.org/~levitte/

From christian_adja at yahoo.it  Wed Mar 22 19:18:40 2017
From: christian_adja at yahoo.it (Christian Adja)
Date: Wed, 22 Mar 2017 19:18:40 +0000 (UTC)
Subject: [openssl-users] openssl-users Digest, Vol 28, Issue 21
In-Reply-To: <20170322.200837.1672873963772680746.levitte@openssl.org>
References: <776809560.1321367.1490204889018@mail.yahoo.com>
 <CAEW9rAggwSSVCScRs_0T0BgXWokz354Qe2A3cYP-C=MNZ2vYyQ@mail.gmail.com>
 <787239451.2530096.1490206287248@mail.yahoo.com>
 <20170322.200837.1672873963772680746.levitte@openssl.org>
Message-ID: <429596455.2772337.1490210320541@mail.yahoo.com>

Ok, thanks but the key is not in DER but COER, there are ways to transform it in DER.
Thanks
Best regards
Christian Adja
 

    Il Mercoled? 22 Marzo 2017 20:08, Richard Levitte <levitte at openssl.org> ha scritto:
 

 In message <787239451.2530096.1490206287248 at mail.yahoo.com> on Wed, 22 Mar 2017 18:11:27 +0000 (UTC), Christian Adja <christian_adja at yahoo.it> said:

christian_adja> Thanks for the response, but haven't the evp_pkey struct of the public
christian_adja> key. I' ve only the an bytes string that i retrieved from IEEE cert
christian_adja> with "PEM_bytes_read_bio()". Now in want to form the ec_key struct and
christian_adja> then the evp_pkey struct.

I'm not sure how IEEE certs differ from X.509 certs...? if they don't,
you're better off reading the cert with PEM_read_bio_X509() and
extracting the public key with X509_get0_pubkey() or X509_get0_pubkey().

If IEEE certs differ in format, you must first know the exact byte
content, where the public key is in there, make sure it's encoded in
DER, and use d2i_EC_PUBKEY() to make a EC_KEY from those bytes.

Cheers,
Richard

-- 
Richard Levitte? ? ? ? levitte at openssl.org
OpenSSL Project? ? ? ? http://www.openssl.org/~levitte/


   
-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
URL: <http://mta.openssl.org/pipermail/openssl-users/attachments/20170322/9f2078e9/attachment.html>

From yu2003w at hotmail.com  Thu Mar 23 02:43:58 2017
From: yu2003w at hotmail.com (Yu Wei)
Date: Thu, 23 Mar 2017 02:43:58 +0000
Subject: [openssl-users] Test message
Message-ID: <SG2PR03MB057097518CAE469A1E4DD512B53F0@SG2PR03MB0570.apcprd03.prod.outlook.com>



Thanks,

Jared, (???
Software developer
Interested in open source software, big data, Linux
-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
URL: <http://mta.openssl.org/pipermail/openssl-users/attachments/20170323/c84de393/attachment.html>

From yu2003w at hotmail.com  Wed Mar 22 17:20:42 2017
From: yu2003w at hotmail.com (Yu Wei)
Date: Wed, 22 Mar 2017 17:20:42 +0000
Subject: [openssl-users] One question about RSA decrypt with private key
Message-ID: <HK2PR03MB0561404E17701E953E0A1D41B53C0@HK2PR03MB0561.apcprd03.prod.outlook.com>

Hi guys,


I generated RSA private key and public key as below,

openssl genpkey -algorithm RSA -out key.pem -pkeyopt rsa_keygen_bits:2048

openssl rsa -pubout -in pri.key -out pub.key


And encrypted text file as below,

openssl pkeyutl -encrypt -pubin -inkey ~/pub.key -in ~/1.txt -out ~/1e.txt


Then I wrote below program to decrypt the encryted file. However, it seemed that decrypt didn't work as  expected.


#include <openssl/evp.h>
#include <openssl/rsa.h>
#include <openssl/pem.h>
#include <openssl/err.h>
#include <openssl/conf.h>
#include <iostream>

using namespace std;

void
cleanup()
{
    EVP_cleanup();
    CRYPTO_cleanup_all_ex_data();
    ERR_free_strings();
}

int
main(int argc, char** argv)
{
    ERR_load_crypto_strings();
    OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms();
    OPENSSL_config(nullptr);

    cout<<"Initialize crypto library done"<<endl;

    EVP_PKEY * key = EVP_PKEY_new();
    if (key == nullptr) {
        cout<<"Failed to contruct new key"<<endl;
        return 1;
    }
    FILE * fpri = nullptr;
    fpri = fopen("/home/stack/pri.key", "r");
    if (fpri == nullptr) {
        cout<<"Failed to load private key"<<endl;
        return 1;
    }
    key = PEM_read_PrivateKey(fpri, &key, nullptr, nullptr);
    if (key == nullptr) {
        std::cout<<"Read private key failed"<<endl;
        return 1;
    }
cout<<"load private key successfully"<<endl;
    EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx = nullptr;
    ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(key, nullptr);
    EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init(ctx);
    EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(ctx, RSA_NO_PADDING);

    size_t outlen = 0, inlen = 0;
    unsigned char * out = nullptr, * in = nullptr;

    char buf[1024];
    FILE * fe = nullptr;
    fe = fopen("/home/stack/1e.txt", "r");
    size_t len = fread(buf, 1, sizeof(buf),  fe);
    cout<<"data input length is "<<len<<endl;
    EVP_PKEY_decrypt(ctx, NULL, &outlen, in, inlen);
    cout<<"outlen is "<<outlen<<endl;

    out = (unsigned char*)OPENSSL_malloc(outlen);
    EVP_PKEY_decrypt(ctx, out, &outlen, in, inlen);
    cout<<"decrypted data "<<out<<endl;
    cleanup();

    return 0;

}


When executing the code, the result is as below,

[stack at agent ~]$ ./test
Initialize crypto library done
load private key successfully
data input length is 256
outlen is 256
decrypted data


Is there anything missed?


Thanks,

Jared, (???
Software developer
Interested in open source software, big data, Linux
-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
URL: <http://mta.openssl.org/pipermail/openssl-users/attachments/20170322/0c9191e9/attachment-0001.html>

From kane.huang at ericsson.com  Thu Mar 23 03:47:06 2017
From: kane.huang at ericsson.com (Kane Huang)
Date: Thu, 23 Mar 2017 03:47:06 +0000
Subject: [openssl-users] openssl-users Digest, Vol 28, Issue 21
In-Reply-To: <429596455.2772337.1490210320541@mail.yahoo.com>
References: <776809560.1321367.1490204889018@mail.yahoo.com>
 <CAEW9rAggwSSVCScRs_0T0BgXWokz354Qe2A3cYP-C=MNZ2vYyQ@mail.gmail.com>
 <787239451.2530096.1490206287248@mail.yahoo.com>
 <20170322.200837.1672873963772680746.levitte@openssl.org>
 <429596455.2772337.1490210320541@mail.yahoo.com>
Message-ID: <DB3PR07MB0603F2BB129CC34AD0E88F26F33F0@DB3PR07MB0603.eurprd07.prod.outlook.com>

Hi guys,
I want to use "multiblock" introduced from 1.0.2 to improve performance of ipsec packet process, which use aes_cbc_hmac_sha as main algorithm.
I have try openssl speed test with  ?-mb? and I observe that the test code use big  buffer size from 8192 to 131072, that show dramatic performance improvement
My questions are:

1)       Can i get so much improvement  when use multiblock on single stream with small data ,like date with size 512 or 1024 bytes.

2)       How to use the multiblock APIs? From speed.c , I saw some APIs call like  EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl() with type EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_AAD and EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_ENCRYPT, is there any document regarding these?

Many thanks in advance for any advice here!


Thanks,
kane
Software developer, Ericsson
-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
URL: <http://mta.openssl.org/pipermail/openssl-users/attachments/20170323/34e4f397/attachment.html>

From yu2003w at hotmail.com  Thu Mar 23 05:29:30 2017
From: yu2003w at hotmail.com (Yu Wei)
Date: Thu, 23 Mar 2017 05:29:30 +0000
Subject: [openssl-users] One question about RSA decrypt with private key
In-Reply-To: <HK2PR03MB0561404E17701E953E0A1D41B53C0@HK2PR03MB0561.apcprd03.prod.outlook.com>
References: <HK2PR03MB0561404E17701E953E0A1D41B53C0@HK2PR03MB0561.apcprd03.prod.outlook.com>
Message-ID: <SG2PR03MB05700824519F4BD42EAC2C28B53F0@SG2PR03MB0570.apcprd03.prod.outlook.com>

After commented out the line "EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(ctx, RSA_NO_PADDING)",  it worked well.


However, I still quite understand the usage of "RSA_NO_PADDING".


Who could kindly explain this?


Thanks,

Jared, (???
Software developer
Interested in open source software, big data, Linux

________________________________
From: openssl-users <openssl-users-bounces at openssl.org> on behalf of Yu Wei <yu2003w at hotmail.com>
Sent: Thursday, March 23, 2017 1:20:42 AM
To: openssl-users at openssl.org
Subject: [openssl-users] One question about RSA decrypt with private key


Hi guys,


I generated RSA private key and public key as below,

openssl genpkey -algorithm RSA -out key.pem -pkeyopt rsa_keygen_bits:2048

openssl rsa -pubout -in pri.key -out pub.key


And encrypted text file as below,

openssl pkeyutl -encrypt -pubin -inkey ~/pub.key -in ~/1.txt -out ~/1e.txt


Then I wrote below program to decrypt the encryted file. However, it seemed that decrypt didn't work as  expected.


#include <openssl/evp.h>
#include <openssl/rsa.h>
#include <openssl/pem.h>
#include <openssl/err.h>
#include <openssl/conf.h>
#include <iostream>

using namespace std;

void
cleanup()
{
    EVP_cleanup();
    CRYPTO_cleanup_all_ex_data();
    ERR_free_strings();
}

int
main(int argc, char** argv)
{
    ERR_load_crypto_strings();
    OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms();
    OPENSSL_config(nullptr);

    cout<<"Initialize crypto library done"<<endl;

    EVP_PKEY * key = EVP_PKEY_new();
    if (key == nullptr) {
        cout<<"Failed to contruct new key"<<endl;
        return 1;
    }
    FILE * fpri = nullptr;
    fpri = fopen("/home/stack/pri.key", "r");
    if (fpri == nullptr) {
        cout<<"Failed to load private key"<<endl;
        return 1;
    }
    key = PEM_read_PrivateKey(fpri, &key, nullptr, nullptr);
    if (key == nullptr) {
        std::cout<<"Read private key failed"<<endl;
        return 1;
    }
cout<<"load private key successfully"<<endl;
    EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx = nullptr;
    ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(key, nullptr);
    EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init(ctx);
    EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(ctx, RSA_NO_PADDING);

    size_t outlen = 0, inlen = 0;
    unsigned char * out = nullptr, * in = nullptr;

    char buf[1024];
    FILE * fe = nullptr;
    fe = fopen("/home/stack/1e.txt", "r");
    size_t len = fread(buf, 1, sizeof(buf),  fe);
    cout<<"data input length is "<<len<<endl;
    EVP_PKEY_decrypt(ctx, NULL, &outlen, in, inlen);
    cout<<"outlen is "<<outlen<<endl;

    out = (unsigned char*)OPENSSL_malloc(outlen);
    EVP_PKEY_decrypt(ctx, out, &outlen, in, inlen);
    cout<<"decrypted data "<<out<<endl;
    cleanup();

    return 0;

}


When executing the code, the result is as below,

[stack at agent ~]$ ./test
Initialize crypto library done
load private key successfully
data input length is 256
outlen is 256
decrypted data


Is there anything missed?


Thanks,

Jared, (???
Software developer
Interested in open source software, big data, Linux
-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
URL: <http://mta.openssl.org/pipermail/openssl-users/attachments/20170323/5ebe74cb/attachment-0001.html>

From matt at openssl.org  Thu Mar 23 09:40:58 2017
From: matt at openssl.org (Matt Caswell)
Date: Thu, 23 Mar 2017 09:40:58 +0000
Subject: [openssl-users] unsigned char * public key to evp_pkey o ec_key
In-Reply-To: <808829684.2632458.1490205551640@mail.yahoo.com>
References: <mailman.1204.1490204900.2180.openssl-users@openssl.org>
 <808829684.2632458.1490205551640@mail.yahoo.com>
Message-ID: <95f0188b-5fe0-8c5f-1df1-8dac267670f0@openssl.org>



On 22/03/17 17:59, Christian Adja via openssl-users wrote:
> Good evening everybody,I need help about to transform public key
> (unsigned char *) retrieved from IEEE cert in EVP_PKEY o EC_KEY. The
> public key is an ecdsaNistP256 in compressed form (compressedy1).
> The public key form in hex =
> |00|80|83|x point (32 bytes)|

You could use BN_bin2bn() to load the x value into a BIGNUM:

https://www.openssl.org/docs/man1.1.0/crypto/BN_bin2bn.html

Then you could use EC_POINT_set_compressed_coordinates_GFp() to create
the EC_POINT for that public key:

https://www.openssl.org/docs/man1.1.0/crypto/EC_POINT_set_compressed_coordinates_GFp.html

Finally you can create an EC_KEY from the EC_POINT using
EC_KEY_set_public_key():

https://www.openssl.org/docs/man1.1.0/crypto/EC_KEY_set_public_key.html

Matt



> Thanks,
> Best Regards
> 
> 
> Il Mercoled? 22 Marzo 2017 18:48, "openssl-users-request at openssl.org"
> <openssl-users-request at openssl.org> ha scritto:
> 
> 
> Send openssl-users mailing list submissions to
>     openssl-users at openssl.org <mailto:openssl-users at openssl.org>
> 
> To subscribe or unsubscribe via the World Wide Web, visit
>     https://mta.openssl.org/mailman/listinfo/openssl-users
> or, via email, send a message with subject or body 'help' to
>     openssl-users-request at openssl.org
> <mailto:openssl-users-request at openssl.org>
> 
> You can reach the person managing the list at
>     openssl-users-owner at openssl.org <mailto:openssl-users-owner at openssl.org>
> 
> When replying, please edit your Subject line so it is more specific
> than "Re: Contents of openssl-users digest..."
> 
> 
> Today's Topics:
> 
>   1. Re: openssl-users Digest, Vol 28, Issue 21 (Christian Adja)
> 
> 
> ----------------------------------------------------------------------
> 
> Message: 1
> Date: Wed, 22 Mar 2017 17:48:08 +0000 (UTC)
> From: Christian Adja <christian_adja at yahoo.it
> <mailto:christian_adja at yahoo.it>>
> To: "openssl-users at openssl.org <mailto:openssl-users at openssl.org>"
> <openssl-users at openssl.org <mailto:openssl-users at openssl.org>>
> Subject: Re: [openssl-users] openssl-users Digest, Vol 28, Issue 21
> Message-ID: <776809560.1321367.1490204889018 at mail.yahoo.com
> <mailto:776809560.1321367.1490204889018 at mail.yahoo.com>>
> Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8"
> 
> Good evening everybody,I need help about to transform public key
> (unsigned char *) retrieved from IEEE cert in EVP_PKEY o EC_KEY. The
> public key is an ecdsaNistP256 in compressed form (compressedy1).
> The public key form in hex =
> |00|80|83|x point (32 bytes)|
> Thanks,
> Best Regards
> 
> 
>     Il Mercoled? 15 Marzo 2017 22:23, "openssl-users-request at openssl.org
> <mailto:openssl-users-request at openssl.org>"
> <openssl-users-request at openssl.org
> <mailto:openssl-users-request at openssl.org>> ha scritto:
> 
> 
> Send openssl-users mailing list submissions to
> ??? openssl-users at openssl.org <mailto:openssl-users at openssl.org>
> 
> To subscribe or unsubscribe via the World Wide Web, visit
> ??? https://mta.openssl.org/mailman/listinfo/openssl-users
> or, via email, send a message with subject or body 'help' to
> ??? openssl-users-request at openssl.org
> <mailto:openssl-users-request at openssl.org>
> 
> You can reach the person managing the list at
> ??? openssl-users-owner at openssl.org <mailto:openssl-users-owner at openssl.org>
> 
> When replying, please edit your Subject line so it is more specific
> than "Re: Contents of openssl-users digest..."
> 
> 
> Today's Topics:
> 
> ? 1. Request for adding new ciphers (Christian Adja)
> ? 2. Re: Request for adding new ciphers (Matt Caswell)
> ? 3. Generating dh parameters multithreaded? (Joseph Southwell)
> ? 4. Re: Generating dh parameters multithreaded? (Salz, Rich)
> ? 5. OpenSSL Certificate Cross Signing (Moritz Wirth)
> ? 6. Re: PKCS#7 (val?ry)
> ? 7. Re: Generating dh parameters multithreaded? (Joseph Southwell)
> ? 8. Re: Generating dh parameters multithreaded? (Salz, Rich)
> 
> 
> ----------------------------------------------------------------------
> 
> Message: 1
> Date: Wed, 15 Mar 2017 18:03:44 +0000 (UTC)
> From: Christian Adja <christian_adja at yahoo.it
> <mailto:christian_adja at yahoo.it>>
> To: "openssl-users at openssl.org <mailto:openssl-users at openssl.org>"
> <openssl-users at openssl.org <mailto:openssl-users at openssl.org>>
> Subject: [openssl-users] Request for adding new ciphers
> Message-ID: <1576557894.1332584.1489601024241 at mail.yahoo.com
> <mailto:1576557894.1332584.1489601024241 at mail.yahoo.com>>
> Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8"
> 
> Hi everyone,
> Someone can help for adding the ciphersuite "
> ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM " and "ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM " in
> openssl?
> I tried adding in the file tls1.h??? # define
> TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM??????????? 0x0300C0AC
> ??? # define TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM??????????? 0x0300C0AD
> And modifing the file? ssl_ciph.c the functions??? ssl_load_ciphers()
> ... And modifing the file evp_cipher.c and sssl_locl.cand finaly ssl_algs.c.
> There are no way to make it works. It continue to give me? error:
> ssl3_get_client_hello:no shared cipher:s3_srvr.c:1420
> thanks.
> 
> 
> -------------- next part --------------
> An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
> URL:
> <http://mta.openssl.org/pipermail/openssl-users/attachments/20170315/5ea926a1/attachment-0001.html>
> 
> ------------------------------
> 
> Message: 2
> Date: Wed, 15 Mar 2017 18:18:52 +0000
> From: Matt Caswell <matt at openssl.org <mailto:matt at openssl.org>>
> To: openssl-users at openssl.org <mailto:openssl-users at openssl.org>
> Subject: Re: [openssl-users] Request for adding new ciphers
> Message-ID: <e507eba7-b0c6-d85a-78aa-2af36c2e487e at openssl.org
> <mailto:e507eba7-b0c6-d85a-78aa-2af36c2e487e at openssl.org>>
> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=windows-1252
> 
> 
> 
> On 15/03/17 18:03, Christian Adja via openssl-users wrote:
>> Hi everyone,
>>
>> Someone can help for adding the ciphersuite "
>> ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM " and "ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM " in
>> openssl?
>> I tried adding in the file tls1.h
>>? ? # define TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM? ? ? ? ? ? 0x0300C0AC
>>? ? # define TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM? ? ? ? ? ? 0x0300C0AD
>>
>> And modifing the file? ssl_ciph.c the functions
>>? ? ssl_load_ciphers() ...
>> And modifing the file evp_cipher.c and sssl_locl.c
>> and finaly ssl_algs.c.
>>
>> There are no way to make it works. It continue to give me? error:
>> ssl3_get_client_hello:no shared cipher:s3_srvr.c:1420
> 
> 
> These ciphersuites already exist in OpenSSL (from version 1.1.0).
> 
> Matt
> 
> 
> 
> ------------------------------
> 
> Message: 3
> Date: Wed, 15 Mar 2017 14:18:38 -0400
> From: Joseph Southwell <jsouthwell at serengeti.com
> <mailto:jsouthwell at serengeti.com>>
> To: openssl-users at openssl.org <mailto:openssl-users at openssl.org>
> Subject: [openssl-users] Generating dh parameters multithreaded?
> Message-ID: <56015584-6EDC-4BD6-AA21-F27835281A99 at serengeti.com
> <mailto:56015584-6EDC-4BD6-AA21-F27835281A99 at serengeti.com>>
> Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8"
> 
> On any new install of our software we generate new dh parameters as follows?
> 
> DH *dh = DH_new();
> !DH_generate_parameters_ex(dh, 2048, 2, NULL);
> int codes = 0;
> DH_check(dh, &codes);
> DH_generate_key(dh);
> 
> It takes a long time. Is there some way to have it use all available
> cores instead of just the one?
> -------------- next part --------------
> An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
> URL:
> <http://mta.openssl.org/pipermail/openssl-users/attachments/20170315/abdcfd11/attachment-0001.html>
> 
> ------------------------------
> 
> Message: 4
> Date: Wed, 15 Mar 2017 18:21:05 +0000
> From: "Salz, Rich" <rsalz at akamai.com <mailto:rsalz at akamai.com>>
> To: "openssl-users at openssl.org <mailto:openssl-users at openssl.org>"
> <openssl-users at openssl.org <mailto:openssl-users at openssl.org>>
> Subject: Re: [openssl-users] Generating dh parameters multithreaded?
> Message-ID:
> ???
> <9ff829cd17f74e4a910ca067196f7d62 at usma1ex-dag1mb1.msg.corp.akamai.com
> <mailto:9ff829cd17f74e4a910ca067196f7d62 at usma1ex-dag1mb1.msg.corp.akamai.com>>
> Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8"
> 
>> It takes a long time. Is there some way to have it use all available
> cores instead of just the one?
> 
> You'll have to write the code to do that parallelism yourself.
> 
> ------------------------------
> 
> Message: 5
> Date: Wed, 15 Mar 2017 19:46:07 +0100
> From: Moritz Wirth <mw at flanga.io <mailto:mw at flanga.io>>
> To: openssl-users at openssl.org <mailto:openssl-users at openssl.org>
> Subject: [openssl-users] OpenSSL Certificate Cross Signing
> Message-ID: <c879dec1-9fab-5ecc-de01-4e033c690690 at flanga.io
> <mailto:c879dec1-9fab-5ecc-de01-4e033c690690 at flanga.io>>
> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8
> 
> Good Evening all,
> 
> 
> I have 2 Root Certificate Authorities which I want to use to cross sign
> an intermediate certificate. I created a certificate request and signed
> it with both CAs.
> 
> I issued an end user certificate with the intermediate CA and added both
> intermediate CA Certificates (the one from Root1 and the one signed by
> Root2). If only one CA is trusted, the certificate is still recognized
> as trusted in Firefox regardless which certificate is on top of the
> chain (Which is exactly what I want.)
> 
> I wondered if I can connect both intermediate Certificates to a single
> certificate or do I always need both certificates?
> 
> 
> Best Regards,
> 
> Moritz
> 
> 
> 
> ------------------------------
> 
> Message: 6
> Date: Wed, 15 Mar 2017 21:42:50 +0100
> From: val?ry <vsbrin at gmail.com <mailto:vsbrin at gmail.com>>
> To: openssl-users at openssl.org <mailto:openssl-users at openssl.org>
> Subject: Re: [openssl-users] PKCS#7
> Message-ID:
> ??? <CAMkdoSFR_kT=wxt5jAFMENwN3dXEhzVr=VkJmh-7=ocaHj14OA at mail.gmail.com
> <mailto:ocaHj14OA at mail.gmail.com>>
> Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8"
> 
> Alright, big thanks to both of you for your input!
> 
> On Mar 15, 2017 23:01, "Wouter Verhelst" <wouter.verhelst at fedict.be
> <mailto:wouter.verhelst at fedict.be>> wrote:
> 
> On 15-03-17 05:13, val?ry wrote:
> 
>> Hi,
>>
>> thank you very much for your response.
>> Say someone would be able to gather several clear text AES keys and
>> their respective asymmetrically encrypted RSA blocks. Would it weakens
>> the security of the RSA key pair ? I mean could it be easier for someone
>> using that information to brute force an RSA key pair ?
>>
> 
> Think of it this way:
> 
> As far as the RSA algorithm is concerned, the AES keys are just data. They
> happen to be AES keys, but they might have been a hash value, an image, or
> somebody's date of birth.
> 
> If getting the cleartext as well as the encrypted text for an RSA message
> would allow you to more easily guess the RSA key, then the RSA algorithm
> would be seriously flawed.
> 
> There is no known attack against RSA for which this is true, however, as
> Rich pointed out.
> 
> -- 
> Wouter Verhelst
> 
> -- 
> openssl-users mailing list
> To unsubscribe: https://mta.openssl.org/mailman/listinfo/openssl-users
> -------------- next part --------------
> An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
> URL:
> <http://mta.openssl.org/pipermail/openssl-users/attachments/20170315/c5426a43/attachment-0001.html>
> 
> ------------------------------
> 
> Message: 7
> Date: Wed, 15 Mar 2017 17:08:50 -0400
> From: Joseph Southwell <jsouthwell at serengeti.com
> <mailto:jsouthwell at serengeti.com>>
> To: "Salz, Rich" <rsalz at akamai.com <mailto:rsalz at akamai.com>>,
> openssl-users at openssl.org <mailto:openssl-users at openssl.org>
> Subject: Re: [openssl-users] Generating dh parameters multithreaded?
> Message-ID: <F3ADE150-0FAA-46B8-B481-816C1DD1B984 at serengeti.com
> <mailto:F3ADE150-0FAA-46B8-B481-816C1DD1B984 at serengeti.com>>
> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii
> 
> Are you suggesting that I should modify openssl myself to expose that
> functionality or are suggesting that there is a way to do that given the
> already exposed functionality? If it is the latter could you point me in
> the right direction?
> 
>> On Mar 15, 2017, at 2:21 PM, Salz, Rich via openssl-users
> <openssl-users at openssl.org <mailto:openssl-users at openssl.org>> wrote:
>>
>>> It takes a long time. Is there some way to have it use all available
> cores instead of just the one?
>>
>> You'll have to write the code to do that parallelism yourself.
>> --
>> openssl-users mailing list
>> To unsubscribe: https://mta.openssl.org/mailman/listinfo/openssl-users
>>
> 
> 
> 
> ------------------------------
> 
> Message: 8
> Date: Wed, 15 Mar 2017 21:15:11 +0000
> From: "Salz, Rich" <rsalz at akamai.com <mailto:rsalz at akamai.com>>
> To: Joseph Southwell <jsouthwell at serengeti.com
> <mailto:jsouthwell at serengeti.com>>,
> ??? "openssl-users at openssl.org <mailto:openssl-users at openssl.org>"
> <openssl-users at openssl.org <mailto:openssl-users at openssl.org>>
> Subject: Re: [openssl-users] Generating dh parameters multithreaded?
> Message-ID:
> ???
> <2a86a335027d437ba9531551ce0ea897 at usma1ex-dag1mb1.msg.corp.akamai.com
> <mailto:2a86a335027d437ba9531551ce0ea897 at usma1ex-dag1mb1.msg.corp.akamai.com>>
> Content-Type: text/plain; charset="Windows-1252"
> 
>> Are you suggesting that I should modify openssl myself to expose that
>> functionality or are suggesting that there is a way to do that given
> the already
>> exposed functionality? If it is the latter could you point me in the right
>> direction?
> 
> OpenSSL code does not do what you want.? You'll have to write it
> 
> 
> ------------------------------
> 
> Subject: Digest Footer
> 
> _______________________________________________
> openssl-users mailing list
> openssl-users at openssl.org <mailto:openssl-users at openssl.org>
> https://mta.openssl.org/mailman/listinfo/openssl-users
> 
> 
> ------------------------------
> 
> End of openssl-users Digest, Vol 28, Issue 21
> *********************************************
> 
> 
>  
> -------------- next part --------------
> An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
> URL:
> <http://mta.openssl.org/pipermail/openssl-users/attachments/20170322/4a392c45/attachment.html>
> 
> ------------------------------
> 
> Subject: Digest Footer
> 
> _______________________________________________
> openssl-users mailing list
> openssl-users at openssl.org <mailto:openssl-users at openssl.org>
> https://mta.openssl.org/mailman/listinfo/openssl-users
> 
> 
> ------------------------------
> 
> End of openssl-users Digest, Vol 28, Issue 25
> *********************************************
> 
> 
> 
> 

