jb-openssl at wisemo.com
Tue Sep 1 07:58:46 UTC 2020
On 2020-09-01 04:26, Viktor Dukhovni wrote:
>> On Aug 31, 2020, at 10:57 PM, Jakob Bohm via openssl-users <openssl-users at openssl.org> wrote:
>> Given the practical imposibility of managing atomic changes to a single
>> POSIX file of variable-length data, it will often be more practical to
>> create a complete replacement file, then replace the filename with the
>> "mv -f" command or rename(3) function. This would obviously only work
>> if the directory remains accessible to the application, after it drops
>> privileges and/or enters a chroot jail, as will already be the case
>> for hashed certificate/crl directories.
> There is no such "impossibility", indeed that's what the rename(2) system
> call is for. It atomically replaces files. Note that mv(1) can hide
> non-atomic copies across file-system boundaries and should be used with
Note that rename(3) and link(2) do replace the file name, by making the
replaced name point to a new inode, thus it would not work with calls
thatmonitor an inode for content or statis change.
There is no basic series of I/O calls that completely replace file contents
inone step, in particular write(2) doesn't shorten the file if the new
contentsis smaller than the old contents.
> And this is why I mentioned retaining an open directory handle, openat(2),
> There's room here to design a robust process, if one is willing to impose
> reasonable constraints on the external agents that orchestrate new cert
> As for updating two files in a particular order, and reacting only to
> changes in the one that's updated second, this behaves poorly when
> updates are racing an application cold start. The single file approach,
> by being more restrictive, is in fact more robust in ways that are not
> easy to emulate with multiple files.
What exactly is that "cold start" race you are talking about?
Obviously, coding the logic to react badly to only one of two
files being present would not work with rules that one of those
two needs to arrive/change after the other.
> If someone implements a robust design with multiple files, great. I for
> one don't know of an in principle decent way to do that without various
> races, other than somewhat kludgey retry loops in the application (or
> library) when it finds a mismatch between the cert and the key.
Jakob Bohm, CIO, Partner, WiseMo A/S. https://www.wisemo.com
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