[openssl-users] in the department of "ain't no perfect"
Hubert Kario
hkario at redhat.com
Thu Jan 17 20:20:37 UTC 2019
On Thursday, 17 January 2019 18:03:55 CET Eliot Lear wrote:
> On 17.01.19 17:29, Hubert Kario wrote:
> > alternatively, you can save all the certificates and revocation data, bind
> > it to the original signature using a timestamp from a TSA and store that
> > (that's necessary if you want to be able to prove to some 3rd party that
> > you received a correctly signed document/message at that time)
> >
> > but that is very close to reimplementing CAdES, or related standards, and
> > is far from simple (for one, requires adding, regularly, new timestamps
> > to extend validity of the original signature and subsequent timestamps)
>
> Right. There are a lot of trust challenges around the timestamp.
> Because there are multiple non-cooperating entities involved, the signer
> is not in a position to predict who the recipients will trust, and the
> recipients may be retrieving the information later. This is not a
> simple matter.
>
> What's more, we're not in a position to provide meaningful programmatic
> diagnostic info in this case because CMS is calling X.509 codes, and so
> ERR_get_err has a little issue when multiple libraries are in play. And
> while nobody likes to hear, “I'll just bypass this one thing”, as a
> matter of practicality we want to provide the application user (in this
> case an administrator) a choice of what to do with as much information
> as possible.
then I'd say that showing the date from within the signature will be more
confusing than helpful to the administrator
--
Regards,
Hubert Kario
Senior Quality Engineer, QE BaseOS Security team
Web: www.cz.redhat.com
Red Hat Czech s.r.o., Purkyňova 115, 612 00 Brno, Czech Republic
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