From matt at openssl.org  Thu Mar 23 10:05:43 2017
From: matt at openssl.org (Matt Caswell)
Date: Thu, 23 Mar 2017 10:05:43 +0000
Subject: [openssl-users] One question about RSA decrypt with private key
In-Reply-To: <SG2PR03MB05700824519F4BD42EAC2C28B53F0@SG2PR03MB0570.apcprd03.prod.outlook.com>
References: <HK2PR03MB0561404E17701E953E0A1D41B53C0@HK2PR03MB0561.apcprd03.prod.outlook.com>
 <SG2PR03MB05700824519F4BD42EAC2C28B53F0@SG2PR03MB0570.apcprd03.prod.outlook.com>
Message-ID: <be82d0e4-cfbe-cf68-243f-cd872b5bc537@openssl.org>



On 23/03/17 05:29, Yu Wei wrote:
> After commented out the line "EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(ctx,
> RSA_NO_PADDING)",  it worked well.
> 
> 
> However, I still quite understand the usage of "RSA_NO_PADDING".
> 
> 
> Who could kindly explain this?
> 

RSA_NO_PADDING gives you "raw" RSA encryption. From the manual:

    RSA_NO_PADDING
    Raw RSA encryption. This mode should only be used to implement
    cryptographically sound padding modes in the application code.
    Encrypting user data directly with RSA is insecure.

https://www.openssl.org/docs/man1.1.0/crypto/RSA_public_encrypt.html

Basically, unless you are implementing a new RSA padding mode, or really
know what you are doing, don't use it.

Matt


> Thanks,
> 
> Jared, (???
> Software developer
> Interested in open source software, big data, Linux
> 
> ------------------------------------------------------------------------
> *From:* openssl-users <openssl-users-bounces at openssl.org> on behalf of
> Yu Wei <yu2003w at hotmail.com>
> *Sent:* Thursday, March 23, 2017 1:20:42 AM
> *To:* openssl-users at openssl.org
> *Subject:* [openssl-users] One question about RSA decrypt with private key
>  
> 
> Hi guys,
> 
> 
> I generated RSA private key and public key as below,
> 
> openssl genpkey -algorithm RSA -out key.pem -pkeyopt rsa_keygen_bits:2048
> 
> openssl rsa -pubout -in pri.key -out pub.key
> 
> 
> And encrypted text file as below,
> 
> openssl pkeyutl -encrypt -pubin -inkey ~/pub.key -in ~/1.txt -out ~/1e.txt
> 
> 
> Then I wrote below program to decrypt the encryted file. However, it
> seemed that decrypt didn't work as  expected.
> 
> 
> #include <openssl/evp.h>
> #include <openssl/rsa.h>
> #include <openssl/pem.h>
> #include <openssl/err.h>
> #include <openssl/conf.h>
> #include <iostream>
> 
> using namespace std;
> 
> void
> cleanup()
> {
>     EVP_cleanup();
>     CRYPTO_cleanup_all_ex_data();
>     ERR_free_strings();
> }
> 
> int
> main(int argc, char** argv)
> {
>     ERR_load_crypto_strings();
>     OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms();
>     OPENSSL_config(nullptr);
> 
>     cout<<"Initialize crypto library done"<<endl;
> 
>     EVP_PKEY * key = EVP_PKEY_new();
>     if (key == nullptr) {
>         cout<<"Failed to contruct new key"<<endl;
>         return 1;
>     }
>     FILE * fpri = nullptr;
>     fpri = fopen("/home/stack/pri.key", "r");
>     if (fpri == nullptr) {
>         cout<<"Failed to load private key"<<endl;
>         return 1;
>     }
>     key = PEM_read_PrivateKey(fpri, &key, nullptr, nullptr);
>     if (key == nullptr) {
>         std::cout<<"Read private key failed"<<endl;
>         return 1;
>     }
> cout<<"load private key successfully"<<endl;
>     EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx = nullptr;
>     ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(key, nullptr);
>     EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init(ctx);
>     EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(ctx, RSA_NO_PADDING);
> 
>     size_t outlen = 0, inlen = 0;
>     unsigned char * out = nullptr, * in = nullptr;
> 
>     char buf[1024];
>     FILE * fe = nullptr;
>     fe = fopen("/home/stack/1e.txt", "r");
>     size_t len = fread(buf, 1, sizeof(buf),  fe);
>     cout<<"data input length is "<<len<<endl;
>     EVP_PKEY_decrypt(ctx, NULL, &outlen, in, inlen);
>     cout<<"outlen is "<<outlen<<endl;
> 
>     out = (unsigned char*)OPENSSL_malloc(outlen);
>     EVP_PKEY_decrypt(ctx, out, &outlen, in, inlen);
>     cout<<"decrypted data "<<out<<endl;
>     cleanup();
> 
>     return 0;
> 
> }
> 
> 
> When executing the code, the result is as below,
> 
> [stack at agent ~]$ ./test
> Initialize crypto library done
> load private key successfully
> data input length is 256
> outlen is 256
> decrypted data
> 
> 
> Is there anything missed?
> 
> 
> Thanks,
> 
> Jared, (???
> Software developer
> Interested in open source software, big data, Linux
> 
> 
> 

From matt at openssl.org  Thu Mar 23 10:32:29 2017
From: matt at openssl.org (Matt Caswell)
Date: Thu, 23 Mar 2017 10:32:29 +0000
Subject: [openssl-users] openssl-users Digest, Vol 28, Issue 21
In-Reply-To: <DB3PR07MB0603F2BB129CC34AD0E88F26F33F0@DB3PR07MB0603.eurprd07.prod.outlook.com>
References: <776809560.1321367.1490204889018@mail.yahoo.com>
 <CAEW9rAggwSSVCScRs_0T0BgXWokz354Qe2A3cYP-C=MNZ2vYyQ@mail.gmail.com>
 <787239451.2530096.1490206287248@mail.yahoo.com>
 <20170322.200837.1672873963772680746.levitte@openssl.org>
 <429596455.2772337.1490210320541@mail.yahoo.com>
 <DB3PR07MB0603F2BB129CC34AD0E88F26F33F0@DB3PR07MB0603.eurprd07.prod.outlook.com>
Message-ID: <7d1ef3fc-8d21-377a-d79e-efbfe29441da@openssl.org>



On 23/03/17 03:47, Kane Huang wrote:
> Hi guys,
> 
> I want to use "multiblock" introduced from 1.0.2 to improve performance
> of ipsec packet process, which use aes_cbc_hmac_sha as main algorithm.
> 
> I have try openssl speed test with  ?-mb? and I observe that the test
> code use big  buffer size from 8192 to 131072, that show dramatic
> performance improvement  
> 
> My questions are:
> 
> 1)       Can i get so much improvement  when use multiblock on single
> stream with small data ,like date with size 512 or 1024 bytes.

Multiblock works by sending multiple TLS records to be encrypted in one
go - either 4 or 8 records depending on how much data you send in one
go. Basically it looks at the amount of data you passed to SSL_write()
and sees how many records it needs to divide it up into (with a record
being max_send_fragment bytes long; by default max_send_fragment is 16k
although you can change that value). If there are at least 4 records
worth of data then multiblock will be used (assuming the negotiated
ciphersuite supports it).

A stream of small records like you describe would not satisfy the above
criteria, so multi-block would not kick in.


> 
> 2)       How to use the multiblock APIs? From speed.c , I saw some APIs
> call like  EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl() with type
> EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_AAD and EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_ENCRYPT,
> is there any document regarding these?

Unfortunately not, no. However it depends on what you are trying to
achieve. If you just want to use the built-in ciphersuites that support
this then you need to:
1) Make sure you are on a platform that supports it (IIRC AESNI support
is required for these to work - Andy Polyakov can probably clarify)
2) Ensure TLS negotiates a multiblock capable ciphersuite
3) Ensure your application sends sufficient data in one go for
multi-block to kick in

If you satisfy all of the above then no API is required. It should just
work.

If, on the other hand, you want to implement a new cipher that supports
multiblock then you will probably want to do it as an engine and use the
implementations of e_aes_cbc_hmac_sha1.c and e_aes_cbc_hmac_sha256.c as
a guide. Ciphers that implement multiblock need to be TLS "aware", in
that they must output the appropriate record headers too. If you're
going down this route then I'd like to point out the similar facility
that we have in OpenSSL 1.1.0 known as pipelining:

https://www.openssl.org/docs/man1.1.0/ssl/SSL_set_max_pipelines.html

This gives you a bit more control over how the data is split up into
records and the ciphers do not need to be TLS aware. Also both
encryption and decryption is supported. However there are no built-in
ciphersuites that use this as yet.

Matt

From rsalz at akamai.com  Thu Mar 23 10:58:48 2017
From: rsalz at akamai.com (Salz, Rich)
Date: Thu, 23 Mar 2017 10:58:48 +0000
Subject: [openssl-users] One question about RSA decrypt with private key
In-Reply-To: <SG2PR03MB05700824519F4BD42EAC2C28B53F0@SG2PR03MB0570.apcprd03.prod.outlook.com>
References: <HK2PR03MB0561404E17701E953E0A1D41B53C0@HK2PR03MB0561.apcprd03.prod.outlook.com>
 <SG2PR03MB05700824519F4BD42EAC2C28B53F0@SG2PR03MB0570.apcprd03.prod.outlook.com>
Message-ID: <7cb2facc176c48219c2736a5708a8ae2@usma1ex-dag1mb1.msg.corp.akamai.com>

> After commented out the line "EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(ctx, RSA_NO_PADDING)",? it worked well.

You need to do some reading about basic RSA cryptography.  Signatures are padded out to the keysize.

From yu2003w at hotmail.com  Thu Mar 23 10:12:46 2017
From: yu2003w at hotmail.com (Yu Wei)
Date: Thu, 23 Mar 2017 10:12:46 +0000
Subject: [openssl-users] One question about RSA decrypt with private key
In-Reply-To: <be82d0e4-cfbe-cf68-243f-cd872b5bc537@openssl.org>
References: <HK2PR03MB0561404E17701E953E0A1D41B53C0@HK2PR03MB0561.apcprd03.prod.outlook.com>
 <SG2PR03MB05700824519F4BD42EAC2C28B53F0@SG2PR03MB0570.apcprd03.prod.outlook.com>,
 <be82d0e4-cfbe-cf68-243f-cd872b5bc537@openssl.org>
Message-ID: <SG2PR03MB0570E480512E238F91624C03B53F0@SG2PR03MB0570.apcprd03.prod.outlook.com>

Hi Matt,


I checked openssl source code. It seems that PKCS#1 is default padding mode.

For encrypting user data such as user's password, could I use PKCS#1 or OAEP padding mode?



Thanks,

Jared, (???
Software developer
Interested in open source software, big data, Linux

________________________________
From: openssl-users <openssl-users-bounces at openssl.org> on behalf of Matt Caswell <matt at openssl.org>
Sent: Thursday, March 23, 2017 6:05:43 PM
To: openssl-users at openssl.org
Subject: Re: [openssl-users] One question about RSA decrypt with private key



On 23/03/17 05:29, Yu Wei wrote:
> After commented out the line "EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(ctx,
> RSA_NO_PADDING)",  it worked well.
>
>
> However, I still quite understand the usage of "RSA_NO_PADDING".
>
>
> Who could kindly explain this?
>

RSA_NO_PADDING gives you "raw" RSA encryption. From the manual:

    RSA_NO_PADDING
    Raw RSA encryption. This mode should only be used to implement
    cryptographically sound padding modes in the application code.
    Encrypting user data directly with RSA is insecure.

https://www.openssl.org/docs/man1.1.0/crypto/RSA_public_encrypt.html

Basically, unless you are implementing a new RSA padding mode, or really
know what you are doing, don't use it.

