[openssl-users] How can I sstart openssl ocsp in secure mode using TLS/SSL

Richard Moore richmoore44 at gmail.com
Tue Sep 26 12:31:16 UTC 2017

On 26 September 2017 at 02:36, Kyle Hamilton <aerowolf at gmail.com> wrote:

> On Fri, Sep 22, 2017 at 9:32 AM, Richard Moore <richmoore44 at gmail.com>
> wrote:
> >
> > It's also worth pointing out that CAs are banned from running OCSP
> servers over HTTPS anyway and it isn't needed since the responses are
> already signed - http is fine.
> That argument fails when you consider that some people want the
> details of who they're talking to or asking about to be confidential,
> not merely authentic.
​That doesn't change the fact it's banned.​

> I'm a believer in the idea that SNI and the Certificate messages
> should happen under an ephemeral DH or ephemeral ECDH cover.  Others
> fear-monger to say "maybe they shouldn't".
​There are a lot of other things that would also need addressing to make it
secret /who/ you're talking to. ​It's not something https guarantees right
now. If you'd like it to that would be a whole other discussion.

> (Also, for completeness, the argument that "CAs are banned from
> running OCSP servers over HTTPS anyway" is a straw man at best -- not
> every CA is created or intends to be a member of or subject to the
> mandates of the CA Security Council, formerly known as the CA/Browser
> Forum.  And every attempt to encode policy into technical standards,

​​The CA Security Council and CA/Browser Forum are unrelated organisations.​



> attempting to prohibit certain actions for whatever misguided
> administrative reasons, is subject to being bypassed by people who
> understand the various parts and how to glue them all together.)
To be fair, the OCSP responder certificate may or may not be
> revoked... but honestly, if you're asking the OCSP responder for the
> status of its own certificate you're opening yourself up to a
> subordination/subversion attack anyway.  OCSP responders should have
> very short-lived certificates, to minimize the temporal subordination
> attack surface.

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