[EXTERNAL] Stricter pathlen checks in OpenSSL 1.1.1 compared to 1.0.2?.

[Corey Bonnell]

Hi Andrew,

Can you provide the actual subject DNs for each certificate? RFC 5280 specifies that self-issued certificates (i.e., issuer DN == subject DN) are not considered in the pathLen calculation, so knowing whether these certificates are self-issued or not may be helpful in better diagnosing the issue.

 

Thanks,

Corey

 

From: openssl-users <openssl-users-bounces at openssl.org> On Behalf Of Andrew Lynch via openssl-users
Sent: Friday, September 16, 2022 4:32 AM
To: openssl-users at openssl.org
Subject: AW: [EXTERNAL] Stricter pathlen checks in OpenSSL 1.1.1 compared to 1.0.2?.

 

So is this a possible bug or a feature of OpenSSL 1.1.1?  (using 1.1.1n right now)

 

If I set up the content of CAfile or CApath so that E <- D <- C <- A is the only path that can be taken then the validation fails with

 

error 25 at 3 depth lookup: path length constraint exceeded

 

If I create the first root certificate (A) with pathlen:2 instead of pathlen:1 then validation succeeds

 

user1_cert.pem: OK

Chain:

depth=0: C = DE, O = Test Org, CN = Test User (untrusted)           E

depth=1: C = DE, O = Test Org, CN = Test Sub-CA                              D

depth=2: C = DE, O = Test Org, CN = Test Root 2-CA                         C

depth=3: C = DE, O = Test Org, CN = Test Root 1-CA                         A

 

So it appears to me that OpenSSL 1.1.1n is definitely taking the pathlen constraint of certificate A into account.

 

Andrew.

 

 

Von: Erwann Abalea <erwann.abalea at docusign.com <mailto:erwann.abalea at docusign.com> > 
Gesendet: Donnerstag, 15. September 2022 19:51
An: Andrew Lynch <andrew.lynch at atos.net <mailto:andrew.lynch at atos.net> >
Cc: openssl-users at openssl.org <mailto:openssl-users at openssl.org> 
Betreff: Re: [EXTERNAL] Stricter pathlen checks in OpenSSL 1.1.1 compared to 1.0.2?.

 

Assuming that all self-signed certificates are trusted (here, A and B), then providing a CAfile with D+C+B+A to validate E, the different possible paths are: 

 - E <- D <- B: this path is valid

 - E <- D <- C <- A: this path is valid

 

In the validation algorithm described in RFC5280 and X.509, the pathlenConstraints contained in the certificate of the Trust Anchor (here, A or B) is not taken into account. Therefore, the only ones that matter are the values set in C and D, and these values are coherent with both chains.

 

 

On Thu, Sep 15, 2022 at 7:34 PM Andrew Lynch via openssl-users <openssl-users at openssl.org <mailto:openssl-users at openssl.org> > wrote:

Hi,

 

I would like to have my understanding of the following issue confirmed:

 

Given a two-level CA where the different generations of Root cross-sign each other, the verification of an end-entity certificate fails with OpenSSL 1.1.1 – “path length constraint exceeded”.  With OpenSSL 1.0.2 the same verify succeeds.

 

All Root CA certificates have Basic Constraints CA:TRUE, pathlen:1.  The Sub CA certificate has pathlen:0.

 

A) Issuer: CN=Root CA, serialNumber=1

   Subject: CN=Root CA, serialNumber=1

 

B) Issuer: CN=Root CA, serialNumber=2

   Subject: CN=Root CA, serialNumber=2

 

C) Issuer: CN=Root CA, serialNumber=1

   Subject: CN=Root CA, serialNumber=2

 

D) Issuer: CN=Root CA, serialNumber=2

   Subject: CN=Sub CA, serialNumber=2

 

E) Issuer: CN=Sub CA, serialNumber=2

   Subject: Some end entity

 

With a CAfile containing D, C, B, A in that order the verify of E fails.  If I remove the cross certificate C then the verify succeeds.

 

I believe OpenSSL 1.1.1 is building a chain of depth 3 (D – C – A) and so pathlen:1 of A is violated.  Without the cross certificate the chain is only depth 2 (D – B).

 

Is my understanding of the reason for this failure correct?

Why is OpenSSL 1.0.2 verifying successfully?  Does it not check the path length constraint or is it actually picking the depth 2 chain instead of the depth 3?

 

Regards,

Andrew.

 




 

-- 

Cordialement, 

Erwann Abalea.

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