Matt


> Thanks,
>
> Jared, (???
> Software developer
> Interested in open source software, big data, Linux
>
> ------------------------------------------------------------------------
> *From:* openssl-users <openssl-users-bounces at openssl.org> on behalf of
> Yu Wei <yu2003w at hotmail.com>
> *Sent:* Thursday, March 23, 2017 1:20:42 AM
> *To:* openssl-users at openssl.org
> *Subject:* [openssl-users] One question about RSA decrypt with private key
>
>
> Hi guys,
>
>
> I generated RSA private key and public key as below,
>
> openssl genpkey -algorithm RSA -out key.pem -pkeyopt rsa_keygen_bits:2048
>
> openssl rsa -pubout -in pri.key -out pub.key
>
>
> And encrypted text file as below,
>
> openssl pkeyutl -encrypt -pubin -inkey ~/pub.key -in ~/1.txt -out ~/1e.txt
>
>
> Then I wrote below program to decrypt the encryted file. However, it
> seemed that decrypt didn't work as  expected.
>
>
> #include <openssl/evp.h>
> #include <openssl/rsa.h>
> #include <openssl/pem.h>
> #include <openssl/err.h>
> #include <openssl/conf.h>
> #include <iostream>
>
> using namespace std;
>
> void
> cleanup()
> {
>     EVP_cleanup();
>     CRYPTO_cleanup_all_ex_data();
>     ERR_free_strings();
> }
>
> int
> main(int argc, char** argv)
> {
>     ERR_load_crypto_strings();
>     OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms();
>     OPENSSL_config(nullptr);
>
>     cout<<"Initialize crypto library done"<<endl;
>
>     EVP_PKEY * key = EVP_PKEY_new();
>     if (key == nullptr) {
>         cout<<"Failed to contruct new key"<<endl;
>         return 1;
>     }
>     FILE * fpri = nullptr;
>     fpri = fopen("/home/stack/pri.key", "r");
>     if (fpri == nullptr) {
>         cout<<"Failed to load private key"<<endl;
>         return 1;
>     }
>     key = PEM_read_PrivateKey(fpri, &key, nullptr, nullptr);
>     if (key == nullptr) {
>         std::cout<<"Read private key failed"<<endl;
>         return 1;
>     }
> cout<<"load private key successfully"<<endl;
>     EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx = nullptr;
>     ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(key, nullptr);
>     EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init(ctx);
>     EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(ctx, RSA_NO_PADDING);
>
>     size_t outlen = 0, inlen = 0;
>     unsigned char * out = nullptr, * in = nullptr;
>
>     char buf[1024];
>     FILE * fe = nullptr;
>     fe = fopen("/home/stack/1e.txt", "r");
>     size_t len = fread(buf, 1, sizeof(buf),  fe);
>     cout<<"data input length is "<<len<<endl;
>     EVP_PKEY_decrypt(ctx, NULL, &outlen, in, inlen);
>     cout<<"outlen is "<<outlen<<endl;
>
>     out = (unsigned char*)OPENSSL_malloc(outlen);
>     EVP_PKEY_decrypt(ctx, out, &outlen, in, inlen);
>     cout<<"decrypted data "<<out<<endl;
>     cleanup();
>
>     return 0;
>
> }
>
>
> When executing the code, the result is as below,
>
> [stack at agent ~]$ ./test
> Initialize crypto library done
> load private key successfully
> data input length is 256
> outlen is 256
> decrypted data
>
>
> Is there anything missed?
>
>
> Thanks,
>
> Jared, (???
> Software developer
> Interested in open source software, big data, Linux
>
>
>
--
openssl-users mailing list
To unsubscribe: https://mta.openssl.org/mailman/listinfo/openssl-users
-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
URL: <http://mta.openssl.org/pipermail/openssl-users/attachments/20170323/ddee1d03/attachment-0001.html>

From svineet at kodiakptt.com  Thu Mar 23 11:51:19 2017
From: svineet at kodiakptt.com (svineet)
Date: Thu, 23 Mar 2017 04:51:19 -0700 (MST)
Subject: [openssl-users] regarding memory cleanup at end of each DTLS
	session
In-Reply-To: <BN6PR10MB179510E3AA0B5556869E697BB03D0@BN6PR10MB1795.namprd10.prod.outlook.com>
References: <BN6PR10MB179510E3AA0B5556869E697BB03D0@BN6PR10MB1795.namprd10.prod.outlook.com>
Message-ID: <1490269879459-70176.post@n7.nabble.com>

I did try dumping the memory state after freeing the ssl session at the end
of each call using  
CRYPTO_mem_leaks_fp(stderr); 

Keep getting on the console alternately 
74372 bytes leaked in 32 chunks
[18:27:48]  2830 file=pqueue.c, line=95, thread=139766236079872, number=16,
address=7F1D6CA32060
[18:27:48]  3013 file=asn1_lib.c, line=425, thread=139766236079872,
number=24, address=7F1D6CA505B0
[18:27:22]   406 file=bn_lib.c, line=317, thread=139766236079872,
number=256, address=7F1D6CA3CC10
[18:27:48]  2829 file=pqueue.c, line=95, thread=139766236079872, number=16,
address=7F1D6CA31FD0
[18:27:48]  3028 file=buffer.c, line=121, thread=139766236079872,
number=140, address=7F1D6CA51520
[18:27:48]  3008 file=a_object.c, line=335, thread=139766236079872,
number=3, address=7F1D6CA504C0
[18:27:48]  2828 file=pqueue.c, line=95, thread=139766236079872, number=16,
address=7F1D6CA31F40
[18:27:48]  3023 file=asn1_lib.c, line=386, thread=139766236079872,
number=13, address=7F1D6CA51490
<and other errors>

And 
112191 bytes leaked in 221 chunks
[18:27:22]  1009 file=lhash.c, line=193, thread=139766236079872, number=24,
address=7F1D6CA311E0
[18:27:22]    36 file=lhash.c, line=193, thread=139766236079872, number=24,
address=7F1D6CA329B0
[18:27:22]   404 file=bn_lib.c, line=317, thread=139766236079872,
number=264, address=7F1D6CA3B480
[18:27:22]   400 file=bn_mont.c, line=325, thread=139766236079872,
number=104, address=7F1D6CA3BC80
[18:27:22]   401 file=bn_lib.c, line=317, thread=139766236079872,
number=128, address=7F1D6CA3AE20
[18:27:22]  1012 file=s3_both.c, line=708, thread=139766236079872,
number=17744, address=7F1D6CA42580
[18:27:22]  1008 file=err.c, line=1019, thread=139766236079872, number=600,
address=7F1D6CA21C00
[18:27:22]   329 file=bn_lib.c, line=317, thread=139766236079872,
number=256, address=7F1D6CA39FF0
[18:27:22]   363 file=bn_lib.c, line=317, thread=139766236079872,
number=256, address=7F1D6CA3B160

Is this data conclusive to arrive at a position ??



--
View this message in context: http://openssl.6102.n7.nabble.com/regarding-memory-cleanup-at-end-of-each-DTLS-session-tp70145p70176.html
Sent from the OpenSSL - User mailing list archive at Nabble.com.

From rsalz at akamai.com  Thu Mar 23 11:59:42 2017
From: rsalz at akamai.com (Salz, Rich)
Date: Thu, 23 Mar 2017 11:59:42 +0000
Subject: [openssl-users] One question about RSA decrypt with private key
In-Reply-To: <SG2PR03MB0570E480512E238F91624C03B53F0@SG2PR03MB0570.apcprd03.prod.outlook.com>
References: <HK2PR03MB0561404E17701E953E0A1D41B53C0@HK2PR03MB0561.apcprd03.prod.outlook.com>
 <SG2PR03MB05700824519F4BD42EAC2C28B53F0@SG2PR03MB0570.apcprd03.prod.outlook.com>,
 <be82d0e4-cfbe-cf68-243f-cd872b5bc537@openssl.org>
 <SG2PR03MB0570E480512E238F91624C03B53F0@SG2PR03MB0570.apcprd03.prod.outlook.com>
Message-ID: <61b51881dc5648779958479b8913de68@usma1ex-dag1mb1.msg.corp.akamai.com>

> For encrypting user data such as user's password, could I use PKCS#1 or OAEP padding mode?

If you do not know what you are doing, use the defaults.



From yu2003w at hotmail.com  Thu Mar 23 03:22:59 2017
From: yu2003w at hotmail.com (Yu Wei)
Date: Thu, 23 Mar 2017 03:22:59 +0000
Subject: [openssl-users] decrypt data with rsa privated key failed
Message-ID: <SG2PR03MB057052356370A32D526F4EC8B53F0@SG2PR03MB0570.apcprd03.prod.outlook.com>

Hi guys,


I generated RSA private key and public key as below,

openssl genpkey -algorithm RSA -out key.pem -pkeyopt rsa_keygen_bits:2048

openssl rsa -pubout -in pri.key -out pub.key


And encrypted text file as below,

openssl pkeyutl -encrypt -pubin -inkey ~/pub.key -in ~/1.txt -out ~/1e.txt


Then I wrote below program to decrypt the encryted file. However, it didn't work as  expected.


#include <openssl/evp.h>
#include <openssl/rsa.h>
#include <openssl/pem.h>
#include <openssl/err.h>
#include <openssl/conf.h>
#include <iostream>

using namespace std;

void
cleanup()
{
    EVP_cleanup();
    CRYPTO_cleanup_all_ex_data();
    ERR_free_strings();
}

int
main(int argc, char** argv)
{
    ERR_load_crypto_strings();
    OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms();
    OPENSSL_config(nullptr);

    cout<<"Initialize crypto library done"<<endl;

    EVP_PKEY * key = EVP_PKEY_new();
    if (key == nullptr) {
        cout<<"Failed to contruct new key"<<endl;
        return 1;
    }
    FILE * fpri = nullptr;
    fpri = fopen("/home/stack/pri.key", "r");
    if (fpri == nullptr) {
        cout<<"Failed to load private key"<<endl;
        return 1;
    }
    key = PEM_read_PrivateKey(fpri, &key, nullptr, nullptr);
    if (key == nullptr) {
        std::cout<<"Read private key failed"<<endl;
        return 1;
    }
    cout<<"load private key successfully"<<endl;
    EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx = nullptr;
    ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(key, nullptr);
    EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init(ctx);
    EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(ctx, RSA_NO_PADDING);

    size_t outlen = 0, inlen = 0;
    unsigned char * out = nullptr, * in = nullptr;

    char buf[1024];
    FILE * fe = nullptr;
    fe = fopen("/home/stack/1e.txt", "r");
    size_t len = fread(buf, 1, sizeof(buf),  fe);
    cout<<"data input length is "<<len<<endl;
    EVP_PKEY_decrypt(ctx, NULL, &outlen, in, inlen);
    cout<<"outlen is "<<outlen<<endl;

    out = (unsigned char*)OPENSSL_malloc(outlen);
    EVP_PKEY_decrypt(ctx, out, &outlen, in, inlen);
    cout<<"decrypted data "<<out<<endl;
    cleanup();

    return 0;

}


When executing the code, the result is as below,

[stack at agent ~]$ ./test
Initialize crypto library done
load private key successfully
data input length is 256
outlen is 256
decrypted data


Any advice?



Thanks,

Jared, (???
Software developer
Interested in open source software, big data, Linux
-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
URL: <http://mta.openssl.org/pipermail/openssl-users/attachments/20170323/2570a751/attachment.html>

From yu2003w at hotmail.com  Wed Mar 22 17:33:22 2017
From: yu2003w at hotmail.com (Yu Wei)
Date: Wed, 22 Mar 2017 17:33:22 +0000
Subject: [openssl-users] decrypt with RSA private key failed
Message-ID: <HK2PR03MB05614159DDFEB5ED62E6B804B53C0@HK2PR03MB0561.apcprd03.prod.outlook.com>

Hi guys,


I generated RSA private key and public key as below,

openssl genpkey -algorithm RSA -out key.pem -pkeyopt rsa_keygen_bits:2048

openssl rsa -pubout -in pri.key -out pub.key


And encrypted text file as below,

openssl pkeyutl -encrypt -pubin -inkey ~/pub.key -in ~/1.txt -out ~/1e.txt


Then I wrote below program to decrypt the encryted file. However, it seemed that decrypt didn't work as  expected.


#include <openssl/evp.h>
#include <openssl/rsa.h>
#include <openssl/pem.h>
#include <openssl/err.h>
#include <openssl/conf.h>
#include <iostream>

using namespace std;

void
cleanup()
{
    EVP_cleanup();
    CRYPTO_cleanup_all_ex_data();
    ERR_free_strings();
}

int
main(int argc, char** argv)
{
    ERR_load_crypto_strings();
    OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms();
    OPENSSL_config(nullptr);

    cout<<"Initialize crypto library done"<<endl;

    EVP_PKEY * key = EVP_PKEY_new();
    if (key == nullptr) {
        cout<<"Failed to contruct new key"<<endl;
        return 1;
    }
    FILE * fpri = nullptr;
    fpri = fopen("/home/stack/pri.key", "r");
    if (fpri == nullptr) {
        cout<<"Failed to load private key"<<endl;
        return 1;
    }
    key = PEM_read_PrivateKey(fpri, &key, nullptr, nullptr);
    if (key == nullptr) {
        std::cout<<"Read private key failed"<<endl;
        return 1;
    }
cout<<"load private key successfully"<<endl;
    EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx = nullptr;
    ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(key, nullptr);
    EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init(ctx);
    EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(ctx, RSA_NO_PADDING);

    size_t outlen = 0, inlen = 0;
    unsigned char * out = nullptr, * in = nullptr;

    char buf[1024];
    FILE * fe = nullptr;
    fe = fopen("/home/stack/1e.txt", "r");
    size_t len = fread(buf, 1, sizeof(buf),  fe);
    cout<<"data input length is "<<len<<endl;
    EVP_PKEY_decrypt(ctx, NULL, &outlen, in, inlen);
    cout<<"outlen is "<<outlen<<endl;

    out = (unsigned char*)OPENSSL_malloc(outlen);
    EVP_PKEY_decrypt(ctx, out, &outlen, in, inlen);
    cout<<"decrypted data "<<out<<endl;
    cleanup();

    return 0;

}


When executing the code, the result is as below,

[stack at agent ~]$ ./test
Initialize crypto library done
load private key successfully
data input length is 256
outlen is 256
decrypted data


Is there anything missed?



Thanks,

Jared, (???
Software developer
Interested in open source software, big data, Linux
-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
URL: <http://mta.openssl.org/pipermail/openssl-users/attachments/20170322/b69b7e1e/attachment-0001.html>

From reachme at kajasweb.com  Fri Mar 24 13:40:41 2017
From: reachme at kajasweb.com (R Kaja Mohideen)
Date: Fri, 24 Mar 2017 19:10:41 +0530
Subject: [openssl-users] OpenSSL sending close_notify right after responding
	to a heartbeat request
Message-ID: <CAMSoAtDCh7AZTBJeOtVa=Gdk3YZ2yTStdwem56eN_d=eNVgaCQ@mail.gmail.com>

Hi,

We have a TLS Server (Written in C) and Client (Written in Java using
Netty + OpenSSL).

I see that when Server sends a TLS extension Heartbeat request to
client - OpenSSL responds to it and sends a close_notify alert right
after it - causing the server to close the session with client.

I don't have any callback registered in client (HB request recipient
side - Java/Netty doesn't really have that support) and so I'm sure
that it is OpenSSL by itself is responding to that heartbeat request.
But, who or what is making OpenSSL to send an alert & close the
session upon responding to heartbeat remains a mystery.

Any help / suggestions to investigate this issue is highly appreciated.

Thanks & regards,
R Kaja Mohideen

From steve at openssl.org  Fri Mar 24 17:46:28 2017
From: steve at openssl.org (Dr. Stephen Henson)
Date: Fri, 24 Mar 2017 17:46:28 +0000
Subject: [openssl-users] how to implement functions for STACK OF custom
 type?
In-Reply-To: <ON5JNR$B02EEBE404DCBF50AF8E30BB1C768924@rustichelli.net>
References: <ON5JNR$B02EEBE404DCBF50AF8E30BB1C768924@rustichelli.net>
Message-ID: <20170324174628.GA16753@openssl.org>

On Tue, Mar 21, 2017, lists wrote:

> Sorry, I first posted this on the -dev list, likely inappropriate... now with an update:
> 
> I am exploring my options with OpenSSL and specifically I am trying to manage the stacks for some custom objects.
> Currently, I have this code (sort of) in the headers:
> 
> typedef struct myThingA_st
> {
> ???? ASN1_OBJECT aID;
> ???? ASN1_OCTET_STRING aOCST;
> }
> ???? myThingA;
> 
> DECLARE_ASN1_ITEM(myThingA)
> DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(myThingA)
> DECLARE_STACK_OF(myThingA)
> // the next one seems to be ininfluent for my purpose, is it?
> DECLARE_ASN1_SET_OF(myThingA)
> 
> typedef struct myThingB_st
> {
> ???? // SEQUENCE OF { ... }
> ???? STACK_OF(myThingA) myThingA_sk;
> }
> ???? myThingB;
> 
> // DECLARE_ASN1_ITEM(myThingB)
> DECLARE_STACK_OF(myThingB)
> // DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(myThingB)
> // the next one seems to be ininfluent for my purpose, is it?
> DECLARE_ASN1_SET_OF(myThingB)
> 
> Then, in the .c file...
> 
> IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(myThingA)
> IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(myThingB)
> 
> I thought that the basic functions for the stacks to be available (such as sk_myThingA_new, sk_myThingA_push...), yet by compiling a main, for 
> the first one that I try to use I get:
> 
> ?????? undefined reference to `sk_myThingA_value'
> 
> What am I doing wrong here?

If you're using OpenSSL 1.1.0 you need to include:

DEFINE_STACK_OF(FOO)

in a header file and that should be it. That implements a set of inline
functions that do the right thing.

For OpenSSL versions before 1.1.0 it's a bit messier. The type specific
STACK_OF functions are actually macros which are generated by the mkstack.pl
script and appear in the safestack.h header file. If you want to create your
own one way is to extract a type specific section from safestack.h, copy it
to your own header file and do a search/replace for the new type.

So for example extract the sk_OPENSSL_BLOCK macros and replace OPENSSL_BLOCK
with FOO.

Steve.
--
Dr Stephen N. Henson. OpenSSL project core developer.
Commercial tech support now available see: http://www.openssl.org

From leikong at msn.com  Fri Mar 24 21:51:07 2017
From: leikong at msn.com (Lei Kong)
Date: Fri, 24 Mar 2017 21:51:07 +0000
Subject: [openssl-users] TLSv1_2_method
Message-ID: <BN1PR01MB021823477985DD1AFB7D042A83E0@BN1PR01MB021.prod.exchangelabs.com>

Can processes running with TLSv1_2_method talk to processes running with something older, e.g. TLSv1_1_method? Along the same lines, will new TLS versions be backward compatible with TLSv1_2_method ?

I would like to make my code proof, is there something like TLS_latest_method()?

I have a cluster of nodes that talk to each other with TLS, currently the version is hardcoded to TLSv1_2_method. Suppose TLSv1_2 is deprecated by TLS_new one day, I update my service to use TLS_new node by node, during this time, some old nodes are running with TLSv1_2, some new nodes are running with new TLS_new, will the communication between old and new nodes work?

Thanks.

-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
URL: <http://mta.openssl.org/pipermail/openssl-users/attachments/20170324/1f4d53f0/attachment.html>

From openssl-users at dukhovni.org  Sat Mar 25 07:19:55 2017
From: openssl-users at dukhovni.org (Viktor Dukhovni)
Date: Sat, 25 Mar 2017 03:19:55 -0400
Subject: [openssl-users] TLSv1_2_method
In-Reply-To: <BN1PR01MB021823477985DD1AFB7D042A83E0@BN1PR01MB021.prod.exchangelabs.com>
References: <BN1PR01MB021823477985DD1AFB7D042A83E0@BN1PR01MB021.prod.exchangelabs.com>
Message-ID: <5D881D46-87A5-4053-B166-F1EE4AA52619@dukhovni.org>


> On Mar 24, 2017, at 5:51 PM, Lei Kong <leikong at msn.com> wrote:
> 
> TLS_latest_method

https://www.openssl.org/docs/man1.1.0/ssl/SSL_CTX_new.html

   ...

   TLS_method(), TLS_server_method(), TLS_client_method()

   These are the general-purpose version-flexible SSL/TLS methods.
   The actual protocol version used will be negotiated to the
   highest version mutually supported by the client and the server.
   The supported protocols are SSLv3, TLSv1, TLSv1.1 and TLSv1.2.
   Applications should use these methods, and avoid the version-specific
   methods described below.

With OpenSSL 1.0.2 these are called SSLv23_method(), ...

   https://www.openssl.org/docs/man1.0.2/ssl/SSL_CTX_new.html

-- 
	Viktor.


From ghanashyam.satpathy at gmail.com  Sat Mar 25 14:05:06 2017
From: ghanashyam.satpathy at gmail.com (ghanashyam satpathy)
Date: Sat, 25 Mar 2017 19:35:06 +0530
Subject: [openssl-users] TLS leak for openssl 1.1.0b with libcurl 7.50.3
Message-ID: <CAKn+8OKWHspSvk=sxZfz3PSOZK5qXkWQTy3z+3PimCiFrOnXkw@mail.gmail.com>

I use libcurl 7.50.3 as statically linked in my application dll , along
with openssl 1.1.0b also statically linked. The dll is dynamically loaded
using LoadLibrary() and unloaded using FreeLibrary() inside application
exe. I observed a TLS index is not getting freed which was allocated inside
openssl. To narrow down the issue I have following exported function, which
I call from my application exe. After FreeLibrary() I see the TLS leak
through APplication verifier.

extern "C" __declspec(dllexport)
void CurlSetup()
{

curl_global_init(CURL_GLOBAL_DEFAULT);
 curl_global_cleanup();
return;

}

An early reply in this context is appreciated.

Thanks
-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
URL: <http://mta.openssl.org/pipermail/openssl-users/attachments/20170325/12c0ccde/attachment.html>

From rsalz at akamai.com  Sat Mar 25 14:13:47 2017
From: rsalz at akamai.com (Salz, Rich)
Date: Sat, 25 Mar 2017 14:13:47 +0000
Subject: [openssl-users] TLS leak for openssl 1.1.0b with libcurl 7.50.3
In-Reply-To: <CAKn+8OKWHspSvk=sxZfz3PSOZK5qXkWQTy3z+3PimCiFrOnXkw@mail.gmail.com>
References: <CAKn+8OKWHspSvk=sxZfz3PSOZK5qXkWQTy3z+3PimCiFrOnXkw@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <6d87957f6c654825a6a6c6f0d3d4a20a@usma1ex-dag1mb1.msg.corp.akamai.com>

Those are curl functions, not openssl

--
Senior Architect, Akamai Technologies
Member, OpenSSL Dev Team
IM: richsalz at jabber.at Twitter: RichSalz

From: ghanashyam satpathy [mailto:ghanashyam.satpathy at gmail.com]
Sent: Saturday, March 25, 2017 10:05 AM
To: openssl-users at openssl.org
Subject: [openssl-users] TLS leak for openssl 1.1.0b with libcurl 7.50.3

I use libcurl 7.50.3 as statically linked in my application dll , along
with openssl 1.1.0b also statically linked. The dll is dynamically loaded
using LoadLibrary() and unloaded using FreeLibrary() inside application
exe. I observed a TLS index is not getting freed which was allocated inside
openssl. To narrow down the issue I have following exported function, which
I call from my application exe. After FreeLibrary() I see the TLS leak
through APplication verifier.

extern "C" __declspec(dllexport)
void CurlSetup()
{

curl_global_init(CURL_GLOBAL_DEFAULT);
 curl_global_cleanup();
return;

}

An early reply in this context is appreciated.

