why does RAND_add() take "randomness" as a "double"?

[Blumenthal, Uri - 0553 - MITLL]

On 5/21/19, 10:45 AM, "openssl-users on behalf of Salz, Rich via openssl-users" <openssl-users-bounces at openssl.org on behalf of openssl-users at openssl.org> wrote:

    When I overhauled the RAND mechanism, I tried to deprecate this use of floating point, 
    in favor of just a number from 0 to 100 but was voted down.

If it's a sarcasm, I'm missing the point.
    
    It *is* stupid.

In general, yes, it is.

    Luckily, on a modern system with system-provided randomness to seed the RNG, you never need this call.

Respectfully disagree. 

There are use cases when one wants to mix/add extra randomness from, e.g., an external source (that, for whatever reasons, is trusted more than what's provided by the system).
    
    
    
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