[openssl-users] OpenSSL Security Advisory

OpenSSL openssl at openssl.org
Thu Jan 8 15:44:33 UTC 2015


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OpenSSL Security Advisory [08 Jan 2015]
=======================================

DTLS segmentation fault in dtls1_get_record (CVE-2014-3571)
===========================================================

Severity: Moderate

A carefully crafted DTLS message can cause a segmentation fault in OpenSSL due
to a NULL pointer dereference. This could lead to a Denial Of Service attack.

This issue affects all current OpenSSL versions: 1.0.1, 1.0.0 and 0.9.8.

OpenSSL 1.0.1 DTLS users should upgrade to 1.0.1k.
OpenSSL 1.0.0 DTLS users should upgrade to 1.0.0p.
OpenSSL 0.9.8 DTLS users should upgrade to 0.9.8zd.

This issue was reported to OpenSSL on 22nd October 2014 by Markus Stenberg of
Cisco Systems, Inc. The fix was developed by Stephen Henson of the OpenSSL
core team.

DTLS memory leak in dtls1_buffer_record (CVE-2015-0206)
=======================================================

Severity: Moderate

A memory leak can occur in the dtls1_buffer_record function under certain
conditions. In particular this could occur if an attacker sent repeated DTLS
records with the same sequence number but for the next epoch. The memory leak
could be exploited by an attacker in a Denial of Service attack through memory
exhaustion.

This issue affects OpenSSL versions: 1.0.1 and 1.0.0.

OpenSSL 1.0.1 DTLS users should upgrade to 1.0.1k.
OpenSSL 1.0.0 DTLS users should upgrade to 1.0.0p.

This issue was reported to OpenSSL on 7th January 2015 by Chris Mueller who also
provided an initial patch. Further analysis was performed by Matt Caswell of the
OpenSSL development team, who also developed the final patch.

no-ssl3 configuration sets method to NULL (CVE-2014-3569)
=========================================================

Severity: Low

When openssl is built with the no-ssl3 option and a SSL v3 ClientHello is
received the ssl method would be set to NULL which could later result in
a NULL pointer dereference.

This issue affects all current OpenSSL versions: 1.0.1, 1.0.0 and 0.9.8.

OpenSSL 1.0.1 users should upgrade to 1.0.1k.
OpenSSL 1.0.0 users should upgrade to 1.0.0p.
OpenSSL 0.9.8 users should upgrade to 0.9.8zd.

This issue was reported to OpenSSL on 17th October 2014 by Frank Schmirler. The
fix was developed by Kurt Roeckx.


ECDHE silently downgrades to ECDH [Client] (CVE-2014-3572)
==========================================================

Severity: Low

An OpenSSL client will accept a handshake using an ephemeral ECDH ciphersuite
using an ECDSA certificate if the server key exchange message is omitted. This
effectively removes forward secrecy from the ciphersuite.

This issue affects all current OpenSSL versions: 1.0.1, 1.0.0 and 0.9.8.

OpenSSL 1.0.1 users should upgrade to 1.0.1k.
OpenSSL 1.0.0 users should upgrade to 1.0.0p.
OpenSSL 0.9.8 users should upgrade to 0.9.8zd.

This issue was reported to OpenSSL on 22nd October 2014 by Karthikeyan
Bhargavan of the PROSECCO team at INRIA. The fix was developed by Stephen
Henson of the OpenSSL core team.


RSA silently downgrades to EXPORT_RSA [Client] (CVE-2015-0204)
==============================================================

Severity: Low

An OpenSSL client will accept the use of an RSA temporary key in a non-export
RSA key exchange ciphersuite. A server could present a weak temporary key
and downgrade the security of the session.

This issue affects all current OpenSSL versions: 1.0.1, 1.0.0 and 0.9.8.

OpenSSL 1.0.1 users should upgrade to 1.0.1k.
OpenSSL 1.0.0 users should upgrade to 1.0.0p.
OpenSSL 0.9.8 users should upgrade to 0.9.8zd.

This issue was reported to OpenSSL on 22nd October 2014 by Karthikeyan
Bhargavan of the PROSECCO team at INRIA. The fix was developed by Stephen
Henson of the OpenSSL core team.


DH client certificates accepted without verification [Server] (CVE-2015-0205)
=============================================================================

Severity: Low

An OpenSSL server will accept a DH certificate for client authentication
without the certificate verify message. This effectively allows a client
to authenticate without the use of a private key. This only affects servers
which trust a client certificate authority which issues certificates
containing DH keys: these are extremely rare and hardly ever encountered.