Thanks
-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
URL: <http://mta.openssl.org/pipermail/openssl-users/attachments/20170325/1a5b8980/attachment-0001.html>

From ghanashyam.satpathy at gmail.com  Sat Mar 25 15:29:10 2017
From: ghanashyam.satpathy at gmail.com (ghanashyam satpathy)
Date: Sat, 25 Mar 2017 20:59:10 +0530
Subject: [openssl-users] openssl-users Digest, Vol 28, Issue 33
In-Reply-To: <mailman.1382.1490452973.2180.openssl-users@openssl.org>
References: <mailman.1382.1490452973.2180.openssl-users@openssl.org>
Message-ID: <CAKn+8OL-er0c+qj-DzhDBu2j5oPQCyD06xo1s0x1Ga15FveJHg@mail.gmail.com>

However this type of TLS leak was not there when my application was using
OpenSSL 1.0.2
Noticed after using OpenSSL 1.1.0b

On Sat, Mar 25, 2017 at 8:12 PM, <openssl-users-request at openssl.org> wrote:

> Send openssl-users mailing list submissions to
>         openssl-users at openssl.org
>
> To subscribe or unsubscribe via the World Wide Web, visit
>         https://mta.openssl.org/mailman/listinfo/openssl-users
> or, via email, send a message with subject or body 'help' to
>         openssl-users-request at openssl.org
>
> You can reach the person managing the list at
>         openssl-users-owner at openssl.org
>
> When replying, please edit your Subject line so it is more specific
> than "Re: Contents of openssl-users digest..."
>
>
> Today's Topics:
>
>    1. OpenSSL sending close_notify right after responding       to a
>       heartbeat request (R Kaja Mohideen)
>    2. Re: how to implement functions for STACK OF custom type?
>       (Dr. Stephen Henson)
>    3. TLSv1_2_method (Lei Kong)
>    4. Re: TLSv1_2_method (Viktor Dukhovni)
>    5. TLS leak for openssl 1.1.0b with libcurl 7.50.3
>       (ghanashyam satpathy)
>    6. Re: TLS leak for openssl 1.1.0b with libcurl 7.50.3 (Salz, Rich)
>
>
> ----------------------------------------------------------------------
>
> Message: 1
> Date: Fri, 24 Mar 2017 19:10:41 +0530
> From: R Kaja Mohideen <reachme at kajasweb.com>
> To: openssl-users at openssl.org
> Subject: [openssl-users] OpenSSL sending close_notify right after
>         responding      to a heartbeat request
> Message-ID:
>         <CAMSoAtDCh7AZTBJeOtVa=Gdk3YZ2yTStdwem56eN_d=eNVgaCQ@
> mail.gmail.com>
> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
>
> Hi,
>
> We have a TLS Server (Written in C) and Client (Written in Java using
> Netty + OpenSSL).
>
> I see that when Server sends a TLS extension Heartbeat request to
> client - OpenSSL responds to it and sends a close_notify alert right
> after it - causing the server to close the session with client.
>
> I don't have any callback registered in client (HB request recipient
> side - Java/Netty doesn't really have that support) and so I'm sure
> that it is OpenSSL by itself is responding to that heartbeat request.
> But, who or what is making OpenSSL to send an alert & close the
> session upon responding to heartbeat remains a mystery.
>
> Any help / suggestions to investigate this issue is highly appreciated.
>
> Thanks & regards,
> R Kaja Mohideen
>
>
> ------------------------------
>
> Message: 2
> Date: Fri, 24 Mar 2017 17:46:28 +0000
> From: "Dr. Stephen Henson" <steve at openssl.org>
> To: openssl-users at openssl.org
> Subject: Re: [openssl-users] how to implement functions for STACK OF
>         custom type?
> Message-ID: <20170324174628.GA16753 at openssl.org>
> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=iso-8859-1
>
> On Tue, Mar 21, 2017, lists wrote:
>
> > Sorry, I first posted this on the -dev list, likely inappropriate... now
> with an update:
> >
> > I am exploring my options with OpenSSL and specifically I am trying to
> manage the stacks for some custom objects.
> > Currently, I have this code (sort of) in the headers:
> >
> > typedef struct myThingA_st
> > {
> > ???? ASN1_OBJECT aID;
> > ???? ASN1_OCTET_STRING aOCST;
> > }
> > ???? myThingA;
> >
> > DECLARE_ASN1_ITEM(myThingA)
> > DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(myThingA)
> > DECLARE_STACK_OF(myThingA)
> > // the next one seems to be ininfluent for my purpose, is it?
> > DECLARE_ASN1_SET_OF(myThingA)
> >
> > typedef struct myThingB_st
> > {
> > ???? // SEQUENCE OF { ... }
> > ???? STACK_OF(myThingA) myThingA_sk;
> > }
> > ???? myThingB;
> >
> > // DECLARE_ASN1_ITEM(myThingB)
> > DECLARE_STACK_OF(myThingB)
> > // DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(myThingB)
> > // the next one seems to be ininfluent for my purpose, is it?
> > DECLARE_ASN1_SET_OF(myThingB)
> >
> > Then, in the .c file...
> >
> > IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(myThingA)
> > IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(myThingB)
> >
> > I thought that the basic functions for the stacks to be available (such
> as sk_myThingA_new, sk_myThingA_push...), yet by compiling a main, for
> > the first one that I try to use I get:
> >
> > ?????? undefined reference to `sk_myThingA_value'
> >
> > What am I doing wrong here?
>
> If you're using OpenSSL 1.1.0 you need to include:
>
> DEFINE_STACK_OF(FOO)
>
> in a header file and that should be it. That implements a set of inline
> functions that do the right thing.
>
> For OpenSSL versions before 1.1.0 it's a bit messier. The type specific
> STACK_OF functions are actually macros which are generated by the
> mkstack.pl
> script and appear in the safestack.h header file. If you want to create
> your
> own one way is to extract a type specific section from safestack.h, copy it
> to your own header file and do a search/replace for the new type.
>
> So for example extract the sk_OPENSSL_BLOCK macros and replace
> OPENSSL_BLOCK
> with FOO.
>
> Steve.
> --
> Dr Stephen N. Henson. OpenSSL project core developer.
> Commercial tech support now available see: http://www.openssl.org
>
>
> ------------------------------
>
> Message: 3
> Date: Fri, 24 Mar 2017 21:51:07 +0000
> From: Lei Kong <leikong at msn.com>
> To: "openssl-users at openssl.org" <openssl-users at openssl.org>
> Subject: [openssl-users] TLSv1_2_method
> Message-ID:
>         <BN1PR01MB021823477985DD1AFB7D042A83E0 at BN1PR01MB021.prod.
> exchangelabs.com>
>
> Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"
>
> Can processes running with TLSv1_2_method talk to processes running with
> something older, e.g. TLSv1_1_method? Along the same lines, will new TLS
> versions be backward compatible with TLSv1_2_method ?
>
> I would like to make my code proof, is there something like
> TLS_latest_method()?
>
> I have a cluster of nodes that talk to each other with TLS, currently the
> version is hardcoded to TLSv1_2_method. Suppose TLSv1_2 is deprecated by
> TLS_new one day, I update my service to use TLS_new node by node, during
> this time, some old nodes are running with TLSv1_2, some new nodes are
> running with new TLS_new, will the communication between old and new nodes
> work?
>
> Thanks.
>
> -------------- next part --------------
> An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
> URL: <http://mta.openssl.org/pipermail/openssl-users/
> attachments/20170324/1f4d53f0/attachment-0001.html>
>
> ------------------------------
>
> Message: 4
> Date: Sat, 25 Mar 2017 03:19:55 -0400
> From: Viktor Dukhovni <openssl-users at dukhovni.org>
> To: openssl-users at openssl.org
> Subject: Re: [openssl-users] TLSv1_2_method
> Message-ID: <5D881D46-87A5-4053-B166-F1EE4AA52619 at dukhovni.org>
> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii
>
>
> > On Mar 24, 2017, at 5:51 PM, Lei Kong <leikong at msn.com> wrote:
> >
> > TLS_latest_method
>
> https://www.openssl.org/docs/man1.1.0/ssl/SSL_CTX_new.html
>
>    ...
>
>    TLS_method(), TLS_server_method(), TLS_client_method()
>
>    These are the general-purpose version-flexible SSL/TLS methods.
>    The actual protocol version used will be negotiated to the
>    highest version mutually supported by the client and the server.
>    The supported protocols are SSLv3, TLSv1, TLSv1.1 and TLSv1.2.
>    Applications should use these methods, and avoid the version-specific
>    methods described below.
>
> With OpenSSL 1.0.2 these are called SSLv23_method(), ...
>
>    https://www.openssl.org/docs/man1.0.2/ssl/SSL_CTX_new.html
>
> --
>         Viktor.
>
>
>
> ------------------------------
>
> Message: 5
> Date: Sat, 25 Mar 2017 19:35:06 +0530
> From: ghanashyam satpathy <ghanashyam.satpathy at gmail.com>
> To: openssl-users at openssl.org
> Subject: [openssl-users] TLS leak for openssl 1.1.0b with libcurl
>         7.50.3
> Message-ID:
>         <CAKn+8OKWHspSvk=sxZfz3PSOZK5qXkWQTy3z+3PimCiFrOnXkw at mail.
> gmail.com>
> Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8"
>
> I use libcurl 7.50.3 as statically linked in my application dll , along
> with openssl 1.1.0b also statically linked. The dll is dynamically loaded
> using LoadLibrary() and unloaded using FreeLibrary() inside application
> exe. I observed a TLS index is not getting freed which was allocated inside
> openssl. To narrow down the issue I have following exported function, which
> I call from my application exe. After FreeLibrary() I see the TLS leak
> through APplication verifier.
>
> extern "C" __declspec(dllexport)
> void CurlSetup()
> {
>
> curl_global_init(CURL_GLOBAL_DEFAULT);
>  curl_global_cleanup();
> return;
>
> }
>
> An early reply in this context is appreciated.
>
> Thanks
> -------------- next part --------------
> An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
> URL: <http://mta.openssl.org/pipermail/openssl-users/
> attachments/20170325/12c0ccde/attachment-0001.html>
>
> ------------------------------
>
> Message: 6
> Date: Sat, 25 Mar 2017 14:13:47 +0000
> From: "Salz, Rich" <rsalz at akamai.com>
> To: "openssl-users at openssl.org" <openssl-users at openssl.org>
> Subject: Re: [openssl-users] TLS leak for openssl 1.1.0b with libcurl
>         7.50.3
> Message-ID:
>         <6d87957f6c654825a6a6c6f0d3d4a20a at usma1ex-dag1mb1.msg.corp.
> akamai.com>
> Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8"
>
> Those are curl functions, not openssl
>
> --
> Senior Architect, Akamai Technologies
> Member, OpenSSL Dev Team
> IM: richsalz at jabber.at Twitter: RichSalz
>
> From: ghanashyam satpathy [mailto:ghanashyam.satpathy at gmail.com]
> Sent: Saturday, March 25, 2017 10:05 AM
> To: openssl-users at openssl.org
> Subject: [openssl-users] TLS leak for openssl 1.1.0b with libcurl 7.50.3
>
> I use libcurl 7.50.3 as statically linked in my application dll , along
> with openssl 1.1.0b also statically linked. The dll is dynamically loaded
> using LoadLibrary() and unloaded using FreeLibrary() inside application
> exe. I observed a TLS index is not getting freed which was allocated inside
> openssl. To narrow down the issue I have following exported function, which
> I call from my application exe. After FreeLibrary() I see the TLS leak
> through APplication verifier.
>
> extern "C" __declspec(dllexport)
> void CurlSetup()
> {
>
> curl_global_init(CURL_GLOBAL_DEFAULT);
>  curl_global_cleanup();
> return;
>
> }
>
> An early reply in this context is appreciated.
>
> Thanks
> -------------- next part --------------
> An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
> URL: <http://mta.openssl.org/pipermail/openssl-users/
> attachments/20170325/1a5b8980/attachment.html>
>
> ------------------------------
>
> Subject: Digest Footer
>
> _______________________________________________
> openssl-users mailing list
> openssl-users at openssl.org
> https://mta.openssl.org/mailman/listinfo/openssl-users
>
>
> ------------------------------
>
> End of openssl-users Digest, Vol 28, Issue 33
> *********************************************
>
-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
URL: <http://mta.openssl.org/pipermail/openssl-users/attachments/20170325/8698795f/attachment.html>

From ghanashyam.satpathy at gmail.com  Sat Mar 25 16:37:15 2017
From: ghanashyam.satpathy at gmail.com (ghanashyam satpathy)
Date: Sat, 25 Mar 2017 22:07:15 +0530
Subject: [openssl-users] openssl-users Digest, Vol 28, Issue 33
In-Reply-To: <CAKn+8OL-er0c+qj-DzhDBu2j5oPQCyD06xo1s0x1Ga15FveJHg@mail.gmail.com>
References: <mailman.1382.1490452973.2180.openssl-users@openssl.org>
 <CAKn+8OL-er0c+qj-DzhDBu2j5oPQCyD06xo1s0x1Ga15FveJHg@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <CAKn+8OLELKVjQGAZmSS-sEZzhQg7OQ1++gCjHfeBk0wjMypHqQ@mail.gmail.com>

It seems any TLS being allocated from the call stack of ERR_get_state() is
not getting freed. I used an OPENSSL sample  demos\bio\server-cmod.c and it
reproduces the issue.
Any tips to resolve this issue is appreciated.

> testConsoleApplication.exe!CRYPTO_THREAD_init_local(unsigned long * key,
void (void *) * cleanup) Line 93 C
  testConsoleApplication.exe!err_do_init() Line 637 C
  testConsoleApplication.exe!err_do_init_ossl_() Line 634 C
  testConsoleApplication.exe!CRYPTO_THREAD_run_once(long * once, void
(void) * init) Line 82 C
  testConsoleApplication.exe!ERR_get_state() Line 643 C
  testConsoleApplication.exe!ERR_put_error(int lib, int func, int reason,
const char * file, int line) Line 358 C
  testConsoleApplication.exe!BIO_new_file(const char * filename, const char
* mode) Line 75 C
  testConsoleApplication.exe!def_load(conf_st * conf, const char * name,
long * line) Line 140 C
  testConsoleApplication.exe!NCONF_load(conf_st * conf, const char * file,
long * eline) Line 217 C
  testConsoleApplication.exe!CONF_modules_load_file(const char * filename,
const char * appname, unsigned long flags) Line 129 C
  testConsoleApplication.exe!main(int argc, char * * argv) Line 120 C++
  [External Code]

//demos\bio\server-cmod.c

#include <stdio.h> #include <signal.h> #include <openssl/err.h> #include
<openssl/ssl.h> #include <openssl/conf.h> int main(int argc, char *argv[])
{ unsigned char buf[512]; char *port = "*:4433"; BIO *in = NULL; BIO
*ssl_bio, *tmp; SSL_CTX *ctx; int ret = 1, i; ctx =
SSL_CTX_new(TLS_server_method()); if (CONF_modules_load_file("cmod.cnf",
"testapp", 0) <= 0) { fprintf(stderr, "Error processing config file\n");
goto err; } if (SSL_CTX_config(ctx, "server") == 0) { fprintf(stderr,
"Error configuring server.\n"); goto err; } /* Setup server side SSL bio */
ssl_bio = BIO_new_ssl(ctx, 0); if ((in = BIO_new_accept(port)) == NULL)
goto err; /* * This means that when a new connection is accepted on 'in',
The ssl_bio * will be 'duplicated' and have the new socket BIO push into
it. * Basically it means the SSL BIO will be automatically setup */
BIO_set_accept_bios(in, ssl_bio); again: /* * The first call will setup the
accept socket, and the second will get a * socket. In this loop, the first
actual accept will occur in the * BIO_read() function. */ if
(BIO_do_accept(in) <= 0) goto err; for (;;) { i = BIO_read(in, buf,
sizeof(buf)); if (i == 0) { /* * If we have finished, remove the underlying
BIO stack so the * next time we call any function for this BIO, it will
attempt * to do an accept */ printf("Done\n"); tmp = BIO_pop(in);
BIO_free_all(tmp); goto again; } if (i < 0) { if (BIO_should_retry(in))
continue; goto err; } fwrite(buf, 1, i, stdout); fflush(stdout); } ret = 0;
err: if (ret) { ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr); } BIO_free(in); exit(ret);
return (!ret); }



On Sat, Mar 25, 2017 at 8:59 PM, ghanashyam satpathy <
ghanashyam.satpathy at gmail.com> wrote:

> However this type of TLS leak was not there when my application was using
> OpenSSL 1.0.2
> Noticed after using OpenSSL 1.1.0b
>
> On Sat, Mar 25, 2017 at 8:12 PM, <openssl-users-request at openssl.org>
> wrote:
>
>> Send openssl-users mailing list submissions to
>>         openssl-users at openssl.org
>>
>> To subscribe or unsubscribe via the World Wide Web, visit
>>         https://mta.openssl.org/mailman/listinfo/openssl-users
>> or, via email, send a message with subject or body 'help' to
>>         openssl-users-request at openssl.org
>>
>> You can reach the person managing the list at
>>         openssl-users-owner at openssl.org
>>
>> When replying, please edit your Subject line so it is more specific
>> than "Re: Contents of openssl-users digest..."
>>
>>
>> Today's Topics:
>>
>>    1. OpenSSL sending close_notify right after responding       to a
>>       heartbeat request (R Kaja Mohideen)
>>    2. Re: how to implement functions for STACK OF custom type?
>>       (Dr. Stephen Henson)
>>    3. TLSv1_2_method (Lei Kong)
>>    4. Re: TLSv1_2_method (Viktor Dukhovni)
>>    5. TLS leak for openssl 1.1.0b with libcurl 7.50.3
>>       (ghanashyam satpathy)
>>    6. Re: TLS leak for openssl 1.1.0b with libcurl 7.50.3 (Salz, Rich)
>>
>>
>> ----------------------------------------------------------------------
>>
>> Message: 1
>> Date: Fri, 24 Mar 2017 19:10:41 +0530
>> From: R Kaja Mohideen <reachme at kajasweb.com>
>> To: openssl-users at openssl.org
>> Subject: [openssl-users] OpenSSL sending close_notify right after
>>         responding      to a heartbeat request
>> Message-ID:
>>         <CAMSoAtDCh7AZTBJeOtVa=Gdk3YZ2yTStdwem56eN_d=eNVgaCQ at mail.
>> gmail.com>
>> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
>>
>> Hi,
>>
>> We have a TLS Server (Written in C) and Client (Written in Java using
>> Netty + OpenSSL).
>>
>> I see that when Server sends a TLS extension Heartbeat request to
>> client - OpenSSL responds to it and sends a close_notify alert right
>> after it - causing the server to close the session with client.
>>
>> I don't have any callback registered in client (HB request recipient
>> side - Java/Netty doesn't really have that support) and so I'm sure
>> that it is OpenSSL by itself is responding to that heartbeat request.
>> But, who or what is making OpenSSL to send an alert & close the
>> session upon responding to heartbeat remains a mystery.
>>
>> Any help / suggestions to investigate this issue is highly appreciated.
>>
>> Thanks & regards,
>> R Kaja Mohideen
>>
>>
>> ------------------------------
>>
>> Message: 2
>> Date: Fri, 24 Mar 2017 17:46:28 +0000
>> From: "Dr. Stephen Henson" <steve at openssl.org>
>> To: openssl-users at openssl.org
>> Subject: Re: [openssl-users] how to implement functions for STACK OF
>>         custom type?
>> Message-ID: <20170324174628.GA16753 at openssl.org>
>> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=iso-8859-1
>>
>> On Tue, Mar 21, 2017, lists wrote:
>>
>> > Sorry, I first posted this on the -dev list, likely inappropriate...
>> now with an update:
>> >
>> > I am exploring my options with OpenSSL and specifically I am trying to
>> manage the stacks for some custom objects.
>> > Currently, I have this code (sort of) in the headers:
>> >
>> > typedef struct myThingA_st
>> > {
>> > ???? ASN1_OBJECT aID;
>> > ???? ASN1_OCTET_STRING aOCST;
>> > }
>> > ???? myThingA;
>> >
>> > DECLARE_ASN1_ITEM(myThingA)
>> > DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(myThingA)
>> > DECLARE_STACK_OF(myThingA)
>> > // the next one seems to be ininfluent for my purpose, is it?
>> > DECLARE_ASN1_SET_OF(myThingA)
>> >
>> > typedef struct myThingB_st
>> > {
>> > ???? // SEQUENCE OF { ... }
>> > ???? STACK_OF(myThingA) myThingA_sk;
>> > }
>> > ???? myThingB;
>> >
>> > // DECLARE_ASN1_ITEM(myThingB)
>> > DECLARE_STACK_OF(myThingB)
>> > // DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(myThingB)
>> > // the next one seems to be ininfluent for my purpose, is it?
>> > DECLARE_ASN1_SET_OF(myThingB)
>> >
>> > Then, in the .c file...
>> >
>> > IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(myThingA)
>> > IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(myThingB)
>> >
>> > I thought that the basic functions for the stacks to be available (such
>> as sk_myThingA_new, sk_myThingA_push...), yet by compiling a main, for
>> > the first one that I try to use I get:
>> >
>> > ?????? undefined reference to `sk_myThingA_value'
>> >
>> > What am I doing wrong here?
>>
>> If you're using OpenSSL 1.1.0 you need to include:
>>
>> DEFINE_STACK_OF(FOO)
>>
>> in a header file and that should be it. That implements a set of inline
>> functions that do the right thing.
>>
>> For OpenSSL versions before 1.1.0 it's a bit messier. The type specific
>> STACK_OF functions are actually macros which are generated by the
>> mkstack.pl
>> script and appear in the safestack.h header file. If you want to create
>> your
>> own one way is to extract a type specific section from safestack.h, copy
>> it
>> to your own header file and do a search/replace for the new type.
>>
>> So for example extract the sk_OPENSSL_BLOCK macros and replace
>> OPENSSL_BLOCK
>> with FOO.
>>
>> Steve.
>> --
>> Dr Stephen N. Henson. OpenSSL project core developer.
>> Commercial tech support now available see: http://www.openssl.org
>>
>>
>> ------------------------------
>>
>> Message: 3
>> Date: Fri, 24 Mar 2017 21:51:07 +0000
>> From: Lei Kong <leikong at msn.com>
>> To: "openssl-users at openssl.org" <openssl-users at openssl.org>
>> Subject: [openssl-users] TLSv1_2_method
>> Message-ID:
>>         <BN1PR01MB021823477985DD1AFB7D042A83E0 at BN1PR01MB021.prod.exc
>> hangelabs.com>
>>
>> Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"
>>
>> Can processes running with TLSv1_2_method talk to processes running with
>> something older, e.g. TLSv1_1_method? Along the same lines, will new TLS
>> versions be backward compatible with TLSv1_2_method ?
>>
>> I would like to make my code proof, is there something like
>> TLS_latest_method()?
>>
>> I have a cluster of nodes that talk to each other with TLS, currently the
>> version is hardcoded to TLSv1_2_method. Suppose TLSv1_2 is deprecated by
>> TLS_new one day, I update my service to use TLS_new node by node, during
>> this time, some old nodes are running with TLSv1_2, some new nodes are
>> running with new TLS_new, will the communication between old and new nodes
>> work?
>>
>> Thanks.
>>
>> -------------- next part --------------
>> An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
>> URL: <http://mta.openssl.org/pipermail/openssl-users/attachments/
>> 20170324/1f4d53f0/attachment-0001.html>
>>
>> ------------------------------
>>
>> Message: 4
>> Date: Sat, 25 Mar 2017 03:19:55 -0400
>> From: Viktor Dukhovni <openssl-users at dukhovni.org>
>> To: openssl-users at openssl.org
>> Subject: Re: [openssl-users] TLSv1_2_method
>> Message-ID: <5D881D46-87A5-4053-B166-F1EE4AA52619 at dukhovni.org>
>> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii
>>
>>
>> > On Mar 24, 2017, at 5:51 PM, Lei Kong <leikong at msn.com> wrote:
>> >
>> > TLS_latest_method
>>
>> https://www.openssl.org/docs/man1.1.0/ssl/SSL_CTX_new.html
>>
>>    ...
>>
>>    TLS_method(), TLS_server_method(), TLS_client_method()
>>
>>    These are the general-purpose version-flexible SSL/TLS methods.
>>    The actual protocol version used will be negotiated to the
>>    highest version mutually supported by the client and the server.
>>    The supported protocols are SSLv3, TLSv1, TLSv1.1 and TLSv1.2.
>>    Applications should use these methods, and avoid the version-specific
>>    methods described below.
>>
>> With OpenSSL 1.0.2 these are called SSLv23_method(), ...
>>
>>    https://www.openssl.org/docs/man1.0.2/ssl/SSL_CTX_new.html
>>
>> --
>>         Viktor.
>>
>>
>>
>> ------------------------------
>>
>> Message: 5
>> Date: Sat, 25 Mar 2017 19:35:06 +0530
>> From: ghanashyam satpathy <ghanashyam.satpathy at gmail.com>
>> To: openssl-users at openssl.org
>> Subject: [openssl-users] TLS leak for openssl 1.1.0b with libcurl
>>         7.50.3
>> Message-ID:
>>         <CAKn+8OKWHspSvk=sxZfz3PSOZK5qXkWQTy3z+3PimCiFrOnXkw at mail.gm
>> ail.com>
>> Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8"
>>
>> I use libcurl 7.50.3 as statically linked in my application dll , along
>> with openssl 1.1.0b also statically linked. The dll is dynamically loaded
>> using LoadLibrary() and unloaded using FreeLibrary() inside application
>> exe. I observed a TLS index is not getting freed which was allocated
>> inside
>> openssl. To narrow down the issue I have following exported function,
>> which
>> I call from my application exe. After FreeLibrary() I see the TLS leak
>> through APplication verifier.
>>
>> extern "C" __declspec(dllexport)
>> void CurlSetup()
>> {
>>
>> curl_global_init(CURL_GLOBAL_DEFAULT);
>>  curl_global_cleanup();
>> return;
>>
>> }
>>
>> An early reply in this context is appreciated.
>>
>> Thanks
>> -------------- next part --------------
>> An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
>> URL: <http://mta.openssl.org/pipermail/openssl-users/attachments/
>> 20170325/12c0ccde/attachment-0001.html>
>>
>> ------------------------------
>>
>> Message: 6
>> Date: Sat, 25 Mar 2017 14:13:47 +0000
>> From: "Salz, Rich" <rsalz at akamai.com>
>> To: "openssl-users at openssl.org" <openssl-users at openssl.org>
>> Subject: Re: [openssl-users] TLS leak for openssl 1.1.0b with libcurl
>>         7.50.3
>> Message-ID:
>>         <6d87957f6c654825a6a6c6f0d3d4a20a at usma1ex-dag1mb1.msg.corp.a
>> kamai.com>
>> Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8"
>>
>> Those are curl functions, not openssl
>>
>> --
>> Senior Architect, Akamai Technologies
>> Member, OpenSSL Dev Team
>> IM: richsalz at jabber.at Twitter: RichSalz
>>
>> From: ghanashyam satpathy [mailto:ghanashyam.satpathy at gmail.com]
>> Sent: Saturday, March 25, 2017 10:05 AM
>> To: openssl-users at openssl.org
>> Subject: [openssl-users] TLS leak for openssl 1.1.0b with libcurl 7.50.3
>>
>> I use libcurl 7.50.3 as statically linked in my application dll , along
>> with openssl 1.1.0b also statically linked. The dll is dynamically loaded
>> using LoadLibrary() and unloaded using FreeLibrary() inside application
>> exe. I observed a TLS index is not getting freed which was allocated
>> inside
>> openssl. To narrow down the issue I have following exported function,
>> which
>> I call from my application exe. After FreeLibrary() I see the TLS leak
>> through APplication verifier.
>>
>> extern "C" __declspec(dllexport)
>> void CurlSetup()
>> {
>>
>> curl_global_init(CURL_GLOBAL_DEFAULT);
>>  curl_global_cleanup();
>> return;
>>
>> }
>>
>> An early reply in this context is appreciated.
>>
>> Thanks
>> -------------- next part --------------
>> An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
>> URL: <http://mta.openssl.org/pipermail/openssl-users/attachments/
>> 20170325/1a5b8980/attachment.html>
>>
>> ------------------------------
>>
>> Subject: Digest Footer
>>
>> _______________________________________________
>> openssl-users mailing list
>> openssl-users at openssl.org
>> https://mta.openssl.org/mailman/listinfo/openssl-users
>>
>>
>> ------------------------------
>>
>> End of openssl-users Digest, Vol 28, Issue 33
>> *********************************************
>>
>
>
-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
URL: <http://mta.openssl.org/pipermail/openssl-users/attachments/20170325/3bebe198/attachment-0001.html>

From chintuhema at gmail.com  Mon Mar 27 06:29:16 2017
From: chintuhema at gmail.com (Hema Murthy)
Date: Mon, 27 Mar 2017 11:59:16 +0530
Subject: [openssl-users] SSL cipher list to disable TLS 1.0 & TLS 1.1
In-Reply-To: <CACWQscYYZPkSkz0RZg40XbyYRMegiPkgPav3WrQe=ohbkttjZA@mail.gmail.com>
References: <CACWQscYJ8EvcJadabGX_o5Dhyy7_fXeZWJyzidj5E1PjdekR-A@mail.gmail.com>
 <CACWQscZabZ2gL3W+MpVy=y56SfTtHWgix-gohiLwtBswsoxC1g@mail.gmail.com>
 <CACWQscZah_ktXRrOacG4RX+6P54hHWv62tgPWqvaW+7Usafx7A@mail.gmail.com>
 <CACWQscaT1N9UJdLSKUHDA-uf_SG7=71qk7NeX24NQN_U2m8TdQ@mail.gmail.com>
 <CACWQscYYZPkSkz0RZg40XbyYRMegiPkgPav3WrQe=ohbkttjZA@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <CACWQscaOQt0zX9jm8ydTPTq9Joym3UtUrHyrfd9ggLds2UdQfg@mail.gmail.com>

Hi,

My system is

FreeBSD 10.2

OpenSSL 1.0.2h

lighttpd :lighttpd-1.4.23

Am trying to disable TLS1.0 and TLS1.1 through lighttpd.conf

but am not sure of what is the equivalent cipher list to be used.

I followed the below link and it didnt work for me.

In case of Appweb Server,I was able to successfully disable TLS1.0 & Above
and TLS1.1 & Above using

SSLProtocol = "ALL -SSLV2 -SSLV3 -TLSV1"

SSLProtocol = "ALL -SSLV2 -SSLV3 -TLSV1.1"



But the same cipher is not working for lighttpd.

Am very new to this and do not know how to proceed further.

Would be great and appreciate if anyone can give me pointers on this.

Please help.



Thanks & Regards,

Hema
-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
URL: <http://mta.openssl.org/pipermail/openssl-users/attachments/20170327/02b8fb3b/attachment.html>

From raja.ashok at huawei.com  Mon Mar 27 08:25:16 2017
From: raja.ashok at huawei.com (Raja ashok)
Date: Mon, 27 Mar 2017 08:25:16 +0000
Subject: [openssl-users] In ssl3_write_bytes,
 some checks related to hanlding write failure are missing
Message-ID: <FDFEA8C9B9B6BD4685DCC959079C81F5E19315C4@blreml509-mbx>

Hi,

I feel there is a check missing in ssl3_write_bytes, in case of handling write failure.

Consider SSL_write is called with 20000 bytes buffer, then internally in ssl3_write_bytes we try to send it as two record (16384 and 3616). If TCP send failed for the second record then we store the states internally (wnum, wpend_tot and wpend_buf) and return back the result.

Later application has to call SSL_write with same buffer, if it calls with different buffer of length 100 byte then we fail that in ssl3_write_bytes using the check (len < tot).

But consider application calls with buffer of size 18000 bytes and SSL_MODE_ACCEPT_MOVING_WRITE_BUFFER is enabled. Then (len < tot) will not succeed as tot is 16384. Then it will call ssl3_write_pending to send the remaining 3616 record. If it succeeds we are incrementing tot, (tot += i). Now tot will have 20000.

Later there is a check (tot == len), this will not succeed. Then directly we are doing n = (len - tot), this will overflow and store a value close to 2^32 in n. Then it will cause out of bound access to the application buffer "buf".

I hope we should have one more check (len < (tot + s->s3->wpend_tot)) before calling ssl3_write_pending.

    if ((len < tot) || (len < (tot + s->s3->wpend_tot))){
        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH);
        return (-1);
}

Note : I am referring 1.0.2k version of OpenSSL.

Regards,
Ashok

________________________________
[Company_logo]

Raja Ashok V K
Huawei Technologies
Bangalore, India
http://www.huawei.com
________________________________
????????????????????????????????????????
????????????????????????????????????????
???????????????????????????????????
This e-mail and its attachments contain confidential information from HUAWEI, which
is intended only for the person or entity whose address is listed above. Any use of the
information contained herein in any way (including, but not limited to, total or partial
disclosure, reproduction, or dissemination) by persons other than the intended
recipient(s) is prohibited. If you receive this e-mail in error, please notify the sender by
phone or email immediately and delete it!

-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
URL: <http://mta.openssl.org/pipermail/openssl-users/attachments/20170327/e8f3d72a/attachment-0001.html>
-------------- next part --------------
A non-text attachment was scrubbed...
Name: image001.jpg
Type: image/jpeg
Size: 6737 bytes
Desc: image001.jpg
URL: <http://mta.openssl.org/pipermail/openssl-users/attachments/20170327/e8f3d72a/attachment-0001.jpg>

From joshi.sanjaya at gmail.com  Mon Mar 27 12:07:46 2017
From: joshi.sanjaya at gmail.com (Sanjaya Joshi)
Date: Mon, 27 Mar 2017 17:37:46 +0530
Subject: [openssl-users] Reg, TLS over SCTP (SOCK_SEQPACKET)
In-Reply-To: <26E0FB9A-4315-41EF-8345-53DDF4A75474@lurchi.franken.de>
References: <CANK1YipAkc3qfsTL5S6RVtymhXF1pP68bwzuLg77z8dA57OLZQ@mail.gmail.com>
 <0cd2f7cd66794e7193596f9788981521@usma1ex-dag1mb1.msg.corp.akamai.com>
 <CANK1YirvgCnnYAWddYVDj0S9y3X0WfzMJWztvKjYwp-Xv-9uJw@mail.gmail.com>
 <26E0FB9A-4315-41EF-8345-53DDF4A75474@lurchi.franken.de>
Message-ID: <CANK1YirGPAQBG-SnZ34Lo5o0X0dcdqOQiEOf58ec69UUzS6GFw@mail.gmail.com>

Hi,
Thanks for the pointers. We will consider that option.

Regards,
Sanjaya

On Wed, Mar 1, 2017 at 6:59 PM, Michael Tuexen <
Michael.Tuexen at lurchi.franken.de> wrote:

> > On 1 Mar 2017, at 06:34, Sanjaya Joshi <joshi.sanjaya at gmail.com> wrote:
> >
> > Hi,
> > Thank you Salz Rich for the confirmation.
> > So, whether application can perform manual TLS handshakes when
> SOCK_SEQPACKET is used ?
> I this the SOCK_SEQPACKET model doesn't fit well to the way the openssl
> code is layed out.
> They basically want a one-to-one relation between a bio (for example a
> socket bio) and
> a TLS connection. So there is no muxing/demuxing ongoing.
>
> I'm wondering why you are sticking to the 1-to-many style sockets and why
> you are not
> considering DTLS over SCTP instead of TLS over SCTP. DTLS over SCTP using
> one-to-one
> style sockets (SOCK_STREAM) is supported by OpenSSL on Linux and FreeBSD.
>
> Best regards
> Michael
> >
> > Regards,
> > Sanjaya
> >
> > On Tue, Feb 28, 2017 at 7:03 PM, Salz, Rich <rsalz at akamai.com> wrote:
> > > But these calls don't work when SOCK_SEQPACKET (one-to-many
> connections) is used. Does openssl provide any alternatives for these calls
> ? Or an application need to perform the TLS handshakes manually ?
> >
> > This is not supported, and there are no demo's available.
> > --
> > openssl-users mailing list
> > To unsubscribe: https://mta.openssl.org/mailman/listinfo/openssl-users
> >
> > --
> > openssl-users mailing list
> > To unsubscribe: https://mta.openssl.org/mailman/listinfo/openssl-users
>
> --
> openssl-users mailing list
> To unsubscribe: https://mta.openssl.org/mailman/listinfo/openssl-users
>
-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
URL: <http://mta.openssl.org/pipermail/openssl-users/attachments/20170327/7bbb6a95/attachment.html>

From reachme at kajasweb.com  Mon Mar 27 17:54:36 2017
From: reachme at kajasweb.com (R Kaja Mohideen)
Date: Mon, 27 Mar 2017 23:24:36 +0530
Subject: [openssl-users] OpenSSL sending close_notify right after
 responding to a heartbeat request
In-Reply-To: <CAMSoAtDCh7AZTBJeOtVa=Gdk3YZ2yTStdwem56eN_d=eNVgaCQ@mail.gmail.com>
References: <CAMSoAtDCh7AZTBJeOtVa=Gdk3YZ2yTStdwem56eN_d=eNVgaCQ@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <CAMSoAtCoy0Ns4-O3WJwhdQhPecaLsRur4mAn_Rfwi74QgL8Y1w@mail.gmail.com>

I have used backtrace function (execinfo.h) as documented here
(http://www.gnu.org/software/libc/manual/html_node/Backtraces.html) in
couple of OpenSSL source files - ssl_lib.c (ssl_shutdown) and s3_pkt.c
(ssl3_send_alert). I have actually used the exact same example from
that page for getting the stack trace printed from those two
functions.

When I reproduce the issue - following is the stacktrace I got

Obtained 3 stack frames.
/OpenSSL/libssl.so.1.0.0(printStackTrace+0x2d) [0x7f13927f482d]
/OpenSSL/libssl.so.1.0.0(SSL_shutdown+0x9) [0x7f13927f74a9]
[0x7f14a901f9e4]
Obtained 4 stack frames.
/OpenSSL/libssl.so.1.0.0(printStackTrace1+0x2d) [0x7f13927da4dd]
/OpenSSL/libssl.so.1.0.0(ssl3_send_alert+0x11) [0x7f13927dbe11]
/OpenSSL/libssl.so.1.0.0(ssl3_shutdown+0xa2) [0x7f13927d8662]
[0x7f14a901f9e4]

I'm surprised to see that I'm not able to get the caller details using
backtrace. Is it due to architecture of OpenSSL or something which
makes OpenSSL to use a new thread for invoking ssl_shutdown?

Any OpenSSL developers?

// Kaja

On Fri, Mar 24, 2017 at 7:10 PM, R Kaja Mohideen <reachme at kajasweb.com> wrote:
> Hi,
>
> We have a TLS Server (Written in C) and Client (Written in Java using
> Netty + OpenSSL).
>
> I see that when Server sends a TLS extension Heartbeat request to
> client - OpenSSL responds to it and sends a close_notify alert right
> after it - causing the server to close the session with client.
>
> I don't have any callback registered in client (HB request recipient
> side - Java/Netty doesn't really have that support) and so I'm sure
> that it is OpenSSL by itself is responding to that heartbeat request.
> But, who or what is making OpenSSL to send an alert & close the
> session upon responding to heartbeat remains a mystery.
>
> Any help / suggestions to investigate this issue is highly appreciated.
>
> Thanks & regards,
> R Kaja Mohideen

From lists at rustichelli.net  Mon Mar 27 18:01:12 2017
From: lists at rustichelli.net (lists)
Date: Mon, 27 Mar 2017 20:01:12 +0200
Subject: [openssl-users] how to implement functions for STACK OF custom
 type?
In-Reply-To: <20170324174628.GA16753@openssl.org>
References: <ON5JNR$B02EEBE404DCBF50AF8E30BB1C768924@rustichelli.net>
 <20170324174628.GA16753@openssl.org>
Message-ID: <e952d67f-6d80-2942-c12e-6eb096594e39@rustichelli.net>

On 03/24/2017 06:46 PM, Dr. Stephen Henson wrote:
> On Tue, Mar 21, 2017, lists wrote:
>
>> Sorry, I first posted this on the -dev list, likely inappropriate... now with an update:
>>
>> I am exploring my options with OpenSSL and specifically I am trying to manage the stacks for some custom objects.
>> Currently, I have this code (sort of) in the headers:
>>
>> typedef struct myThingA_st
>> {
>>       ASN1_OBJECT aID;
>>       ASN1_OCTET_STRING aOCST;
>> }
>>       myThingA;
>>
>> DECLARE_ASN1_ITEM(myThingA)
>> DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(myThingA)
>> DECLARE_STACK_OF(myThingA)
>> [...]
> If you're using OpenSSL 1.1.0 you need to include:
>
> DEFINE_STACK_OF(FOO)
>
> in a header file and that should be it. That implements a set of inline
> functions that do the right thing.
>
> For OpenSSL versions before 1.1.0 it's a bit messier. The type specific
> STACK_OF functions are actually macros which are generated by the mkstack.pl
> script and appear in the safestack.h header file. If you want to create your
> own one way is to extract a type specific section from safestack.h, copy it
> to your own header file and do a search/replace for the new type.
>
> So for example extract the sk_OPENSSL_BLOCK macros and replace OPENSSL_BLOCK
> with FOO.
>
> Steve.
> --
> Dr Stephen N. Henson. OpenSSL project core developer.
> Commercial tech support now available see: http://www.openssl.org

Thank you very much, Steve. Seems I'm progressing now.



From christian_adja at yahoo.it  Tue Mar 28 09:25:35 2017
From: christian_adja at yahoo.it (Christian Adja)
Date: Tue, 28 Mar 2017 09:25:35 +0000 (UTC)
Subject: [openssl-users] Functions for retrive public key from x509 cert
In-Reply-To: <mailman.1442.1490603173.2180.openssl-users@openssl.org>
References: <mailman.1442.1490603173.2180.openssl-users@openssl.org>
Message-ID: <1443144006.8724303.1490693135385@mail.yahoo.com>

Dear friends,
Someone can tell me what function is called for retrieve public key from x509 cert? in the case of EC public key? 

Best regards. 

    Il Luned? 27 Marzo 2017 10:26, "openssl-users-request at openssl.org" <openssl-users-request at openssl.org> ha scritto:
 

 Send openssl-users mailing list submissions to
??? openssl-users at openssl.org

To subscribe or unsubscribe via the World Wide Web, visit
??? https://mta.openssl.org/mailman/listinfo/openssl-users
or, via email, send a message with subject or body 'help' to
??? openssl-users-request at openssl.org

You can reach the person managing the list at
??? openssl-users-owner at openssl.org

When replying, please edit your Subject line so it is more specific
than "Re: Contents of openssl-users digest..."


Today's Topics:

? 1. SSL cipher list to disable TLS 1.0 & TLS 1.1 (Hema Murthy)
? 2. In ssl3_write_bytes, some checks related to hanlding write
? ? ? failure are missing (Raja ashok)


----------------------------------------------------------------------

Message: 1
Date: Mon, 27 Mar 2017 11:59:16 +0530
From: Hema Murthy <chintuhema at gmail.com>
To: openssl-users at openssl.org
Subject: [openssl-users] SSL cipher list to disable TLS 1.0 & TLS 1.1
Message-ID:
??? <CACWQscaOQt0zX9jm8ydTPTq9Joym3UtUrHyrfd9ggLds2UdQfg at mail.gmail.com>
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8"

Hi,

My system is

FreeBSD 10.2

OpenSSL 1.0.2h

lighttpd :lighttpd-1.4.23

Am trying to disable TLS1.0 and TLS1.1 through lighttpd.conf

but am not sure of what is the equivalent cipher list to be used.