This issue affects OpenSSL versions: 1.0.1 and 1.0.0.

OpenSSL 1.0.1 users should upgrade to 1.0.1k.
OpenSSL 1.0.0 users should upgrade to 1.0.0p.

This issue was reported to OpenSSL on 22nd October 2014 by Karthikeyan
Bhargavan of the PROSECCO team at INRIA. The fix was developed by Stephen
Henson of the OpenSSL core team.


Certificate fingerprints can be modified (CVE-2014-8275)
========================================================

Severity: Low

OpenSSL accepts several non-DER-variations of certificate signature
algorithm and signature encodings. OpenSSL also does not enforce a
match between the signature algorithm between the signed and unsigned
portions of the certificate. By modifying the contents of the
signature algorithm or the encoding of the signature, it is possible
to change the certificate's fingerprint.

This does not allow an attacker to forge certificates, and does not
affect certificate verification or OpenSSL servers/clients in any
other way. It also does not affect common revocation mechanisms. Only
custom applications that rely on the uniqueness of the fingerprint
(e.g. certificate blacklists) may be affected.

This issue affects all current OpenSSL versions: 1.0.1, 1.0.0 and
0.9.8.

OpenSSL 1.0.1 users should upgrade to 1.0.1k.
OpenSSL 1.0.0 users should upgrade to 1.0.0p.
OpenSSL 0.9.8 users should upgrade to 0.9.8zd.

One variant of this issue was discovered by Antti Karjalainen and
Tuomo Untinen from the Codenomicon CROSS program and reported to
OpenSSL on 1st December 2014 by NCSC-FI Vulnerability
Co-ordination. Another variant was independently reported to OpenSSL
on 12th December 2014 by Konrad Kraszewski from Google. Further
analysis was conducted and fixes were developed by Stephen Henson of
the OpenSSL core team.

Bignum squaring may produce incorrect results (CVE-2014-3570)
=============================================================

Severity: Low

Bignum squaring (BN_sqr) may produce incorrect results on some
platforms, including x86_64. This bug occurs at random with a very
low probability, and is not known to be exploitable in any way, though
its exact impact is difficult to determine. The following has been
determined:

*) The probability of BN_sqr producing an incorrect result at random
is very low: 1/2^64 on the single affected 32-bit platform (MIPS) and
1/2^128 on affected 64-bit platforms.
*) On most platforms, RSA follows a different code path and RSA
operations are not affected at all. For the remaining platforms
(e.g. OpenSSL built without assembly support), pre-existing
countermeasures thwart bug attacks [1].
*) Static ECDH is theoretically affected: it is possible to construct
elliptic curve points that would falsely appear to be on the given
curve. However, there is no known computationally feasible way to
construct such points with low order, and so the security of static
ECDH private keys is believed to be unaffected.
*) Other routines known to be theoretically affected are modular
exponentiation, primality testing, DSA, RSA blinding, JPAKE and
SRP. No exploits are known and straightforward bug attacks fail -
either the attacker cannot control when the bug triggers, or no
private key material is involved.

This issue affects all current OpenSSL versions: 1.0.1, 1.0.0 and 0.9.8.

OpenSSL 1.0.1 users should upgrade to 1.0.1k.
OpenSSL 1.0.0 users should upgrade to 1.0.0p.
OpenSSL 0.9.8 users should upgrade to 0.9.8zd.

This issue was reported to OpenSSL on 2nd November 2014 by Pieter Wuille
(Blockstream) who also suggested an initial fix. Further analysis was
conducted by the OpenSSL development team and Adam Langley of
Google. The final fix was developed by Andy Polyakov of the OpenSSL
core team.

[1] http://css.csail.mit.edu/6.858/2013/readings/rsa-bug-attacks.pdf

Note
====

As per our previous announcements and our Release Strategy
(https://www.openssl.org/about/releasestrat.html), support for OpenSSL versions
1.0.0 and 0.9.8 will cease on 31st December 2015. No security updates for these
releases will be provided after that date. Users of these releases are advised
to upgrade.

References
==========

URL for this Security Advisory:
https://www.openssl.org/news/secadv_20150108.txt

Note: the online version of the advisory may be updated with additional
details over time.

For details of OpenSSL severity classifications please see:
https://www.openssl.org/about/secpolicy.html

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