I followed the below link and it didnt work for me.

In case of Appweb Server,I was able to successfully disable TLS1.0 & Above
and TLS1.1 & Above using

SSLProtocol = "ALL -SSLV2 -SSLV3 -TLSV1"

SSLProtocol = "ALL -SSLV2 -SSLV3 -TLSV1.1"



But the same cipher is not working for lighttpd.

Am very new to this and do not know how to proceed further.

Would be great and appreciate if anyone can give me pointers on this.

Please help.



Thanks & Regards,

Hema
-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
URL: <http://mta.openssl.org/pipermail/openssl-users/attachments/20170327/02b8fb3b/attachment-0001.html>

------------------------------

Message: 2
Date: Mon, 27 Mar 2017 08:25:16 +0000
From: Raja ashok <raja.ashok at huawei.com>
To: "openssl-users at openssl.org" <openssl-users at openssl.org>,
??? "openssl-dev at openssl.org" <openssl-dev at openssl.org>
Subject: [openssl-users] In ssl3_write_bytes, some checks related to
??? hanlding write failure are missing
Message-ID: <FDFEA8C9B9B6BD4685DCC959079C81F5E19315C4 at blreml509-mbx>
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="gb2312"

Hi,

I feel there is a check missing in ssl3_write_bytes, in case of handling write failure.

Consider SSL_write is called with 20000 bytes buffer, then internally in ssl3_write_bytes we try to send it as two record (16384 and 3616). If TCP send failed for the second record then we store the states internally (wnum, wpend_tot and wpend_buf) and return back the result.

Later application has to call SSL_write with same buffer, if it calls with different buffer of length 100 byte then we fail that in ssl3_write_bytes using the check (len < tot).

But consider application calls with buffer of size 18000 bytes and SSL_MODE_ACCEPT_MOVING_WRITE_BUFFER is enabled. Then (len < tot) will not succeed as tot is 16384. Then it will call ssl3_write_pending to send the remaining 3616 record. If it succeeds we are incrementing tot, (tot += i). Now tot will have 20000.

Later there is a check (tot == len), this will not succeed. Then directly we are doing n = (len - tot), this will overflow and store a value close to 2^32 in n. Then it will cause out of bound access to the application buffer "buf".

I hope we should have one more check (len < (tot + s->s3->wpend_tot)) before calling ssl3_write_pending.

? ? if ((len < tot) || (len < (tot + s->s3->wpend_tot))){
? ? ? ? SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH);
? ? ? ? return (-1);
}

Note : I am referring 1.0.2k version of OpenSSL.

Regards,
Ashok

________________________________
[Company_logo]

Raja Ashok V K
Huawei Technologies
Bangalore, India
http://www.huawei.com
________________________________
????????????????????????????????????????
????????????????????????????????????????
???????????????????????????????????
This e-mail and its attachments contain confidential information from HUAWEI, which
is intended only for the person or entity whose address is listed above. Any use of the
information contained herein in any way (including, but not limited to, total or partial
disclosure, reproduction, or dissemination) by persons other than the intended
recipient(s) is prohibited. If you receive this e-mail in error, please notify the sender by
phone or email immediately and delete it!

-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
URL: <http://mta.openssl.org/pipermail/openssl-users/attachments/20170327/e8f3d72a/attachment.html>
-------------- next part --------------
A non-text attachment was scrubbed...
Name: image001.jpg
Type: image/jpeg
Size: 6737 bytes
Desc: image001.jpg
URL: <http://mta.openssl.org/pipermail/openssl-users/attachments/20170327/e8f3d72a/attachment.jpg>

------------------------------

Subject: Digest Footer

_______________________________________________
openssl-users mailing list
openssl-users at openssl.org
https://mta.openssl.org/mailman/listinfo/openssl-users


------------------------------

End of openssl-users Digest, Vol 28, Issue 35
*********************************************


   
-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
URL: <http://mta.openssl.org/pipermail/openssl-users/attachments/20170328/a6d0bcc5/attachment-0001.html>

From kgoldman at us.ibm.com  Tue Mar 28 13:18:28 2017
From: kgoldman at us.ibm.com (Ken Goldman)
Date: Tue, 28 Mar 2017 09:18:28 -0400
Subject: [openssl-users] Functions for retrive public key from x509 cert
In-Reply-To: <1443144006.8724303.1490693135385@mail.yahoo.com>
References: <mailman.1442.1490603173.2180.openssl-users@openssl.org>
 <1443144006.8724303.1490693135385@mail.yahoo.com>
Message-ID: <obdnqh$1ln$1@blaine.gmane.org>

On 3/28/2017 5:25 AM, Christian Adja via openssl-users wrote:
>
> Someone can tell me what function is called for retrieve public key from
> x509 cert? in the case of EC public key?

X509_get_pubkey()


From Michael.Wojcik at microfocus.com  Tue Mar 28 14:18:24 2017
From: Michael.Wojcik at microfocus.com (Michael Wojcik)
Date: Tue, 28 Mar 2017 14:18:24 +0000
Subject: [openssl-users] OpenSSL sending close_notify right after
 responding to a heartbeat request
In-Reply-To: <CAMSoAtCoy0Ns4-O3WJwhdQhPecaLsRur4mAn_Rfwi74QgL8Y1w@mail.gmail.com>
References: <CAMSoAtDCh7AZTBJeOtVa=Gdk3YZ2yTStdwem56eN_d=eNVgaCQ@mail.gmail.com>
 <CAMSoAtCoy0Ns4-O3WJwhdQhPecaLsRur4mAn_Rfwi74QgL8Y1w@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <B550B44BF8AF314BB00C4E2AC1C1808801A9A33334@prvxmb03.microfocus.com>

> From: openssl-users [mailto:openssl-users-bounces at openssl.org] On Behalf
> Of R Kaja Mohideen
> Sent: Monday, March 27, 2017 13:55
> 
> I'm surprised to see that I'm not able to get the caller details using
> backtrace. Is it due to architecture of OpenSSL or something which
> makes OpenSSL to use a new thread for invoking ssl_shutdown?

I suspect it's due to compiler optimization, a lack of symbols in the caller, or some other generic obstacle to backtracing, and not anything OpenSSL is doing.

Michael Wojcik 
Distinguished Engineer, Micro Focus 



From reachme at kajasweb.com  Tue Mar 28 14:29:59 2017
From: reachme at kajasweb.com (Kaja Mohideen)
Date: Tue, 28 Mar 2017 19:59:59 +0530
Subject: [openssl-users] OpenSSL sending close_notify right
 afterresponding to a heartbeat request
In-Reply-To: <B550B44BF8AF314BB00C4E2AC1C1808801A9A33334@prvxmb03.microfocus.com>
References: <CAMSoAtDCh7AZTBJeOtVa=Gdk3YZ2yTStdwem56eN_d=eNVgaCQ@mail.gmail.com>
 <CAMSoAtCoy0Ns4-O3WJwhdQhPecaLsRur4mAn_Rfwi74QgL8Y1w@mail.gmail.com>
 <B550B44BF8AF314BB00C4E2AC1C1808801A9A33334@prvxmb03.microfocus.com>
Message-ID: <58da7367.8490620a.6f6d7.34d4@mx.google.com>

Thanks for the response, Micheal Wojcik. Any idea what is making OpenSSL close the session after responding to Heartbeat request?

-----Original Message-----
From: "Michael Wojcik" <Michael.Wojcik at microfocus.com>
Sent: ?28-?03-?2017 07:46 PM
To: "openssl-users at openssl.org" <openssl-users at openssl.org>
Subject: Re: [openssl-users] OpenSSL sending close_notify right afterresponding to a heartbeat request

> From: openssl-users [mailto:openssl-users-bounces at openssl.org] On Behalf
> Of R Kaja Mohideen
> Sent: Monday, March 27, 2017 13:55
> 
> I'm surprised to see that I'm not able to get the caller details using
> backtrace. Is it due to architecture of OpenSSL or something which
> makes OpenSSL to use a new thread for invoking ssl_shutdown?

I suspect it's due to compiler optimization, a lack of symbols in the caller, or some other generic obstacle to backtracing, and not anything OpenSSL is doing.

Michael Wojcik 
Distinguished Engineer, Micro Focus 


-- 
openssl-users mailing list
To unsubscribe: https://mta.openssl.org/mailman/listinfo/openssl-users
-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
URL: <http://mta.openssl.org/pipermail/openssl-users/attachments/20170328/a65af458/attachment.html>

From Michael.Wojcik at microfocus.com  Tue Mar 28 17:02:35 2017
From: Michael.Wojcik at microfocus.com (Michael Wojcik)
Date: Tue, 28 Mar 2017 17:02:35 +0000
Subject: [openssl-users] OpenSSL sending close_notify right
 afterresponding to a heartbeat request
In-Reply-To: <58da7367.8490620a.6f6d7.34d4@mx.google.com>
References: <CAMSoAtDCh7AZTBJeOtVa=Gdk3YZ2yTStdwem56eN_d=eNVgaCQ@mail.gmail.com>
 <CAMSoAtCoy0Ns4-O3WJwhdQhPecaLsRur4mAn_Rfwi74QgL8Y1w@mail.gmail.com>
 <B550B44BF8AF314BB00C4E2AC1C1808801A9A33334@prvxmb03.microfocus.com>
 <58da7367.8490620a.6f6d7.34d4@mx.google.com>
Message-ID: <B550B44BF8AF314BB00C4E2AC1C1808801A9A33591@prvxmb03.microfocus.com>

> From: openssl-users [mailto:openssl-users-bounces at openssl.org] On Behalf Of Kaja Mohideen
> Sent: Tuesday, March 28, 2017 10:30

> Any idea what is making OpenSSL close the session after responding to Heartbeat request?

I'm afraid not. I haven't seen that problem myself, and I've not looked at heartbeat processing in the OpenSSL source code (aside from the quick glance I, like many people, took when Heartbleed was disclosed).

Michael Wojcik 
Distinguished Engineer, Micro Focus 




From jb-openssl at wisemo.com  Tue Mar 28 18:48:27 2017
From: jb-openssl at wisemo.com (Jakob Bohm)
Date: Tue, 28 Mar 2017 20:48:27 +0200
Subject: [openssl-users] OpenSSL sending close_notify right
 afterresponding to a heartbeat request
In-Reply-To: <58da7367.8490620a.6f6d7.34d4@mx.google.com>
References: <CAMSoAtDCh7AZTBJeOtVa=Gdk3YZ2yTStdwem56eN_d=eNVgaCQ@mail.gmail.com>
 <CAMSoAtCoy0Ns4-O3WJwhdQhPecaLsRur4mAn_Rfwi74QgL8Y1w@mail.gmail.com>
 <B550B44BF8AF314BB00C4E2AC1C1808801A9A33334@prvxmb03.microfocus.com>
 <58da7367.8490620a.6f6d7.34d4@mx.google.com>
Message-ID: <db23832a-c941-a5a1-c9f5-e56571b252b1@wisemo.com>

Just to clarify: Does it respond to the heartbeat before closing
the session, or does it just close the session when you try to
trigger the heartbeat/bleed code?

On 28/03/2017 16:29, Kaja Mohideen wrote:
> Thanks for the response, Micheal Wojcik. Any idea what is making 
> OpenSSL close the session after responding to Heartbeat request?
> ------------------------------------------------------------------------
> From: Michael Wojcik <mailto:Michael.Wojcik at microfocus.com>
> Sent: ?28-?03-?2017 07:46 PM
> To: openssl-users at openssl.org <mailto:openssl-users at openssl.org>
> Subject: Re: [openssl-users] OpenSSL sending close_notify right 
> afterresponding to a heartbeat request
>
> > From: openssl-users [mailto:openssl-users-bounces at openssl.org] On Behalf
> > Of R Kaja Mohideen
> > Sent: Monday, March 27, 2017 13:55
> >
> > I'm surprised to see that I'm not able to get the caller details using
> > backtrace. Is it due to architecture of OpenSSL or something which
> > makes OpenSSL to use a new thread for invoking ssl_shutdown?
>
> I suspect it's due to compiler optimization, a lack of symbols in the 
> caller, or some other generic obstacle to backtracing, and not 
> anything OpenSSL is doing.
>

Enjoy

Jakob
-- 
Jakob Bohm, CIO, Partner, WiseMo A/S.  https://www.wisemo.com
Transformervej 29, 2860 S?borg, Denmark.  Direct +45 31 13 16 10
This public discussion message is non-binding and may contain errors.
WiseMo - Remote Service Management for PCs, Phones and Embedded


From reachme at kajasweb.com  Wed Mar 29 01:17:14 2017
From: reachme at kajasweb.com (Kaja Mohideen)
Date: Wed, 29 Mar 2017 06:47:14 +0530
Subject: [openssl-users] OpenSSL sending close_notify
 rightafterresponding to a heartbeat request
In-Reply-To: <db23832a-c941-a5a1-c9f5-e56571b252b1@wisemo.com>
References: <CAMSoAtDCh7AZTBJeOtVa=Gdk3YZ2yTStdwem56eN_d=eNVgaCQ@mail.gmail.com>
 <CAMSoAtCoy0Ns4-O3WJwhdQhPecaLsRur4mAn_Rfwi74QgL8Y1w@mail.gmail.com>
 <B550B44BF8AF314BB00C4E2AC1C1808801A9A33334@prvxmb03.microfocus.com>
 <58da7367.8490620a.6f6d7.34d4@mx.google.com>
 <db23832a-c941-a5a1-c9f5-e56571b252b1@wisemo.com>
Message-ID: <58db0b1a.d0d9620a.ecbd6.9842@mx.google.com>

It responds and then closes.

-----Original Message-----
From: "Jakob Bohm" <jb-openssl at wisemo.com>
Sent: ?29-?03-?2017 12:19 AM
To: "openssl-users at openssl.org" <openssl-users at openssl.org>
Subject: Re: [openssl-users] OpenSSL sending close_notify rightafterresponding to a heartbeat request

Just to clarify: Does it respond to the heartbeat before closing
the session, or does it just close the session when you try to
trigger the heartbeat/bleed code?

On 28/03/2017 16:29, Kaja Mohideen wrote:
> Thanks for the response, Micheal Wojcik. Any idea what is making 
> OpenSSL close the session after responding to Heartbeat request?
> ------------------------------------------------------------------------
> From: Michael Wojcik <mailto:Michael.Wojcik at microfocus.com>
> Sent: ?28-?03-?2017 07:46 PM
> To: openssl-users at openssl.org <mailto:openssl-users at openssl.org>
> Subject: Re: [openssl-users] OpenSSL sending close_notify right 
> afterresponding to a heartbeat request
>
> > From: openssl-users [mailto:openssl-users-bounces at openssl.org] On Behalf
> > Of R Kaja Mohideen
> > Sent: Monday, March 27, 2017 13:55
> >
> > I'm surprised to see that I'm not able to get the caller details using
> > backtrace. Is it due to architecture of OpenSSL or something which
> > makes OpenSSL to use a new thread for invoking ssl_shutdown?
>
> I suspect it's due to compiler optimization, a lack of symbols in the 
> caller, or some other generic obstacle to backtracing, and not 
> anything OpenSSL is doing.
>

Enjoy

Jakob
-- 
Jakob Bohm, CIO, Partner, WiseMo A/S.  https://www.wisemo.com
Transformervej 29, 2860 S?borg, Denmark.  Direct +45 31 13 16 10
This public discussion message is non-binding and may contain errors.
WiseMo - Remote Service Management for PCs, Phones and Embedded

-- 
openssl-users mailing list
To unsubscribe: https://mta.openssl.org/mailman/listinfo/openssl-users
-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
URL: <http://mta.openssl.org/pipermail/openssl-users/attachments/20170329/b540d292/attachment-0001.html>

From noloader at gmail.com  Wed Mar 29 08:43:11 2017
From: noloader at gmail.com (Jeffrey Walton)
Date: Wed, 29 Mar 2017 04:43:11 -0400
Subject: [openssl-users] install libcrypto.so.1.1 ->
 /usr/local//usr/local/lib64/libcrypto.so.1.1 ?
Message-ID: <CAH8yC8=VkowEJTVhRCpwC2kf8VMmtCh6LhpNkqrpAq5ipgBuAA@mail.gmail.com>

I'm working with OpenSSL 1.1.0. I'm trying to set prefix=/usr/local,
openssldir=/usr/local and libdir=/usr/local/lib64. The configure looks
like:

INSTALL_PREFIX=/usr/local
INSTALL_LIBDIR=$INSTALL_PREFIX/lib64
KERNEL_BITS=64 ./config no-ssl2 no-ssl3 no-comp shared \
    enable-ec_nistp_64_gcc_128
    -Wl,-rpath,$INSTALL_LIBDIR --prefix=$INSTALL_PREFIX \
    --openssldir=$INSTALL_PREFIX --libdir=$INSTALL_LIBDIR

When I look at the tail of the compile and install I see:

...
install ./include/openssl/x509.h -> /usr/local/include/openssl/x509.h
install ./include/openssl/x509_vfy.h -> /usr/local/include/openssl/x509_vfy.h
install ./include/openssl/x509v3.h -> /usr/local/include/openssl/x509v3.h
install libcrypto.a -> /usr/local//usr/local/lib64/libcrypto.a
install libssl.a -> /usr/local//usr/local/lib64/libssl.a
install libcrypto.so.1.1 -> /usr/local//usr/local/lib64/libcrypto.so.1.1
link /usr/local//usr/local/lib64/libcrypto.so ->
/usr/local//usr/local/lib64/libcrypto.so.1.1
install libssl.so.1.1 -> /usr/local//usr/local/lib64/libssl.so.1.1
link /usr/local//usr/local/lib64/libssl.so ->
/usr/local//usr/local/lib64/libssl.so.1.1
install libcrypto.pc -> /usr/local//usr/local/lib64/pkgconfig/libcrypto.pc
install libssl.pc -> /usr/local//usr/local/lib64/pkgconfig/libssl.pc
install openssl.pc -> /usr/local//usr/local/lib64/pkgconfig/openssl.pc
*** Installing engines
install engines/capi.so -> /usr/local/usr/local/lib64/engines-1.1/capi.so
install engines/padlock.so -> /usr/local/usr/local/lib64/engines-1.1/padlock.so
*** Installing runtime files
install libcrypto.so.1.1 -> /usr/local//usr/local/lib64/libcrypto.so.1.1
install libssl.so.1.1 -> /usr/local//usr/local/lib64/libssl.so.1.1
install apps/openssl -> /usr/local/bin/openssl
install ./tools/c_rehash -> /usr/local/bin/c_rehash

I believe OpenSSL 1.0.2 is a little better behaved. I don't recall
seeing this when using it, but I might be wrong.

Any ideas how to get OpenSSL to use /usr/local as a prefix, but place
its libraries in /usr/local/lib64?

Jeff

From matt at openssl.org  Wed Mar 29 08:48:36 2017
From: matt at openssl.org (Matt Caswell)
Date: Wed, 29 Mar 2017 09:48:36 +0100
Subject: [openssl-users] install libcrypto.so.1.1 ->
 /usr/local//usr/local/lib64/libcrypto.so.1.1 ?
In-Reply-To: <CAH8yC8=VkowEJTVhRCpwC2kf8VMmtCh6LhpNkqrpAq5ipgBuAA@mail.gmail.com>
References: <CAH8yC8=VkowEJTVhRCpwC2kf8VMmtCh6LhpNkqrpAq5ipgBuAA@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <76ccfade-37c0-81f8-3c05-c0211ddee828@openssl.org>



On 29/03/17 09:43, Jeffrey Walton wrote:
> Any ideas how to get OpenSSL to use /usr/local as a prefix, but place
> its libraries in /usr/local/lib64?

libdir is relative to prefix, to just use "--libdir=lib64"

>From INSTALL:

  --libdir=DIR
                   The name of the directory under the top of the
installation
                   directory tree (see the --prefix option) where
libraries will
                   be installed. By default this is "lib". Note that on
Windows
                   only ".lib" files will be stored in this location.
dll files
                   will always be installed to the "bin" directory.





Matt


From kane.huang at ericsson.com  Wed Mar 29 09:24:28 2017
From: kane.huang at ericsson.com (Kane Huang)
Date: Wed, 29 Mar 2017 09:24:28 +0000
Subject: [openssl-users] how to get digest for  stitched AES-HMAC-SHA
Message-ID: <DB3PR07MB060302900D8C14A5984C8AEFF3350@DB3PR07MB0603.eurprd07.prod.outlook.com>

Hi guys,
I try to use build-in cipher suite EVP_aes_128_cbc_hmac_sha1 to get the benefit of function stitch.
There some some questions :

1)       Case this cipher stitch AESNI and HAMC-SHA1 in one go, how to get the hamc digest?


2)       In some case, like ESP package ,the Encryption and Auth start from different offset of same buffer, is there any APIs to specify the offset between Auth and Encryption for stitched cipher?

            -------------------------------------------------

      IPv4  |orig IP hdr   | ESP  |           |   ESP  | ESP|
|(any options) | Hdr  | TCP  Data  | Trailer  |Auth|

            -------------------------------------------------

                              |<----- encrypted --------->|

                            |<------ authenticated ------------> |

Thanks in advance for any advice!


BR
Kane
Software developer, Ericsson
-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
URL: <http://mta.openssl.org/pipermail/openssl-users/attachments/20170329/f1402247/attachment.html>

From lists at rustichelli.net  Wed Mar 29 10:05:38 2017
From: lists at rustichelli.net (lists)
Date: Wed, 29 Mar 2017 12:05:38 +0200
Subject: [openssl-users] how to implement functions for STACK OF custom
 type?
In-Reply-To: <20170324174628.GA16753@openssl.org>
References: <ON5JNR$B02EEBE404DCBF50AF8E30BB1C768924@rustichelli.net>
 <20170324174628.GA16753@openssl.org>
Message-ID: <ba05b59f-f3b9-df98-e034-fe0f71304c06@rustichelli.net>

On 03/24/2017 06:46 PM, Dr. Stephen Henson wrote:
> On Tue, Mar 21, 2017, lists wrote:
>
 > On Tue, Mar 21, 2017, lists wrote:
 >
 >> [...]
 >> I am exploring my options with OpenSSL and specifically I am trying 
to manage the stacks for some custom objects.
 >> [...]
 >> What am I doing wrong here?
 >
 > [...]
 >
 > For OpenSSL versions before 1.1.0 it's a bit messier. The type specific
 > STACK_OF functions are actually macros which are generated by the 
mkstack.pl
 > script and appear in the safestack.h header file. If you want to 
create your
 > own one way is to extract a type specific section from safestack.h, 
copy it
 > to your own header file and do a search/replace for the new type.
 >
 > So for example extract the sk_OPENSSL_BLOCK macros and replace 
OPENSSL_BLOCK
 > with FOO.
 >
 > Steve.
 > --
 > Dr Stephen N. Henson. OpenSSL project core developer.
 > Commercial tech support now available see: http://www.openssl.org

Sorry but it seems I still got something wrong, now that I am more 
practically addressing qcStatements (as in RFC 3039, for the moment, not 
yet RFC 3739). I put here almost all of the code because it may be 
useful to some other who want to cover this attribute.
Question number one: is there a document/tutorial about ASN.1 to OpenSSL 
macros mapping?
Question number two: why does the code that I add in the end of the 
message miserably fails when I execute

     const unsigned char *tmpMovingPt = oneExt->value->data;
     // d2i_UC_qcStatements returns NULL here! It cannot parse it?
     // Is X509_EXTENSION *oneExt->value->data the right thing to pass here?
     qcstt = d2i_UC_qcStatements(NULL, &tmpMovingPt, oneExt->value->length);

and I know for sure that X509_EXTENSION *oneExt is qcStatements?
Specifically, the qcStatements should be RFC 3039-compliant because all 
of the entries only have statementId and statementInfo.

Here the rest of the code for OpenSSL 1.0, something must be wrong or 
maybe I have to implement something more:

(.h)

// -- QCStatement

// I use this odd name to avoid confusion with qcStatements (with the 
"s"), for the moment
typedef struct UC_QcsAtom_st
{
     // statementId OBJECT IDENTIFIER
     ASN1_OBJECT *statementId;
     // statementInfo ANY DEFINED BY statementId OPTIONAL
     ASN1_TYPE *statementInfo;
}
     UC_QcsAtom;

DECLARE_STACK_OF(UC_QcsAtom)
DECLARE_ASN1_ITEM(UC_QcsAtom)
DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(UC_QcsAtom)

#define sk_UC_QcsAtom_new(cmp) SKM_sk_new(UC_QcsAtom, (cmp))
#define sk_UC_QcsAtom_new_null() SKM_sk_new_null(UC_QcsAtom)
#define sk_UC_QcsAtom_free(st) SKM_sk_free(UC_QcsAtom, (st))
#define sk_UC_QcsAtom_num(st) SKM_sk_num(UC_QcsAtom, (st))
#define sk_UC_QcsAtom_value(st, i) SKM_sk_value(UC_QcsAtom, (st), (i))
#define sk_UC_QcsAtom_set(st, i, val) SKM_sk_set(UC_QcsAtom, (st), (i), 
(val))
[...many more...]

// -- QCStatements

typedef struct UC_qcStatements_st
{
     // SEQUENCE OF QCStatement
     STACK_OF(UC_QcsAtom) *statements_sk;
}
     UC_qcStatements;

DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(UC_qcStatements)

(.c)

// -- QCStatament aka UC_QcsAtom

ASN1_SEQUENCE(UC_QcsAtom) = {
     ASN1_SIMPLE(UC_QcsAtom, statementId, ASN1_OBJECT),
     ASN1_OPT(UC_QcsAtom, statementInfo, ASN1_ANY)
} ASN1_SEQUENCE_END(UC_QcsAtom)

IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(UC_QcsAtom)
IMPLEMENT_ASN1_DUP_FUNCTION(UC_QcsAtom)
IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(UC_QcsAtom)

// -- qcStataments aka QCStatements aka UC_qcStatements

ASN1_SEQUENCE(UC_qcStatements) = {
     ASN1_SEQUENCE_OF(UC_qcStatements, statements_sk, UC_QcsAtom)
} ASN1_SEQUENCE_END(UC_qcStatements)

IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(UC_qcStatements)
IMPLEMENT_ASN1_DUP_FUNCTION(UC_qcStatements)

/* ...is it required to implement something like this?...:

     UC_QcsAtom *d2i_UC_QcsAtom_bio(BIO *bp, UC_QcsAtom **a)
     {
         return ASN1_d2i_bio_of(UC_QcsAtom, UC_QcsAtom_new, 
d2i_UC_QcsAtom, bp, a);
     }

     etc.?
*/


From sarvesh.renghe at brickandbyte.in  Wed Mar 29 11:31:33 2017
From: sarvesh.renghe at brickandbyte.in (Sarvesh Renghe)
Date: Wed, 29 Mar 2017 17:01:33 +0530
Subject: [openssl-users] https using OpenSSL for embedded device and java
	server
Message-ID: <010f01d2a880$05f135e0$11d3a1a0$@brickandbyte.in>

Dear all,

 

I have application specific query as below.

 

We have a solution for remote data monitoring. It picks up the data from
remote sites using a modem, forms a string of data values, connects to
server on GPRS/Ethernet using socket and pushes data to server periodically.
The modem is having firmware developed in embedded c on top of RTOS. The
server has tomcat application server which hosts a data server class (in
java) listening on a configurable port. The listener listens to this port
and parses the data to store in database.

 

Now we want to send this data from modem to server in a secured way. Once
option is to encrypt the data using RSAEncyptor before sending and decrypt
the data using RSADescryptor after receiving. Second option could be to use
https protocol so that it is more standardized. So if we have to use second
option, what should be the approach? Are there readymade libraries available
to send it on https from modem in embedded C? Are there corresponding
libraries available in java to receive it on server? What should be overall
architecture. We though OpenSSL can help in this.

 

I am new to this and may not have given all the information required. Feel
free to let me know if you need any more inputs. Also you may direct me to
appropriate forum, if this is not the right forum.

 

 

Thanks & Regards,

Sarvesh.

 

Mobile: +91 9820921719

 



---
This email has been checked for viruses by Avast antivirus software.
https://www.avast.com/antivirus
-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
URL: <http://mta.openssl.org/pipermail/openssl-users/attachments/20170329/d0eb070a/attachment-0001.html>

From glosterj9 at gmail.com  Wed Mar 29 15:17:34 2017
From: glosterj9 at gmail.com (john gloster)
Date: Wed, 29 Mar 2017 20:47:34 +0530
Subject: [openssl-users] Certificate path validation.
Message-ID: <CAPJ95F_5s1n8pgo2_P0RLjY9QbZhCK0jk9u44+QE-nEBqp-V0w@mail.gmail.com>

Is there any API to retrieve the values of BasicConstraint extention of a
certificate?

Needed to find out whether it is a CA certificate and Path Length
constraint.

Could someone please provide me with sample code?

Thanks.
-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
URL: <http://mta.openssl.org/pipermail/openssl-users/attachments/20170329/b011d70b/attachment.html>

From richard.stanek at rockwellcollins.com  Wed Mar 29 16:01:53 2017
From: richard.stanek at rockwellcollins.com (Richard Stanek)
Date: Wed, 29 Mar 2017 11:01:53 -0500
Subject: [openssl-users] Certificate path validation.
In-Reply-To: <CAPJ95F_5s1n8pgo2_P0RLjY9QbZhCK0jk9u44+QE-nEBqp-V0w@mail.gmail.com>
References: <CAPJ95F_5s1n8pgo2_P0RLjY9QbZhCK0jk9u44+QE-nEBqp-V0w@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <CACgqfWM4GNrViRcj_afVVjj7LNoO32yi==sCdsCcQsONniqrSw@mail.gmail.com>

      static bool IsCACertificate(X509* cert)
      {
         // (U) Initialize to false.
         bool bRetVal = false;

         BASIC_CONSTRAINTS* bsCA =
(BASIC_CONSTRAINTS*)X509_get_ext_d2i(cert, NID_basic_constraints,
NULL, NULL);
         if (bsCA)
         {
            // (U) Could be a CA.
            if (bsCA->ca)
            {
               // (U) Is a CA.
               bRetVal = true;
            }
            else
            {
               // (U) Is NOT a CA.  Return value set.
            }
            BASIC_CONSTRAINTS_free(bsCA);
         }
         else
         {
            // (U) Not a CA.  Return value set.
         }

         // (U) return the results.
         return bRetVal;
      }

On Wed, Mar 29, 2017 at 10:17 AM, john gloster <glosterj9 at gmail.com> wrote:
> Is there any API to retrieve the values of BasicConstraint extention of a
> certificate?
>
> Needed to find out whether it is a CA certificate and Path Length
> constraint.
>
> Could someone please provide me with sample code?
>
> Thanks.
>
> --
> openssl-users mailing list
> To unsubscribe: https://mta.openssl.org/mailman/listinfo/openssl-users
>

From murugesh.pitchaiah at gmail.com  Thu Mar 30 06:57:48 2017
From: murugesh.pitchaiah at gmail.com (murugesh pitchaiah)
Date: Thu, 30 Mar 2017 12:27:48 +0530
Subject: [openssl-users] Certificate path validation.
In-Reply-To: <CACgqfWM4GNrViRcj_afVVjj7LNoO32yi==sCdsCcQsONniqrSw@mail.gmail.com>
References: <CAPJ95F_5s1n8pgo2_P0RLjY9QbZhCK0jk9u44+QE-nEBqp-V0w@mail.gmail.com>
 <CACgqfWM4GNrViRcj_afVVjj7LNoO32yi==sCdsCcQsONniqrSw@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <CAOu9RAc=N4XYQL==x1Lj0VHoHnyE56Cnfe85nB+5cbEyJ6V=MA@mail.gmail.com>

Hi,

To find CA or not, "X509_check_ca" may be used.

Thanks,
Murugesh P.

On 3/29/17, Richard Stanek <richard.stanek at rockwellcollins.com> wrote:
>       static bool IsCACertificate(X509* cert)
>       {
>          // (U) Initialize to false.
>          bool bRetVal = false;
>
>          BASIC_CONSTRAINTS* bsCA =
> (BASIC_CONSTRAINTS*)X509_get_ext_d2i(cert, NID_basic_constraints,
> NULL, NULL);
>          if (bsCA)
>          {
>             // (U) Could be a CA.
>             if (bsCA->ca)
>             {
>                // (U) Is a CA.
>                bRetVal = true;
>             }
>             else
>             {
>                // (U) Is NOT a CA.  Return value set.
>             }
>             BASIC_CONSTRAINTS_free(bsCA);
>          }
>          else
>          {
>             // (U) Not a CA.  Return value set.
>          }
>
>          // (U) return the results.
>          return bRetVal;
>       }
>
> On Wed, Mar 29, 2017 at 10:17 AM, john gloster <glosterj9 at gmail.com> wrote:
>> Is there any API to retrieve the values of BasicConstraint extention of a
>> certificate?
>>
>> Needed to find out whether it is a CA certificate and Path Length
>> constraint.
>>
>> Could someone please provide me with sample code?
>>
>> Thanks.
>>
>> --
>> openssl-users mailing list
>> To unsubscribe: https://mta.openssl.org/mailman/listinfo/openssl-users
>>
> --
> openssl-users mailing list
> To unsubscribe: https://mta.openssl.org/mailman/listinfo/openssl-users
>

From Michael.Wojcik at microfocus.com  Thu Mar 30 13:22:16 2017
From: Michael.Wojcik at microfocus.com (Michael Wojcik)
Date: Thu, 30 Mar 2017 13:22:16 +0000
Subject: [openssl-users] https using OpenSSL for embedded device and
 java	server
In-Reply-To: <010f01d2a880$05f135e0$11d3a1a0$@brickandbyte.in>
References: <010f01d2a880$05f135e0$11d3a1a0$@brickandbyte.in>
Message-ID: <B550B44BF8AF314BB00C4E2AC1C1808801A9A34C41@prvxmb03.microfocus.com>

> From: openssl-users [mailto:openssl-users-bounces at openssl.org] On Behalf Of Sarvesh Renghe
> Sent: Wednesday, March 29, 2017 07:32

> Now we want to send this data from modem to server in a secured way. Once option is to encrypt the data using
> RSAEncyptor before sending and decrypt the data using RSADescryptor after receiving.

This would be an inappropriate use of asymmetric cryptography. Don't use a chisel as a screwdriver.

More importantly: Don't roll your own cryptography, including cryptographic primitives, cryptographic protocols composed from primitives, application protocols composed from cryptographic protocols, and so on. Don't do that if you don't know why you shouldn't. Don't do it even if you do know why you shouldn't. Unless you're a professional cryptographer and protocol designer with a deep understanding of why you shouldn't do it, don't do it.

>  Second option could be to use https protocol so that it is more standardized. So if we have to use second option, what
> should be the approach?

Why are there only two approaches? There are a lot of secure application protocols. HTTPS is a viable one for some applications, but not for all. What about SSH, for example?

You've reduced this to a false dichotomy between "do something with a cryptographic primitive" and "HTTPS". That suggests what you actually need to do is:

1. Understand your users' threat models.
2. Understand the attack space defined by the attack surface of your device / application and those threat models.
3. Determine what risks in that space can be remediated by cryptography, and from that a list of cryptographic requirements.
4. Decide what existing cryptographic application protocol will satisfy those requirements, as much as is feasible with reasonable cost. ("Cost" here includes money, your effort, the work and cognitive load required of customers, etc.)
5. Look for suitable implementations.

Cryptography is difficult. Implementing it successfully requires special expertise.

>  Are there readymade libraries available to send it on https from modem in embedded C?

Not a question for this list, I'm afraid.

> Are there corresponding libraries available in java to receive it on server?

Nor is this. There is a vast amount of information available online and in books regarding cryptography in general and HTTPS in particular for Java.

>  What should be overall architecture. We though OpenSSL can help in this.

The OpenSSL software? The OpenSSL organization? The community?

I'm afraid the best advice is to acquire expertise in cryptography and IT security. Whether you do that in-house by studying or hire it in, that's the only viable path to a solution that's actually secure.

> I am new to this and may not have given all the information required.

Sure. Everyone's new at first. Unfortunately this is not an area in which you can get a quick answer that's of much use. (Say someone says "just use HTTPS". That's fine, but how will you manage certificates? How do you handle errors? How do you unlock private keys at startup?)

>  Also you may direct me to appropriate forum, if this is not the right forum.

No forum will suffice, if you want to do this right. You have to start with cryptography and security basics, and those are best learned through books or courses.

And it's not possible, except by chance, to recommend an approach without knowing the threat model. Do you need to provide confidentiality, integrity, identity, non-repudiation, timestamping? Against what threats, and with what cost to the attacker? Will all the product's users have similar threat models, or are there a variety? Do some of them have regulatory or other requirements (PCI-DSS, HIPPA, FIPS 140-2, ...) that have to be met?

Michael Wojcik 
Distinguished Engineer, Micro Focus 

From cipetpet5 at yandex.com  Thu Mar 30 17:44:46 2017
From: cipetpet5 at yandex.com (ebe ebe)
Date: Thu, 30 Mar 2017 20:44:46 +0300
Subject: [openssl-users] openssl verify with 1B certificates
Message-ID: <2441651490895886@web25g.yandex.ru>

Hello,

I am a CS graduate student and doing a measurement study regarding the SSL ecosystem. I have approximately 1 billion SSL certificates and I would like to run openssl verify on each certificate to sift out invalid certificates. My major concern, as you might guess, is whether doing this verification is feasible given the size of my dataset. An alternative idea I have is to replicate the verification steps of openssl. More specifically, I am working with a Hadoop infrastructure and I can perform some of the verification steps without running into scalability issues (e.g is certificate between notBefore-notAfter timestamps, subject key&authority key identifier checks). However, with this approach I feel like verifying the signature would be a big challenge. Any ideas on how I can tackle these problems?

Regards,
Ceyhun

From richmoore44 at gmail.com  Thu Mar 30 20:10:03 2017
From: richmoore44 at gmail.com (Richard Moore)
Date: Thu, 30 Mar 2017 21:10:03 +0100
Subject: [openssl-users] openssl verify with 1B certificates
In-Reply-To: <2441651490895886@web25g.yandex.ru>
References: <2441651490895886@web25g.yandex.ru>
Message-ID: <CAMp7mVvCaeGCojrgxk5b849JGbhU3GdwCXPaUAQqEJ0KCS88Ug@mail.gmail.com>

Depends what information you need - if you just need a binary valid/not
valid then prune it first then verify. If you want a more fine grained data
set then don't. Write some code  - forking and running openssl verify each
time will be insanely slow - don't do that. I doubt you really have a
billion unique certificates - avoid testing duplicates. Also don't forget
that you really need certificate chains, so I hope you captured the
intermediate certificates too!

Cheers

Rich.

On 30 March 2017 at 18:44, ebe ebe <cipetpet5 at yandex.com> wrote:

> Hello,
>
> I am a CS graduate student and doing a measurement study regarding the SSL
> ecosystem. I have approximately 1 billion SSL certificates and I would like
> to run openssl verify on each certificate to sift out invalid certificates.
> My major concern, as you might guess, is whether doing this verification is
> feasible given the size of my dataset. An alternative idea I have is to
> replicate the verification steps of openssl. More specifically, I am
> working with a Hadoop infrastructure and I can perform some of the
> verification steps without running into scalability issues (e.g is
> certificate between notBefore-notAfter timestamps, subject key&authority
> key identifier checks). However, with this approach I feel like verifying
> the signature would be a big challenge. Any ideas on how I can tackle these
> problems?
>
> Regards,
> Ceyhun
> --
> openssl-users mailing list
> To unsubscribe: https://mta.openssl.org/mailman/listinfo/openssl-users
>
-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
URL: <http://mta.openssl.org/pipermail/openssl-users/attachments/20170330/e3403d88/attachment-0001.html>

From jb-openssl at wisemo.com  Fri Mar 31 12:41:09 2017
From: jb-openssl at wisemo.com (Jakob Bohm)
Date: Fri, 31 Mar 2017 14:41:09 +0200
Subject: [openssl-users] openssl verify with 1B certificates
In-Reply-To: <CAMp7mVvCaeGCojrgxk5b849JGbhU3GdwCXPaUAQqEJ0KCS88Ug@mail.gmail.com>
References: <2441651490895886@web25g.yandex.ru>
 <CAMp7mVvCaeGCojrgxk5b849JGbhU3GdwCXPaUAQqEJ0KCS88Ug@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <ce658394-a061-a82d-88d0-9bb96c69a33c@wisemo.com>

Also consider using the functions that the "openssl verify"
command uses (source file: apps/verify.c), perhaps from a
bulk process that can be run on each CPU node on your
compute cluster.  With a little thought, these can be done
efficiently, with lots of reused (i.e. not repeated) actions,
such as setting up parameters, loading known CA and intermediary
certs, opening files that contain multiple certs, etc.

On 30/03/2017 22:10, Richard Moore wrote:
> Depends what information you need - if you just need a binary
> valid/not valid then prune it first then verify. If you want a more
> fine grained data set then don't. Write some code  - forking and
> running openssl verify each time will be insanely slow - don't do
> that. I doubt you really have a billion unique certificates - avoid
> testing duplicates. Also don't forget that you really need certificate
> chains, so I hope you captured the intermediate certificates too!
>
> Cheers
>
> Rich.
>
> On 30 March 2017 at 18:44, ebe ebe <cipetpet5 at yandex.com
> <mailto:cipetpet5 at yandex.com>>wrote:
>
>     Hello,
>
>     I am a CS graduate student and doing a measurement study regarding
>     the SSL ecosystem. I have approximately 1 billion SSL certificates
>     and I would like to run openssl verify on each certificate to sift
>     out invalid certificates. My major concern, as you might guess, is
>     whether doing this verification is feasible given the size of my
>     dataset. An alternative idea I have is to replicate the
>     verification steps of openssl. More specifically, I am working
>     with a Hadoop infrastructure and I can perform some of the
>     verification steps without running into scalability issues (e.g is
>     certificate between notBefore-notAfter timestamps, subject
>     key&authority key identifier checks). However, with this approach
>     I feel like verifying the signature would be a big challenge. Any
>     ideas on how I can tackle these problems?
>
>


-- 
Jakob Bohm, CIO, partner, WiseMo A/S. https://www.wisemo.com
Transformervej 29, 2860 Soborg, Denmark. direct: +45 31 13 16 10 
<tel:+4531131610>
This message is only for its intended recipient, delete if misaddressed.
WiseMo - Remote Service Management for PCs, Phones and Embedded


Enjoy

Jakob
-- 
Jakob Bohm, CIO, Partner, WiseMo A/S.  https://www.wisemo.com
Transformervej 29, 2860 S?borg, Denmark.  Direct +45 31 13 16 10
This public discussion message is non-binding and may contain errors.
WiseMo - Remote Service Management for PCs, Phones and Embedded

From Michael.Wojcik at microfocus.com  Fri Mar 31 14:17:40 2017
From: Michael.Wojcik at microfocus.com (Michael Wojcik)
Date: Fri, 31 Mar 2017 14:17:40 +0000
Subject: [openssl-users] openssl verify with 1B certificates
In-Reply-To: <ce658394-a061-a82d-88d0-9bb96c69a33c@wisemo.com>
References: <2441651490895886@web25g.yandex.ru>
 <CAMp7mVvCaeGCojrgxk5b849JGbhU3GdwCXPaUAQqEJ0KCS88Ug@mail.gmail.com>
 <ce658394-a061-a82d-88d0-9bb96c69a33c@wisemo.com>
Message-ID: <B550B44BF8AF314BB00C4E2AC1C1808801A9A35650@prvxmb03.microfocus.com>

A lot depends on what you mean by "verify", too.  TLS endpoints should perform a large number of checks on certificates; some of them aren't relevant for your purposes, and others might not be.

For example, a TLS client such as a browser will check whether the received entity certificate identifies the peer it wants to connect to - generally checking the subjAltName extensions, and possibly falling back on e.g. the CN of the subject DN if the certificate isn't X.509v3. That's not relevant in your case.

And then there are things like CRLs and OCSP checks. If you don't care about those, obviously that's work you don't have to do. What about, oh, certificate purpose, for example? Do you care about the chain length?

So what are you checking? My guess is the list is something like this:
1. Object is a valid X.509 certificate (ASN.1 parsing doesn't show any errors, structure is appropriate, contains required fields...).
2. Within the validity period, as you noted in your original message.
3. Valid signature. This means you'll need the public key of the signing certificate, of course. Are you going to chase it all the way to the root? Do you care about whether the root's in some collection of trust anchors?

That's a lot simpler than verifying a peer certificate for TLS - my checklist for that is 11 steps, and recurses as it walks the chain. But it's still a fair bit of work.

Personally, for a project like this, as I harvested public keys I'd put them in a NoSQL key-value store, with the certificate subject DN as the key. Then I wouldn't have to find and parse the signing certificate for step 3, if I'd already stored the corresponding key.

Michael Wojcik 
Distinguished Engineer, Micro Focus 




From Timothy.Nichols at va.gov  Fri Mar 31 17:41:41 2017
From: Timothy.Nichols at va.gov (Nichols, Timothy (Checkpoint))
Date: Fri, 31 Mar 2017 13:41:41 -0400
Subject: [openssl-users] [EXTERNAL]  scripting creating a cert
In-Reply-To: <6708e891-05e0-e1ea-f062-5ee851f25191@htt-consult.com>
References: <6708e891-05e0-e1ea-f062-5ee851f25191@htt-consult.com>
Message-ID: <F617F88F2A73394CB03194DA1ED744BD10A9717FC4@CDCCRBMSGW1.vha.med.va.gov>

Hi, did you get your answer to this? I just discovered 134 messages in the folder I'd set up for receiving said messages...and promptly forgot to check for same.

I just went through this exercise and have set up my configuration files and bash script to generate certificates.

-TN (Tim)

-----Original Message-----
From: openssl-users [mailto:openssl-users-bounces at openssl.org] On Behalf Of Robert Moskowitz
Sent: Thursday, March 09, 2017 15:50
To: openssl-users at openssl.org
Subject: [EXTERNAL] [openssl-users] scripting creating a cert

I am creating self-signed certs with:

openssl req -new -outform PEM -out certs/$your_host_tld.crt -newkey
rsa:2048 -nodes -keyout private/$your_host_tld.key -keyform PEM -days
3650 -x509 -extensions v3_req

Where, for example:

your_host_tld=z9m9z.test.htt-consult.com

Thing is that this then prompts for a number of fields:

Country Name (2 letter code) [XX]:
State or Province Name (full name) []:
Locality Name (eg, city) [Default City]:
Organization Name (eg, company) [Default Company Ltd]:
Organizational Unit Name (eg, section) []:
Common Name (eg, your name or your server's hostname) []:
Email Address []:

Is there some 'simple' way to provide these answers?  Like with env variables?

thanks


--
openssl-users mailing list
To unsubscribe: https://mta.openssl.org/mailman/listinfo/openssl-users

From raja.ashok at huawei.com  Fri Mar 31 17:54:20 2017
From: raja.ashok at huawei.com (Raja ashok)
Date: Fri, 31 Mar 2017 17:54:20 +0000
Subject: [openssl-users] In ssl3_write_bytes,
 some checks related to hanlding write failure are missing
Message-ID: <FDFEA8C9B9B6BD4685DCC959079C81F5E193225E@blreml509-mbx>

Hi All,

In ssl3_write_bytes, if (len < tot) we are returning failure with SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH error. In this place I hope we should set ?tot? back to ?s->s3->wnum?. Otherwise when application calls back SSL_write with correct buffer, it causes serious problem (?tot? is 0 and iLeft is not NULL). I hope we should do like below.

    if (len < tot) {
        s->s3->wnum = tot;
        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH);
       return (-1);
    }

And also we should do one additional check for ?len? as mentioned in my previous mail.

    if ((len < tot) || ((tot != 0) && (len < (tot + s->s3->wpend_tot)))){
        s->s3->wnum = tot;
        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH);
       return (-1);
    }

Regards,
Ashok

________________________________
[Company_logo]

Raja Ashok V K
Huawei Technologies
Bangalore, India
http://www.huawei.com
________________________________
????????????????????????????????????????
????????????????????????????????????????
???????????????????????????????????
This e-mail and its attachments contain confidential information from HUAWEI, which
is intended only for the person or entity whose address is listed above. Any use of the
information contained herein in any way (including, but not limited to, total or partial
disclosure, reproduction, or dissemination) by persons other than the intended
recipient(s) is prohibited. If you receive this e-mail in error, please notify the sender by
phone or email immediately and delete it!

From: Raja ashok
Sent: 27 March 2017 13:55
To: 'openssl-users at openssl.org'; 'openssl-dev at openssl.org'
Subject: In ssl3_write_bytes, some checks related to hanlding write failure are missing

Hi,

I feel there is a check missing in ssl3_write_bytes, in case of handling write failure.

Consider SSL_write is called with 20000 bytes buffer, then internally in ssl3_write_bytes we try to send it as two record (16384 and 3616). If TCP send failed for the second record then we store the states internally (wnum, wpend_tot and wpend_buf) and return back the result.

Later application has to call SSL_write with same buffer, if it calls with different buffer of length 100 byte then we fail that in ssl3_write_bytes using the check (len < tot).

But consider application calls with buffer of size 18000 bytes and SSL_MODE_ACCEPT_MOVING_WRITE_BUFFER is enabled. Then (len < tot) will not succeed as tot is 16384. Then it will call ssl3_write_pending to send the remaining 3616 record. If it succeeds we are incrementing tot, (tot += i). Now tot will have 20000.

Later there is a check (tot == len), this will not succeed. Then directly we are doing n = (len - tot), this will overflow and store a value close to 2^32 in n. Then it will cause out of bound access to the application buffer "buf".

I hope we should have one more check (len < (tot + s->s3->wpend_tot)) before calling ssl3_write_pending.

    if ((len < tot) || (len < (tot + s->s3->wpend_tot))){
        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH);
        return (-1);
}

Note : I am referring 1.0.2k version of OpenSSL.

Regards,
Ashok

________________________________
[Company_logo]

Raja Ashok V K
Huawei Technologies
Bangalore, India
http://www.huawei.com
________________________________
????????????????????????????????????????
????????????????????????????????????????
???????????????????????????????????
This e-mail and its attachments contain confidential information from HUAWEI, which
is intended only for the person or entity whose address is listed above. Any use of the
information contained herein in any way (including, but not limited to, total or partial
disclosure, reproduction, or dissemination) by persons other than the intended
recipient(s) is prohibited. If you receive this e-mail in error, please notify the sender by
phone or email immediately and delete it!

-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
URL: <http://mta.openssl.org/pipermail/openssl-users/attachments/20170331/689b72fa/attachment-0001.html>
-------------- next part --------------
A non-text attachment was scrubbed...
Name: image002.jpg
Type: image/jpeg
Size: 6737 bytes
Desc: image002.jpg
URL: <http://mta.openssl.org/pipermail/openssl-users/attachments/20170331/689b72fa/attachment-0001.jpg>

From Timothy.Nichols at va.gov  Fri Mar 31 19:44:56 2017
From: Timothy.Nichols at va.gov (Nichols, Timothy (Checkpoint))
Date: Fri, 31 Mar 2017 15:44:56 -0400
Subject: [openssl-users] ca's config options -certs vs. -new_certs_dir
In-Reply-To: <B550B44BF8AF314BB00C4E2AC1C18088018C44DFA8@prvxmb03.microfocus.com>
References: <F617F88F2A73394CB03194DA1ED744BD104B18E0A3@CDCCRBMSGW1.vha.med.va.gov>
 <B550B44BF8AF314BB00C4E2AC1C18088018C44DFA8@prvxmb03.microfocus.com>
Message-ID: <F617F88F2A73394CB03194DA1ED744BD10A971804D@CDCCRBMSGW1.vha.med.va.gov>

Thank you, sir. I was attacking this from the standpoint of needing to generate several thousand certificates for testing purposes and so unique certificates went to unique files. I think I must have used -out by itself, though I believe I tried the -outdir option at the end when I tried to tighten up my script.

I didn't think when I undertook this effort that it would turn into such a slog wherein I'd need to understand all this minutia. Now, much to my surprise, I love this stuff...

-TN

From: openssl-users [mailto:openssl-users-bounces at openssl.org] On Behalf Of Michael Wojcik
Sent: Wednesday, March 08, 2017 13:39
To: openssl-users at openssl.org
Subject: [EXTERNAL] Re: [openssl-users] ca's config options -certs vs. -new_certs_dir

It's because processing a request can generate multiple certificates. Therefore ca needs a destination where it can write multiple certificates, not just a single one.

Note that new_certs_dir is only used if -outdir wasn't specified on the command line. You could create a temporary directory, pass its pathname with -outdir, then remove the directory and its contents after running ca.

With -out, all the certificates are just concatenated to the file. Usually they're PEM, so that's OK; the exception is if -spkac is used to specify an SPKAC file. SPKAC is mostly used in conjunction with the HTML KEYGEN element, when interpreted by Firefox and some other browsers. So you could argue that -outdir / new_certs_dir should be optional, since usually the single output file is more or less usable.

But it isn't optional, and that's life.

Of course, if you're building OpenSSL from source, it wouldn't be hard to make the necessary changes to ca.c.

Michael Wojcik
Distinguished Engineer, Micro Focus



From: openssl-users [mailto:openssl-users-bounces at openssl.org] On Behalf Of Nichols, Timothy (Checkpoint)
Sent: Wednesday, March 08, 2017 13:57
To: openssl-users at openssl.org<mailto:openssl-users at openssl.org>
Subject: [openssl-users] ca's config options -certs vs. -new_certs_dir

Hi, I am not understanding the point of the config file's mandatory default -new_certs_dir into which goes what appears to be a copy of the certificate I specifically locate elsewhere in the file system. I am using the -out option from the command line to generate the file named according to the convention I have chosen...and then in the new_certs directory is deposited the <hex>.pem file. Of course, I haven't found an explanation as to why this happens in the documentation or the Googlie.

Thanks,

Tim
-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
URL: <http://mta.openssl.org/pipermail/openssl-users/attachments/20170331/aeb84646/attachment.html>

From garyp at firstech.com  Mon Mar 13 09:35:46 2017
From: garyp at firstech.com (Gary L Peskin)
Date: Mon, 13 Mar 2017 09:35:46 -0000
Subject: [openssl-users] Cannot read exported PKCS12 cert and private key
Message-ID: <007901d29bdc$0fba6570$2f2f3050$@firstech.com>

Hello all

 

I exported a certificate and corresponding private key in base 64 encoded
DER format from a mainframe system and FTP'd it to my Windows desktop.

 

I tried to read it using OpenSSL 1.0.2.k and 1.1.0d 32-bit and 64-bit on
Windows with 

 

openssl pkcs12  -in mycert.p12  -noout

 

But I get the following messages:

 

15956:error:0D0680A8:asn1 encoding routines:ASN1_CHECK_TLEN:wrong
tag:.\crypto\asn1\tasn_dec.c:1199:

15956:error:0D07803A:asn1 encoding routines:ASN1_ITEM_EX_D2I:nested asn1
error:.\crypto\asn1\tasn_dec.c:374:Type=PKCS12

 

I'm able to import this with the private key into the Windows certificate
store with no issues.

 

Can someone please advise as to what I'm doing wrong?

 

Thanks,

Gary

 

PS Here is the file:

 

-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----

MIIKCAIBAzCCCcQGCSqGSIb3DQEHAaCCCbUEggmxMIIJrTCCBE8GCSqGSIb3DQEH

BqCCBEAwggQ8AgEAMIIENQYJKoZIhvcNAQcBMBwGCiqGSIb3DQEMAQMwDgQIjdBS

+TZF+xQCAgP5gIIECNtJIUg23ab7AXi33MKueO03S1pUkHCQk+kByNK/6f1FgEvu

XRqhniR3mdyzeMVBCrCBSx3GhZlpLcW/d6OAd3z8hbXjvw5OC5OLavemfRNtsi+R

q9LggkcWT2oCszc2nglKzHYaFnkG80vwxLwUXmROL+UK4ZlYmqp46EjuNAEo/yqQ

yEwgia3iP84wiZRfY9kBJMq9yUm+LvowO/1E9v/ycgE6IWe1CrThQzrD6Vm9LaTy

0oZqAbTbzbedZwGsuWZoedw2FtmRijkH5EbRNRpTrUUO/qQMO19v5IKtd4kUAWea

dpYrwn1kkD2aInKKsjycCFtGopXPbmrqj2cm335cESN4XePBHQuzaywHgd0WjU5O

++UM+B/5Kpx3af53E412pGAcgnPH/ZQKMa5Zkp73pcFmViLEC7Tn9eNB2iNUfX9p

rV3RNRnrEPZlD1MuYEkmBIWA5czUiDKrpyYA1fmrSsFthFMhD5fTVoDMSTBmNXPz

5B8HYW4+aDbo7N2a+BtFNcbMqYJqYwVL7xE2rL6nUedMyN2uKeZfOnLLQuYoUCg7

iYO5k7D/jQNsviyZg022Nzwy4agdPBKqok8oanQge8/pr3NeMrNDDKVyWy8ZBVBv

KGi3qaX45ejJxP8XaJxxw88+KOc1OvAMhWhAHlHqpw9d7OiAP1oCV+vRuYnD5N9a

YyLspoKy1nk+Htl71QQ4GYCRRGXMl7YsxtRrUSOAZa2+V/5h6ljUsTsib3VhO0eL

/jf+BlBxhpWw1J9L0r6sFMYvVS3AsqfqnBLJUFLxeQxYvVsV0Gpx8BonpZACQC91

DB4oV0l6whqtAQ4dJMJEk9nNnP0NYsVceKybF5NvgL3lzALw/Ezv8K7Y69FJaM35

LrT9JlGSt/BJ0oXp4wxqH4UbHikhGpSCteh7k3ZQkbE4fokVhH9lYkMXqBRXqXlI

nV9b7hR26NeJY0C7a9VyNXtzIVsP+JiBhDzc7GDafIF99fUHPVfqh15CPnTb5liZ

A6QlYw1aVvyhS8ST4I117kALKWUdl9xhe+ui0IFCEQY/mNuQ8O13nlcx+DvGtPxc

WCUG0VpP6AkE9Mkd67CghF6sFh/8FqdE1jU2Asj+iCZVU/s0ngH3hAXwMVUwOW9S

voxYParz1b0sF7vgrhLteHOZ03TEra7rh7OiOVUCOE6CACG1qV8QXDvpkZp2mGTx

5T7ob8nNF8XQWhIHjULVdKdOBuMh/4dOrHTuU5cFosR29mbzAZDDi0myuzTv37GJ

OgyiX0XXvwn5jCmAoaE0ji1fgxrWUs8yVYYHOj3IyQwzU+FydfKtlnhh8ZxHKDBo

8wPqrEAzTXT49bsxvy3cYxUp4Dd1G2ymkoTZonEi7Vir0kN7qjCCBVYGCSqGSIb3

DQEHAaCCBUcEggVDMIIFPzCCBTsGCyqGSIb3DQEMCgECoIIE7jCCBOowHAYKKoZI

hvcNAQwBAzAOBAh2oqSgVyE4cwICA/EEggTInCkEbWknH/Vojqzmn1jIPRGb7dG+

egxS5YDtk14LxnQuwACTQef2wQnKlosYbfH8dJVIvXRYB19MXroGpd5KJA8Dftqa

dWFVAcDIrzV/ZS252aita0fKOVeqjKWo7TkA9jnwDeekAcK+1R5ioIcfXPLJDSUX

gdEaza88oQ+g+34+B2o+mnTPT/PM/o1n6cifVRURn2jMASwiB/cwLn58UZibCSgL

h3CrcKamWi8AF3eJ2rkpPuK41s8SfqZ1ByNEFSgnsX5UQzJpn8FoBPBOmFnR8FTr

XNwtT7GcJJuWDSnf+On2PI2LYT6XAhNeCkfMwdnUa6N1YV2Okelmae4J21sldQlw

ATZFiuigyPMFF1X3wUfdvZTwQGC17YFTN+OIYF9/62XTiZUEJ6y0I3nRvAxpaRHS

VVyh2KA89e5Llxv+bArgA6brykRHFk5I7e7krrflPoQJ0o1oKhb8DshnxAk65v/H

xTPLq9gac81AY8rWnrTCZcO+inCan/IlOKDXnVCUfZATtAOOIQ6Mf9KwuAeyE9xu

4dUO0vF5juFU6hK8SR//apf0JF+zejq5wnEhc1o/sWVpKQkakYayJ+4Hnlx+G6Ra

bJ3ZYQv4U/kUx0Q43qvvwhx0qdZ79BUpqPTxLeBzwVG6q5ys8eZY988YcIg11NY9

+qC4cFGBsbMuWSispichDN5wEJ9C9UrdKRGsAztz0j1GTiJcXPnBH+vTeULh7Spx

GmLbJWyj3tg+QaefDPo4aaIpZCZV0BFSy41fgoBB+rZ45wNgRiDuDuHue2WY28PC

dGrAuXzQTUeEUYqN2zL2DhiYD/6/Y+/BCUS/kO0w3x0J7ityoSlyVJ+cf84FYmtB

zmPIqgjDZS/NGC0OWgUBWxzspADETmwpZDCz8MJHK99nbAcYz3AybW6307NCJTKp

gPfH6RyTrDzoijIweHUeU2pANpDjbp53UKV5/WyEvbjvy9maf1Jze60zS7EFgZ/n

ZEe+eQbSY5SGtTWCB3mMbOTFvDH0QKGbfj6EX2Z+P+RZEeU/xzMOejcBbOO7XpgV

+Uryt+NgcocTtg/5YjVkAdMeVz9A/XdGydAy7hE2FwFI1hJTl/aI4ZaAKV34xH2r

J4/VstlG8ongv9zMNaS4Xl1n3wk6W3oAUmqWdoYYyDsocIBl1he1oP588Capa7OL

NLYDl3llQXbyah1A//xJsH5M8KiB0MlJ0qSSp0U7LXmxDP3dw3kcR9XgOX835Bpi

NlOPQDfzYZyKN6sIGDcuxwQPdOg2EQZxI3W5xp+oHTM/yTuqo/5vpOIlMdwqfQ/R

HGLVyyQ0yO3oIMxiE56jSnrhjj/H/bJJAMMUBXI6pi18JCv24cTjVsXGjsf4jH7g

9uGmoecX/Sx77Sx+814aO0Qkm0WzadLagKoz1nOV1hmeSan1nFnXkE94VqIJ9YTV

qnLrY0JYjpI2ywkW4wCscjVMIxkAfhifc31v4LWUnTMO0Y+xqO89v1hKbSYkZYYs

psrxnomXJq/RqjfZBhF3f+0aTNxpvlJnGOjnlT0qX1yHBOr+bmkcTIhL7pKA+qK1

fZD8834wTLrRcFiPD7pX6/zglMEG4PUf1RoDC0+3Ud8qa2SqfyYZeFm8+9yFsFnZ

RYFkMTowIwYJKoZIhvcNAQkUMRYeFABDAEEAQwBUAEUAUwBUACAAQwBBMBMGCSqG

SIb3DQEJFTEGBAQAAAABMDswHzAHBgUrDgMCGgQUoiKIky5oqgCxt5DnJxWNQvZ1

WecEFDabnXfA8sLdfwIXx9AexvOOS0gpAgID+w==

-----END CERTIFICATE-----

-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
URL: <http://mta.openssl.org/pipermail/openssl-users/attachments/20170313/172c6361/attachment-0001.html>
-------------- next part --------------
An embedded and charset-unspecified text was scrubbed...
Name: SelfReg-0.4.txt
URL: <http://mta.openssl.org/pipermail/openssl-users/attachments/20170313/172c6361/attachment-0001.txt>